Welcome to the May issue of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) Conflict Trends report. Each month, ACLED researchers gather, analyse and publish data on political violence in Africa in realtime. Monthly updates to realtime conflict event data are published through our research partners at Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) and also on the ACLED website.

In May, ACLED launches a pilot of weekly data updates for select Sub-Saharan African states. Check online for weekly data updates, or sign up for email alerts via our website to receive files directly.

This issue, we profile unrest in Algeria and Tunisia; the unfolding crisis in central Africa; and tensions in Malawi and South Africa as they face elections. Following the dramatic escalation in conflict in Nigeria which has drawn international condemnation, we outline some parallels between Boko Haram and one of the continent’s other notorious militant groups, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to draw insights on the dynamics and trajectory of conflict.

![Conflict Trajectory, April 2014](image)

**Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities, Select Countries, January - April 2014.**

ACLED is a publicly available database of political violence, which focuses on conflict in African states. Data is geo-referenced and disaggregated by type of violence and a wide variety of actors. Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.acleddata.com or by contacting acledinfo@gmail.com. Follow ACLED on Twitter for realtime updates, news and analysis: @ACLEDinfo
Following a lull in violence at the end of last year, this month saw violent political conflict events in Algeria escalate to nearly 3 times the levels of December 2013 (see Figure 1). Riots and protests dominated the conflict profile of the first four months of the year, while the number of battles increased significantly (see Figure 2). This rise in conflict events went hand-in-hand with the re-election of President Bouteflika for a fourth term despite his weakened physical health. Bouteflika has divided Algerian popular opinion, with some heralding him as bringing about stability and guiding Algeria out of a civil war whilst others seek more fundamental change away from a corrupt regime.

Algerians have had to contend with the trade-off between relative regional stability under Bouteflika and peaceful socio-economic change. Whilst negative sentiment permeates the population, social movements have proven themselves to be moderate and largely non-violent, with relatively few fatalities witnessed during protests in 2014. This reflects popular demands for incremental but comprehensive reform rather than full-scale revolution, likely to influence the conflict trajectory of the coming year.

Conflict activity has predominantly centred in the Kabylie region of Northern Algeria and the central province of Ghardaïa. In Kabylie, sporadic outbreaks have involved ongoing battles between Islamist militants and security forces catalysed by domestic politics. Serving to reinforce questions of the military’s effectiveness (El Watan, 21st April, 2014), the most violent attack on security forces since the 2011 attack in Azazga took place in Tizi Ouzou this month. The attack carried out by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was seen as a direct response to the landslide 85.1% victory of Bouteflika a few days previously and as a challenge to state apparatus after security raids in the region (Al Jazeera TV, 20th April, 2014).

Meanwhile, Ghardaïa has struggled to contain sectarian clashes between Berber and Arab ethnic communities that have paralysed the region since December 2013. The strife is driven by issues the unequal distribution of land, and minority status in the region, over which the government has largely failed to act.

Figure 2: Conflict Events by Type, Algeria, January 2013 - April 2014.

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Algeria
Conflict across Central Africa increased slightly in April from relatively small decreases in March (see Figure 3). In DR-Congo, conflict has resumed average rates since the September 2013 lull due to the success of Military and UN forces; new increases are not due to M23 or other nefarious foreign-supported groups, but the common threats of FDLR and various Mai-Mai groups of the East. The persistent rate of conflict across the region perpetrated by various groups suggests something of a ‘conflict carrying capacity’ in the region. Last month, quite a lot of trouble was caused by Nduma Defense of Congo (the same as Mayi-Mayi Cheka). Thousands were displaced in Walikale as this group established headquarters close to UN forces, and when disrupted and moved, caused considerable chaos across the region. The group was able to operate across several areas of Walikale and successfully resisted disarming and disintegration (as is the mandate of the UN forces assisting the FARDC).

That fighting continues in DR-Congo is not a surprise: despite the recent successes of FARDC, there is still a considerable mountain to climb. What is disturbing is that the number of active, violent non-state/opposition groups is persistent. Actions from 64 discrete groups were recorded in January and 57 in April. There are not just a few holdouts to the forcible peace, the war economy has sustained many interests in the region and, undoubtedly, many groups will not welcome its end.

