Welcome to the July issue of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED) Conflict Trends report. Each issue, ACLED data on conflict patterns and dynamics in Africa from the preceding month are presented and analysed in comparative and historical perspective. Realtime conflict event data is collected and published through our research partners at Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) where it is updated monthly.

In addition, historical data from Volume III of the dataset, covering conflict in Africa from January 1997 to December 2012, is available online at acleddata.com, along with previous Conflict Trends reports, country profiles for key conflict-affected states, thematic special features, and information on the data collection and publication process.

This month, we profile the escalation of unrest in Egypt, where June saw massive and diverse protests and riots, followed by the military intervening to oust the country’s first elected President a year after he had taken office.

Ongoing violence in DR-Congo’s Katanga Province is also explored, alongside continuing communal violence in Kenya, escalating conflict in Somalia’s cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo, and what to expect in the upcoming elections in the two very different contexts of Mali and Zimbabwe.

Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities, January - June 2013.
In the past few months, the DR-Congo has witnessed the almost complete deployment of a UN Intervention Brigade in the Eastern part of the country. With a unique mandate, this international military force is asked to neutralize the active militant groups in the area, as well as protecting civilians, a function it shares with the UN’s peace-keeping mission, MONUSCO (IRIN 14 May 2013).

This demonstrates the dead end reached by this last mission to counteract the violence targeting the civilian population in both Kivus. The M23, the rebel group that launched an offensive in late 2012, has been one of the most active groups in the region, along with the country’s national military forces.

It has drawn much of the international attention, as a result of the regional implications of Rwandan and Ugandan involvement with a group which appears to threaten the country’s territorial integrity.

However, relatively little attention has been paid to the rising levels of violence occurring in Katanga, where there has been a clear rise in both events and fatalities recorded in 2013 (see Figure 2). While violent events in both North and South Kivu have remained relatively stable over the course of 2013, Katanga has experienced an acute increase in recorded political violence. There has been a particularly sharp increase in events of involving the targeting of civilians, constituting over 55% of conflict events in 2013 to date.

The Mayi-Mayi communal groups involved in much of this violence have mostly targeted civilians and the national military forces, in what the humanitarian agencies call the ‘triangle of death’ between Manono, Mitwaba, and Pweto (IRIN, 2 May 2013). Within the Katanga province, there has been a clear spread of violence east-ward and south-ward compared to violence patterns in 2012 (see Figure 3).

Among the diverse militia groups active in the province, one group is notable (see Figure 4). Formed earlier this year, the Kata Katanga, which means ‘cut off Katanga,’ is a...
new group directly issued from the Mayi-Mayi communal group militias, as its chief Ferdinand Kazadi Ntanda Imena Mutombo is close to Kyungu Mutanga, the charismatic leader of the Northern branch of the Mayi-Mayi militia (Jeune Afrique, 14 May 2013).

According to the Mid-Term Report of the UN Group of Experts, the militia has forces in Kamina, Manono, Mitwaba, Kalemie, Pweto, and Bendera, as well as in Lubumbashi, where it recruits and trains new soldiers (African Arguments, 5 July).

In March 2013, this separatist militia group attacked a military camp as well as the Provincial Governor’s office in Lubumbashi. After forcing their way into a UN compound, they finally surrendered on 24 March. The security situation of Katanga is still volatile as the militia keeps targeting civilians in Haut-Katanga and Haut-Lomami.

Figure 3: Level of Conflict Events, DR-Congo, 1997 - June 2013 (Three Time Periods).

Figure 4: Conflict Events by Actor and Event Type, Katanga, DR-Congo, January - June 2013.
Throughout June, analysis of the ongoing unrest in Egypt was preoccupied with the theme of Egypt’s “second revolution” (*The Guardian*, ‘Egyptian activists hope for a “second revolution” a year after Morsi’s election,’ 27 June 2013; *Financial Times* ‘Egyptians stage a second revolution, 1 July 2013). By the time of writing, talk had turned to the significance of Egypt’s military coup for Arab democracy, with world leaders such as David Cameron walking a fine line, stating that the UK ‘never supports intervention by the military,’ but stopping short of condemning the ousting of President Morsi, or calling for his restoration to power.

The events which precipitated the initial transition to democracy in Egypt were spectacular in terms of size and impact, but in terms of the discrete number of protests, demonstrations and rallies taking place across the country, this latest wave of unrest surpasses its 2011 predecessor (see Figure 5).

This does not represent a measure of crowd size or participants in the protest, but the number of distinct protest events (both anti- and pro-regime) taking place on a single day in Egypt. From this perspective, the data highlights that more groups were organising discrete demonstrations and counter-demonstrations than were in 2011, which suggests that the groups involved in the most recent upheaval are more diverse, less coordinated (or less willing to cooperate) than when singular, central, massive protests were taking place in early 2011.

