Welcome to the July issue of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) Conflict Trends report. Each month, ACLED researchers gather, analyse and publish data on political violence in Africa in realtime. Monthly updates to realtime conflict event data are published through our research partners at Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) and also on the ACLED website.

In this issue, we explore conflict dynamics in relation to conflict minerals in DR-Congo and elsewhere, the growing security crisis in Kenya, changing dynamics in Mali, and on-going unrest in Nigeria. This issue also includes a special focus on state fragility and indices of measurement.

Elsewhere on the continent, while conflict events fell overall in June in Somalia and Sudan, the number of fatalities increased sharply, indicating an intensification of conflict; while clashes between government and rebels in Mozambique continue to affect stability there; and social unrest and waves of strikes were prominent features of both Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia this month.

ACLED is a publicly available database of political violence, which focuses on conflict in African states. Data is geo-referenced and disaggregated by type of violence and a wide variety of actors. Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.acleddata.com or by contacting acledinfo@gmail.com. Follow ACLED on Twitter for realtime updates, news and analysis: @ACLEDinfo
Conflict Minerals

An article in Think Africa Press by Christoph Vogel on June 23rd questioned the rhetoric and policies surrounding ‘conflict minerals’ and the proliferation of violence in states with intractable violence. Policies including the Dodd-Frank Law make corporations track the presence of Congolese conflict minerals in their trade; the implication is that the political economy of resource extraction fuels conflict, and that preventing the sale of minerals will inhibit conflict. This interpretation has also been challenged by Laura Seay in her discussion of how higher levels of conflict have been recorded in eastern Congo since the passage of the Dodd-Frank law, indicating either that conflict patterns and dynamics have little relation to resource extraction, or that the law has been ineffective.

On the latter, John Prendergast noted in Foreign Affairs in March 2014 that the law can claim M23 as one of its victims, despite (as Seay notes) this group had little activity in mining areas, and the bill led to an increase in smuggling as opposed to transparent trade. Vogel also contends that 8-10 million people in Eastern DR Congo are involved in artisanal mining and the bill has created mass unemployment. Dire local economic collapse makes militia recruitment a more attractive option (an example of ‘distress-push diversification’).

The ‘conflict diamond’ narrative is often extended to conflicts that are complex, and follows a familiar rhetoric of de-politicising African conflicts (also found in reductionist claims of ‘climate conflict’ or ‘ethnic/religious conflict’ that frequently populate media and advocacy accounts of African violence).

Sierra Leone’s and Angola’s conflict were the first to receive this treatment, despite – in both cases- the attraction of diamond mines as sites of conflict and diamonds as fuel for violence occurring relatively late in both conflicts (this simple fact makes applying the ‘greed’ argument difficult- if the lure of resource wealth motivates groups to challenge the state, surely they would not wait until the latter stages of the conflict to access it). Even the implication that diamonds and other resources help continue conflict through providing material wealth ignores the multiple sources of income readily available to successful rebels (as Seay makes clear).

Indeed, the presumption that precious resources are
Conflict Minerals

Conflict trends are often associated with violence across Africa. Effective resource management can support states. Diamond mining is practiced by 15 countries in Africa. The largest mining states - Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia and South Africa - annually recover more than half a billion U.S. dollars in sales. Smaller mining states include Zimbabwe, Guinea, Ghana, Congo, Lesotho, Liberia, Sierra Leone, CAR, Tanzania, and Togo. Conflict rates and patterns vary considerably from state to state, with little to suggest that precious resource extraction is the determining factor (see Figures 2 and 3).

