Democracy Aid in Difficult Contexts: Assessing Strategies and Impact

Ashley Moran, Brooke Escobar, and Daniel Robles-Olson

October 2016
Democracy Aid in Difficult Contexts: Assessing Strategies and Impact

Editor

Ashley Moran directs the Strauss Center’s state fragility initiative and the CCAPS program’s democratic governance research team.

Chapter Authors

Brooke Escobar is assistant data manager at AidData and a research associate on the Strauss Center’s CCAPS program.

Daniel Robles-Olson is a research associate on the Strauss Center’s CCAPS program.

Ashley Moran directs the Strauss Center’s state fragility initiative and the CCAPS program’s democratic governance research team.

Executive Summary

Nascent democratic governments in Africa face considerable—and growing—challenges from climate change, violent non-state actors, demographic shifts, and other global trends that stress state capacity and resources. International aid could provide critical support to build the governance capacity of these states to meet the diverse security challenges they face. Encouraging recent studies on U.S. democracy aid worldwide found that democracy aid programs overall do have a positive impact on democratic development—and they have the most impact in Africa. Yet there has been little empirical evidence on how democracy aid has brought about this success. This study thus explores the causal mechanisms through which democracy aid impacts democratic development in Africa, focusing on two particularly challenging contexts: countries recovering from conflict and countries facing low human development. Across both contexts, the study finds that formal institutional reforms alone do not advance democratic development; instead, democracy aid increases a country’s democratic development only if aid includes a focus on building informal democratic processes and norms. Study findings offer new empirical analysis to inform the design of democracy aid programs in difficult contexts and maximize their effectiveness in building governance capacity and societal resilience.
# Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Assessing Effectiveness of Democracy Aid in Africa  
*By Ashley Moran*

DEMOCRACY AID AND SECURITY .................................................................................1  
THE DEMOCRACY DEBATE......................................................................................2  
METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................4  
  RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..........................................................................................4  
  CASE MATCHING ..................................................................................................5  
FINDINGS ....................................................................................................................9  
  AID BUILDING INFORMAL DEMOCRATIC NORMS .............................................10  
  AID SUPPORTING DECENTRALIZATION ...............................................................11  
  AID SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES .................................12  
  AID LINKING DIVERSE OBJECTIVES ................................................................13  
PROSPECTIVE IMPACT .............................................................................................14

Chapter 2. Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts: Rwanda and Burundi  
*By Brooke Escobar*

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................15  
CONTEXT AND REGIONAL LITERATURE ..................................................................16  
  OVERVIEW OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI DURING THE STUDY PERIOD .............16  
    Rwanda .................................................................................................................16  
    Burundi ................................................................................................................17  
DEMOCRATIC PROMOTION IN POST-CONFlict COUNTRIES ....................................18  
  The Post-Conflict Context: Challenges and Opportunities .....................................18  
  Democracy Promotion Programming ......................................................................21  
  Implications for Post-Conflict Case Studies .............................................................25
Chapter 3. Aid Effectiveness in Countries with Low Human Development: Benin and Guinea

By Daniel Robles-Olson

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................141

CONTEXT AND REGIONAL LITERATURE ..........................................................142

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE CONTEXT OF LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ..........142

Poverty through the Governance Lens ..........................................................142

Governance through the Development Lens ..................................................144

Governance and Human Development in the 21st Century ................................146

Governance Aid Effectiveness in a Low Human Development Context ................148

Implications for Low HDI Countries ..................................................................150

BENIN’S DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORY ..........................................................150

A Crisis in the Regime Brings Change .............................................................150

Civil Society Steps Up to the Plate at the National Conference .........................151

Ethnic and Social Fractionalization Brings Stability and Stalemate ......................154

GUINEA’S DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORY ..........................................................156

Isolated and Armed, the Military Strengthens ....................................................156

Volatility and Lack of Regional Capacity Prevent Democratic Consolidation ..........158

DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORIES COMPARED ..................................................159

Common Trends ...............................................................................................159

Major Differences .............................................................................................160

ASSESSING AID INTERVENTIONS .............................................................161

FORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: REPRESENTATION .........................162

Aid in Guinea: Institutional Reforms Focused on Representation .........................165
Table of Figures

Figure 1. First stage of matching process for case selection .................................................................6
Figure 2. Second stage of matching process for case selection (Guinea-Benin results) .........................7
Figure 3. Second stage of matching process for case selection (Burundi-Rwanda results) .................8
Figure 4. Democracy aid for institutional reforms focused on representation
           in Rwanda and Burundi, 1990-2010 .........................................................................................52
Figure 5. Conclusion on Hypothesis 1 for Rwanda and Burundi .......................................................83
Figure 6. Conclusion on Hypothesis 2 for Rwanda and Burundi .....................................................106
Figure 7. Conclusion on Hypothesis 3 for Rwanda and Burundi .....................................................136
Figure 8. Democracy aid for institutional reforms focused on representation
           in Guinea and Benin, 1990-2010 ..........................................................................................163
Figure 9. Conclusion on Hypothesis 1 for Guinea and Benin ..........................................................176
Figure 10. Democracy aid for institutional reforms focused on checks and balances
           in Guinea and Benin, 1990-2010 ..........................................................................................178
Figure 11. Conclusion on Hypothesis 2 for Guinea and Benin .......................................................191
Figure 12. Democracy aid for informal democratic processes in Guinea and Benin, 1990-2010 ....192
Figure 13. Conclusion on Hypothesis 3 for Guinea and Benin .......................................................200
Chapter 1. Assessing Effectiveness of Democracy Aid in Africa

By Ashley Moran

Alongside the Third Wave of democratization in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, significant scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the contexts within which democracy may grow or atrophy. This research has reached a degree of consensus about a range of factors that impact democratic consolidation, agreeing that on average democracy grows in countries experiencing economic growth\(^1\) and in those buttressed by democratic neighbors,\(^2\) while democracy is slower to take root in environments with conflict\(^3\) or social cleavages.\(^4\)

An additional line of inquiry began in recent years to assess whether international aid to promote these democratic changes is indeed effective in doing so. Landmark recent studies on U.S. democracy assistance worldwide found that democracy aid overall does have a positive impact on democratic development—and it has the most impact in Africa.\(^5\)

Yet while research to date has made strides in identifying the contextual factors that impact democratic development, and in affirming that democracy aid contributes to that development, it has not identified empirically how democracy aid has brought about this success. The questions remain: what are the crucial defining features of a successful democracy promotion effort? Why does the same level of investment in similarly situated countries not produce comparable democratic gains? This CCAPS study thus seeks to identify the causal mechanisms through which democracy aid positively impacts democratic development in a set of African countries.

**DEMOCRACY AID AND SECURITY**

Understanding what drives the success of democracy promotion programs has significant potential implications for U.S. and international investments in promoting good governance in Africa. The U.S. administration’s FY 2017 budget request for governance assistance in Africa is $343 million—a 96 percent increase from FY 2015 actual figures.\(^6\) And the rising level of U.S. governance assistance seen in Africa is seen globally as well, with the administration requesting $2.7 billion globally for governance assistance in FY 2017, compared to $1.9 billion spent in FY 2015.\(^7\) Having empirical evidence on the causal mechanism through which democracy aid most directly impacts governance quality could help policy planners allocate democracy aid funds for maximum impact.

Moreover, effective governance reform in Africa could reduce the need for external military or humanitarian interventions in fragile African states. The international community often provides humanitarian relief or conflict response in states that lack the capacity to execute these efforts on their own. Nascent democratic governments in Africa face considerable—and growing—challenges from climate change, violent non-state actors, demographic shifts, and other global
trends that stress state capacity and resources. Already 19 African countries are labeled as “extreme” or “high” fragility states, with an additional 18 earning a lower but still unstable warning of “moderate” fragility. Democracy aid could provide critical support to build the capacity of these states to handle the diverse challenges they face, bolstering institutional and societal resilience, while reducing the need for U.S. military or humanitarian intervention in the future.

At its core, this study investigates the origin of change in a political system. There is a vigorous academic debate over whether political change is shaped and determined by the formal institutions or the informal norms and practices at work in a political system. This study seeks to inform this debate by assembling empirical evidence on democracy aid programs over time in a range of contexts to examine the causal mechanisms through which democracy aid impacts the political system.

**THE DEMOCRACY DEBATE**

Prior studies and theories on democratic development put forward two competing arguments regarding what shapes change in a political system. These theories, broadly defined, differ in whether they see democratic development as being driven by changes to formal government institutions or by changes to informal processes and norms in the broader political context. The logic behind these theories reflects two distinct assumptions about the causal mechanism through which change occurs in a political system and thus through which democracy aid could potentially impact democratic development.

The first set of theories on democratic development highlights the role of formal institutions in democratic transformation. This literature argues that institutions provide the decisive parameters for guiding political change and overcoming challenges to democratic transition and consolidation. Advocates for this line of reasoning famously advance institutional solutions to alleviate societal conflict, manage ethnic divisions, construct political identities and promote social cohesion, and generally guide society toward a stable democracy. In this thinking, institutions fill an irreplaceable role in structuring relations in society and offering a credible way to engage the diverse actors that must be involved if the democratic project is to succeed; formal institutions are thus the central mechanism by which democratic change takes root.

This line of reasoning about the cause of political change could likewise inform assessments of the mechanisms by which democracy aid contributes to this change. In prioritizing the role of institutions, this literature implies that the crucial factor in the success of democracy promotion efforts would be the legal and policy changes promoted in formal institutions, which in turn structure the choices and relations of societal actors, thereby moving them toward democracy. Thus, if this approach is correct, similar countries experiencing successful versus unsuccessful democratic progress should show a divergence in the type of institutional reforms promoted in those countries.
The second set of theories on democratic development has a wider lens, underscoring the influential role played by the broader context within which institutions operate in a political system. This literature moves beyond assessing formal structural and legal changes in institutions to consider how informal processes and norms impact the behavior of institutions and actors in that society. This literature asserts that formal institutions are not as independent as they may appear, with their actions and impact instead being shaped by the broader context within which they are organized in relation to each other. Hall and Taylor, for example, note that the political system, and thus political change, involves both formal and informal processes that link diverse sectors of government and society within a unified structure; this complex combination of factors thus generates ‘distinctive’ outcomes in each location.\textsuperscript{15}

A central facet of this second set of literature, then, is its assertion that the same institutional reforms will have different outcomes in different contexts. This underscores the unique context and trajectory of each country—a uniqueness determined by the particular series of historical events and current conditions in that country.\textsuperscript{16} Lipset and Rokkan go so far as to argue that formal institutions are inconsequential and that it is instead these key moments in history that set the course and determine future outcomes for each country.\textsuperscript{17}

This second line of reasoning about the cause of political change would also frame our understanding of how democracy aid may contribute to such change. In asserting that change arises through the complex set of formal and informal processes that make up a state’s institutional landscape, this literature implies that democratization efforts cannot focus on reforming formal institutions alone, but must also change the informal patterns of behavior that could impact democratic consolidation. If this literature is correct, similar countries experiencing successful versus unsuccessful democratic progress should likewise diverge in how democracy aid in each country sought to develop those informal democratic norms and domestic support for democratic change.

So which is it: Are formal institutions the lynchpin to democratic development? Or are informal processes and norms equally if not more important? In terms of how democracy aid may influence the process of democratic development, the answer may lie somewhere in between. Yet to understand when and how democracy aid successfully impacts democratic progress—through formal institutions, informal norms, or both—requires an analysis of the strategies that democracy aid programs have employed to advance change in these systems through various formal and informal channels.

Importantly, prior studies on democracy aid have found that the environment in which democratic development advances most consistently is not always the environment in which democracy aid has the most impact. Initial studies found, for example, that democracy aid has a positive impact in countries with high levels of ethnic fragmentation and in countries with low levels of human development\textsuperscript{18}—both of which are contexts known to challenge democratic development more generally. This underscores the need to better understand not only what contexts are ripe for democratic development generally, but what contributes to that development.
at different points in democratic consolidation. The factors that spur democratic advancements in the early days of a democracy—after conflict or under new political and economic institutions—may not be the same dynamics that drive democratic development in the later stages of a democracy. Specific democracy aid interventions, then, may also have greater or lesser effect at these different stages of a democracy.

This research project considers two broad mechanisms theorized to impact democratic development—formal institutions and informal norms—and within this framework examines how democracy aid leverages these mechanisms in varied contexts of democratic development.

**METHODOLOGY**

Parsing out which of these theorized causal mechanisms is at work in successful democracy promotion requires an examination of empirical evidence from democracy promotion efforts in varied contexts and at varied stages of democratic development. This project thus examines the impact of democracy aid in paired countries with similar socioeconomic and political conditions and dissimilar democratic outcomes. The case studies seek to identify which democracy and governance programs—under what conditions—had the most impact in selected African countries and to examine the causal mechanisms at work.

The case studies examine democracy aid programs and strategies implemented for two decades after 1990 by four major donors working in all case study countries—the United States, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank—as well as other major donors of democracy aid in each country. This aims to capture the majority of democracy aid in each country while also allowing comparisons of several donors across all countries under study. Most prior studies assessing democracy promotion have considered only a single donor. This study’s consideration of democracy aid from multiple donors aims to provide a more complete picture of democracy aid in each country and thus the best prospects at capturing the potential causal mechanism linking democracy aid to changes in a country’s level of democratic development.

Data on democracy aid programs and impacts has been collected through donors’ program planning and evaluation documents; indicators of democracy aid and democratic development; indicators of socioeconomic conditions that could impact democratic development; and qualitative research on each study country.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The research questions aim to assess whether approaches to democracy promotion varied between similar countries that have experienced successful and unsuccessful democratic change. Any variations are then assessed as to whether they provide evidence for different theoretical explanations of what causes political change. In doing so, the study examines the causal mechanisms argued by theories on formal institutions (i.e. whether promoting particular types of
institutional changes proved critical) and theories on informal norms (i.e. whether accounting for informal patterns of behavior and interacting contextual factors proved critical).

To achieve this, the study considers three related but distinct arguments found in democracy literature on the role of democratic institutions and norms. This study explores whether there is empirical evidence for any or all of the following arguments:

1. Democracy aid programs that increase the representativeness of formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

2. Democracy aid programs that increase checks and balances across formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

3. Democracy aid programs that build informal democratic processes and norms will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

We thus assign each aid program reviewed in this study to one of these three categories of democracy aid. In the first category, aid programs that increase the representativeness of formal government institutions include those supporting elections, power-sharing mechanisms, public participation mechanisms, and decentralization as a means of increasing the representativeness and responsiveness of government. In the second category, aid programs that increase checks and balances across formal government institutions include those seeking to improve horizontal checks and balances, vertical checks and balances, and bureaucratic accountability and transparency. In the third category, aid programs that build informal democratic processes and norms include those supporting civil society organizations, civic participation, and independent media. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a detailed accounting of each program assigned to each of these categories in each case study country. Appendix A describes the decision rules and evidence we use in analyzing these aid programs and determining if we reject or fail to reject each of the three hypotheses for each case pairing.

The case study design allows comparative analysis of these questions in several ways. It assesses differences in donor approaches over time in each country, differences in donor approaches across countries sharing similar contexts but different democratic outcomes, and differences in donor approaches across country pairs in different contexts.

**CASE MATCHING**

Because the case studies explore how the design of democracy aid impacts its effectiveness in contributing to the overall level of democracy in a country, it is critical that other factors that could potentially explain variations in democracy levels across countries are as equal as possible between paired cases.

The case matching process thus identified pairs of countries in Africa with similar socioeconomic and political conditions and dissimilar democratic outcomes. Countries were
paired using a three-stage statistical matching process. Figures 1 through 3 show a comparison of countries on the variables used to match countries for this study, and Appendix B describes the indicators and sources used for each variable.

In the first stage, all countries receiving democracy aid in Africa were matched on the similarity of their democracy trends prior to the start of the study in 1990. This includes measures of short- and long-term democratic trends. Figure 1 shows the results for the Guinea-Benin and Burundi-Rwanda case pairings. In all figures, the selected cases are shown in their respective colors, and the cases that were not chosen are shown in gray to convey the range of possible country values for each indicator in each year. The time window used for matching is shown in the black box, and cases were selected to be similar in these time periods only. The closer the country lines are to each other, the better the match.

*Figure 1. First stage of matching process for case selection. All countries receiving democracy aid in Africa were matched on the similarity of their short- and long-term democracy trends prior to the start of the study in 1990. Below are results for the Guinea-Benin and Burundi-Rwanda case pairings.*

Source: All graphs included here were produced by Rich Nielsen based on indicators selected by the author.

In the second stage, countries with the most similar democratic starting points in 1990 were then paired according to their similarity on socioeconomic and political dynamics during the study period. This sought to account for alternative explanations for democratic development and key predictors of democracy aid allocation and effectiveness, including regional democratic diffusion, economic growth, ethnic fractionalization, conflict, trade, and military alliances. This statistical matching process produced a list of prospective case study pairs that were most similar on the matching criteria from these first two stages. Figures 2 and 3 show the results for the Guinea-Benin and Burundi-Rwanda case pairings.
Figure 2. Second stage of matching process for case selection (Guinea-Benin results). Countries with the most similar democratic starting points in 1990 were then paired based on their similarity on six, equally weighted indicators of socioeconomic and political dynamics during the study period. Below are the results for the Guinea-Benin case pairing.

Source: All graphs included here were produced by Rich Nielsen based on indicators selected by the author.
Figure 3. Second stage of matching process for case selection (Burundi-Rwanda results)

Source: All graphs included here were produced by Rich Nielsen based on indicators selected by the author.
In the third stage, we selected final pairs that also had similar levels of total democracy aid during the two-decade study period (1990-2010) and dissimilar levels of democratic development by the end of the study period. To the extent possible, final pairs were selected such that they also had similar colonial history, Cold War alliances, natural resource wealth, population density, and land size—all features that can impact the practical implementation or uptake of democratic reforms.

The country pairs selected for study represent two different contextual settings shown in scholarly literature to have important influences on democratic development: first, countries recovering from conflict (Burundi and Rwanda) and, second, countries with low human development (Benin and Guinea). The study is thus able to explore how democracy promotion efforts respond to varying degrees of conflict and socioeconomic constraints.

**FINDINGS**

At the start of the study period in 1990, these four countries were at similarly promising but fragile points in their democratic transitions. Benin and Guinea were taking initial steps away from authoritarian rule yet also grappling with low human development, slow economic development, and challenges associated with governing an ethnically diverse and rapidly growing population. Two decades later, however, Benin had largely consolidated its democracy, while Guinea was still struggling to do so. For their part, in 1990, leaders in Burundi and Rwanda had likewise begun transitions to democracy—transitions stopped short by political assassinations and genocide. By the early 2000s, both countries had reached peace agreements and restarted their democratic transitions, yet by 2010, Burundi had made substantial democratic progress while Rwanda’s democratic progress continued to stagnate.

What explains these divergent democratic outcomes among countries that share so many similarities? In particular, what role has international aid played in contributing to these outcomes?