In Central African Republic, the war is back on. After decreasing steadily since its zenith in January, it is steadily rising (reaching rates of December 2013 and continuing to rise). As has long been the story in CAR, the civilians are bearing the brunt of the fighting and the government, police or military troops are nowhere to be found. Seleka have resurrected themselves somewhat to again talk of secession and are getting support from Muslims in Bambari. Seleka, now supported by Peuhl communal groups, is active in Northern CAR and accused of attacking clinics, chiefs and aid workers. Anti-Balaka continued its elimination of Muslims: the group reportedly has over 10,000 Muslims captured in Bozoum, and its campaign against Muslims in the capital has culminated in the last of that community leaving in April. Also leaving in April: Chadian troops after being accused of siding with Seleka during the 2013 coup. Last but not least, LRA took advantage of the crisis by increasing their activity in South-eastern CAR this month (and DR-Congo); most of this violence was directed at unprotected civilians, but an LRA commander was caught by the regional task force during the surge. Not to worry though, EU peacekeepers have arrived - all 55 of them.
In the midst of this focus on the government’s (in)action, developing a full profile and clearer understanding of the activity of Boko Haram itself is critical. Previous Conflict Trends reports have highlighted patterns in the group’s tactics: the increasing targeting of civilians over time; with a geographic expansion in to neighbouring Nigerian states throughout 2012 – early 2013, followed by a concentration of activity in its stronghold, Borno, for much of late 2013 – 2014.

There are, however, growing similarities between the actions of Boko Haram and another African militant group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), active in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region since the 1990s. A comparison of the two groups may help shed light on possible trajectories of violence. Vast ideological differences notwithstanding, the profile will highlight similarities in tactics; geographic scope; and the context in which violence is taking place in an attempt to draw useful lessons from previous experiences of violence on the continent.

**Tactics:**

The most immediate similarity between these two groups is the use of violence against unarmed, civilians. The LRA...
The similarities, however, go beyond a commonality in tactics alone: there is also a distinct temporal pattern to the evolution of civilian targeting. Both the LRA and Boko Haram evolved as groups which initially primarily engaged in conflict with state military, with levels of civilian targeting evolving largely in line with (both directionally and in terms of absolute levels) its engagement with armed forces (Phase 1). Both groups also witnessed a spike in activity corresponding with an intensified military cam-

Nigeria: Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army - Some Parallels

became notorious in the mid-2000s for its brutal campaign against communities in Northern Uganda, with widespread mutilation, and the abduction of children and forced recruitment of civilians making international headlines. Boko Haram has likewise increased its brutal targeting of civilians over time, and has been accused of recruiting child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 29 November 2013) and using forced conscription (IRIN News, 12 December 2013).

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Figure 5: Conflict Events by Type, Boko Haram and LRA, by Quarter and Proposed Phase, 1997 - March 2014.
sharply increasing rates of violence against civilians outstripped conflict with armed actors, which is declining. It is too early to say with certainty whether this is the beginning of a medium- to long-term trend, as it may represent only a temporary spike in civilian targeting. However, it is worth noting that this pattern is relatively unique to these two groups: a wider analysis of active rebel groups on the African continent reveals distinct patterns in violence, none of which mirror the trends we see in Boko Haram and LRA violence (see Figure 6).

In the case of Boko Haram, the dynamics of this third phase is apparent only in the past few months when sharply increasing rates of violence against civilians outstripped conflict with armed actors, which is declining. It is too early to say with certainty whether this is the beginning of a medium- to long-term trend, as it may represent only a temporary spike in civilian targeting. However, it is worth noting that this pattern is relatively unique to these two groups: a wider analysis of active rebel groups on the African continent reveals distinct patterns in violence, none of which mirror the trends we see in Boko Haram and LRA violence (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Conflict Events by Type and Actor, January 1997 - March 2014.
The drivers of this tactical change on the part of both groups also share some similarities: both groups had their operational capacity and territorial scope severely restrict-
ed by the limited successes of a sustained military campaign against them. In the case of the LRA, the Ugandan military’s campaign resulted in the modest victory (for Uganda, at least) of pushing the LRA into neighbouring countries and largely routing them from former strong-
holds in northern Uganda. The Nigerian military has had more limited success still: where it has made gains since the declaration of a state of emergency in three northern states in May 2013, these have been predominantly in urban areas. Pushing Boko Haram out of its Maiduguri straddled without concomitantly increasing security in surrounding rural areas has contributed to the group’s increased targeting of highly vulnerable, soft targets such as schools around Borno.