Recently, ‘diamond lure’ has been associated with the conflicts in Central African Republic (Christopher Day of the Daily Beast wrote on ‘The Curse of CAR: Warlords, Blood Diamonds, and Dead Elephants’), the Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire. Yet research on the relationship between resources and conflict is far more nuanced than media and advocacy approaches suggest: indeed, Anouk Rigterink finds that the relationship is largely unstable, and the even the proposed links between diamonds and conflict suffer from how little consensus there is on which mechanisms are most important. In this vein, Cuvelier, Vlassenroot and Olin from the Justice and Security Research Programme suggest that the ways in which the link between conflict and resources is studied contributes to the problem:

“Much attention has been paid to claims that resource abundance increases the risk of bad governance and conflict, and that economic incentives are the explanatory factor of armed groups’ strategies. While these claims have a significant impact on policy and have had the effect of narrowing down the attention to resource control in conflict settings, the evidence in support of these claims is largely macro-level orientated and tends to overlook the complexities of armed actors’ motivations and incentive structures. The same literature tends to overlook the local level and the position and role of populations.” (p. 16).

Since little is known about how wealth is distributed in areas of rebel control and active resource extraction, the presumption of predatory behavior is problematic. Wars create economies of necessity, as well of those of greed. As Vogel notes, there are significant negative consequences for dismantling such economies in a war zone.
Both conflict events and reported fatalities increased in Kenya this month, with the most intense violence associated with an attack on civilians in Witu, Lamu island, in Kenya’s Coastal region. The attack incorporates several key complex dynamics in contemporary Kenyan political violence, each of which is worth unpacking in turn.

The first is the spectre and threat of Islamist militancy. While Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the attack, as with the attack on Westgate in September 2013, some analysts are suspicious of this claim. The attack does not fit the profile of typical Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya, which have generally fallen into one of three categories since 2011. The first category is fairly persistent, but low-grade attacks on security forces (police and military) primarily in the former North-Eastern province near the border with Somalia. The second, sporadic, but generally low-intensity, attacks on civilians either along the coast in Mombasa (where tourists have been targeted), or in Nairobi (where nightclubs and minibus stands have been targeted), usually with low-sophistication grenade attacks. The third is high-intensity, high-profile attacks intended to garner public attention, such as the Westgate attack in Nairobi (see Figure 4 for an illustration of the clustering of events by event type and fatality rates). While the Mpeketoni attack might constitute an evolution and escalation of previous forms of violence, it is certainly a new strategy for the group if it is in fact responsible; and one which warrants closer analysis of the factors which contributed to and drive this intensification.

If the group is not responsible, but has strategically claimed responsibility for the attack in order to increase its perceived presence and capacity in Kenya, this points to a very different trend. Conventionally, the attribution of responsibility for violent conflict to Islamist groups has been driven in part by state interests in engineering an image of a state under siege by Islamist radicalism, in an effort to position themselves favourably in relation to western interests (for example, as some have argued is the case in Mauritania and Algeria); and de-legitimise and de-politicise the claims and grievances of opposition groups by branding them as terrorists (for example, through the association of Tuareg and other northern communal groups active in Mali which were variously, loosely and inconsistently aligned with Islamist militants in the area). This is not to deny the reality of Islamist violence as a growing phenomenon across Africa; but rather to highlight the potential political and strategic motivations for its labelling. By contrast, if Al Shabaab strategical-
Ly claims responsibility for attacks in which it had no part, we are witnessing the reverse: the acceptance of responsibility as part of a strategy in which the militants seek to amplify their impact, their perceived global reach and their capacity.