Protests and rallies are also more geographically widespread than they were in 2011 (see Figure 6). Cairo is still predictably witnessing the highest rates of protesting and rioting, but the most recent wave has seen an increase in conflict in Alexandria, Luxor, Aswan and Asyut among others. Riot and protest activity is still overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas, but the wider geographic spread of this second wave of unrest reflects the wide basis of mobilisation and dissatisfaction across the country.

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In spite of these patterns of intensified unrest, it should also be noted that the protests have to date been less violent than those of the 2011 period. An enduring narra-

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**Figure 5:** Conflict Events by Type, Egypt, December 2010 - June 2011; and December 2012 - June 2013.
tive of the first Egyptian uprising was that it was almost entirely peaceful, and yet, as Figure 7 shows, riots, battles and attacks on civilians led to high levels of fatalities throughout the unrest. By the end of June, this same level of fatalities had not been witnessed in Egypt. However, at the time of writing, several lethal incidents involving the military and pro-Morsi supporters were reported, with the situation extremely volatile, and an escalation in violence a distinct and worrying possibility.
After the dust has settled from the recent Kenyan election, politics as usual has continued, with all the accompanying issues of communal violence, tensions surrounding the constitutional power devolution process, and lingering voting challenges. The diversity of actors, and the change on last year’s dynamics, is represented in Figure 8.

Ongoing voting challenges are the main reason fighting is flaring up in otherwise peaceful districts. There have always been concerns that devolution would change the dimensions of Kenyan conflicts, as political power has been reorganized from national to county levels. This made for contentious county-level elections, as this level of government is empowered as never before with increased political and financial resources.

However, there was also speculation that power devolution would not be effectively put into practice, as governing funds would stay within national power coffers (see Division of Revenue Bill debates in National Assembly and Supreme Court). Delays, obstacles and political maneuvering continue to slow the devolution process. In a phased transfer, counties are unsure that they will get their respective share of functions and resources. At the core of the dispute is the fact that finance is provided for each governing function that is transferred to the county level (not the actual functions). This issue is at the heart of current debates in the capital, and contributes to the conflicts across the state, and this month in particular has seen the escalation of violence in the eastern Wajir and Mandera countries.

The most recent escalation in Wajir began on June 21st when a group of Degodia militants attacked a small convoy in Eldas, killing four members of the Gare ethnic group. The same group attempted an unsuccessful attack on a General Service Unit (GSU) camp in the area. Either the GSU is losing its feared reputation, or the Degodia group is eager to display its conflict abilities.

This event is part of a larger contest that began in March when a Gare group Senate candidate campaign vehicle killed a businessman from the Degodia group. Speculations that the attack was deliberate have fueled ongoing instability in the area through tension between the groups. The conflicts between the groups has escalated periodically since competition in the 1980s regarding land rights and access pitted them against one another.
But the election has added additional faultlines: Figure 9 tracks the history of communal violence following elections in Kenya since 2000, with clear evidence in the last two cycles of a sharp increase in communal militia violence in the wake of electoral contest.

The devolution process is believed to favour the dominant groups in Wajir and Mandera, respectively, thereby leaving the minority clans marginalized. Local police and observers suggest that minority groups in both (but not necessarily across both) areas are using violence to influence this process. Local reports suggest that regional and local politicians have engaged militias to attack rival groups, influence the election petition process (currently underway) and engage in politically motivated confrontations.

All Gare and Degodia security officers were transferred from Mandera and a full-scale disarmament is underway in the border areas between the two counties (continuing in Mandera, Tarbaj and Eldas areas of Wajir). This is believed necessary to end the clashes that are responsible for 100 people in recent months.

Wajir’s problems are not just with Mandera: Somali groups are also involved in attacks in the county, although this month shows a general decline in the cross border attacks from Al-Shabab as the organization splinters within Somalia, and confronts its reduced capacity on all fronts.

In Marigat (Baringo county), disarmament is underway to lessen the effects of the ongoing cattle rustling in the area. It is reported that more than 10,000 people are homeless due to attacks since January.

Finally, although the ICC is having problems, the Kenya judiciary is clear about land grabbing in the former election: Deputy President William Ruto has been ordered to pay Sh5 million to an IDP for trespassing on his 100 acre Eldoret farm. Ruto lost ownership of the farm in Uasin Gishu, Eldoret after the court ruled that the land was illegally obtained. The farm owner is a victim of the 2007/08 election-violence and accused Ruto (then representing Eldoret in Parliament) of grabbing land during the conflict.
Conflict events dropped for the sixth month in a row in Mali in June, reaching the lowest level they’ve reached all year, and approaching pre-crisis levels of events (see Figure 10). Associated reported fatalities increased slightly in June over figures reported in May, but the overall rates for the quarter remain far below the peak of the first quarter (January - April) of this year. Nevertheless, in spite of these broad trends in increasing security, the burden of violence continues to be heavily borne by civilian populations, with persistent targeting of non-combatants constituting a high proportion of overall conflict events (see Figure 12). While rates in the most recent quarter of 2013 do not rival those at the peak of the crisis, when civilian targeting was at its highest, attacks on civilians still constituted over 30% of overall conflict events since April. Additionally, the actors involved in the conflict have shifted. While events in the first quarter of the year were dominated by Ansar Dine, the MNLA has made a return to the forefront of conflict in the country since April and is now involved in over 20% of recorded conflict events, including clashes with Malian forces, and reportedly ethnically-targeted attacks on civilians in Kidal.