The following chapters detail case studies by Brooke Escobar and Daniel Robles-Olson exploring these very questions. Escobar’s study of Burundi and Rwanda delves into the implementation of democracy aid in countries recovering from conflict, while Robles-Olson’s study of Benin and Guinea explores the effectiveness of democracy aid in countries with low human development. These cases highlight how the design and impact of aid programs contributed to the generally positive democratic trajectories seen in Burundi and Benin and to the slower and at times stalled democratic development seen in Rwanda and Guinea. Together, these cases produce several key findings summarized below regarding the potential impact of democracy aid on democratic development.
This study’s central finding is that democracy aid increases a country’s democratic development only if aid includes a focus on building informal democratic processes and norms. There is evidence for this across all four countries studied. When a country received sustained civil society aid and successfully implemented associated reforms, the country saw democratic progress both in the civil society sector and in its democratic development overall. This is seen in both Burundi and Benin where early and sustained investments in civil society development aligned with increasing democratic progress. This is also seen later in Guinea where an infusion of civil society aid from 2006 through the end of the study period coincided with notable increases in democratic development both in the civil society sector and overall. Importantly, in all three of these countries, this progress in civil society development and overall democratic development was seen even while the countries experienced mixed or declining results in building governance capacity. This underscores that it was progress in civil society development that drove progress in democratic development overall. Importantly, this study finds that this critical progress in civil society development corresponded with donors’ aid to this sector.

Conversely, when a country had little or no sustained aid building informal democratic norms, it made little to no progress on democratic development during that time—even when it made progress in implementing formal institutional reforms. This is seen in Rwanda where aid building informal democratic norms was limited and inconsistent, and where democratic progress was equally lacking. This is also seen in Guinea before 2006 when there was no aid for civil society development and little democratic progress during those years. It was not until donors focused on building informal democratic norms after 2006 that Guinea began to see gains in democratic development. Taken together, these four cases provide compelling evidence that democracy aid building informal democratic processes and norms is key to advancing overall democratic development.

Democracy aid building formal government institutions does not advance democratic development on its own. Unlike aid to the civil society sector—which advanced overall democratic development in some cases even when there was not progress in the governance sector, aid to the governance sector did not advance overall democratic development on its own. As described in the sections below, both Rwanda and Guinea received substantial aid for decentralization, and made notable progress in creating decentralized institutions, yet these institutional reforms did not translate to progress in democratic development overall. It was not until Guinea began receiving substantial aid building informal democratic norms that the country saw improvements in its democratic development.

Democracy aid in Rwanda also included a sizable focus on strengthening national government institutions and checks on the executive. This aid succeeded in bolstering legislative and judicial bodies in Rwanda, yet—without commensurate changes to the informal norms guiding actors’ behavior within these newly strengthened institutions—these institutions continued to defer to
the executive branch. Again, the considerable gains made in institutional reform in Rwanda did not translate to progress in democratic development overall.

**Delayed introduction of aid building informal democratic norms risks undermining its success.** As noted above, this study finds that successful implementation of aid building informal democratic norms was a requisite component of aid flows that contributed to democratic development. This does not mean, however, that aid for informal democratic norms can be successfully implemented in all cases. Guinea provides an important example of how the successful implementation of civil society aid late in the study period contributed to a decided shift in the country’s democratic trajectory. Rwanda, however, provides an example where substantial civil society aid was introduced seemingly too late in the democratic transition to succeed. In Rwanda, donors focused first and primarily on building formal government institutions. When donors turned to building informal democratic norms in earnest later in the study period, patterns of behavior within institutions were largely already set, and prospective partners in civil society were limited, resulting in most of these aid projects being cancelled or completed without achieving their targeted results.

Why did delayed civil society aid succeed in Guinea when such a tactic failed in Rwanda? One clear difference between the two countries that may have had an impact is that the delayed civil society aid in Guinea started just before the democratic opening that occurred with the 2008 death of Guinea’s semi-authoritarian President Conté. Rwanda had no such democratic opening during the introduction of substantial civil society aid there. Thus while building informal democratic norms is integral to the ability of democracy aid to impact democratic development, it is not guaranteed that the introduction of this civil society aid will be successful at all stages of a democratic transition. The varied experiences of Rwanda and Guinea in this regard provide a cautionary lesson to consider in designing future democracy aid programs.

**AID SUPPORTING DECENTRALIZATION**

In Rwanda and Guinea, donors saw decentralization as a key step in countering the colonial- and authoritarian-era practice of using the centralized bureaucracy for patronage and political control. This took on added importance in these countries, for varying reasons. With Guinea facing markedly low human development, it was clear that centralized governance had failed to meet the basic needs of much of the population, and decentralization had the potential to make government more responsive and effective. With Rwanda recovering from ethnic conflict, decentralization offered a way to ensure the new government represented and protected the interests of all parts of society. These case studies produce two clear findings related to aid for decentralization.

**Decentralization did not increase democratic development when civil society did not have the capacity to use the newly decentralized, participatory mechanisms of government.** Aid to both Rwanda and Guinea focused heavily on increasing the representativeness of government institutions—and, in particular, on decentralization as a tool for increasing the representativeness
and responsiveness of government. This strong focus on decentralization alone, however, was not enough to impact overall democracy levels in Rwanda or Guinea. The countries thus achieved decentralization, but this did not lead to democratization. Why? Evidence from both countries suggests that, without simultaneously building civil society capacity, civil society remained weak and unable to fully engage with or leverage these decentralized government institutions. The decentralization that aid achieved through formal institutional reforms thus did not have the desired impact on engaging civil society, making government more responsive to public needs, or increasing democratic development overall.

**Decentralization did not increase government effectiveness or overall democratic development when the central government retained financial and policymaking power.**

Both Rwanda and Guinea achieved substantial decentralization. The decentralization aid to these countries, however, sought primarily to use decentralization as a tool for increasing the representativeness and responsiveness of government, for example by establishing participatory budgeting processes or building local government capacity. Decentralization aid thus included little (in the case of Guinea) or no (in the case of Rwanda) explicit focus on establishing local government institutions as a check on the national government, for example by devolving responsibility for public expenditure management. Thus, both countries saw substantial progress in creating the institutions of decentralized government, but there was little devolution of financial or policymaking power from the central government to these local government institutions.

The Rwandan government asserted—and donors implicitly agreed—that this tight control over the policymaking process was necessary to ensure that the country did not collapse back into conflict. The Guinean government likewise asserted that such control was necessary during the country’s years of instability. Yet in both cases, this centralized control undermined the ability of decentralized institutions to play their intended role in the democratic system. This is a cautionary lesson for future institutional reforms designed to promote democracy in post-conflict and crisis-prone countries. Future aid programs must ensure that real devolution of power accompanies any efforts to decentralize government institutions.

### AID SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES

**A lack of progress in bureaucratic accountability can undermine other institutional reforms.** In Guinea most aid for formal institutional reforms focused on decentralization. The limited and late focus on building bureaucratic accountability and horizontal checks across the national government left the strong executive largely unchecked for most of the study period. Thus despite the strengthening of local government capacity in Guinea, the national executive had limited capacity for democratic governance and limited incentive to democratize.

Similarly, in Rwanda, much of the country’s aid for formal institutional reforms focused on decentralization and horizontal checks and balances—efforts that were largely successful in technical terms. Yet without a robust focus on simultaneously building bureaucratic
accountability, these successful institutional reforms in other areas were insufficient to check the formal and informal sources of executive power.

In contrast, in Benin, aid for formal institutional reforms focused first and chiefly on creating horizontal checks on the executive and building bureaucratic accountability. Though Benin had a comparatively stronger and more professional bureaucracy at its time of democratic transition, democracy aid nonetheless focused early on shoring up the accountability, transparency, and checks related to the national bureaucracy and executive. This allowed greater oversight of a strong executive and ensured greater checks on all governing institutions in a political system seen as fractionalized and heavily partisan.

**Corruption erodes democratic progress directly but also indirectly by undermining implementation of democracy aid targeting formal institutional reforms.** This is most striking in Guinea, where corruption reflected the central barrier to advancing institutional reforms. Yet aid interventions focused primarily on other aspects of government reform—namely decentralization and vertical checks and balances—and turned in earnest to anti-corruption programs and bureaucratic accountability only very late in the study period after the 2008 coup. The negative impact that corruption had on Guinea’s democratic progress generally and on aid program success in particular highlights that starting aid programs earlier in the area of bureaucratic accountability and transparency could have paid dividends in advancing other aid programs and democratization more broadly.

In contrast, in Benin, aid programs focused early on building transparency and accountability in the national executive as a way to increase the proper functioning and legitimacy of the democratic system. In doing so, these programs attempted to harness the bureaucratic strength in Benin held over from the years of authoritarianism, while eliminating the accompanying legacies of corruption and political patronage.

These two lessons convey that aid programs must address bureaucratic and executive deficiencies alongside or before seeking to create other checks on the executive. This is true in all countries—even, and indeed particularly as Escobar notes, in those countries where the executive is strong at the start of the democratic transition.

### AID LINKING DIVERSE OBJECTIVES

**Integrated democracy programming can prevent capacity deficits in one part of the democratic system from undermining progress made in other parts of the democratic system.** In both Benin and Burundi—which saw positive democratic trajectories—more individual democracy aid programs pursued activities that advanced multiple democratization goals simultaneously. In these countries, USAID and UNDP in particular had many aid programs that each sought to advance at least two and sometimes all three of the broad goals of democracy aid studied here: increasing the representativeness of formal institutions, increasing checks and balances across formal institutions, and building informal democratic norms.
In Guinea and Rwanda, on the other hand, aid programs were designed to focus predominantly on only one of these democratization goals at a time, with few programs that integrated activities across these goals within a single program. Particularly given the findings noted earlier—that substantial progress in institutional reforms in Guinea and Rwanda did not lead to democratic development without commensurate progress in civil society, and that progress reforming some institutions was undermined by deficits that remained in unreformed institutions—the integrated program designs seen in Benin and Burundi may be an important way for donors to ensure that progress made by aid in one part of the democratic system is not undermined by deficits in another part of the democratic system.

**Civil society may be a particularly effective means through which donors can link democratic and economic development objectives in countries with low human development.** In both Benin and Guinea, donors took deliberate steps to link democracy aid to economic development objectives in the country. For example, donors focused decentralization aid on developing participatory development plans and improving service delivery, focused bureaucratic transparency and accountability aid on improving the management of public expenditures, and focused civil society aid on engaging citizens in implementing development projects. Yet in Benin, donors focused civil society aid not only on engaging citizens in general development initiatives but also on creating economic and leadership opportunities for groups that faced barriers to economic and political participation. Such democracy aid programs may be particularly important in countries with low human development where, as Robles-Olson notes, poverty often fuels rural-to-urban migration, indirectly diluting the strength of poor constituencies once concentrated in rural areas but now diffused across urban areas. Democracy aid programs like those seen in Benin, which not only link democratic and economic objectives, but also build the advocacy skills and mobilization power of politically and economically marginalized groups, are well designed for countries with low human development and should be expanded in the future.

**PROSPECTIVE IMPACT**

The human and financial stakes are high in democracy promotion. It is not enough to know which contexts are most ripe or hostile for democratic development. Effective democracy promotion also requires knowing how to best design democracy aid programs to work within these external constraints.

Donors must know not only *that* democracy aid and democratic progress are related in a particular context but also *how* democracy aid is most effectively designed to meet the particular needs of that context. This study provides new empirical analysis of the factors driving political change in difficult contexts, aiming to support the design of democracy aid programs and potentially help maximize their effectiveness in building governance capacity and societal resilience.
Chapter 2. Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts: Rwanda and Burundi

By Brooke Escobar

INTRODUCTION

Rwanda and Burundi were once described as “false twins” by a leading scholar on the two countries. This description is apt given that no two countries on the African continent have such similar histories and ethnic makeups, and yet neither have any two countries diverged so resolutely in how they weave ethnicity together with democracy. Rwanda and Burundi each consist of approximately 85-90% Hutu, 10-14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. They have similar climates, population densities (which are both among the highest in Africa), economies, religious backgrounds, and colonial histories. Most significantly, though, both Rwanda and Burundi have borne the cost of massive violent conflicts over the last 50 years between Tutsis and Hutus. Perhaps even worse, these similarities exacerbated ethnic conflict in each country because of the demonstration effects of conflict in the other—when Hutus came to power in Rwanda and carried out massive violence against Tutsis, Tutsis in Burundi would use violence to keep power because they feared similar violence from their own Hutu populations, and vice versa.

Similarly, both countries began 1990 on the very end of the political freedom spectrum: Neither country had a functioning democracy, and political and civil rights abuses based on ethnicity were rampant. For that year, Freedom House rated both countries as “Not Free.” Over the next twenty years, Rwanda and Burundi both received a great deal of attention and aid money from the international community to help them along the democratic pathway. By 2010, Burundi had made significant progress (moving to “Partly Free” according to Freedom House ratings), but Rwanda had stagnated with few improvements on the democracy front, and it continues to be rated “Not Free.”

What role has international aid played in these outcomes? Which aspects of democracy and governance aid were more effective at promoting democracy in this post-conflict context? This case study will delve into the causal mechanisms through which democracy promotion programs have a positive impact on democratic development in Burundi and Rwanda. In particular, it seeks to identify whether building formal institutions or fostering informal democratic norms contributes more effectively to democratic development.
CONTEXT AND REGIONAL LITERATURE

OVERVIEW OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI DURING THE STUDY PERIOD

RWANDA

Rwanda came into the 1990s with a one-party rule political system dominated by a Hutu party. In the early 1990s, President Juvénal Habyarimana, who had been president of Rwanda for nearly 20 years, started to open some political space for increased political debate and opposition—especially a higher degree of inclusion for Tutsi parties, including a multi-party constitution and power-sharing agreements. In 1994, however, President Habyarimana was assassinated in a plane crash. This event marked the beginning of a horrific genocide perpetuated by extremist Hutus—led by the political group Hutu Power—against Tutsis and moderate Hutus. In just three months over 800,000 people—mainly civilians—were killed by soldiers, militia members, local leaders, and even neighbors. This left approximately 13% of the population dead. The genocide came to an end when Tutsi rebels—the Rwandan Patriotic Army or RPA—fought their way into the capital and took power. After several rounds of peace accords, the transitional government was replaced by an elected constitutional government. The constitution passed in 2003 by national referendum set up a presidential, multi-party system with a bicameral legislature consisting of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and an independent judiciary headed by the national Supreme Court. Since the genocide, the Rwandan government has been dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the political wing of the RPA, and led by President Paul Kagame since 2000. The RPF remains the dominant party in the Rwandan government.

Some of the most important and far-reaching policies implemented by the Rwandan government are the laws focused on establishing Rwandan national unity—specifically in relation to ethnicity. After the genocide, the Rwandan government essentially banned reference to ethnicity and instead focused on generating a national sense of “Rwandaness.” Thus, no organizations, political parties, or government agencies were allowed to acknowledge, let alone discriminate because of, a person’s ethnicity. Ethnicity references disappeared from government documents and, ultimately in 2002, a new law was passed outlawing “divisionism,” which included most actions that could create conflict between people. As such, government positions are now required to be allocated based on merit, and political parties and civil society are banned from considering ethnicity in their appointments and activities.

To date, the government of Rwanda is routinely accused of using this divisionist law to restrict democratic space. The government has regularly denied political parties registration applications, claiming that the party’s ideology or the individuals in it are divisionist, endorse ethnic hatred, or are tied to the genocide. In the parliamentary elections in 2008, the RPF garnered 98% of the vote, but fearing those results belied an authoritarian nature, the regime reportedly reduced the official number to 78% and conceded 20% to other parties within its alliance. Similarly, both
times President Kagame has faced the ballot box, he received over 90% of the vote. Election returns such as these indicate that, while Rwanda may have democratic institutions on paper, in reality the country may be far away from real, pluralistic democracy.\textsuperscript{39}

Overall, the situation in Rwanda regarding democratic development was rather bleak by the end of the study period and continues to be so. For the last decade or more, observer reports have indicated that elections do not offer meaningful political choice to voters, that press freedom is limited, and civil liberties are not adequately protected, including accusations of manipulating the judicial system, intimidation, and even torture.\textsuperscript{40} As such, it is currently rated as “Not Free” using Freedom House’s ratings.

**BURUNDI**

At the beginning of 1990, Burundi was ruled by a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship led by Major Pierre Buyoya. Buyoya led a series of political reforms aimed at ending exclusionary policies against Hutus, culminating in establishing a government of national unity led by equal numbers of Hutus and Tutsis, establishing a new constitution in 1991, and holding Burundi’s first ever democratic elections in 1993. The ruling Tutsi party though was decisively defeated in the elections and Melchior Ndadayue, a Hutu, was elected President. Only three months later, Tutsi extremists assassinated Ndadayue in a failed coup attempt. The assassination sparked off a civil war in Burundi that lasted ten years and claimed approximately 300,000 lives. In 1994, the parliament appointed a second Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, but he was killed only months later in the same plane crash that killed Rwandan President Habyarimana. In 1996, Buyoya took power again—this time through a bloodless coup—and fighting continued with several failed attempts by the international community to halt the violence. Peace negotiations commenced in 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania with seventeen different factions present, but even then not all political and military factions agreed to the terms, so fighting continued until 2003. Finally, in 2005 a new constitution was established through referendum and national elections followed later that year.\textsuperscript{41} In the 2005 election, Pierre Nkurunziza became Burundi’s president, and he was re-elected again in 2010. However, the results of the 2010 election help indicate the weak state of Burundian democracy by the end of the study period, Nkurunziza was elected with 91.6% of the vote. His overwhelming victory was largely because opposition parties accused the government of interfering with the electoral process and subsequently the parties withdrew from the elections.\textsuperscript{42}

As part of the power-sharing arrangement negotiated in 2000 and again in 2004, Burundi made a radically different choice from Rwanda on how to address the ethnicity issue that had so recently sparked violence in its society. Rather than denying ethnicity all together and outlawing any reference to it, Burundi chose to codify ethnicity directly into its entire governmental system. Burundi’s power-sharing arrangement is based on the idea of minority over-representation as both a way to guarantee representation to the Tutsi rulers and military so they would be willing to give up some power, as well as a way to avoid the tyranny of the majority. As such, the peace
agreement sought to strike a balance between Hutu and Tutsi representation in the executive and legislative branches of government and in the communal councils. Specifically, the President is assisted by two vice presidents (one of each ethnic group), and Tutsi representation cannot fall below 40% in either government office in general or in the National Assembly. For the Senate, representation between Hutu and Tutsi is strictly 50-50. At the local level, no more than 67% of mayors can come from any one ethnic group. Lastly, similar to Rwanda, women must make up at least 30% of the members of the National Assembly. Should any of these quotas fail to be filled naturally through election results, the imbalances are ‘rectified’ through co-opting the requisite number of seats.43

Despite some of the troubling signs in the 2010 elections, Burundi has successfully implemented a new constitution, established a participatory and vibrant civil society, and made enough improvements to move from a rating of “Not Free” to “Partly Free” according to Freedom House Status ratings during the study period.

The potential causes of democratic progress, or lack thereof, in post-conflict countries like Rwanda and Burundi are vigorously debated by academics and policymakers alike. The following sections outline first these debates for post-conflict countries in general, and then the particular salient factors that any analysis of democratic development in Rwanda and Burundi specifically should take into consideration.