The second dimension of Kenyan conflict highlighted by the attack is the tension between central and county control in Kenya. The President has rejected claims that Al Shabaab were responsible for the attack (in spite of the group’s claims of responsibility), and instead saw the Lamu Governor Issa Timamy arrested on terrorism charges (bailed on the 30th of June). It is a surprising move in a context in which the state has previously extremely ready to attribute violence to suspected Islamist militants, even when no claims of responsibility are made. If nothing else, such a willingness to by-pass the state’s preferred public enemy in favour of local politics points to the complex political tensions at play in the investiture of power in local counties. The devolution of power to county level under Kenya’s 2010 constitution has often been presented as a panacea to the communal and local conflicts which pitted communal - primarily ethnic - groups against one another in a zero-sum game of demographic arithmetic contesting central power. The reality in some - but not all - counties, has in fact been the reverse: the devolution of power in areas with diverse ethnic and communal demographics has in some cases been accompanied by the devolution of violent conflict between these communities. In effect, county-level power has created yet another basis on which communal groups compete with one another for power, rather than presenting an alternative in which the pressure of competition was reduced. Cyclical violence between Pokomo and Orma ethnic militias in the former Coastal Province’s Tana River county in late 2012 and early 2013, which claimed over 150 lives, is one reflection of this dynamic; while persistent inter-communal conflict in Baringo and Turkana claimed at least six lives. Ultimately, while the dynamics of Islamist violence in Kenya certainly pose one of the most serious threats to stability and security in the country, it is by no means the only one.

That many predominantly Muslim ethnic groups have historically been politically and economically marginalised, in part because of their smaller number, may create incentives for the mobilisation of collective action around increasingly religious, rather than ethnic bases. Whenever Kenya is featured in ACLED’s Conflict Trends reports, the multi-dimensional nature of the country’s sometimes discrete, sometimes overlapping security challenges is emphasised. Events this month are sadly illustrative of this phenomenon (see Figure 5). In the month that a suspected Islamist attack dominated headlines, other dynamics were underscoring the volatility of the political context throughout the country: Kenya saw the highest number of riots and protests to date this year, involving a diverse range of groups from disaffected traders protesting the demolition of stores in Nakuru, to demonstrations against government landgrabbing in Kajiado, to protests against electoral procedures in Kiambu and Kwale. Elsewhere, inter-communal conflict in Baringo and Turkana claimed at least six lives. Ultimately, while the dynamics of Islamist violence in Kenya certainly pose one of the most serious threats to stability and security in the country, it is by no means the only one.
Since the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in April 2013, Mali has experienced relative calm punctuated by periods of intense violence. The most recent of these occurred in mid-May (see Figure 6), when fighting broke out suddenly between the Military Forces of Mali and the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) during a trip by Prime Minister Moussa Mara to Kidal, which has historically been a hotbed of Tuareg separatism.

The fighting was preceded and followed by riots against the Malian government in the north, which were in turn subsequently followed by demonstrations in support of the Malian government and military. The spike in Riots/Protests indicates, in particular, the differing nature of the battles which took place in May, the most intense of which involved the Malian military and MNLA, as opposed to those from February to April which were largely low-intensity incidents between government, international, and MNLA forces and the various militant Islamist groups operating in northern Mali.

A number of interesting points in the data which show how extraordinary the recent violence has been. Most notably, the return to open conflict between the Malian military and MNLA, even if only for a few days, has made May the deadliest month by far since March 2013 when the active phase of the French intervention was still winding down. As would be expected due to the sudden out-

break of fighting, May was defined by a high-proportion of events involving the Malian military and the MNLA. But rather than being part of a trend, the low level of activity of both the Malian military and MNLA since last summer, and the subsequent drop-off in their activity in June, are rather indicative of the isolated nature of the recent violence. The violence was also overwhelmingly situated in Kidal, which further underscores the flashpoint nature of the recent violence (see Figure 7).

In contrast to May, June has seen the lowest level of violent events since the height of violence in January 2013, and comparable only to the July-August 2013 period. This period saw relative stability return to northern Mali following the deployment of UN and African peacekeeping forces, and the signing of a peace agreement between the Malian government and a coalition of Tuareg rebel groups the previous month ( Reuters, Dec 4, 2013). The absence of major violence in June 2014 however is likely rooted in two causes: first, the retreat of the Malian military from many northern towns ( Reuters, May 22, 2014), and second, the mutual ceasefire and commitment to negotiations by both sides ( BBC News, May 24, 2014). The question is whether the Malian government and the coalition of Tuareg rebel groups it will be negotiating with over the coming months ( Reuters, June 24, 2014) can achieve a durable peace, putting an end to decades of instability in the north.
The past two months have witnessed a continued deterioration of security in Nigeria, most notable for the spread of violence beyond the North East. Since 2012 (when the Boko Haram insurgency was at its most widespread, geographically, although less intense in terms of both the number of events and the rate of reported fatalities attributed to the group), the group has been largely pushed back into the north-eastern corner of the country, with the vast majority of its attacks taking place in this region since the declaration of the state of emergency in May 2013.