Pushing a formerly urban organisation into an isolated or rural operating environment has several other, disturbing consequences. One of these is that where militants might have formerly resided in their homes or communities where they have social ties, an organisation which is forced to operate in an increasingly isolated and clandestine way – including establishing camps in forest reserves (This Day, 29 April 2014) and isolated regions of neigh-
bouring countries (Al Jazeera, 4 March 2014) – may be more likely to abduct girls and young women for forced marriage and sex slavery. This practice was common among the LRA, which abducted large numbers of girls and young women, with harrowing consequences (see for example, Carlson and Mazurana, 2007).

**Geographic features:**

There are also some similarities in the geographic features of both groups. Geographically, having emerged as domestic, nationally-oriented organisations, both began to be active in neighbouring states, but without much evidence of a corresponding trans-national agenda. That is to say, while the LRA’s activities have for several years been primarily concentrated outside Uganda, its agenda for action, and engagement with regime leaders has remained resolutely focused on the Ugandan regime (IRIN, 31 May 2007), and – recently – the possibility of return to Uganda (see Daily Monitor, 27 January 2014; BBC News, 27 January 2014).

Boko Haram’s activity outside Nigeria is considerably low-
er (see Figure 7): however, it has been increasing in recent months, with growing speculation as to its transnational linkages. This activity, however, has been dominated by logistical needs for safe spaces to establish bases and op-
erate, much as the LRA’s migration was, rather than a genu-
ine transnational agenda. This is not to minimise the impact of Boko Haram activity in neighbouring states: kid-
nappings and attacks attributed to the group have a seri-
ous cost both in terms of human security and regional stability. However, this is quite different from an organisa-
tion with a genuinely transnational agenda. Boko Haram’s main focus and interest remains the Nigerian state, a point which is sometimes obscured by the association of Islamist violence in particular with a monolithic, global movement (Dowd and Raleigh, 2013).

**Context:**

Finally, there are important similarities between the con-
text in which both these groups operate. As mentioned above, the Federal Government of Nigeria has come un-
der fire for its apparent inaction in the search for the miss-
ing Chibok schoolgirls. When the military has responded to Boko Haram activity in the past, however, it has faced criticism for the heavy-handedness of its approach and accompanying human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 1 May 2013) and reprisal attacks by security forces (Amnesty International, 30 March 2014, warning: graphic imagery). The sense of frustration over the government’s failure to act on the Chibok abductions is widespread, palpable, and remarkable only in its outspokenness: “Nobody rescued them,” an official in Chibok told the New Yorker of the escape of four of the original abductees. “I want to stress this point. Nobody rescued them. They es-
aped on their accord. This is painful.” (New Yorker, 30 April 2014).

Less openly expressed is a suspicion that this governmen-
tal duality has fostered among some northerners that Federal failure to tackle Boko Haram has either been a deliberate strategy – or a convenient means – to keep the region in a state of emergency and thereby restrict northern political power (Daily Trust, 18 December 2013). An alternative theory, and equally corrosive to north-south relations, among some southern Nigerians is that Boko Haram is sponsored by northern elites, precisely as a vehi-
cle to return northerners to political power through intimi-
dation.

This duality was also a feature of the Ugandan military’s response to the LRA: speculation that the government had
the legitimacy of the government, and the prospect of peaceful elections.

Implications and Conclusions:

This brief survey has attempted to draw out some of the tactical, geographic and contextual parallels between two of the most violent rebel groups which have been active in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade. While such a brief overview necessarily obscures fundamental differences in the two organisations and the contexts in which they operate, several implications can be drawn.

The first is that any treatment of the undisputed brutality of Boko Haram’s violence as a function of its anti-western, Islamist or even Islamic agenda should be carefully interrogated. While active over a much longer period of time, the LRA has shown not only comparable levels of brutality (see Figure 8), but comparable tactical, temporal and geo-

abandoned northern populations to their fate at the hands of the brutal group, and could have brought the insurgency to a halt much earlier, was accompanied by the experience of abuse at the hands of the same military when they did carry out action (BBC News, 16 July 2003; Human Rights Watch, 21 September 2005; Human Rights Watch, 4 April 2012). There were echoes of similar theories in northern Uganda that the government had resolved not to conclusively defeat the insurgents in the country’s economically marginal north because it served to suppress dissent and bolster the regime’s international profile as one tackling a terrorist threat.