**DEMOCRATIC PROMOTION IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES**

Democracy promotion in any context is at best difficult and formidable, but promoting democracy in post-conflict countries provides an even more unique set of challenges and opportunities for the international community. Donors must contend with a state that has often ceased to function as a state due to the breakdown of political, economic, or social institutions and norms. Given this set of constraints, donors must be both strategic and comprehensive in their approach to establishing, or re-establishing, democracy in a post-conflict situation. As part of this study, Rwanda and Burundi represent cases of democracy promotion in just such a post-conflict context. As such, this section reviews literature identifying unique factors that affect democracy aid effectiveness in post-conflict situations.

**THE POST-CONFLICT CONTEXT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

Democracy is often equated with the holding of free and fair elections. However, current democracy literature suggests that lasting democracy is of course much more than that. It involves stable, active democratic institutions and norms within a society to perpetuate the democracy into the future. Academic and policy research has written extensively on this topic in concert with world events. The literature emerged in two tranches: First, a large body of research was published in the aftermath of the Cold War and the subsequent “wave” of democratization in former Soviet countries and other places. Second, a more focused and comprehensive set of research emerged in the wake of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these sets of
research, though, recognize the unique challenges and opportunities that come with a post-conflict context. On the one hand, the aftermath of conflict not only leaves massive devastation to state infrastructure, institutions, and formal political arrangements, but it also destroys the basic fabric of society and often leaves the people with a deep distrust of other groups. Subsequently, the international community must address all of these challenges as a part of any effort to promote democracy and establish stability in the country. Post-conflict democracy promotion activities are therefore much more extensive than those in other contexts.

On the other hand, though, the existence of conflict and its resulting cessation provides an exceptional opportunity for the international community to directly influence domestic political structures that were not fulfilling their role in protecting and providing for the people. As donors enter the fray in an attempt to help the country deal with the aftermath of the conflict, they often get direct access to the country’s political leaders and have ample opportunities to use development finance to motivate these leaders to implement democratic reforms. This is particularly true if peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations are present in the country. Without the pretext of post-conflict peacebuilding, donors traditionally have very limited options to directly change a country’s current regime, which gives donors an important advantage when they are working with post-conflict countries. Furthermore, most democracies have emerged only after conflict—especially devastating conflict—has occurred. Conflict and its resulting destruction is one of the only situations where problematic military and political institutions can be effectively dismantled and where elites will settle on a new power arrangement. Post-conflict countries are also significantly more likely to fall (back) into conflict. As such, post-conflict settings are simultaneously among the most fertile and volatile grounds possible for new or fledgling democracies. Democracy promotion activities thus have the greatest chance of being effective in these difficult situations if they can avoid more conflict.

The Three Imperatives: Context, Commitment, and Sustainability

Existing literature on democracy promotion in post-conflict settings does not explicitly address whether building formal institutions or fostering informal democratic norms provides a more effective mechanism of advancing democracy in post-conflict countries, but it does coalesce around several important features for policy makers to consider.

The first imperative is that democracy promotion activities must be adapted to the country context in order to be successful. The cookie-cutter approach where donors try to apply western institutions and practices to other countries is bound to fail. Every country will have different formal and informal structures within which democracy must work, so donors must identify what those structures are and work with the local populations to find a democratic process that will fit within their society. Donors must first understand traditional sources of authority and governance and then incorporate these as much as possible into their democracy promotion activities. Additionally, donors should involve national actors in planning and implementation phases—including even historians and anthropologists—to make sure the plans are well adapted to the
country context. This process involves valuing local resources, knowledge, and information and using them wherever possible. More than anything else, the literature identifies this as one immutable condition for success in post-conflict democracy promotion.

The second imperative that is consistently highlighted in the existing literature is that donors need to exhibit clear and continuing commitment for their efforts in the post-conflict country. Building democratic processes and institutions does not happen overnight, so sustained support for the entire process is essential to successfully establishing democracy after conflict. Critics assert that donors often do not commit the necessary amount of resources or expend the required political will to stay in a country long enough to make peaceful, democratic processes self-sustaining. Instead, donors often flood a country with attention and resources immediately after the cessation of fighting, but that flow of resources prematurely peters out—especially once another conflict or country garners international attention, triggering donors to re-direct their resources to the new country. This leaves the original country in the middle of an unstable and incomplete consolidation process—one that is more likely to fail to continue along the democratic road.

The third and last imperative in post-conflict democracy promotion is that donors must focus on building the sustainability of the democratic processes they help set up within the country so these processes will continue once the donors exit. Given the initial state of damage to the country’s infrastructure, the institutions, and the society in general, donors often rely on international agencies or their own capacities to re-establish order and state functions within the country. However, this approach creates dependencies on international actors for activities that will then not be sustained once the international actors leave the country. For example, donors often effectively set up a host of workshops and seminars, and fund a multitude of NGOs, but the benefit of these activities and institutions can often dissipate as soon as the donor leaves. These activities act as temporary institutions that only function with direct donor support, so they do not contribute to the continuing democratization of the country. Even more damaging, often these imposed institutions stifle local initiatives and replace them with unsustainable international ones. Instead, the literature conveys, donors must build sustainable processes and institutions by building up local capacities that will continue to function and grow even after the donor leaves. Strategies to successfully build sustainable democratic processes often hinge on working with local actors and institutions instead of starting from scratch. For example, using local and indigenous methods of mediation and arbitration—where appropriate—to quell local disputes and prevent the eruption of violence can help establish sustainable judicial institutions. It can also be useful to incorporate regional interest groups—as opposed to only international ones—such as African interest groups as a way to increase sustainability. While it may be easier for donors in the short term to perform many of the services of the state with their own capacity, the real goal of democracy promotion should be to have these functions continue to work once the donors leave, so donors need to focus on building sustainable long-term capacity from the beginning as they design and implement their activities.
Beyond these overarching imperatives, the literature extensively outlines the major activities that donors must incorporate in their democracy promotion plans to eventually be successful in post-conflict countries. These activities include establishing order, building legitimacy, fostering democratic institutions, and paving the way for economic recovery. Given the complete breakdown of state and society, there is a general consensus among researchers and policymakers that agencies must implement these policies simultaneously to be most effective, though some authors are critical of donors’ and states’ capacity to do so.

Establishing Peace and Order: Dealing with the Security Sector

As it emerges from the fog of war, the state—and donors helping it—must not only deal with political reform, but must also establish order in an acceptable and equitable way. As donors enter a post-conflict country and work to support democracy, then, the first thing they need to address is the security of the state. As one notable researcher put it:

Whatever the specific form of the post-conflict effort to build democracy, one thing must be stressed above all others: no order, no democracy. Democracy cannot be viable (and neither can it be really meaningful) in a context where violence or the threat of violence is pervasive and suffuses the political calculations and fears of groups and individuals. Thus promotion of democracy in post-conflict situations cannot succeed without the rebuilding of order in these contexts, the task of democracy building and of peace implementation are inseparable. 58

With this in mind, donors must help the state re-establish this order. To begin with, this will likely include a DDR process (Disarmament of warring parties, Demobilization of combatants, and Reintegration of ex-combatants into society). Ultimately, the DDR process needs to control and demobilize any alternative source of violence from non-state actors—including militias, warlords, and private armies—and establish civilian control over the authorized army. By doing so, the state will open political space and incentives to use democracy to resolve conflict instead of using the threat of violence. 59 Similarly, donors need to help rebuild the capacity of the state to continue that order through developing the police force, the justice system, and even intelligence systems. These systems help increase the cost of resorting to violence for actors, so they are more likely to respect the peace—and people will have more trust that they will continue to respect the peace. 60 It is of particular import that these systems are in place before elections can take place. 61

Establishing Legitimacy: Elections

After the cessation of conflict, it is important to establish a legitimate government. Elections are usually considered the best political instrument to do so because they establish popularly
supported leadership and methods to transfer power. There are many aspects of elections that need to be carefully considered and designed to help ensure democratic success in a post-conflict country. First, there are a wide range of supporting institutions, processes, and norms that must be developed to accompany elections. As donors work with the state, it is important to not only focus on elections themselves, but also build up the supporting infrastructure needed for elections to contribute to continuing democracy—including processes like voter registration, political party development, civic education, and establishing an election commission and an election complaints system. The inclusion of marginalized groups such as women, youth, and people in rural areas in the election process is particularly critical in post-conflict environments.

The second aspect of elections that donors need to consider is the timing of the election. While donors may be anxious to hold elections as soon as possible, having elections too soon could cause the country to backslide into violence. Elections are meant to be a new form of competition for power, so they are inherently destabilizing. Without careful planning, they can serve as flashpoints for more conflict instead of being a way to resolve conflict. The literature reflects a general consensus that having elections within two years of the peace agreement is best practice, but it also reveals that there are many elements that donors and states should consider before citizens cast their ballots. Early elections—within a year of the peace agreement—tend to strengthen and rely on the leaders and groups who were involved in the fighting. Further, if a country has no history of democracy, then the supporting institutions and processes will not be well-established enough to support early elections. Despite these risks, practitioners in the field often push for elections as early as possible because they are in dire need of legitimate counterparts in local government that the people accept as leaders. The most extensive study on this subject suggests that the timing should be adjusted according to the country’s history with democratic processes. If the country has a history of democracy or already has democratic institutions that could support it, then holding elections as early as one year after the peace agreement should not increase the chance of backsliding. However, if the country has no history of democracy or no supporting institutions, then waiting roughly two years will help reduce the likelihood the country will return to violence. This additional time is essential to building up the democratic institutions and norms that must be built from scratch.

The third aspect to consider in elections is how national and regional elections are sequenced, as in which should be held first. In the literature, there are competing theories on which is best, though holding regional elections first seems to be the most widely supported theory. In that stream of thought, convening local elections first has a greater chance of enhancing local participation and bolstering democratic institutions before the high-stakes national elections take place. Regional elections should affect citizens more in their day-to-day lives, and the electoral success of both sides in different districts will help both parties feel empowered and therefore less likely to return to violence. In a competing theory, some researchers show that having national elections first can help reduce ethnically based political parties and pandering—especially if the country uses a federal system with multiple ethnicities. In this situation, having
regional elections first is thought to privilege regional nationalists more than broadly based political parties.\textsuperscript{73}

No matter how elections are timed or sequenced, though, a crucial aspect to election success is making sure the election does not become a winner-takes-all scenario. For elections in post-conflict countries to work, all major political parties must feel that they will have a voice in the political sphere after the election. If an opposition group begins to feel that they will likely lose the majority vote, and that they will therefore be shut out of government completely, then they no longer have an incentive to avoid using violence and will likely try to pre-empt or overturn the electoral process.\textsuperscript{74} Luckily, this sort of scenario can be addressed through different electoral systems. First-past-the-post systems—where two or more candidates compete for one seat, and the one with the most votes wins—often contribute to creating this winner-takes-all scenario. If a certain party rarely has a majority vote in any specific district or area, then they are most likely to lose for the foreseeable future. However, proportional representation electoral systems help guarantee representation to groups that do not necessarily have a majority in specific areas. As such, most current research suggest using a form of proportional representation (with a 5\% threshold) in post-conflict countries to help reduce backsliding and ensure diverse groups have a stake in the new government.\textsuperscript{75}

The last step in establishing legitimacy involves fostering broad public debate and consultation on a new constitution that is eventually voted on and implemented. As with elections, the constitution needs to give a stake in the system to every group that agrees to play—and continues to play—by the new democratic rules, and it needs to be adequately tailored to the local context.\textsuperscript{76}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Fostering Democratic Institutions: Formal and Informal}
\end{center}

Underpinning the entire democratization process must be a continual focus on building both formal and informal institutions that will support and perpetuate democracy in the country. The formal institutions include those associated most closely with the state and elections. For example, many researchers and policymakers highlight the importance of an independent Election Commission, an Election Complaints System, effective voter registration methods, an independent judiciary, an effective parliament, and an accountable executive. Such institutions are essential to conducting democratic processes and ensuring the elections are truly free and fair and that democratic reform unrolls in a controlled, sustainable manner.\textsuperscript{77} These institutions can be undermined by transitional leaders who do not want to lose control after the election, or by any other party that has the ability to fix the results, so donors and state actors must be vigilant to monitor the institutions’ implementation.\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, as noted, the democracy literature conveys that it is crucial that these institutions eventually rely on local capacity and processes for them to be truly sustainable. The only way these institutions can build democracy is if they continue when donors exit.\textsuperscript{79}
One specific formal institution the literature consistently highlights is the need for development of strong political parties. Having strong political parties makes the different political groups more likely to accept electoral competition as a new form of resolving conflict.\textsuperscript{80} However, exactly how to develop strong political parties has proved elusive to researchers and policymakers.\textsuperscript{81}

In addition to formal institutions, the state and international actors should also focus on building the democratic norms and social processes necessary for democracy to thrive. This is what many call “civil society.” Democracy literature focuses in particular on three core channels to building democratic norms in civil society. The first is the through development of free media. Free media can help foster public debate and encourage discussion of public policy issues by the masses, which are all important for effective elections.\textsuperscript{82} Specific activities focused on media could include advocating legal and regulatory reforms, buoying alternative media, supporting conflict resolution programming, training journalists, and funding media organizations.\textsuperscript{83}

A second key area of democratic norm development in post-conflict societies focuses on human rights. Conflict often breaks down society’s trust that human rights will be protected, so that trust must be re-established for democracy to flourish. Therefore donors often focus on developing norms and informal processes to support human rights through mechanisms such as setting up international human rights observation campaigns, advice on legal reforms, truth commissions, and aid to human rights organizations.\textsuperscript{84}

The third key area of democratic norm development in post-conflict societies focuses generally on building “civil society” by fostering research institutions, community organizations, and NGOs working in the country. These constitute the bulk of what most researchers call “civil society” and can play an important role in disseminating democratic norms and information and rebuilding trust in society. More recent literature on post-conflict democracy promotion emphasizes the critical importance of civil society, but also cautions that it is important to recognize that civil society can potentially be a limiting factor in democratization as well. Civil society can often mirror the divisions, strengths, and weaknesses of the larger conflict, so external support should try to build bridges across those divisions.\textsuperscript{85} In particular, donors should seek to support and foster cross-cutting community organizations. These associations mix citizens of diverse social, ethnic, or religious groups together. Such organizations will help reduce internal violence and build trust across groups in the aftermath of war.\textsuperscript{86}

---

\textbf{Paving the Way for Economic Recovery: Reform and Development}

Finally, the last group of programming activities that donors should seek to pursue in post-conflict contexts include activities that lead to economic recovery. This is particularly important for the long-term stability of the new democracy. The state needs to re-establish delivery of core services to its citizens and pursue market reforms and policies that will reduce unemployment and allow budget management.\textsuperscript{87} Economic recovery will help re-establish the state’s legitimacy and re-engage citizens in normal economic activity. In fact, fast economic growth during the
transition period can help specifically reduce the risk of backsliding to violence.\textsuperscript{88} It is particularly important to make sure reconstruction funds are disbursed widely and equitably to all groups in the country. Doing so will build local trust and acceptance, whereas selective disbursement can fuel the fire for more violence.\textsuperscript{89} Full economic recovery may nonetheless be an elusive goal given the damage to the country’s infrastructure as well as the state’s weak absorptive capacity,\textsuperscript{90} but even modest gains in economic growth could aid the democratization process in this particularly vulnerable post-conflict context.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-CONFLICT CASE STUDIES}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
This literature review for democracy promotion in post-conflict countries highlights the most critical issues donors should consider to enhance the effectiveness of their programs. As such, these issues will inform the analysis of aid programs in Rwanda and Burundi as the case study assesses their effectiveness. The specific dimensions that should be given considerable weight include the following:\tabularnewline
\hline
\textbullet \ Structure of aid design and implementation. Were the donor’s aid programs structured and implemented in a way that was adequately adapted to the recipient country’s context, signaled a strong commitment from the donor, and focused on sustainability?\tabularnewline
\hline
\textbullet \ Establishing peace and order. Did the donor help establish and maintain peace in the recipient country, and was peace established before democracy aid programs were implemented?\tabularnewline
\hline
\textbullet \ Establishing Legitimacy. Did the donor aid programs support elections in a way that allowed all political actors to win in some way so that the elections do not become a winner-take-all scenario? Did the sequencing of regional and national elections help create cohesive, pluralist political parties with high civic participation?\tabularnewline
\hline
\textbullet \ Fostering democratic institutions. Did the donor aid programs support formal and informal institutions that would move the country towards democratic development?\tabularnewline
\hline
\textbullet \ Paving the way for economic recovery. Did the donor help foster economic development so that political actors have legitimate economic opportunities outside the public sphere? Where reconstruction aid funds distributed equitably and widely?\tabularnewline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

When applicable, these issues will be highlighted in the aid analysis section of this case study.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{RWANDA’S DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORY}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
There are two overarching views to interpreting whether the government’s actions in the aftermath of the genocide have been in line with eventual democratic development. The first group, which is dominated largely by policymakers, interprets the actions of the RPF with a great deal of leniency and imbues them with good intentions. In this view, any move toward political consolidation in Rwanda has simply been a byproduct of having to establish peace, security, and economic development in a deeply divided society where the fabric of social trust has essentially\tabularnewline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
disintegrated. As such, in this view, the RPF has been dealt a tough hand and is doing the best it can to avoid another genocide. In contrast, the second group interprets the RPF’s actions in the last decade as actions bent on furthering political consolidation, increasing repression, and establishing a de facto authoritarian regime.

A BUMPY ROAD TOWARDS DEMOCRACY: ONE VIEW OF RWANDA

One group of scholars and policymakers argues that Rwanda’s actions are in line with a regime that must deal with a country destroyed socially, economically, and politically by genocide and other violence. Ultimately the task of rebuilding the social fabric of society so deeply wounded by neighbors outright murdering neighbors is a task that no government would want to take on. After the genocide, there was a complete breakdown of government institutions, social structures, and human capital. When the RPF established the Government of National Unity in 1994, it became responsible for a country characterized by lawlessness, insecurity, displaced and traumatized populations, and deeply destroyed infrastructure. This group of analysts argue that Rwanda’s regime, led by the RPF, has thus done a commendable job rebuilding Rwanda in the wake of the 1994 genocide. These authors focus on the practicality of the policies the government has endorsed and, while not entirely excusing all government indiscretions, they endorse the realpolitik view of Rwanda’s situation and believe the government deserves some leniency because of the sheer size of the task in front of it.

National Unity and Consensual Democracy

This group of authors and policymakers assert that the Rwandan government’s policies could be characterized as focused on ensuring national unity, good governance, and security, which are all prerequisites for democracy. They argue that the government has pursued these ideals through instituting specific policies at all levels of government. For example, they cite the divisionist laws established by the government as being necessary not only to halt violence or discrimination based on ethnicity, but also to generate a new focus on “Rwandaness” to replace ethnicity. In this view, the laws were critical to having Rwandan citizens identified as Rwandans, not as Hutu or Tutsi anymore, and removing ethnicity as an organizing and potentially radicalizing factor in society. The government wanted society to un-learn its ethnicity, or have what some term “ethnic amnesia.”