While its activities in the North East, most notably the kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls from Chibok in April, have garnered international attention, a spate of bombings attributed to the group in Abuja in recent months drive home for Nigerians the proximity of the violence to those outside the state of emergency. Nevertheless, in such a vast country, the duality of the Nigerian experience of violent conflict is stark: former US Ambassador to Nigeria has recently written that ‘Nigeria is now highly bifurcated. On the one hand, the Lagos-Ibadan corridor is booming [...] Boko Haram has mounted no attacks, and Islamist terrorism seems to be far away. On the other hand, death and destruction are ubiquitous in the north-east where Boko Haram killings are now daily - no longer weekly or monthly. Abuja seems to be between the two extremes.’ (Campbell, 1 July 2014).

Similarly, as Meagher highlighted in May, ‘Amid the media storm surrounding the kidnapped Nigerian schoolgirls, it is important to remember that just a couple of months ago that same media was celebrating Nigeria’s stellar growth performance and investment potential.’ (Meagher, 22)

---

**Figure 8: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Event Type, State, and Region, Nigeria, January - June 2014.**
These observations of a highly divided country are certainly borne out in the event data: even if we include all politically violent events and reported fatalities in the country (although much of it is dominated by Boko Haram), it is clear that the North East, North Central and to a lesser extent, North West, of the country are much more profoundly affected by insecurity and instability (see Figure 8). The southern regions, with the exception of the South West, where conflict events are dominated by riots and protests, have much lower conflict and reported fatality averages.

The concentration of violent conflict in particular regions of a country is well documented across a wide range of case studies: across Africa, on average, repeated violent conflict occurs in only 15% of a state’s territory (Raleigh et al., 2010). However, in cases such as Nigeria, where the concentration of conflict corresponds to deeply rooted perceptions of government neglect, marginalization, and failure to act to establish security, this has a reinforcing impact on the drivers of violent conflict itself: namely, political and economic marginalization which, in part, motivate opposition to the government are underscored by the government’s repeated failure to address and resolve the conflict, entrenching these sentiments. This may be aggravated further by the intensification of attacks on civilians in particular, for whom the government is expected to establish and maintain security. As Figure 9 shows, in the past year, Boko Haram attacks have not only increased in frequency, but the intensity (measured by reported fatalities associated with individual events) has escalated in the context of violence against non-combatant populations in particular.

Internationally, interest in Boko Haram has been viewed variously through the lenses of terrorism, human rights and development. Domestically, it is impossible to consider these conflict dynamics without an eye on the upcoming 2015 elections: what this escalation means for the election is yet unclear, but will be a test of the extent to which the crisis has become a national, rather than primarily northern, issue.
After a cursory look at the Fund for Peace’s (hereafter FFP) 2014 fragile state rankings, @ACLEDInfo mentioned on twitter that the metrics were ‘questionable’. We suggested index’s rankings of fragility bear little relationship to reality. A polite reply from the FFP opened the space for more discussion. Since a complete conversation is not ‘tweetable’, this piece summarizes how we consider any failed/fragile state index to be a largely futile, and empirically questionable, exercise.