Finally, Mali’s first elections since the 2012 coup will take place on the 28th of July, in spite of concerns in some quarters about the appropriateness of elections at such an early stage (ICG, 26 June 2013). Whether the electoral ritual itself will be sufficient to address the competing and often conflicting demands and grievances of many of the key players to the conflict remains to be seen.
July was the fourth month in which Somalia witnessed an increase in conflict events. The country also saw a sharp increase in fatalities, over what has been to date a fairly stable level of monthly casualties this year (see Figure 12). June witnessed a high-profile and extremely lethal bombing of a UN compound in Mogadishu, in which 22 people were reported killed (Reuters, 19 June 2013). Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, with militants battling African Union and Somali forces for control of the compound for over an hour (Al Jazeera, 19 June 2013).

Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, with militants battling African Union and Somali forces for control of the compound. The attack highlights continued instability in Mogadishu, at a time when the dominant narrative of Somalia’s development is one of increasing peace, security and stability. It serves as a sharp and tragic reminder of the continued operational capacity of a much-weakened Al Shabaab which can, in spite of its reduced strength and numbers, still inflict huge losses through relatively low-tech attacks.

Persistent instability in Mogadishu is also important in the context of a mounting crisis in Kismayo. The port city, once an Al Shabaab stronghold and key source of revenue, is at the centre of a dispute over Somalia’s future political form. The self-declared Jubbaland administration claims its legitimacy derives from the constitutional federal structure, at odds with the capital’s ‘lead from Mogadishu’ approach (African Arguments, 21 June 2013). The Kismayo issue has three clear implications for the wider Somali context: first, as events in Mogadishu and escalating conflict across the country demonstrate, establishing security remains a top priority, and the failure to resolve the Kismayo dispute leaves the city and former Al Shabaab headquarters, vulnerable to instability and attack when the supposedly allied forces are internally divided.

Secondly, there are longer-term implications for the rest of Somalia: as the federal government and international community shifts (perhaps prematurely) into consideration of state-building and post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia, the question of how a strong Somali state can be reconciled with pronounced federalism in the South and open secessionism in the North-West and (to a lesser extent) North-East regions of Somaliland and Puntland cannot be ignored forever. Building a strong, capable government in Mogadishu may well be at odds with the long-term aim of establishing peace and security in Somalia, something policy-makers and analysts will need to confront before the two stated objectives collide.

Thirdly, there are important regional implications. The Kenyan forces, whose required post-hoc integration into the AMSIOM forces after they invaded their neighbour should have indicated where their priorities lay, are being blamed for sowing seeds of discord in Somalia’s third city (African Arguments, 3 July 2013). The allied forces were hindered by internal divisions and open shoot-outs between rival factions long before Kenya’s integration, but their apparent interest in a Jubaland ‘buffer zone’ raises the stakes of this. Further, as with the tension between the goals of central state-building and longer term of national stability, the international community will have to eventually confront the fact that regional players such as Ethiopia and Kenya may well prefer a relatively stable, but weaker Somalia. The reconciliation of these competing interests, too, will have to be confronted as the discussion of Somalia’s future continues apace.
Elections in Zimbabwe are scheduled for the 31st of July. Even the date has become an issue in the high stakes contest and attests to the general unsettled atmosphere that permeates any discussion of national political change in Zimbabwe. Since the violence and (speculated) election stealing in 2008 by President Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has consistently and tirelessly made public the attempts by the President to dismantle power-sharing and election processes.

In spite of the different political contexts at the time, Zimbabwe's last two elections were accompanied by surprisingly similar levels of conflict events. The 2002 electoral cycle witnessed higher levels of conflict, although the associated reported fatalities - in keeping with a general trend for low fatality conflict in the country - were quite low. Conflict-related fatalities peaked surrounding the 2008 electoral conflict, although these rates typically remain well below levels seen elsewhere on the continent (Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, etc.)

While typically low-intensity, Zimbabwe’s conflict profile is however characterized by remarkably high levels of civilian targeting. Figure 15 illustrates the scale of violence against civilians compared to other types of conflict in the country, which constitutes over 85% of all conflict events in the country since 1997. The next highest rate of violence against civilians (at 66%) is found in Rwanda, followed by South Sudan (at 53%). The overall dataset mean of conflict events which involve civilian targeting is 36%.

Figure 14: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities, Zimbabwe, 1997 - June 2013.

Conflicts Trends reports are compiled from ACLED data and draws on news and analysis from African Arguments, International Crisis Group, Jeune Afrique and others cited throughout. More information about sources, methodology and data is available online at acleddata.com.