Critics assert that banning ethnicity in the public sphere could be a way to promulgate ethnic discrimination under the radar screen in an environment now acutely sensitive to ethnic discrimination after the genocide, but this policy was actually advocated by the RPF even before the genocide and allowed it to attract moderate Hutus to its ranks. Authors looking favorably on the performance of the Rwandan government attribute any disproportionate ethnic breakdowns in government today to educational differences—with Tutsis traditionally being more educated—and the power of personal networks. One author even shows that such de-ethnicitization is a coping mechanism for those who were engulfed in the violence of the
Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts

genocide but now are in a society where perpetrators and victims live side by side. Susanne Buckley-Zistel calls it “chosen amnesia,” wherein people she interviewed in Rwanda purposefully forgot ethnic details of the genocide. Such “amnesia,” supporters argue, can be critical to creating a functioning society again, suggesting the Rwandan government’s policies could successfully help Rwanda recover from the genocide and create national unity.

Beyond its distinct treatment of ethnicity, the Rwandan government has focused on the need for its own distinct version of democracy as well. Observers note that Rwanda has been fostering “consensual democracy” instead of Western-styled “competitive” democracy. This type of democracy focuses on participation rather than the competition of ideas at the ballot box. In fact, one assessment even identified inclusive participation as a pillar of RPF ideology, and by extension, of the Rwandan government’s policy.

This ideology stops short of allowing real competition though. For example, between 1996-1997, the Rwandan government initiated and organized a series of discussions that sought to tackle the causes of violent conflict in Rwanda as well as identify future policy priorities. These discussions started out at the grassroots level and featured posing questions to informally elected representatives from each local community in Rwanda, including equal representation for respective Hutu and Tutsi groups. These community members were then invited to participate in sector-level discussions. From 1998-1999, these discussions were then carried out on a national scale in a series of consultations called Urugwiro Village, held every Saturday in the Presidential offices. In the end, the executive branch released a report called Rwanda Vision 2020 outlining government policy for the future. While the level of participation and popular consultation in this process is impressive, it is important to recognize that ultimately the decision-making power never left the small group of executive offices that ran the country. Participants were consulted, but their ideas were not voted on or decided in a competitive way. The government instead controlled the process to an outcome that it deemed appropriate. In this sense, Rwandan democracy encourages participation and consultation, but the government still tightly controls decisions.

Similarly, in the broader sphere of political life throughout the rest of the study period, the government allows multiple parties to exist and compete for votes, but it often bans parties or disqualifies their candidates for ‘divisionism’. Critics claim that these parties or candidates represent a threat to the ruling regime, so the regime bars them from the election process. Those that do run candidates are generally part of the RPF’s ruling coalition. While some of the more positive assessments of the Rwandan system conclude that public pluralism is allowed and protected in Rwanda, other assessments are more tempered in their enthusiasm, noting that some control over political parties is warranted given Rwanda’s history. These authors assert that it is too soon for a fully competitive democratic model in Rwanda, particularly since competitive democracy contributed to conditions for violence before the genocide, and thus full democracy is simply ‘too dangerous’ for Rwanda this soon after the genocide. In this view, the government’s fostering of consensual democracy is simply realistic, not political blindness. The Rwandan government has been very successful at promoting participation—resulting in
voter turnouts that are generally over 90% for local and national elections and the constitutional referendum. As such, donors in particular seem apt to praise the progress Rwanda has made with electoral democracy as “fair, progressive, and realistic” as well as democracy “adapted to the Rwandan context.”

Good Governance

Another set of policies that point to Rwanda’s efforts to work towards democracy focus on good governance. Rwanda has focused its governance initiatives in three policy areas. The first policy is decentralization. In 2000, the government reorganized the country into 106 districts and 11 provinces as a way to create local government structures, increase government efficiency, and empower local residents to make local decisions. As part of this decentralization process, the government also had local and district elections to increase participation in the government reorganization process. The decentralization process even extended to the development aid sphere, where in an effort to revive and foster collective action at the community level, Rwanda worked with donors to set up Community Development Committees and Ubudehe—the Rwandan tradition of collective action to solve community challenges. Both of these structures allowed communities to define their own priorities and development projects at the cell level—a local government unit just above the village level. As such, these policies of decentralization required communities to work together, enhance community spirit, and start to move beyond the legacy of the genocide.

The second good governance policy that Rwanda has pursued is aggressively enforcing anti-corruption policies. The government created a strong, independent anti-corruption agency through an official Ombudsman. The anti-corruption policies have led to the lowest levels of corruption in East Africa and considerably decreased graft, which is crucial in a development context where resources are scarce. This has also led to an increase in foreign direct investment, which could help Rwanda more quickly recover economically.

The third key good governance policy Rwanda has pursued is increasing representation of women and youth groups in government. The constitution mandates that at least 30% of the national parliament and local elected bodies should include women representatives and, for the most part, these quotas have been implemented. Similarly, the Rwandan government has ensured women’s participation at the highest levels of government—including appointing women to high-profile positions as ministers, Secretaries of States, and Supreme Court Justices. The government has also created a ministry specifically focused on gender issues—Ministry of Gender and Women in Development—and propagated local ‘women’s councils’ as a way to further ensure women’s issues are considered and protected. Taken as a whole, the good governance policies initiated by the Rwandan government are seen by some scholars and even more policymakers (such as donors) as innovative solutions that build off of local contexts and traditions and are a positive step forward in a country challenged by a violent past.
The Judicial Process

Accompanying good governance policies, some authors have pointed to judicial policies that Rwanda has pursued as positive indications of where the country is headed. Standing out the most is Rwanda’s re-institution of a traditional community court called *Gacaca* to help process the thousands of backlogged cases against those accused of participating in the genocide. After the genocide, the new government was faced with an almost insurmountable task—including prosecuting an estimated 760,000 people involved with the genocide (nearly 25% of the population) with only 12 prosecutors who remained alive in the entire country by the end of the genocide. In 1998, the government began using *Gacaca* courts as a way to process those accused of the lowest level of involvement in the genocide. Assessments of this policy (among this group of authors) range from tempered support based on practice necessity (in the sense that using a traditional community institution is an innovative solution to an overwhelming problem) to outright enthusiasm that the *Gacaca* system could help open up civil society like nothing else has. For the latter, researcher Aneta Wierzynska in particular argues that the *Gacaca* court system promotes local participation, encourages citizens to voice their concerns openly, and even allows them to question authority—all of which could positively impact democratization by decentralizing power and offering a pre-democratic training ground. Additionally, advocates challenge critiques of *Gacaca* courts as potentially allowing undue ethnic bias and focusing on retribution instead of justice, arguing that such criticism must be weighed against “the overwhelming challenge of delivering justice on a large scale in a post-genocide context in a low-income and low-capacity country.”

Development of the Press and Civil Society

In relation to the press, the government of Rwanda was tasked with a particularly challenging dilemma. As one report from *Reporters without Borders* noted, “How can a government seeking to replace a racist, totalitarian dictatorship with a pluralist, multi-ethnic democracy reconcile respect for freedom of the press with the need to prevent a return to genocidal propaganda?” The government pursued policies that, supported by other policymakers at the time, agreed with what one human rights organization noted: “We always remember that genocide was the fruit of propaganda orchestrated by the media. Caution is therefore the order of the day.” Certainly the media did play a major role in the genocide, as hate propaganda was broadcast from the main radio station Radio Télévision Mille Collines (RTLM) before and during the genocide, encouraging the population to ‘do their work’ (or eliminate Tutsis). The radio station was a private one, but before the genocide it increasingly became a platform for Hutu Power extremists to air their views.

It is thus understandable that the new regime, in picking the pieces up after the genocide, would want to limit the press to some extent. To do this, the government created a strong regulatory body—the High Council of the Press, or HCP—that along with the Ministry of Information within the Prime Minister’s Office, regulates the media and protects against ‘divisionism’ or any
Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts

form of ethnic propaganda.\textsuperscript{120} While many accuse the government of abusing this regulatory power (as will be detailed later), still many accept that it is the lesser of two evils—people would rather hear of limitations on press freedoms than hear about violent attacks like before.\textsuperscript{121} Again, this seems to be viewed as a practical policy that is adapted to the Rwandan context. As one publication director put it, “The press is working with a Rwandan version of freedom. This is a freedom defined in relation to genocide. Freedom, like the rest of political life in this country, needs time to acquire a sound footing.”\textsuperscript{122}

Looking more towards the development process and civil society, the Rwandan government has similarly taken a heavily top-down approach. All non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations must align their activities with the national development plan (Vision 2020). In fact, all local and international NGOs and civil society groups must be approved by the government to operate within Rwanda, and they must submit annual action plans that the government can choose to reject.\textsuperscript{123} This includes all activities funded by international donors.\textsuperscript{124} While at first glance this may seem heavy-handed, from an economic development standpoint, this strategy is incredibly effective in reducing inefficiencies and ensuring resources are well-coordinated across the entire country. The initial international response to the genocide suffered greatly from such inefficiencies, for example in one extreme example where multiple organizations collected confessions from individuals involved in the genocide, which usually caused the confessions to be legally invalid.\textsuperscript{125} Observers assert that these NGO registration policies have ultimately led to a much more successful economic development model than what would have otherwise been possible.\textsuperscript{126}

Observers have also interpreted Rwanda’s top-down control over the development process as evidence of Rwanda’s almost staunch commitment to the idea that reform must be locally owned and driven rather than imposed by an international community.\textsuperscript{127} As such, this drive for local ownership motivated the Rwandan government to form its national development plan, Vision 2020, and outside development efforts are thus encouraged to appropriately complement that vision where needed.

\textbf{Rwandan Exceptionalism}

Overall, this group of authors seems content with the progress Rwanda has made and is content with prioritizing security and avoiding genocide over fulfilling pure democracy in the short term. Essentially, these authors appeal to a sense of ‘Rwandan Exceptionalism,’ meaning that even though some of the policies the government has pursued may seem heavy-handed or less than completely democratic, the Rwandan government should have more latitude allowing it to take such measures to avoid a return to violence. Who is to say exactly what is and is not feasible in such a context? As such, donors and some scholars have tended to give the benefit of the doubt to the Rwandan government—even by not conditioning aid in the late 1990s like most donors did with Burundi\textsuperscript{128}—and such faith does not seem completely unfounded. When the RPA finally wrestled Kigali from the perpetrators of the genocide, the new government unilaterally
implemented the terms of the Arusha Accords—the set of power-sharing agreements approved before Habyarimana’s assassination—even though the RPA had won a complete military victory after the genocide. The new RPF government included multiple political parties—except those directly involved in the genocide—and was even led by a Hutu president—President Pasteur Bizimungu, a senior Hutu member of the RPF. While some might denounce these moves as smokescreen strategies, most see these moves by the RPF as evidence of the new government’s good intentions to break from the past. It is clear, though, that Rwanda is far away from being a pluralistic, competitive democracy. At best it can be termed a hybrid regime that encourages widespread participation, but it is essentially ruled through electoral authoritarianism. Regardless though, Rwanda’s progress in many policy areas is impressive given where it began. As one head of an aid agency stated:

If you are going to understand what is happening in Rwanda today, you have to understand genocide and the enduring consequences of genocide. It permeates, affects and influences human behavior so totally that it is remarkable that the survivors and the government have been able to exercise the degree of restraint they have been exhibiting.

**INTENTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM: ANOTHER VIEW OF RWANDA**

In contrast to those who focus on the practicality and perhaps necessity of Rwanda’s policies, another group of scholars argues that Rwanda has become an authoritarian government and that the RPF’s leadership in Rwanda has limited any possibility of real democratic development. In this set of theories, the authors interpret the same policies detailed above, but instead of giving the RPF the benefit of the doubt, they conclude that the RPF has intentionally consolidated power under its own wing and destroyed any political space for democracy. These interpretations assert that the RPF has used subtle constitutional formulas to hide its dictatorship. Specifically, they assert that the RPF has built a thinly veiled authoritarian regime using ‘national unity’ policies as a guise to control or eliminate opposition parties, pursuing good governance policies only as a smokescreen, subverting the judicial process, controlling the press and civil society, and invoking the genocide whenever its policies come under international attack.

**‘National Unity’ or ‘Coercive Unity’? Eradicating Dissent**

While Rwanda’s focus on ‘national unity’ is seen by some as a natural coping mechanism to heal a nation ripped apart by genocide, other authors are much more skeptical of the RPF’s real intentions behind it’s national unity policies. The RPF is often accused of using the divisionist laws and ‘ethnic amnesia’ policies as a tool of repression. Some have theorized that banning ethnic references is a way to allow Tutsis to disproportionately take over high-ranking positions. In a country where only 10-14% of the population is Tutsi, by 2004 the majority of government officials were Tutsi, leading some observers to assert that the government has perhaps pursued...
‘selective amnesia’ when it comes to ethnicity for important positions instead of ‘ethnic amnesia.’\textsuperscript{134} Banning references to ethnicity also make it impossible to adequately represent discriminated groups such as the Twa, which make up approximately 1% of the population. Any political party, civil society organization, or NGO associated with a specific ethnic group such as the Twa are quickly shut down for ‘divisionism,’ which makes it difficult to adequately protect minorities or vulnerable groups.\textsuperscript{135}

As noted, Rwanda has focused on ‘consensual democracy,’ meaning that political life must work for consensus instead of traditional competition. As such, many accuse the RPF of abusing the ‘divisionist’ law and charging any person or political party criticizing the regime’s stance with seeking to stir up ethnic hatred and a return of the genocide.\textsuperscript{136} Political parties that pose a legitimate threat to the RPF’s dominance or to Kagame himself have been accused of ‘divisionist’ ideologies, and their leaders jailed or exiled. For example, in 2001, former President Bizimungu announced he was forming a new political party. He was immediately put under house arrest and officially jailed a year later.\textsuperscript{137} The main opposition party in the early 2000s (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain, or MDR) was eventually outlawed and disbanded in 2003—right before parliamentary elections. The government has also routinely denied political parties’ registration applications, claiming that the party ideology or the individuals in it are divisionist, endorse ethnic hatred, or are tied to the genocide.\textsuperscript{138}

Critics of the Rwandan government point to exceedingly high vote totals as a sign for concern over Rwanda’s democracy. As part of the parliamentary elections in 2008, the RPF garnered a total 98% of the vote; wary of looking too authoritarian, however, it reduced the official number to 78% and conceded 20% to other parties within its alliance.\textsuperscript{139} Similarly, both times President Kagame has faced the ballot box, he received over 90% of the vote. Elections such as these show that democracy is much more than just elections—and Rwanda seems to be far away from real, pluralistic democracy.\textsuperscript{140} Indeed, some have argued that these elections were more for international consumption than anything else.\textsuperscript{141} Others interpret this trend to be signal something much deeper, asserting that Rwanda is emerging as a regime that co-opts traditional elections as a way to legitimate its authoritarian rule. In this view, Rwanda’s ruling regime is an elected authoritarian regime.\textsuperscript{142} Overall, many see the government’s policies as a way to eliminate any diversity and to enforce a consensus on the population. In this view, a more apt description for Rwanda’s ‘national unity’ would be ‘coercive unity.’\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Good Governance as a Smokescreen}
\end{center}

As detailed before, Rwanda has implemented a range of good governance initiatives and innovations involving decentralization, anti-corruption policies, and increased representation of women and youth. These improvements are real. However, while good governance is often associated with creating fertile ground for democracy, many authors believe Rwanda’s policies have been specifically designed to mask the larger consolidation of top-down control throughout Rwanda. The Rwandan government has kept an unusually tight top-down control of the districts
and lower levels, which has stifled traditional forms of local competition and closed space for
democratic activities. With decentralization, the structure of government may have changed,
but still anyone who puts forth policy that is not in line with the RPF’s policies will often
disappear without explanation. Similarly, the anti-corruption measures have become a
convenient weapon to use against political dissenters.

Critics also assert that the increased involvement of women in all levels of government may
likewise be a smokescreen for the government’s consolidation of power. In two particular
important articles focused on the evolution of women’s representation in Rwanda, the authors
theorize that the Rwandan government uses its advances in women’s involvement as a
distraction from its more sinister anti-democratic policies and human rights abuses. Knowing
that donors and the international community value increased involvement of women, the
Rwandan government has focused on implementing such policies. That way, when donors and
others criticize the government on any policy, Rwandan officials can point to their advances in
women’s representation as proof that they are making progress as a whole. However, even the
progress in women’s rights appears to be largely cosmetic. The authors also show that while
women may be better represented now and have higher levels of involvement; their actual
influence on government has actually decreased as well as their ability to engage in democratic
processes. In particular, they cite the failure of Rwandan agencies to pass more women-friendly
laws such as those protecting widows and more family-friendly work schedules. These authors
assert that the even condemning evidence is that many women, when interviewed by the authors,
did not know the purpose of women’s councils or the Ministry of Gender.

Blinded Justice

One of the major—almost universal—criticisms of the current regime is that it has demanded
justice for acts of violence committed during the genocide by the Hutu extremists, but it has also
claimed immunity for most acts of violence committed by the RPA (during and after the
genocide). The current judicial process in Rwanda and even those involved in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are only focused on identifying and punishing those
involved in the genocide against Tutsis. What is ominously missing is any accountability for
alleged crimes committed by the RPA (including killing approximately 25,000-45,000 civilians)
in its effort to gain control of the government during the genocide and afterward. The
government argues that investigating and trying these crimes would create a moral equivalency
between them and the crime of genocide. While most authors and policymakers would agree
this is not optimal, the international community (including the ICTR) has largely agreed to the
government’s request here and has not pushed for equal prosecution of crimes. Similarly,
there is no effective judicial independence—and therefore no effective judicial review of the
parliament’s or president’s actions. In fact, one author highlights that loyalty to the RPA is
important to getting appointed as a judge in Rwanda even though the ‘official’ rules ban party
affiliation. This also means that there is no check on Rwanda’s consolidation towards
authoritarianism.
Lastly, some authors criticize the government’s use of Gacaca courts to deal with criminal cases involving the genocide. They assert that, because the Gacaca system is an informal, traditional form of settling community disputes, using it to manage criminal cases is threatening the process of dispensing justice. In particular, human rights groups have criticized Gacaca courts for their lack of trained judges, lack of impartial juries—which are usually drawn from the same communities that the defendant is being accused of terrorizing, and juries that may be prone to ethnic bias. Furthermore, using the Gacaca courts to only prosecute genocide crimes—and not those committed by RPF members—increases the sense that the government is just using Gacaca as a tool of repression and as a way to enforce “victor’s justice” even at the local level.

Controlling the Press, Civil Society, and Development

In line with the other theories outlined here, many authors and policymakers see the Rwandan government’s heavy-handed control of the press, civil society organizations, and even of the development process as a direct attempt to consolidate control over the country. This group of authors identifies a rather large arsenal of weapons the government has deployed to intimidate, control, co-opt, or eliminate any political opposition or dissention. This arsenal includes accusing individuals or organizations of inciting ethnic hatred, of being divisionist, of down-playing the genocide, or of sympathizing with genocidaires—all of which are punishable by law. Furthermore, the government has been accused of co-opting organizations that oppose its policies by intimidating organization members to leave and appointing new, RPF-compliant members—as happened with a prominent human rights organization. Critics assert that press organizations are routinely denied authorization if they are not loyal to the RPF, and journalists are habitually intimidated and either self-censor or seek asylum in another country. Press freedoms are particularly repressed during elections.