In the FFP’s tenth index on state failure and fragility, Chad in more ‘fragile’ than Pakistan, Zimbabwe than Nigeria, Malawi than Libya and Kenya over Mali. Perhaps the Malawi-Libya comparison is the most egregious, and indicates the distance between an intuitive understanding of what state fragility is, and how it is expressed in indices such as the FFP’s. In 2013 and into 2014, Malawi underwent a corruption scandal; a hotly contested, yet largely nonviolent, election; and a transition of power between parties as a result of the 2014 election. Similar to other sub-Saharan states, it has pockets of deepening poverty, high population and climate vulnerability. Yet overall, it is one of the least violent states across Africa and indeed the developing world. On the other hand, Libya is still undergoing a violent and unstable transition from autocracy to democracy.

Benghazi was one of the most violent hotspots in Africa in 2013; over a dozen discrete violent groups are operating within the state with the aim of destabilizing the post-Quadaffi government apparatus; the government is holding together a weak, fragmented and persistently attacked alliance. Battles and violence against civilians characterize the violence within the state, compared to the high rate of intermittent riots and largely non-violent protests that occur in Morocco and Tunisia. Libya has a development level that is higher than African averages, the variation in public good access and political stability throughout the state is also high. To place Malawi as more ‘fragile’ than Libya (and other comparisons mentioned above) is to fundamentally misunderstand how a state apparatus is made vulnerable to and by internal dissent, poverty and political institutions.

FFP’s index is the subject of this piece, but multiple fragility indices commit many of the same errors, and can also differ in which countries are considered fragile. Figure 10 displays how African countries have fared in recent indices, compared to overall event and fatality counts from ACLED data (excluding non-violent events and peaceful protests). There is limited agreement on what constitutes ‘fragility’, largely due to vague, contradictory, and tautological definitions and necessary and sufficient conditions. FFP rankings are based on a series of twelve indicators; each a compilation of over 100 initial sub indicators, whittled down to fourteen sub-indicators using a factor analysis. Data for the indicators and sub-indicators are from three main data sources and aggregated through the FFP’s CAST- Conflict Assessment System Tool. Therefore, each of the selected twelve indicators (demographic pressure, refugees and IDPs, group grievances, brain drain/human flight, uneven economic development, economic pressures, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and the rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention) are based on several sub-indicators that may- or may not (it is not mentioned)- be measured and aggregated equally to create a score by which countries are relatively ranked.

Our issues with the index are three-fold: the composite indicators and their inherent endogeneity; how and why different indicators are weighted the way they are; and the meaning of fragility and failure and its consequences. While there is a small academic cottage industry devoted to dismantling the concept of state failure and fragility as a useful heuristic (some excellent pieces include that by Putzel and Di John, 2012) there is somewhat less material questioning how measures should be compiled, if at all, and consequences of ‘bad’ rankings on states.

The measures

Policy communities often appreciate a comparable assessment, or relative measure, in order to prioritize and classify crises. However, measurements can also obscure as much as they elucidate about the relative state of crises. This is particularly true when criteria used to measure distinct indicators are similar, the exact same or endogenous. By integrating factors that are similar, aggregated indices can ‘double count’ and miscount, leading to poor and corrupted relative measures.

The composite indicators, as described by the methodology section available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/methodology, include sub-measures that consistently overlap; these include the constituent sub-indicators for economic development and poverty/economic decline or state legitimacy and public services; sub-indicators including multiple measures of ‘elections’ and ‘electoral institutions’, ‘power struggles’ and ‘political competition’,
‘housing access’, ‘civil rights’ and ‘systematic violation of rights’. Other indicators are the exact same and used in several indices: violence and harassment is captured in multiple ways by the ‘group grievance’ indicator, but also by ‘state legitimacy’, ‘human rights and the rule of law’, and security apparatus. ‘Infant mortality’ is used to measure ‘demographic pressures’ and ‘public services’.