The truth to these rumours is not the focus of this profile: their very circulation is powerful. In the case of Nigeria, the theories themselves are both products of, and further reproduce, internal distrust and mutual suspicion in an already divided country, with profound implications for the legitimacy of the government, and the prospect of peaceful elections.
graphic dynamics, suggesting that the nature of violence employed by groups, is much more closely linked to their tactical goals, the environment within which they’re operating, and their organisational capacity. This is particularly important to note in the context of violence by Islamist groups, which are often conflated with ideologically – but not operationally – aligned groups.

A second implication is that if the shared pattern in violence holds, we should expect to see a further escalation in attacks on civilians as Boko Haram’s ability to engage with military forces in the North is restricted. A reduced operating capacity can result in the increased targeting of soft targets – both around regional strongholds such as rural areas of Borno, and in capital cities. This reflects a necessary evolution on the part of a group which may no longer be able to engage security personnel directly at the scale it once did, but can continue to make an enormous impact on security and stability through targeting civilians.

Finally, there are implications of ongoing forced recruitment and abduction for forced marriage, which interact with conditions of inter-regional hostility and low north-south trust in Nigeria. In Uganda, one obstacle to conclusively defeating the LRA has been the sometimes ambivalent relationship of northern communities to the rebel group. While there is no doubt that the LRA brutalised and victimised large portions of the northern population, forced recruitment and abduction created a scenario in which communities identified their children, family members and friends among the organisation’s ranks, and sometimes rejected the narrowly legalistic pursuit of justice by trial advocated by members of the international community, in favour of processes of amnesty, reintegration and restorative justice. This latter approach was by no means universal, but it interacted to a significant degree with communities’ experiences of brutalisation and abuses at the hands of the Ugandan military during their campaigns against the LRA.

As we have shown, some of these features are also found in the Nigerian context: there are numerous reports of Boko Haram historically enjoying variable and in some cases, considerable, support among local communities in northern Nigeria (New York Times, 25 February 2012). Together, this suggests that if forced conscription, abductions and forced marriages continue, alongside ongoing reports of human rights abuses by the government, the options available to resolve the conflict may well evolve in complexity while reducing in number.
Elections in South Africa and Malawi reflect generally stable patterns compared to the rest of the continent. Elections (May 7th in South Africa and May 20th in Malawi) are often periods of contestation. Despite the inevitable result in South Africa and the open possibilities in Malawi, both countries remain stable during this time. South African elections are not always without problems—as shown in the Figure below, past elections are associated with relative increases in riots and protests.

There is obvious disappointment with the ANC as a vehicle for change and progress, yet despite the evident corruption (such as the scandal over expenditure on his residence in Nkandla) and distaste (reports of booing at rallies) for Zuma, the ANC will win handily. The other parties have taken small pieces from the ANC monopoly, but South Africa is firmly in its clutches. However, in South Africa the electoral tension in intra-party, and specifically within the ANC. Contests between leadership across South Africa has resulted in fighting across militias, riots etc (see ACLED Conflict Trends Report June 2013).

The new government will have to face the country’s high crime rate and violence and the continuing fallout from the 2012 Lonmin mine killings. No easy task for a government and party believed to be regressing and incapable of delivering development for South Africans.

No instability concerns exist for Malawi - four parties are contesting, but the splintered opposition means that President Banda will likely carry much of the South and the North, this despite corruption and mismanagement scandals that have plagued her tenure in office. Riots, protests, government intimidation is not Malawi’s style, but let’s wait to see what the election brings.
In April, Tunisia witnessed an increase in violence levels, although reported fatalities fell slightly month-on-month (see Figure 1). The month of April saw the number of battles rise to their highest levels in 2014 (see Figure 10), as the government responded to the growing threat of diffuse Islamist militias in the Mount Chaambi area of Kasserine, now declared a military zone. Despite low fatality counts in the clashes, the Tunisian army flexed its military power this month with pro-active operations carried out to eliminate militant threats.

Socio-economic woes continued to plague Tunisia’s south, with sustained violent riots and protests in Ben Guerdane provoked by the closure of the Tunisian-Libyan Ras Jedir border crossing. Whilst short-term tensions were placated by its re-opening, the informal business networks create an “economic lifeline for Ben Guerdane” (AFP, 2nd April, 2014) and any future attempt to close it again will likely be matched by further unrest.