Beyond the press, the government also has a great deal of control over civil society organizations and NGOs. The government not only has the right to shut an organization down, but it also has control (by law) over the management, finances, and projects of national and international NGOs. The control over civil society is so complete that many authors have come to view civil society as an extension of the state—it is not something that is meant to balance the state or even provide a testing ground for new, democratic ideas. University students studying ‘civil society’ routinely choose state agencies because they view no difference between the state and what the western world would identify as ‘civil society.’ With the degree of control that the government seems to command in all areas of Rwandan political and social life, there are very few (if any) forums where citizens can voice any dissidence.

International Blank Check: Genocide Credit

Lastly, some authors argue that Rwanda has learned to adeptly invoke ‘genocide credit’ or ‘genocide guilt’ with the international community whenever their policies come under criticism. The government has created an environment where they categorize anyone opposing them as
therefore supporting those who perpetrated the genocide. In this dichotomous environment, the government has successfully avoided a majority of international pressures to answer for its human rights abuses and its political consolidation of power. Critics assert that the government also exploits victim-hood imagery to establish its own exceptionalism. These authors assert that Rwanda capitalizes on the horrors of the genocide to legitimize its actions to ‘secure’ the country—especially since no international actor stepped in to stop the genocide.\textsuperscript{161} One way in particular that Rwanda has used its genocide credit is to establish a “monopoly of knowledge construction.”\textsuperscript{162} After the genocide, the new regime claimed that, since ethnicity had been manipulated by leaders to incite violence, and the media had then propagated the violence, it was the new regime’s responsibility to re-educate citizens and control information. Such an endeavor would require a great deal of control over Rwandan society, and for the most part, the international community has granted Rwanda that prerogative.\textsuperscript{163}

\section*{A QUESTION OF MOTIVATION}

Ultimately this overall debate comes down to motivations—what are the motivations of the Rwandan government, and more specifically, the RPF? Why has it so categorically asserted control over all aspects of Rwandan life? Those in the first camp would be willing to say Kagame is mainly motivated by avoiding more violence and is thus mostly justified in his actions to secure stability in the country given the immensity of the genocide legacy. However, the scholars and policymakers in the second camp would not grant Kagame that benefit of the doubt. Rather, many of these authors believe that the regime is intentionally seeking complete control—perhaps especially because the minority Tutsis would lose power under full democracy. As some authors have specifically outlined, Tutsis’ history with forms of democracy have not been very successful. Habyarimana was technically ‘elected’ to represent the Rwandan people, but the Tutsis experienced the tyranny of the majority under his rule given the lack of any minority protection rights.

In fact, the only representation or protection Tutsis had since the 1970s had to be earned through violence. Even when Habyarimana started the power-sharing talks (through the Arusha Accords in the early 1990s), this was closely timed with the RPAs invasion of the country in 1990. And even in the talks, some argue that neither side was truly interested in an agreement, but rather that both sides were using the talks as a way to strategically reposition and strengthen their own side.\textsuperscript{164} Once the genocide started, it was only the RPF’s victory over Kigali that stopped the genocide and broke the extremist Hutu’s power over the country. Rather than having to negotiate this time for peace, the RPF established peace through victory.

This also meant there was no genuine opposition to temper the RPF’s actions. As such, the RPF has been free to pursue what some call ‘victor’s justice.’\textsuperscript{165} Rather than focusing on reconciliation (like South Africa did after apartheid), the new regime chose to prosecute all genocide crimes, punish anyone involved in any way, and claim complete impunity for those fighting with the RPF. Some argue that these policies are counter-productive, and rather than
healing a society after violence, their main purpose is to manipulate the political scene to maintain power.\textsuperscript{166}

From a realistic point of view, the Tutsis have many reasons to avoid democracy. Most important among them is the 85-90\% reason: Hutus make up 85-90\% of the population and Tutsis only make up 10-15\% of it. With this breakdown, pure democracy has no guarantees for Tutsis’ representation and protection. Even though the current regime has tried to erase ethnicity, it is still there—like an undercurrent in the society.\textsuperscript{167} The status of ethnic relations in Rwanda is best summarized by a statement made by Professor Mahmoud Mamdani:

\begin{quote}
After 1994, the Tutsi want justice above all else, and the Hutu democracy above all else. The minority fears democracy. The majority fears justice. The minority fears that democracy is a mask for finishing an unfinished genocide. The majority fears the demand for justice is a minority ploy to usurp power forever.\textsuperscript{168}
\end{quote}

Scholars and policymakers can continue to debate the motivations and true intentions of the current Rwandan regime. However, the emergence of meaningful democracy is becoming a much more distant dream as the regime continues to consolidate power and close spaces for democratic competition and pluralism in society. As such, history may be proving the second camp—the group of authors touting the RPF’s moves to establish an authoritarian regime—as the ultimate victors of this debate.

**THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S ROLE IN RWANDA: A PATCHY PAST**

One important factor in Rwanda is the prominent role the international community has played. Whether through exerting pressure on the government, inaction, or wielding the promise of development assistance, the international community has certainly had a major effect on Rwanda and where it is today. However, whether the balance of their actions have hurt or helped Rwanda is again up for debate. Several authors have focused specifically on how international donors have affected Rwanda’s democratic development, and summaries of their findings before and after the genocide are below.

**Before the Genocide: First Attempts**

During the Habyarimana regime (1973-94), Rwanda became one of the highest per-capita recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Africa—despite the regime’s authoritarian structure and the virulent anti-Tutsi rhetoric that Habyarimana openly propagated.\textsuperscript{169} However, with the fall of the USSR and the change in international dynamics, donors increasingly put an emphasis on democratization (or more specifically, began to condition their aid on democratization)\textsuperscript{170}. France in particular was one of the main donors for Rwanda and its strongest ally. As one author notes, within one month of a landmark speech by French President Mitterrand where he announced France’s new focus on democracy, Habyarimana similarly announced his intention to embrace democracy.\textsuperscript{171}
France was certainly not the only donor to pressure Rwanda though. Right after the crash in coffee prices in the late 1980s, Habyarimana was pressured into signing a Structural Adjustment Program with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. One author even ties the organization of Hutu Power and the increased focus on ethnic hatred as a reaction by Habyarimana’s loyalists to donors’ pressure, noting that they saw the donor’s ability to pressure Rwanda as a direct threat to Rwanda’s own sovereignty. This, combined with the increased tension after the RPF invasion in 1990, prompted Hutu Power to become an outlet for those close to Habyarimana to deal with the perceived threats to their control. Other authors draw similar conclusions. While donors pressured Rwanda to move towards democracy, democracy was not in the interest of either political side—Habyarimana’s regime or the RPF. Habyarimana’s regime started to implement politically liberalizing policies so it could continue to receive aid, but it certainly had no interest in losing its complete control of the country. On the opposite side, the RPF and its supporters were a minority in the country, so democracy did not provide any assurances for their protection.

In such a situation where neither side truly wants or has an incentive to make democracy work, the external pressure from donors was not enough to build a stable system. Rather, both sides paid lip service to democracy while undermining the peace process. Some have speculated that the RPF invasion and Habyarimana’s assassination were attempts to stop the democratization process. International actors pushing for democracy believed that the tensions created during the first stages of democratization would ultimately be worked out naturally through negotiation and through the power-sharing arrangements of the Arusha Accords. As history has proved, though, that was not the case. In fact, one author shows that donor’s adopted “voluntary blindness” to these building tensions. As he states, “Development aid basically lived in a well-intentioned but separate sphere, following its internal dynamics, almost totally unrelated to the political and social trends tearing the country apart during that period.”

**After the Genocide**

Unfortunately, the role of donors and the international community after the genocide has not received much better reviews than its actions before the genocide. The role of donors in promoting democracy in Rwanda is not specifically addressed by any authors, but they do discuss some of the components of democracy, such as civil society, freedom of the press, and the like, as well as donors’ general responses to the actions of Rwanda’s government. Since the genocide, donors have focused on generous funding for the justice sector—especially capacity building with prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, elections, the media—especially professionalizing the industry and funding for independent radio programs, and civil society such as women’s organizations and training.

Despite the contributions donor efforts have certainly made in Rwanda’s progress, the major theme among authors writing about Rwanda—and especially those critical of the Rwandan government—was that donors seem to gloss over or ignore the troubling signs of democratic
failure in Rwanda. For example, minus a few relatively short interruptions in aid flows, donors have continued to give money to Rwanda even though the government has been clamping down on dissent and freedoms. Rather than openly acknowledge and discuss Rwanda’s shortcomings, donors instead are accused of overlooking these problems. This has been particularly apparent after elections. Many authors concluded that elections have been deeply flawed and nothing more than a rubber-stamp for the current regime without any meaningful pluralism. Yet with these same elections, which were largely funded by international donors, the donors generally expressed their endorsement of the elections and hailed them as an important step forward.179 As one author states, pointing to a Front Line Rwanda article:

The donor gave Rwanda about $7 million to hold superficially democratic elections [in 2003], but then turned a blind eye to the widespread fraud, intimidation, and human rights violations committed by the RPF to ensure its election victory—even though those problems were thoroughly documented and reported the European Union’s own election observer mission.180

Beyond elections though, donors have been accused of also turning a blind eye to the human rights abuses by the current regime. The same Front Line Rwanda article continues: “If donors were unwilling to cry foul over flawed elections that they helped finance, the Rwandan government clearly calculated that it did not have much to fear from donors when it came time to suppress human rights defenders.”181 In fact, the literature highlights that donors seem to value security and stability over human rights. Donors and foreign policy representatives seem to treat the human rights abuse of anyone opposed to the regime as an ‘understandable’ type of violence given the importance of establishing stability in the country.182

As part of detailing the blindness of donors and the international community, authors have suggested potential causes of this seemingly intentional neglect. A summary of their hypotheses include the following:

- The international community gave more latitude to the new Rwandan regime because of feelings of international guilt for not stopping the genocide earlier as well as because of a perceived exceptionalism of Rwanda due to the genocide. These feelings of ‘genocide guilt’ and ‘genocide credit’ meant the international community were not as quick to condemn the new regime for controlling the press, tightening the space for civil society to operate, flawed elections, or even human rights abuses—all for the sake of stability.183

- A real ‘law of silence’ exists among aid organizations and NGOs where they do not call attention to the regime’s abuses. This law of silence was first denounced by members of the Médecins sans Frontiérs, claiming that aid organizations had ‘closed eyes and mouths’ that allowed the regime to continue with impunity. This is likely due to fear of reprisals to themselves or for fear of getting kicked out of Rwanda.184
• Compared to many aid recipients, Rwanda exhibited an impressive ability to suppress critical analyses of Rwanda by international donor agencies. For example, in 2005 the World Bank launched a multi-country study that collected data on the determinants of overcoming poverty. One of the areas it studied was participatory decision making at local and national levels. However, six months into the study, Rwandan security forces seized the data, questioned the researchers, and claimed that the study design and content included genocide ideology. Subsequently, the World Bank was forced to abandon the project and destroy all information associated with it.\textsuperscript{185} This brief example shows that Rwanda seems to strong-arm even donors to avoid criticism.

• Rwanda has also taken a great deal of ownership over its development process. This is exhibited by the extraordinary measures Rwanda has taken to reduce inefficiencies in aid by requiring all aid activities coincide with its Vision 2020. Some authors show that the aid has therefore been particularly effective in Rwanda—such as the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program funded largely by the World Bank.\textsuperscript{186} This again shows that Rwanda is not like other recipients and tends to strong-arm donors into what type of projects it wants them to carry out.

• Lastly, Kagame has been very successful in establishing personal connections with prominent international donors. Not only has this ensured that Rwanda continues to receive aid regardless of accusations of abuse, it has also allowed him to consolidate power within his own country (since donor funds seem tied to his leadership and aid is vital to the country’s economic progress).\textsuperscript{187}

Despite these alleged shortcomings, the aid sphere has adapted to the new context in Rwanda. While the total amount of aid continues to be high, the way donors deliver that aid has evolved. During the Habyarimana regime, aid flows generally went directly through the government. However, the delivery channel has now changed: aid generally flows through multilateral agencies and NGOs that work in the country.\textsuperscript{188} Therefore, the regime does not have as much control over those funds and how they are spent. So perhaps this change shows that donors are not as naïve or blind as some authors would suggest.

BURUNDI’S DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORY

Certainly the successful peace agreement and re-establishment of a running government are major accomplishments for Burundi and those involved from the international community. However, Burundi’s path towards true democracy is still unsure, and strewn along the wayside are a myriad of theories, predictions, and explanations that policymakers, researchers, and academics have written on Burundi’s behalf. While not as much has been written on Burundi compared to Rwanda, Burundi’s progress towards democracy (or lack thereof) is similarly contentious. The following sections will highlight the major debates that the literature bears out as well as other important factors relevant to Burundi’s development.
The most contentious debate among scholars and policymakers is whether the power-sharing arrangement is democratic, whether it is a step towards democracy, or whether it is simply a façade all together. In contrast to Rwanda, the main debate is less about the motivations of leaders and instead focuses on the potential value of institutional processes.

Some scholars and policymakers contend that power-sharing in Burundi is not a manifestation of democracy; rather, it is directly hampering the democratic development of the country through three main routes. First, institutions alone do not constitute a true democracy. Imposing power-sharing through a peace negotiation process did not allow for the democratic norms of society— which are crucial to a functioning democracy—to develop and take root before elections took place. These norms include peaceful conflict resolution, respect for human rights, accountability, and rule of law. Since Burundi did not include these democratic values in its system before power-sharing was instituted, and has not made any progress in doing so (at least according to this group of scholars), the current system cannot be considered democratic in any real sense. Power-sharing left the divisions and contradictions in Burundian society unresolved.

Second, some authors consider the institutional depths of Burundi’s particular brand of power-sharing to impede basic democratic development. For example, leaders of key institutions such as the army and the police are assigned according to ethnicity. Such a system represents what one author termed a “methodological pre-occupation with ethnic identities” and essentially uses rigid institutional ethnic quotas to substitute for the democratic norms that would normally stabilize and keep a society together. So Burundians do not need to develop those inter-ethnic bonds of trust because the institutions enforce the ethnic parity.

Third, the power-sharing arrangements in Burundi allow elites to exploit the system for their own gain. Instead of being subjected to public pressure to conform to democratic norms (such as proportional representation, accountability, and rule of law), elites can dodge democratic expectations using power-sharing principles. In this way, power-sharing arrangements perpetuate ethnicity instead of solving the ethnic problems in Burundian society, and elites continue to use ethnicity to gain or secure their own political power. The proliferation of over 40 political parties in the legislature is one manifestation of this dysfunction as political parties are often used as a way to gain benefits for one person and their friends and do not represent significant ideological differences. One statement from the Uprona party in 1998 summarizes this sentiment well (and, these authors would argue, this statement still applies):

In our country the state is practically the only employer. The political game that gives access to material resources is a fact of life and death where the winner takes all and the loser loses all. For Burundi politicians the democratic game has been reduced to sharing the national cake. The people only serve as a
springboard for the political class. Under this system democracy loses its identity as the river in the sea.\textsuperscript{194}

In fact, some of these authors even question the historical link between power-sharing and democracy in Burundi. As briefly described above, the Tutsi leader of the military dictatorship coming into the 1990s, Buyoya, introduced several instances of power-sharing, including establishing a National Commission in 1988 that was made up of equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi and was charged with studying national unity. A few years later, Buyoya established a government of national unity that again had equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi, and was even lead by a Hutu prime minister. However, these institutions were focused mostly on reconciliation and inclusiveness, not democracy. One author in particular believes this is likely an important factor in the ‘political psychology’ of Burundi’s elites today—to them, power-sharing does not necessarily mean democracy. Rather, one-party dominant rule can go hand in hand with power-sharing, as it did in the past.\textsuperscript{195} Therefore, the assumption that the international community makes that power-sharing is a form of democracy (or a step towards it) is not necessarily shared with Burundians themselves. And indeed, some authors point to evidence that Burundi is trending more towards electoral authoritarianism than it is towards democracy.\textsuperscript{196}

\textbf{The Democratic Highway: Power-Sharing as a Path Towards Democracy}

On the opposite end of the spectrum, other scholars and policymakers assert power-sharing is the best and only democratic solution to Burundi’s ethnic problems. Specifically, they assert that power-sharing is a stepping-stone towards a more meaningful democracy through three avenues. First of all, these authors contend that the current brand of power-sharing—established in 2004 onward—was the only successful way to end the civil war in Burundi, and certainly peace is a prerequisite to any degree of stable democracy.\textsuperscript{197} Despite several attempts throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the only arrangement that has led to an end of large-scale violence has been the power-sharing accords finalized and implemented in 2003 and afterwards. Before that, no faction was able to win an outright victory, as in Rwanda, and no peace agreement proved to provide enough power-sharing to end the fighting.

For example, in 1992 the Tutsi military dictatorship led a series of reforms that allowed for elections and generally more inclusiveness of Hutus. However, when the elections lead to a majoritarian government of Hutus, the Tutsi-dominated military attempted a coup. Some authors therefore argue that the power-sharing arrangements at the time—loosely built on consociationalism—were not sufficiently thorough because they did not protect a minority veto for the Tutsis. So, the coup was simply the military—or more directly, the Tutsis—wielding its own veto in a sense.\textsuperscript{198} Similarly, several attempts to re-establish the government and bring peace failed miserably, including the Convention of Government in 1994 and the 1996 bloodless coup, and the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. Throughout all of these arrangements, fighting continued. It wasn’t until the 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement,
followed by the negotiated cease-fires of the last remaining rebel group in 2006, that Burundi enjoyed large-scale peace.\textsuperscript{199}

Therefore, many authors recognize that the current arrangement in Burundi has been successful at establishing peace where other attempts have failed. This is largely due to successfully extending power-sharing arrangements to both the security and defense forces.\textsuperscript{200} Since authors agree that peace is a prerequisite to democracy, the power-sharing implemented in Burundi is perhaps the most important step towards democracy the country has taken in the last 20 years.

However, authors that explore this viewpoint are not blind to the non-democratic features of power-sharing. Burundi’s implementation of power-sharing includes a mandatory over-representation of Tutsis by approximately 30-40\%, and likewise, an under-representation of Hutus by the same margin. This mis-representation extends to not only national electoral representation, but also the makeup of the military, the local community institutions, and many other parts of public society. However, these authors generally recognize that such mis-representation—often embodied in the form of consociationalism—is the cost of stability in a bi-ethnic country that is prone to violence.\textsuperscript{201} Indeed, one author terms this the ‘democratic deficit’ that is required to establish peace.\textsuperscript{202}

The second way that power-sharing is moving Burundi closer to democracy, as some authors contend, is through building the institutional processes of democracy. By establishing democratic institutions, such as local and national elections, separation of powers (separate judiciary, military, and political branches of government), freedom of the press, and so forth, many authors believe that the current power-sharing arrangements will guide Burundians to develop democratic habits and values. Most scholars and policymakers would agree that democratic values have very little root in Burundi, but this group of authors is particularly optimistic that going through the ‘democratic motions’ set up in the power-sharing arrangement will ultimately lead to Burundians to accept and practice true democracy in the future, though in the literature, many times this belief is implied rather than stated outright.\textsuperscript{203} Therefore, this idea puts a great deal of stock in the value of institutional processes.