Other indicators and sub-indicators are endogenous: endogeneity relates to how one factor is highly correlated to another, albeit not the same. An example of this is how violence consistently creates high levels of IDPs. There is also some debate about whether IDPs cause violence (and if so, suggests a ‘feedback’ mechanism). Including endogenous variables create the same problems are integrating similar variables: it is double counting and should be captured in a factor analysis (but only if that is done within and across indicators). Clearly endogenous variables in the FFP index include ‘elite power struggles’ and multiple manifestations of violence, ‘state legitimacy’ measures and ‘fractionalized elites’ and ‘demographic pressures’ and ‘human flight’. Aggregating sub-indicator assessments within indicators, and indicators within scores violates all basic statistical techniques.

There are further empirical issues: all sub-indicators are compiled on a range from 0-10; the distinctions between each level are relatively vague (for example, moving from 1-2 is based on meager to insignificant; while 9-10 is devastating to catastrophic). These are sometimes associated with the numbers of people affected (100, 1000s, etc.).
Special Focus Topic: State Fragility

but few data sources can accurately assess the impact of any of the factors used in the FFP on an annual and immediate basis.

The constituent parameters

In assessing state fragility - taken here to mean the ability of a state to continue to function as a cohesive unit, where even challenged regimes can maintain authority and a basic level of state capacity - surely some attributes are more important than others. For example, ‘state legitimacy’ and ‘security apparatus’ indicators includes the presence of ‘armed insurgents’, ‘suicide bombers’, ‘political assassinations’, ‘paramilitaries’, ‘political violence’ and ‘militias’.

These factors are likely to affect regime stability, state capacity and institutional coherence far more that other indicators including ‘access to information’, ‘access to housing’, ‘the presence of airports’, ‘consumer confidence’, ‘job training’, ‘orphan population.’ While these sub-indicators are important measures of the problems facing poor countries, they do not have the same effects on state fragility. To give such sub-indicators equal weight is both theoretically and empirically questionable and leads to a corrupted index.

There are several open questions about the relevance of each indicator on ‘fragility’ and/or ‘state failure’. Brain drain will not create state fragility, and the role of demographic factors is hotly debated; yet these are both equally weighted to known, consistent factors including state legitimacy, factionalized elites and group grievances.

The result of these problematic measurement decisions is that the index returns quite questionable rankings, where-in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Chad – all countries with significant, but different, problems resulting in relatively low political violence- are regarded as more fragile than Pakistan, Nigeria, and Libya – countries with substantial problems with political violence, institutional instability, inability of the state to provide security for significant parts of the population, and getting progressive worse in recent years.

Is it useful?

Finally, what use is it to rank states? In response to the chronic problems found amongst the most under-developed and conflict-ridden country cases, state fragility research and policy has almost exclusively privileged a state-building and democratization approach. But typical perspectives on state fragility and failure overlook a key point: the ‘anatomy’ of fragility and failure differs substantially across the diverse selection of likely states.

The disparity in causes and categorization make this term relatively meaningless for research or policy; the international response to state fragility is to build the capacity and reach of governing and military institutions; this in turn creates a higher likelihood of state-initiated violence and civilian risk. Indeed, modern African conflict demonstrates how political institutions – mandated and provided for by development aid – often incentivises political elite violence, which now dominates conflict profiles across the continent. Given the centrality of peace and conflict to the post-2015 humanitarian and development agendas, policy makers and researchers must acknowledge both how conflict has changed in developing states, and how institutions incentivise conflict to occur.

Weekly Data Updates

In May, ACLED launched a pilot of weekly data updates for select Sub-Saharan African states. Conflict data is circulated and published online each week to provide our most comprehensive and realtime information on African political violence to date.

A full list of the countries which will be covered each week is available online at http://www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2014/

Check online for weekly data updates, or sign up for email alerts via our website to receive files directly.

Support

This material is based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U.S. Army Research Office grant number W911NF-09-1-0077 under the Minerva Initiative of the U.S. Department of Defense.

Sources

Conflict Trends reports are compiled from ACLED data and draw on news sources, civil society reports, and academic and policy analyses. Full details of sources and coding processes are available online at acleddata.com.