One successful example that an author points to is the multi-ethnic political parties that have emerged in Burundi. One part of the 2004 power-sharing agreement was that political parties could not be ethnically or regionally exclusive in membership or in ideology. Even more importantly, each list of electoral candidates a party submitted had to be representative of Burundi’s ethnic and gender diversity. In this way, parties would have to include and work with members of other ethnicities, and therefore reduce the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Due to these provisions, Burundi’s political competition is no longer based on ethnicity—or even coincides with it—and even the largest party is no longer seen as an exclusively Hutu party.\textsuperscript{204} Furthermore, no party has the two-thirds majority required to pass legislation, so each party must develop partnerships across ethnic and political lines, which is certainly a step towards democracy.\textsuperscript{205}
Likewise, the third way that power-sharing is moving Burundi closer to democracy, authors contend, is that it deals with Burundi’s ethnic problems better than any other feasible solution. Compared to Rwanda, Burundi’s power-sharing arrangements are vastly different. Where Rwanda banned any reference to ethnicity, Burundi codified ethnicity into every public structure imaginable. By codifying ethnic representation though, Burundi was able to reassure both ethnic groups that they would get enough representation to protect themselves. As such, ethnic power-sharing seeks to harness the fear and anger between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Burundi by pacifying each group, getting them to work together, and eventually to build bonds of trust that go between the ethnic groups. One author calls this sentiment ‘trust through pacification.’ As the ethnic groups must work through the democratic institutions of the country now, they must find new and peaceful ways of dealing with conflict instead of turning to violence. In general, most authors agree that Burundi’s approach to ethnicity has been much more successful than Rwanda’s.

Arguments Along a Spectrum

Finally, it is important to note that most scholars and policymakers writing on Burundi generally fall somewhere between these two camps—they combine arguments from both sides and temper them with their own brand of optimism or realism. As such, these arguments listed above—including those articulating why power-sharing hinders democracy or how it helps democracy—are meant to give a sense of what evidence authors give, though only a few authors fall decidedly on one side or the other. For example, Vandeginste specifically recognizes that the power-sharing arrangements have ended the war, de-ethnicized political competition, and reduced the potential for violence from elections. However, he also asserts that power-sharing institutions have failed at the more lofty goals of establishing democracy, rule of law, accountability, and effective governance. Similarly, most authors recognize the validity of some points from both sides, and likewise make a stand somewhere along a spectrum between the two extremes.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In general, the literature touts the international community as being helpful in Burundi, with some exceptions. The international community has provided a great deal of aid to Burundi, and it also expended many resources to negotiate and implement the peace negotiations throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Luckily, this attention from the international community was generally successful and seen as helpful. Compared to Rwanda, the role of international actors is therefore much less ambiguous (or, perhaps more likely, it has been analyzed much less compared to the literature on Rwanda).

Wielding Influence: The International Community in Burundi

To set the scene a bit, Burundi was, and is, heavily dependent on international aid to buttress its economy. In the 1980s, it was the highest per capita recipient of concessional loans from the IMF
and World Bank. Peaking in 1992, foreign aid flowing into Burundi reached $312 million. At that same time, Burundi was under immense pressure from donors and the international community to open up its political process. In fact, in 1990, France specifically announced it would start conditioning its aid on democratic progress. As detailed before, this is also the time period where Buyoya (leader of the Tutsi military dictatorship) established a national commission to study national unity, ended educational discrimination against Hutus, and established a Government of National Unity with equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi. These steps established more inclusive policies towards Hutus, and eventually, the government opened up the country to elections. Most scholars attribute these political changes to the pressure from donors, just as in Rwanda.

However, the outcome of the elections—and the looming threat to change the ethnic makeup of the military forces—proved too threatening for the Tutsi military leaders. The resulting attempted coup in 1993 failed to put the military back in power, but it did stall reforms and incite a civil war. So when Buyoya successfully took over the presidency again in 1996—called by many a creeping coup—the international community and neighboring countries again pressured Burundi to re-establish democratic institutions, but this time they didn’t just threaten to condition aid—donors actually suspended aid and neighboring countries placed a total embargo on Burundi. The international community specifically demanded that the Burundi government agree to peace negotiations with the various Hutu rebel groups that were fighting across the country.

The embargo and suspension of aid deeply hurt the government forces while largely leaving the rebel groups uninhibited. This gave the rebel groups more influence than they would have enjoyed naturally, and also gave them more sympathy from the international community—even though they were committing horrendous crimes against innocent victims, as was the government as well though. Ultimately, the government was forced to negotiate with the rebels—a major accomplishment—and most authors will again attribute this success to the international community. Because of the international community’s pressure to negotiate before one side won the war outright, all sides of the civil war had to compromise to establish peace—in contrast with Rwanda. With the peace agreement signed in 2000, most donors unblocked their aid flows and pledged substantial increases. After the agreement was implemented, foreign aid represented 42% of the national income in Burundi.

Aid Flows: A Force for Good

When aid was allowed to flow into Burundi, it has generally had positive impacts. Specifically, the literature analyzes three specific sectors of successful aid in Burundi: poverty reduction, civil society, and media—all of which help contribute to democratic development. Burundi’s economy has suffered greatly from the devastation of civil war. Plus, the largest employer in Burundi has always been the government because of the country’s generally weak economy. However, some donors have focused specifically on reducing the resulting poverty. One author credits the World Bank’s poverty reduction strategy program in particular for its progress in
pulling the country out of the poverty trap, though all the aid Burundi receives is helpful in reducing the burden of poverty.\textsuperscript{215}

In the civil society sector, Burundi has benefited from significant commitment from donors including Africare, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Canadian Centre d’Etude et Cooperationale (CECI). These donors have specifically focused on supporting, strengthening, and consolidating local NGOs within Burundi and developing democratic values. The resulting strength of civil society helped increase reconciliation among citizens and find peaceful approaches to conflict resolution after the war.\textsuperscript{216}

In relation to the media, one author—Frére—found that assistance from international donors to the media sector was not only substantial, but it had increased the professionalism of the sector and helped end ethnically-biased journalism. Specifically, international funding in Burundi for media helped break the perverse dependence the media had previously had on political parties. This allowed media outlets to pursue new routes of peace and reconciliation, including assigning journalists of different ethnic backgrounds to work together. This strategy allowed the journalists to appreciate the perspective of the other ethnic group and represent that in their reporting.\textsuperscript{217}

Another impressive outcome of International funding and support for the media sector in Burundi was the widespread cooperation among media outlets during the 2005 elections. Called the ‘Synergie des médias,’ 10 different radio stations coordinated together to create a network of 140 journalists, and then deployed that network to cover almost every single municipality election post. Such a feat helped denounce any fraudulent voting cards, discourage or call-out undue pressure from political parties at polling stations, and revealed the use of washable ink in some areas. All of these efforts helped increase the transparency of the voting and its legitimacy. This success certainly represented the initiative and hard work of Burundi’s media sector, but it is also a manifestation of the funding and influence of international donors and their focus on ‘journalism for peace.’\textsuperscript{218}

\textbf{Keeping the Peace: Other International Help}

Beyond aid flows though, the international community had a significant impact on Burundi through the peace negotiations. The peace accords were hosted in Tanzania and were facilitated by several international actors, including the United Nations, the African Union, and so forth. But perhaps the most formidable international actor was South Africa. Two South Africans served as facilitators for the Arusha peace process: Nelson Mandela first, and later Deputy-President Jacob Zuma. Their role in getting the 17 different factions to finally agree to a power-sharing arrangement, and South Africa’s larger role in providing stability, cannot be understated.\textsuperscript{219} The following quote provides a useful overview of South Africa’s contributions:

\begin{quote}
It was Mandela who brokered the agreement on transitional leadership, and South African Deputy-President Zuma who negotiated an end to the deadlock over security sector reform and the ceasefires. When the transitional institutions were
\end{quote}
established, South Africa sent a protection force to encourage Burundian politicians to return from exile and take part in the transitional institutions. Without this force, it is unlikely that many of the politicians would have returned, thus retaining an incentive for continued conflict. Furthermore, South Africa provided the backbone of the AU peace-keeping force, when the UN did not want to get involved due to the lack of a comprehensive cease-fire.\(^{220}\)

Once the warring factions agreed to the ceasefire, the international community was invaluable in implementing it. The UN set up a UN Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi as well as the African Union. These forces helped ensure large-scale violence did not erupt again. The international community also helped with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants through funding and implementation assistance. In particular, the UN, the World Bank, Germany, and the World Food Program provided substantial funds or goods to support the DDR process in Burundi. Also, in 2006, the UN created an Integrated Office in Burundi to continue its work on peace consolidation, democratic governance, protection of human rights, and so forth. These stabilizing efforts by the international community especially paved the way for peaceful elections and the passing of a new national constitution.\(^{221}\)

The Other Side: The Ills of Western Intervention

Despite the glowing reviews by most authors, there are a few scholars that offer scathing assessments of donors and the international community writ large. These focus on criticizing international actors for imposing ‘western’ democracy on Burundian society and creating western institutions through donor funds—both of which nullified existing local traditions and practices and therefore destabilized society. They also call on the donors to focus more on DDR and Security Sector Reform, as well as economic recovery.\(^{222}\) Compared to the negative literature on international roles in Rwanda though, this literature is rather slight and meager.

**DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORIES COMPARED**

**COMMON TRENDS**

*Strong one-party governments opened democratic space in the early 1990s.* Both Rwanda and Burundi came into the early 1990s with strong one-party rule systems. By 1993, both had made moves to open political space for greater democratic development. In Rwanda, the ruling regime announced a move to multi-party elections, and at the same time Burundi ended discriminatory policies and initiated a series of inclusive consultations at various levels of government. These democratic openings in both countries were largely motivated by the promise of aid flows by international donors. Specifically, in the early 1990s many large donors to the countries announced plans to condition aid to recipients on democratic development.
Democratic opening quickly led to insecurity and mass violence. As the countries moved to open political space, the political uncertainty led to mass violence. When both presidents were shot down in the same plane crash, Rwanda was unceremoniously taken over by extremists within Hutu Power that lead the country in a genocide against minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus, leaving at least 800,000 dead within three months. After the plane crash, Burundi similarly erupted in a civil war after the plane crash that would last another ten years and kill at least 300,000 people.

Demonstration effects of violence across both countries hindered motivation for democratic changes. Rwanda and Burundi have an ethnic breakdown of approximately 85-90% Hutu and 10-14% Tutsi. In Rwanda, the regime was led by a Hutu-dominant party that discriminated against Tutsis, while Burundi’s regime was led by a Tutsi-dominant party. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, both countries experienced mass violence by the ruling party targeting the discriminated ethnic group, and this motivated violence from the opposing ethnic group in the other country. When Hutus came to power in Rwanda and carried out massive violence against Tutsis within the country, Tutsis in Burundi would use violence to hold on to their power in Burundi because they feared similar violence from their own Hutus, and vice versa.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES

International reaction to conflict. Both Burundi and Rwanda experienced mass ethnically motivated violence, but the scale of Rwanda’s violence was at a much higher rate over an exceedingly short period of time. As such, the international community’s reaction after the genocide was much more involved compared to the international community’s response to Burundi’s civil war. Rwanda is often viewed as an “exceptional situation” and has thus benefitted from additional leeway from donors and international leaders because of what some have called this “genocide credit.”

Nature of the peace agreement. In Burundi, the civil war ended as a result of a peace agreement painstakingly negotiated by the international community. To get all warring parties to agree, the peace agreement—and subsequent government structure—reflected major compromises from all opposing sides and sought to protect the rights of all groups involved. Burundi’s peace agreement institutionalized the protection of minority rights and civil liberties for all. In contrast, the genocide in Rwanda only ended only when the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) fought its way to the capital and took over the government. Rwanda’s regime therefore could set the terms of its government without having to make concessions to the opposition. Without a significant opposition to motivate compromise, the regime institutionalized central power in the executive branch, hindered free speech and civil liberties, and precluded the formation of a fully pluralistic multi-party system. Rwanda has created its own form of “consensual democracy” that prioritizes mass participation without devolving significant decision-making power. The nature of the peace process in each country has led the two governments on drastically different paths.
Treatment of ethnicity. Burundi has a meticulously crafted power-sharing arrangement where ethnic breakdowns for representation at all levels of government became mandated by law. With this, Burundi sought to ensure both minority rights for Tutsis as well as majority representation for Hutus. This treatment of ethnicity has allowed both groups in Burundi to feel protected and represented during the study period—enabling greater security in democracy for both groups. Rwanda instead eschewed formal power-sharing arrangements and attempted to erase ethnic differences among the population and focus on creating a new identity of “Rwandaness.” This provides no protection for either ethnic group in competitive democracy, though, and many assert it has instead led to poor a democratic trajectory for Rwanda.

Democratic development trajectory. During the study period from 1990-2010, Burundi ultimately experienced more democratic development compared to Rwanda. Rwanda’s democratic development, despite a lot of attention from donors, looked rather unpromising by the end of the study period. Elections do not offer meaningful political choice to voters, press freedom is limited, and civil liberties are not protected. By 2010, it was still rated as “Not Free” according to Freedom House ratings. On the other hand, during the same time period Burundi successfully implemented local, regional, and national elections; established a participatory and vibrant civil society; and made enough improvements to move from a rating of “Not Free” to “Partly Free” according to Freedom House ratings.  

In turning to an analysis of whether building formal institutions or fostering democratic norms was more effective in either Burundi or Rwanda, this case study considers these important contextual factors. The analysis outlines how they helped or hindered the countries’ democratic development as well as donors’ potential roles in supporting them.

ASSESSING AID INTERVENTIONS

While previous aid research has convincingly shown that aid focused on democracy and governance can be effective, this study seeks to uncover the specific causal mechanisms through which different types of democracy and governance aid has successfully increased democracy development in Africa in a range of contexts. In the specific context of post-conflict countries, this study analyzes the democracy promotion programs funded in Rwanda and Burundi and compares them to competing theories and hypotheses from existing literature. The common theories and hypotheses that all case studies are compared to include the following:

Theory 1: Formal government institutions are the central mechanism by which democratic change takes root.

• Hypothesis 1: Democracy aid programs that increase the representativeness of formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.
• **Hypothesis 2:** Democracy aid programs that *increase checks and balances across formal government institutions* will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

**Theory 2: Political change is driven by informal processes and norms.**

• **Hypothesis 3:** Democracy aid programs that *build informal democratic processes and norms* will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

These competing theories and associated hypotheses identify different drivers of change for democracy development—in the first theory, formal institutions drive change, whereas norms and informal processes drive change in the second theory. The first theory prioritizes formal changes in institutions, such as changes to the structure of government branches, changing laws, and amending or creating constitutions. This theory posits that these institutional changes create the formal opportunity for democracy, and citizens and leaders will respond to these new rules and functions in sync to increase democratic development. Contrastingly, the second theory prioritizes developing norms in society that foster democratic principles and practices. Without these norms, the formal institutions will not function democratically because people’s behavior will not change. It is these theories and hypotheses that this study will now analyze against the experiences of Rwanda and Burundi.

This case comparison studies democracy aid programs implemented by the United States, African Development Bank, United Nations Development Program, World Bank, Belgium, Norway and several smaller donors in Rwanda and Burundi from 1990 to 2010.

As described in a previous chapter, this study chose Rwanda and Burundi as a case study pair through a rigorous case-matching exercise. Based on their similarities on a variety of variables, Rwanda and Burundi were identified as highly comparable case studies: They started at roughly the same level of democratic development at the beginning of the case study period in 1990; they received comparably high levels of democracy aid during the study period from 1990-2010; they experienced massive conflict during the beginning of the case study; and they had similar levels on many potentially competing variables including population density, country size, economic performance, ethnic makeup, colonial history, and human development indicators. However, Burundi and Rwanda experienced substantially different democratic development trajectories over the two decades of the study period from 1990 through 2010: Rwanda has consistently remained “Not Free” according to Freedom House ratings while Burundi has progressed to “Partly Free.” Given their similarities on many other variables, this study analyzes the distinctive composition of their democracy and governance aid packages to determine if those differences caused one country to be more successful than the other in promoting democratic change.

To categorize and assess the aid programs in each country, this study uses two types of sources. First, the study utilizes relevant project documents, assessments, annual reports, and evaluations published directly by the donors. The largest repository of documents was made available by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank. Other donors that
published project documents included the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Netherlands, and the United States’ Millennial Challenge Corporation (MCC)—though the coverage of these project documents was often sporadic. When available, this study seeks to systematically report project objectives, implementation details, and evaluation results. For the majority of data though, details beyond a project description were unavailable.

Second, the study uses project flows accessed through the AidData Research Release 2.1 (Provisional Governance Release). This dataset tracks all reported aid flows from over 90 bilateral and multilateral donors across the globe. It includes project flows reported by donor governments to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) along with data from other multilateral and bilateral donors that do not report to the CRS. To identify democracy and governance aid flows specifically, this study used a combination of CRS purpose codes and AidData activity and purpose codes. In each section analyzing the relevant hypothesis, the flows directed at Burundi and Rwanda are further broken down into projects that targeted specific institutions, reforms, or democratic practices. This study seeks to unify the information provided by both of these source types and pulls out relevant details to enrich and fortify the analysis.

It is also important to recognize that even after controlling for a variety of variables, there are still important differences between Rwanda and Burundi that likely affected their democratic development trajectories. When possible, the study will identify any of these issues and discuss them within the analysis section of each relevant hypothesis. Even given these issues though, the experiences of Rwanda and Burundi and their associated aid programs highlight important lessons that could potentially inform better democracy program design to increase true democratic development in other countries in Africa.

**FORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: REPRESENTATION**

In an effort to initiate democratic reform and increase democracy and good governance, aid programs may seek to increase the representativeness of formal government institutions. These types of programs attempt to increase citizen participation in formal institutions, and help those institutions better incorporate citizen feedback and reflect the voice of the people (see Figure 4). By increasing the representativeness of these government institutions, these programs aim to increase the overall democratic development of the country as a whole. As such, the first hypothesis this study tests is stated thus:

**Hypothesis 1:** Democracy aid programs that increase the representativeness of formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

If this hypothesis is true, then aid programs targeting formal institutional changes such as decentralization, public participation mechanisms, group quotas, and/or institutionalized pluralism will lead to increased democratic performance in the country. In our analysis of aid programs in Rwanda and Burundi, we will test this hypothesis by first outlining the aid programs
from major donors focusing on increasing the representativeness of formal institutions in Rwanda and Burundi, and then assessing whether these programs were successful in leading the way to democratic change. We will conclude this hypothesis is correct if after the implementation of the democracy and governance aid program:

- The government adopted and/or allowed the program’s intended reforms, e.g. decentralized institutions were established (criterion 1).
- These reforms contributed to or increased the designated type of formal representation, e.g. the establishment of community councils contributed to decentralized decision making in the country (criterion 2).
- The designated type of formal representation contributed to the democratization of the country—measured qualitatively and through quantitative measures of sectoral and overall democratic development (criterion 3). The study will also seek to analyze whether democracy and governance aid programs contributed to any of the key historical or contextual factors known to be influential in the country’s democratic development. Depending on the factor, though, this influence could positively affect the country’s democratic trajectory or lead the country further away from democracy and good governance.

Furthermore, since Rwanda and Burundi had different democratic trajectory outcomes, we expect to see a divergence in the type or effectiveness of institutional reforms promoted by aid programs in these countries if this hypothesis is true. Likewise, we will reject this hypothesis if:

- The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but they did not contribute to the democratic reform of the institution (criterion 2), or
- Democratic reform of the institution was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).

This study will look for such evidence from donor reports, project documents, existing scholarly research, and published quantitative measures—namely Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* to assess overall democracy levels and the World Governance Indicators’ *Voice and Accountability* and *Government Effectiveness* to assess sectoral democracy levels related to the representativeness and responsiveness of government institutions. It will also identify any factors that inhibited the aid program’s ability to increase democratic development in the country through increasing the representativeness of formal government institutions.

To facilitate a more comprehensive analysis, the first and second criteria for effectiveness listed above—whether a democracy and governance aid program was successfully implemented and whether that type of reform increased the representativeness of formal institutions—have been incorporated in the following sections detailing the aid programs implemented during the study period. The final criterion for effectiveness—whether the designated type of institutional representation contributed to democratization in the country—will be analyzed in the last section.
### Figure 4. Democracy aid for institutional reforms focused on representation in Rwanda and Burundi, 1990-2010

Democracy aid programs in this category support institutional reforms focused on representation through elections, public participation mechanisms, power sharing, and decentralization implemented as a means to increase the representativeness and responsiveness of government institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid Type</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Decentralization  
(as a means to increase the representativeness & responsiveness of government institutions) | **Political and Community Development**  
*Decentralization:*  
• Provide support to commune-level governments and decentralization process  
• Train local officials and develop association for mayors  
• Fund pilot community development projects  
1993-2004: World Bank Decentralization and Community Development Program  
• Support decentralization and community development  
1997: USAID Local Government Initiative Project  
• Elect community development committees in selected pilot communities  
1999-2004: EU Social Micro Achievement Project  
• Train local elected officials  
• Support vulnerable groups  
2000-2004: USAID Fiscal Decentralization Project  
• Provide policy and technical assistance to local governments to manage development projects  
2001-2003: USAID Support Project for Community Development and Good Governance  
• Involve citizens in the decision-making process and decentralized political institutions  
2001-2005: Sweden Support to Decentralization in Butare and Gikongoro Province Project  
• Foster decentralization in two provinces  
2002-2005: Netherlands Decentralization and Economic Development Support through Participatory Approach  
• Foster decentralization through participatory approaches  
2002-2003: UNDP, Netherlands, and Switzerland Management and Decentralization Unit Project  
• Establish Management and Decentralization Unit in Ministry of Local Government  
2003: Netherlands Evaluation of the 1st Phase of the National Decentralization Program | **Decentralization:**  
2004: USAID Community-Focused Reintegration Program  
• Train local authorities on conflict mitigation techniques  
• Build local structures and capacity to reintegrate IDPs and ex-combatants and direct local development  
• Build public participation in local development planning  
2005: USAID/OTI Community-Focused Reintegration Program  
• Build local structures and capacity to reintegrate IDPs and ex-combatants and direct local development  
2005-2007: USAID Post-Conflict Transitional Assistance Program  
• Train communal and hillside councils  
• Empower local leaders and devolve authority from central government  
2007-2012: World Bank Community and Social Development Project  
• Establish decentralized, participatory local institutions  
• Foster community-driven development projects  
• Build public participation in development activities  
2007-2011: UNDP Reconstruction and Development Support Project in Rutana Province  
• Establish decentralized, participatory, transparent local government institutions  
2009-2010: UNDP Reintegration, Community Recovery, and Peacebuilding Program  
• Establish decentralized, participatory, transparent local government institutions  
2008 & 2009: Switzerland and Belgium  
• Support decentralization  
2010: Germany  
• Increase local service delivery through decentralization  
Dates unknown: EC and Switzerland  
• Pilot decentralization and land management operations in nine provinces |
• Evaluate the national decentralization program
  2003-2004: Netherlands National Program of Support to Decentralization
  • Foster decentralization through support to the Ministry of Local Government

2003-2004: Switzerland Peace and Decentralization Program in Kubuye Province
• Foster decentralization in one province

2004-2010: UNDP
• Decentralize the Ministry of Local Government
• Support Community Development Committees and associated local institutions
• Build capacity of local elected officials
• Implement government’s decentralization policies at national and local levels

2005-2009: USAID Twubakane Decentralization and Health Program
• Decentralize health services delivery

2005-2009: Germany Program to Support Imp. of Decentralization/CDF
• Foster decentralization (3 projects)

2007-2010: USAID Local Government and Decentralization Program
• Build capacity of national government to plan, manage, and implement decentralization policies
• Build planning capacity of local government
• Foster participatory planning process that involves all sectors of society

2007-2010: Switzerland Support Decentralization Western Province Project
• Increase capacity of local authorities to be involved in executing government administration

**Judicial Decentralization:**

2001-2010: Netherlands and multiple other donors
• Establish and build capacity of Gacaca courts
• Increase public awareness of and engagement with the courts
• Provide general financial support

• Build capacity for decentralized courts
• Establish meditation committees at the cell level

• Establish Maison d’Acces a la Justice office in pilot district to provide citizen contact point and legal aid at the local level
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Dispute Decentralization:</th>
<th>Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dates unknown: UK Bilateral Aid for National Land Tenure Reform Programme</td>
<td>• Increase citizens’ access to formal institutions in the justice sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Formalize land rights</td>
<td><strong>2007-2010:</strong> UNDP and UK Programme of Support for Good Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006-2008:</strong> USAID Land Dispute Management Project</td>
<td>• Expand <em>Maison d’Acces a la Justice</em> model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Build local participation in and capacities for land dispute resolution</td>
<td>• Assess mediation committee system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decentralize decision-making power to resolve land disputes to local levels</td>
<td><strong>2009-2010:</strong> Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006:</strong> UNDP</td>
<td>• Complete expansion of <em>Maison d’Acces a la Justice</em> model nationwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate decentralization aid</td>
<td><strong>Land Dispute Decentralization:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish a plan of action with donors and Rwandan government to prioritize and sequence decentralization actions</td>
<td><strong>Elections:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1999-2000:</strong> Netherlands and other donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1999-2000:</strong> Netherlands and other donors</td>
<td>• Establish National Elections Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support local elections held in 1999 and 2001</td>
<td><strong>2004-2005:</strong> Belgium, Netherlands, EC, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, UK, US, Italy, and UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor election results</td>
<td>• Establish electoral institutions and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002-2003:</strong> Multiple donors</td>
<td>• Provide general election support for 2005 communal, parliamentary, and presidential elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide general election support for 2003 national election and constitutional referendum</td>
<td>• Support constitutional referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Build electoral institutions</td>
<td><strong>2005:</strong> UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor elections</td>
<td>• Support National Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support public debate on content of proposed constitution and government implementation of adopted text</td>
<td><strong>2008-2011:</strong> UK, UNDP, Netherlands, Canada, and Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008-2011:</strong> UK, UNDP, Netherlands, Canada, and Belgium</td>
<td>• Provide sustained funding and capacity-building support for National Elections Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide general election support for 2008 and 2010 elections</td>
<td><strong>2009:</strong> USAID Burundi Policy Reform Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct voter education</td>
<td>• Organize participatory review of Election Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Update electoral and voter lists</td>
<td><strong>2009-2010:</strong> UNDP, Norway, and other donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009-2010:</strong> UNDP, Norway, and other donors</td>
<td>• Provide general support for 2010 communal, parliamentary, and presidential elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support the National Independent Electoral Commission</td>
<td>• Support the National Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide voter education</td>
<td>• Provide voter education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing civil society participation in election process</td>
<td><strong>2010-2014:</strong> UNDP (Norway, EC, Belgium)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Public Participation Mechanisms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1994-1997: USAID Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project | - Support Office of President in organizing public debate on how to address justice needs after genocide  
- Sponsor Genocide Conference to debate and draft post-genocide justice policies |
| 1999-2001: US, Italy and other donors | - Support government in holding public consultations under National Unity and Reconciliation Commission  
- Support National Unity and Reconciliation Summit |
| 2002-2007: UNDP and UK Good Governance for Poverty Reduction Program | - Involve citizens in building national unity and peace  
- Promote inclusive dialogue on conflict drivers  
- Run peace camps for students  
- Educate teachers on their role in promoting peace |
| 2003: USAID National Assembly Support Project | - Train MPs to increase citizen participation in legislative decision making |
| 2005-2006: UNDP Good Governance for Poverty Reduction Program | - Build Parliament’s capacity and willingness to consult with citizens  
- Organize grassroots meetings between constituents and MPs |
| 2007-2010: UNDP and UK Programme of Support for Good Governance | - Involve citizens in building national unity and peace  
- Promote inclusive dialogue on conflict drivers  
- Run peace camps for students  
- Educate teachers on their role in promoting peace |
| 2008-2010: US Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Program (component focused on citizen participation) | - Strengthen capacity of local officials to encourage and respond to public participation  
- Pilot community score card system to encourage civic participation in policy planning |
| 2008-2012: UNDP Justice Sector Support Programme | - Strengthen ties between local population and |

- Support National Independent Electoral Commission and voter education to bolster electoral processes
| police • Facilitate community policing | Institutionalized Pluralism:  
Dates unknown: Netherlands and Belgium • Facilitate establishment of local and national government structures for power sharing according to the peace accords  
2004-2008: World Bank Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Program • Integrate opposition forces into state military and instate proportional representation of ethnic groups within military • Reduce size of military  
2009-2012: World Bank Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project • Extended activities of 2004-2008 program |

**AID IN RWANDA: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON REPRESENTATION**

Many of the aid programs in Rwanda during the study period focused on increasing the representativeness of formal institutions—in fact, it is a major focus in Rwanda. The following sections will detail the relevant aid programs from each major donor in Rwanda and their involvement in aid programs focused on decentralization, elections, and public participation mechanisms. However, there was not much evidence that donors supported other types of reforms to institutional representation such as institutionalizing group quotas and institutionalized pluralism. This is largely because the Rwandan government chose to ban references to ethnicity, so group quotas were not used in government institutions, and neither were institutionalized forms of power sharing. The government did institute quotas for the percentage of women in parliament and at lower levels, but there is no evidence that these quotas were initiated or supported by aid programs.

An important contextual factor to keep in mind in analyzing aid programs in Rwanda is the strong control that the Rwandan government held over aid programs. In its efforts to show country ownership and reduce duplication, the Rwandan government required all aid programs to first be approved by the government before the programs could be implemented in the country. This even extended to media and civil society organizations whether funded by aid flows or not—the Rwandan government had to approve all their annual action plans and initiatives after 2000. As such, the aid programs that were implemented were perhaps more likely to be successful given that the government already indicated their approval of the program and its goals, but it also could mean that the aid programs in Rwanda were more conservative in nature because the government would not approve programs that were not in its interests.
Decentralization and empowering local communities was a major focus for the Rwandan government and donors throughout the entire study period. When President Habyarimana opened some political space for democratic development in the early 1990s, donors reacted quickly to support these positive advancements. The United States was particularly responsive and committed $7 million towards a Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) project that was designed to run from 1992-1997. A major portion of this project by USAID was strengthening local democratic governance through providing support to commune-level governments and decentralization. Potential activities included training local officials, developing an association for mayors (known as the Burgomaster’s Association), and funding pilot community development projects. Furthermore, the project documents specify that the purpose of the project was to “broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.” Other strategic documents from USAID for the same time stress a broadly defined commitment to decentralization and putting resources closer to the population. While this information shows the United States’ intention to empower local governments and increase decentralization from an early stage in Rwanda, it is likely that most of the funding from this time period was not released and the project activities were not completed due to the genocide in 1994. Specifics on which activities were completed, and to what extent, is not available. Immediately after the genocide, the project was amended to focus mostly on emergency aid as well as some public participation mechanisms.

In 1997, USAID initiated another project that focused on building capacity and increasing decision-making power at the community level. The Local Government Initiative (LGI) project was implemented by Africare and focused on electing community development committees (CDCs) in selected pilot communities—initially 12 communes. These committees were then empowered to debate what development activities the community needed most. When the committee had decided on specific activities, they were awarded sub-grants to carry out the development projects they had identified. This project became a critical test case to show the Rwandan government the benefits of decentralization as well as a feasible model to implement it. Early on, the Rwandan government was impressed with the results—enough to request USAID expand its reach to four times the initial project design. Soon after, the Rwandan government officially institutionalized this public decision-making structure into the government structure at the local level. Using the election process modeled by the LGI project, the government agreed to nationwide local elections at the cell and sector level and scheduled them for spring 1999. With the support of USAID, the elections were completed successfully—leading to 160,000 newly elected local officials. These officials also received leadership and resource mobilization training through the help of USAID. This same year UNDP also funded decentralization activities, likely related to the
The replication of USAID’s LGI model for decentralization and community development on a nationwide scale represent the project’s success not only in implementation, but also in inspiring the government to adopt the decentralization reform the aid program promoted.

Political decentralization was further implemented with the nationwide, district-level elections held in March 2001. This was the first time all Rwandan citizens could elect local leaders that were then directly accountable to their community. Again USAID was a major contributor to the elections through providing commodity support and implementing a sensitization campaign alongside the World Bank and UNDP, which had a voter turnout of 96% of registered voters.

With nationwide elected officials at the cell, sector, and district level by 2001, Rwanda and relevant donor programs were making significant strides towards successful decentralization. It quickly became apparent that there was a momentous lack of capacity at these lower levels of government. This led to a watershed of decentralization projects from donors that focused on institutionalizing decentralization through capacity building in various ways. For example, fiscal decentralization became a desperate requirement. The community development committees (CDCs) resulting from the USAID LGI project were tasked with designing and implementing local development projects, but the resource envelope for each community was not always clear or dependable. So in 2000, the United States implemented a project to help the Rwandan government implement fiscal decentralization that ran through 2004. The project focused on providing policy and technical assistance to local governments to help them manage, account for, and allocate revenue for development projects. By 2002 though, USAID had wildly surpassed its target—instead of implementing its pilot training system in fiscal decentralization within five districts, it had expanded and completed training in twenty districts. In fact, the pilot projects had seen so much success that the government of Rwanda requested the program be implemented in all 106 Rwandan districts—which the UK and the Netherlands helped fund.

Many other donors likewise funded aid programs focused on decentralization, including the following:

- **The World Bank** implemented a project modeled off of USAID’s DIG project focused on decentralization and community development. The World Bank successfully ran its project in 11 districts between 1999 and 2003, and then extended this program in 2004 to an additional 39 districts.

- **The EC** funded a project between 1999 and 2004 focused on training elected local authorities and supporting vulnerable groups.

- **USAID** funded an additional project between 2001 and 2003 focused on involving citizens in the decision-making process and decentralized political institutions. In 2005, it funded a 5-year project focused on decentralizing health services delivery, and again in 2007 it funded a 4-year project focused on capacity building in local government. According to available information, these projects were all successfully implemented. Specifically, the results of these projects helped improve the national
government’s ability to plan, manage, and implement decentralization policies. From the local government perspective, participants also indicated that the training, technical assistance, and even equipment provided through these decentralization projects and community development programs increased their own planning capacity and had fostered greater participatory planning involving all sectors of society (including local civil society and NGOs).244

- **The Netherlands** funded a project focused on decentralization through participatory approaches between 2002 and 2005.245 The next year it also funded two more projects—one directed at the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) to support decentralization policy and another to conduct an evaluation of the National Decentralization Program.246

- **UNDP, the Netherlands, and Switzerland** jointly funded a project to establish a Management and Decentralization Unit within MINALOC from 2002 to 2003.247

- **Sweden** funded a decentralization project for 2 provinces from 2001 to 2005.248

- **The African Development Bank (AfDB)** funded a project for institutional capacity building at MINALOC to increase participatory development between 2002 and 2005.249

- **Switzerland** funded a project for decentralization in Kibuye between 2003 and 2004 and then funded a decentralization project focused on the western provinces in Rwanda from 2007 to 2010.250 Available information indicates these projects were successfully implemented, increasing the capacity of local authorities to be involved in executing government administration in these specific provinces.251

- In 2005, **Germany** also stepped into the decentralization sphere and funded three large projects focused on decentralization between 2005 and 2009.252

- **UNDP** consistently funded decentralization activities every year between 2004 and 2010. These activities largely focused on decentralizing the Ministry of Local Government, supporting Community Development Committees and associated local institutions, building capacity of local elected officials, and helping implement the government’s decentralization policies at both the national and local levels.253 UNDP annual reports document successfully implementing these activities between 2004 and 2010. In the beginning, UNDP identified the weak capacity of authorities at the local level as a significant constraint, but through the donors’ and the government’s efforts, significant progress was made.254

In terms of aid dollars, the Netherlands was the most active donor in political and community development decentralization, dedicating almost $33 million. The World Bank was also a major contributor with $23 million, followed closely by the UK and Germany at $11 million each. Sweden, AfDB, and UNDP all contributed approximately $5 million each.255 Exact figures for USAID’s contribution to community decentralization are not available. All these projects focused on providing new models to empower citizens to make decisions that were traditionally controlled by the central government.
Beyond political and community development decentralization, decentralization can also apply to many government institutions and roles. Because of Rwanda’s unique situation coming out of the genocide, the government needed to find a way to decentralize the justice sector and encourage public participation. This was particularly important because after the genocide, there was a deep lack of trust in all parts of society—especially in the justice sector’s ability to bring the 130,000 people accused of genocide crimes to justice. After a wide-ranging public consultative process between 1998 and 2000, the government settled on instituting the country’s traditional conflict resolution mechanism, the Gacaca courts. This mechanism called for local communities to elect judges and conduct prosecution and reconciliation procedures for those with lesser charges related to genocide crimes, with the most serious crimes against humanity still being prosecuted at the national level. This unique institution for the justice sector prioritized public participation and local empowerment to help increase reconciliation and trust in the justice sector.

Many donors supported the implementation of the Gacaca courts in Rwanda. The most generous donor for Gacaca-specific projects was the Netherlands, who contributed more than half the total Gacaca-specific funds, giving over $11 million for this purpose between 2001 and 2010. Other notable donors included Austria, the UK, Belgium, Norway, the EC, the United States, and UNDP. The aid programs funded by the Netherlands, the UK, Norway, the EC and UNDP were largely directed specifically at establishing and supporting the Gacaca institution. UNDP annual reports and project documents from the Netherlands indicate its project activities supporting Gacaca—especially capacity building of those involved, increasing public awareness, and general financial support—were effectively implemented. More generally, the process of Gacaca and its mandate to process the backlog of genocide cases experienced significant delays in the first few years, but by 2011 it had successfully moved through the relevant pending cases and was closed as a judicial institution. Survey respondents to a USAID evaluation study indicated that that over 75% of respondents had participated in selecting Gacaca judges, which is one indication of Gacaca’s success at engaging local communities. Without the support from donors, Gacaca would not have been able to complete such a daunting task that also provided the population with the opportunity to participate in the judicial proceedings—allowing them both a mechanism for greater reconciliation as well as a more prominent voice in the judicial sector.

In contrast, the aid from Belgium and the United States tended to be more diverse. For example, a significant portion of Belgium’s aid went towards public awareness campaigns and building Rwanda’s civil society’s capacity to interact with the Gacaca courts. Similar to Belgium’s approach, the United States decided to implement an aid program through USAID to help the Rwandan Ministry of Justice more effectively communicate with the public on issues related to the Gacaca court, such as how it would work, Gacaca jurisdictions, and how members of the community can actively participate in the whole Gacaca process. Unfortunately the USAID project encountered unexpected problems due to low capacity in the Rwandan Ministry of...
Justice, so USAID later provided social marketing expertise to the Ministry of Justice to increase its capacity to mount effective public awareness campaigns.  

Overall, the Belgian and United States’ aid programs in this area still supported the formal institution of the Gacaca courts, but they did it in a way that specifically prioritized encouraging increased public participation and restoring Rwandan citizen’s trust in the justice sector and rule of law more broadly, which meant to increase the representativeness of Rwanda’s formal institutions. In an evaluation conducted after USAID’s project was completed, the evaluation team found that the campaign had been successful in reaching a large majority (80%) of the sample respondents, inferring that the campaign had also reached a large portion of the population. Furthermore, the percentage of respondents who successfully participated in Gacaca courts’ selection of judges went up by 11% among respondents who had been exposed to the campaign compared to those who had not. These evaluation results show the interventions supported by aid flows were effective at promoting the Gacaca courts’ purposes and sensitizing the targeted population. 

Relating to the general justice sector, USAID furthered its efforts to support decentralizing justice institutions with a two-year project that focused on providing capacity building for decentralized courts in Rwanda in 2005. This project focused on the traditional institutions for justice (not Gacaca courts). One particular form of decentralized institutions was the establishment of mediation committees at the cell level called Abunzi. These committees, established through law in 2006, provided a localized institution that could mediate conflicts before they were formally entered into the court system. Starting in 2007 UNDP and the UK carried out assessments of the mediation committee system and conducted capacity-building activities for the existing committees through the Programme of Support for Good Governance (PSGG) that ran from 2007-2010. Annual reports from UNDP-Rwanda indicate these activities were successfully implemented and the Abunzi system was significantly strengthened. 

In a similar strain, between 2003 and 2007 the UNDP and the UK implemented a pilot project to establish a Maison d’Acces a la Justice (MAJ) office within the Nyanza district. The MAJ was established to serve as a local contact point for citizens with the justice sector and as a place to give legal aid and advice at the local level. The UNDP and the UK funded the pilot in line with the Ministry of Justice’s legal aid program, and by 2007 the MAJ office in Nyanza was fully functional. Subsequently the MAJ model was incorporated into a national implementation plan. UNDP and the UK continued to support this form of judicial decentralization through continued funding directed at MAJs through the Programme of Support for Good Governance that ran from 2007-2010. Starting in 2009 and 2010, the Netherlands also directed and successfully implemented aid flows towards MAJs, allowing for MAJs to be established in all 30 districts in the country. These projects sought to increase citizens’ access to formal institutions in the justice sector in Rwanda.
Land Dispute Decentralization

Lastly, another form of decentralization supported by aid flows in Rwanda includes flows directed at land reform and building local capacity for land dispute resolution. Given Rwanda’s high population density and low economic development, land ownership is a major source of conflict among citizens. The Rwandan government initiated a pilot program with the support of the UK to test the process for formalizing land rights in the country under the project National Land Tenure Reform Programme. Starting in 2006, the U.S. also began to support this initiative through the Land Dispute Management Project. This project had multiple activity goals, but one of them was specifically directed at building local participation in and capacities for land dispute resolution.

These projects therefore sought to decentralize decision-making power to resolve land disputes to local levels before disputes entered the legal system. The project completed in 2008, and the final report indicates it was implemented with huge success. The project evaluation team received overwhelmingly positive feedback from residents and authorities from the two involved cells. The local authorities specifically asked USAID to extend the project to the surrounding areas—or nationwide if possible. The same authorities also expressed an interest in training neighboring areas themselves on how to implement the program of decentralized land dispute management. Such feedback from the local authorities indicates that, at least on the local level, the government representatives had adopted the reform supported by the aid project and had an interest to expand it to other areas of the country.

The sheer amount of projects and aid flows dedicated to decentralization in Rwanda is daunting. In 2005, UNDP noted the need for greater coordination among donors and government agencies to reduce duplication and better systematize decentralization efforts. As such, it helped establish cluster meetings to institutionalize better coordination. Starting in 2006, UNDP coordinated all donor support focused on facilitating decentralization—where the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany were all major players. With this coordination and close cooperation with the Rwandan Ministry of Local Government, UNDP helped establish a plan of action that mindfully prioritized and sequenced decentralization actions in the country. UNDP’s coordinating role is an example of successful donor coordination that helped increase the impact of the aid flows—especially in a sector that saw so much attention from a myriad of donors.

Elections

In a standard democracy, the institution of elections is one of the foremost vehicles to increase the representativeness of the government. So it is no surprise that many donors in Rwanda funded aid programs that supported the election process. Unfortunately, detailed project documents were not available for these flows—perhaps because donors viewed election support as routine. Because of this lack of detail, it is difficult to see any unique features of donors’ aid to Rwanda that targeted elections or to find reports of whether the projects were successfully implemented. Broadly, the flows seek to support the elections or election institutions, such as the
National Election Commission (NEC). In contrast, there are very few projects that focus on supporting civil society’s role in elections or voter education.

Using the information that is available, the annual flows reported by the donors show at least $31 million in aid programs to Rwanda during the study period. The first elections-related aid flows came in 1999 and in 2000, where donors collectively gave $5 million to support the local elections held at the cell, sector, and district levels in 1999 and 2001. The 2001 elections were secret-ballot elections, which were the first held in Rwanda for over 35 years. These aid flows were led by the Netherlands, which gave nearly $1 million specifically to support the establishment of the National Elections Commission (NEC). A host of other donors also supported these elections though, including Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States. Most of these aid flows went towards supporting the elections and building electoral institutions broadly, but one small project from the Netherlands also focused on monitoring the election results. Project documents from USAID indicate its election activities were successfully implemented and even go so far as to assert that “without USAID’s election-related interventions, the March 2001 elections might never have taken place, and certainly would not have run as smoothly.” Both the 1999 and 2001 local elections were important steps in preparing Rwanda for the nationwide elections coming up in 2003, and USAID project documents called these elections an “important milestone in Rwanda’s march towards full representative democracy.”

The second big push for elections in terms of donor funding came for the 2003 national elections and constitution referendum. The same donors gave over $11 million dollars collectively between 2002 and 2003 to help support the elections. Most of this aid again went towards supporting the elections generally, but there was also some funding from the EC, Sweden, and Belgium for specifically monitoring the elections. There were also several projects that focused specifically on supporting the constitutional referendum—either through giving support for fostering public debate and dialogue on the content of the proposed constitution or through supporting the government’s efforts to carry out the referendum and enacting the resulting constitution.

The last—and largest—push for election funding during the study period came in 2008 with the national parliamentary elections held in September of 2008. This round of elections elicited over $10 million from donors, with almost half coming from the UK. This time, donors also directed more funds specifically at the NEC, which was the target of at least three major projects funded through the UK, the Netherlands, and UNDP. The rest of the election aid flows provided general support for the elections. A few more specifics are known for the UNDP’s project, which ran from 2008-2011 and included $5 million (including basket-funding from the UK, Canada, and Belgium). The project involved voter education activities, updating electoral and voter lists for both the 2008 and 2010 elections, and increasing the capacity of the NEC more broadly. This large basket-funded project was organized in response to UNDP’s and other donors’ concerns that the ad-hoc capacity building and election support Rwanda had previously experienced (largely right before election time) was not leading to sustainable progress towards Rwanda’s
institutional ability to carry out democratic elections—especially considering the extensive needs of the NEC. As such, this project sought to provide a more sustained capacity-building effort for the NEC and elections in general. Project documents report that the project was successfully implemented—better facilitating the 2008 and 2010 elections from an institutional standpoint.\textsuperscript{284}

There was also one other election held in the country during the study period when President Kagame came up for re-election in August 2010. However, it is interesting to note that there was not an upswing in donor funding in the lead-up to this election. The only significant funding came from UNDP, which went directly to the National Election Commission and is likely related to the basket-funded project described above.

\textbf{Public Participation Mechanisms}

Throughout the study period, donors in Rwanda implemented various projects that focused on institutionalizing public participation mechanisms within the formal institutions of government. Some of the earliest relevant aid programs came from the United States. At the end of 1994, the USAID mission in Rwanda was reactivated, and the existing DIG project that started in 1992 was modified to adjust to the most pressing needs for Rwanda after the genocide. One of these pressing needs was to figure out how to reestablish justice in the country and deal with the huge amount of genocide suspects who were now incarcerated. Most donors immediately focused on the Ministry of Justice and provided technical assistance, USAID took a different approach and worked with the Office of the President to organize a public debate on how best move forward with these issues. The result was the Genocide Conference where participants debated which policies were most appropriate to deal with the daunting caseload of genocide suspects. In 1996, a law originating from this conference was enacted that set the rules for prosecuting genocide crimes and crimes against humanity, including introducing the plea-bargain concept for the first time in Rwandan law.\textsuperscript{285}

This aid activity shows a specific effort to encourage public participation in solving national problems, and it is a focus that is continued throughout the rest of the study period in Rwanda. While it is unclear if the United States’ involvement in initiating and organizing the Genocide Conference inspired the government of Rwanda to replicate this model of public participation mechanisms, it is clear that donors continued to play an important supporting role in funding these public participation mechanisms. Shortly after the Genocide Conference, the Rwandan government initiated a series of widespread public consultations through a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). The consultations invited public participation in debating issues such as the root causes of violence in Rwanda and policies options to alleviate those. Initially the NURC was a temporary institution, but in 1999 the parliament officially institutionalized it through parliamentary law. Donors such as Italy had provided some support for this public participation mechanism in the past, but in 2000 it was still struggling with too little funding and low capacity. So the United States increased its support significantly in 2000 and supported a widely attended National Unity and Reconciliation Summit.\textsuperscript{286}
According to USAID project documents, this support helped firmly establish the NURC as a national institution, allowing it to attract appropriate funding from other donors. Perhaps as evidence of the validity of this statement, UNDP became a significant supporter of NURC in 2002 to help it carry out activities involving citizens in building national unity and peace. This support was part of the broader Good Governance for Poverty Reduction (GGPR) project implemented by UNDP with funds from UNDP core resources and the U.K. This first project ran through 2007. UNDP and the UK’s support for NURC was further extended in the subsequent Programme of Support for Good Governance (PSGG) running from 2007 through 2010.

Activities of the NURC that these projects supported included promoting inclusive dialogue on conflict drivers in the community, running peace camps (*Ingando*) for students, and educating teachers of their crucial role in promoting peace. UNDP project documents indicate the NURC-related activities were successfully implemented and contributed towards the NURC’s ability to foster inclusive national dialogue and promote peace.

After 2000, donors’ efforts to increase representation in formal institutions largely focused on the community development committees described above, and were generally successful. Several evaluations showed that communes benefitting from donor support had an improved understanding of participatory development and were more likely to actively participate in the new community institutions. Starting in 2008 though, the U.S. revitalized this sector with its Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program. While the 3-year MCC program focused on many different areas—including the judicial sector and civil society, one portion of the program was designed to strengthen the capacity of local officials to encourage and respond to public participation. This included specific support to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning as well as a pilot citizen report card and community score card system to strengthen civic participation in policy planning. Unfortunately this component of the MCC program was only partially implemented because the threshold program was not extended for the third year (2011) as planned. An independent evaluation of MCC’s actions in this area concluded that the project helped encourage citizens to more freely voice criticisms of government policy but did not significantly increase the citizen’s perception of their ability to influence government. However many respondents stated the project had been successful at building local authorities’ and citizen’s capacity for interaction.

Other similar initiatives focused on getting national-level elected officials to engage more directly with citizens. In 2003, USAID held a training meeting for Members of Parliament (MPs) on how to allow and increase citizen participation in legislative decision making through engaging their constituents and opening parliament’s meetings to the public. UNDP also funded an activity between 2005-2006 (via the GGPR project described above) focused on building Parliament’s capacity and willingness to consult with citizens and be responsive to their needs. In particular, UNDP regularly organized grassroots-level meetings between constituents and MPs and Senators to discuss constituent concerns and allow for greater communication between elected representatives and their constituents. The annual reports for UNDP indicate this activity was successfully implemented, increasing the number of MPs’ and Senators’
grassroots meetings each year. This practice seems to have been adopted and institutionalized in a similar format by the government through the establishment of Public Accountability Days where local leaders consult with constituents as well as national leaders on their progress towards their development plans. Similarly, after USAID interventions with Parliament encouraging greater engagement with the public, Parliament embraced the importance of letting citizens participate in its deliberations and subsequently opened committee meetings of both chambers to the public. The parliament also incorporated citizen input into proposed bills, such as the land bill.

Lastly, another unique donor-funded activity that focused on increasing public participation in government institutions is a community policing initiative funded by the UNDP. This activity was implemented as part of the Justice Sector Support Programme that ran from 2008 to 2012. While the project focused on strengthening traditional roles of the Rwandan justice sector in general, this component sought to strengthen the ties between the local population and the police through encouraging community policing and conducting sensitization campaigns targeting vulnerable populations in high-crime areas. As an institution, the police force is traditionally not a main recipient of aid flows, but with this aid activity the police become a mechanism to engage citizen participation in law enforcement functions and in establishing the rule of law in their own communities. The available annual reports for UNDP indicate this activity was successfully implemented in 2008 and perhaps after this as well. Interestingly, the government of Rwanda first adopted community policing through a ministerial degree in 2007, and UNDP subsequently facilitated its implementation. As such, this activity serves as an example of donor activities supporting initiatives of the recipient government, instead of the other way around. In general, UNDP documents seem to indicate this is the modus operandi of UNDP in general—rather than pushing the recipient to reform through implementing its own projects, UNDP largely supports the reforms the recipient is already willing to make. This is in contrast with many programs funded by bilateral donors—especially the United States—where many projects are initiated based on the donor’s strategic goals for the recipient.

**Taking Stock: Progress in Institutional Reforms Focused on Representation in Rwanda**

As a complete set of interventions directed at increasing representation in formal institutions in Rwanda, donor documentation shows that aid flows directed towards decentralization, elections, and public participation mechanisms effectively helped establish the institutional framework for citizen’s capacity to engage in government institutions and decision-making. Beyond the evidence detailed above, in 2002 USAID commissioned an assessment of the democracy and governance aid projects implemented in Rwanda. It recognized certain challenges the programs faced, including problems distributing training materials to elected officials and making those trainings appropriate to the varying education levels present. However, according to the report, the projects were on the whole effective and led to four specific advancements. First, the projects successfully enabled the de-concentration of administrative duties from the line and technical ministries to the provinces. Second, as discussed above, these projects influenced the
successful completion of elections at the cell, sector, and district levels—representing the first successful round of inclusive elections in Rwanda and paving the way for critical national elections in 2010 that could have been a source for division just 15 years after the genocide but that instead proceeded peacefully. Third, the projects helped train local officials to formulate policies that were tied to the needs and expectations of the public. Fourth, the projects successfully encouraged public participation in analyzing and developing solutions to community issues. These advancements provide evidence that the decentralization aid flows up to 2002 were largely effective at implementing real governmental reform.

Similarly, information from available later project final reports and evaluations illustrate the general progression of institutionalized representation in Rwanda. Donors such as UNDP, the World Bank, USAID, and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC) indicate in various analyses that their efforts in Rwanda had been a technical success in implementing the programs of decentralization, public participation, and election support—at least in the sense that it was continually making progress in establishing the institutions to support those activities. Taken with the analysis of donor’s involvement in these arenas detailed in this entire section, it is reasonable to conclude that the aid flows passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 1: 1) the decentralization, election support, and public participation mechanism projects were successfully implemented and the government of Rwanda adopted the associated reforms, and 2) the project outcomes successfully increased the level of institutional representation in the country. Assessment of whether these aid programs passed the third criteria for Hypothesis 1 will be discussed at the end of this section.

### Aid in Burundi: Institutional Reforms Focused on Representation

Increasing institutional representation was also a priority for donors in Burundi, but the aid flows to Burundi differed in content and timing. The following sections highlight the relevant aid programs from each major donor in Burundi that focused on institutionalized pluralism, decentralization, elections, and public participation mechanisms. Broadly speaking, the conflict in Burundi led to democracy and governance aid flows to be low at the beginning of the study period, but they sharply increased between 2004 and 2010. The high levels of instability throughout the twelve-year civil war (1993-2005) decreased donors’ willingness to devote democracy and governance aid flows to Burundi—both because donors were hesitant to operate in a country experiencing violent conflict and because the donors directed the aid they did offer to emergency sectors instead of democracy and governance.

Also, it is important to note that the projects that donors chose to implement in Burundi were often heavily affected by periodic aid suspensions. While these suspensions of aid flows did not necessarily stop all aid flows into the country, they did affect the amount and content of the aid. For example, all U.S. aid to the country was suspended when the 1996 coup took place because U.S. law bans aid to governments that displace a democratically elected one. Between 1996 and 2005, then, the only aid flows allowed by the U.S. government were flows that went through
channels outside the Burundian government. This meant that the United States had to use NGOs, civil society, and other means to implement aid projects. Clearly this affected the type of aid programs they could fund in Burundi—in particular, it made official aid to Burundian government institutions mostly impossible to fund before 2005. Funds from other donors also had varying levels of suspension periods and restrictions. These restrictions likely also help account for the low levels of aid flows before 2004.

Institutionalized Pluralism

Burundi is perhaps one of the strongest examples globally of institutionalized pluralism. By the end of the study period, Burundi had established an impressively comprehensive power-sharing arrangement that sought to engage and balance the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups within the country. The relationship between aid flows and the establishment of the power-sharing arrangement is murky at best though. This is a situation where the promise of aid flows—as opposed to the actual delivery and implementation of aid flows—may have had a large impact on the recipient government’s behavior. In 1990, the United States and other donors pressured Burundi to provide more political space for Hutus by threatening to condition their aid on democratic progress in recipients. In turn, President Buyoya initiated changes to increase Hutu representation in the government including equal cabinet representation from each ethnic group and allowing for a Hutu prime minister.

After the civil war broke out in Burundi in 1993, there were several attempts to establish peace. The first attempt came in 1994 with a transitional power-sharing arrangement where some of the Hutu-led forces agreed with some of the Tutsi-led forces on a power-sharing arrangement that mostly encompassed divvying up of posts in local and national government positions. This scene quickly dissolved into violence again though and led to the 1996 coup and continued violence. Peace negotiations began again later that year, this time with active engagement from regional leaders as well as international leaders, including the major donors to Burundi. As with Buyoya in 1990 though, donors did not influence the peace process by implementing aid projects. Instead, they used two tools to influence the actors in Burundi: First, they supported peace negotiations that were dedicated to power sharing as an appropriate model for establishing peace. The negotiation and mediation process was largely led by regional leaders from countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa, so instead the international donor community committed to funding the peace process and providing a supportive role—which ended up being a long and expensive commitment for them. These donors included the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, France, and the European Union.

Second, they used the promise of renewed funding to Burundi to motivate actors to make enough concessions to get the major parties to sign the peace accord. Nelson Mandela, who was the lead facilitator after 1999, was particularly effective at wielding this “carrot”—he specifically called on donors to pledge significant assistance if the peace process was finalized, and they in turn made such pledges. Given Burundi’s economic devastation as well as its traditional dependence
on aid flows, the promise of aid flows was likely persuasive for most, if not all, actors. The 2000 and 2004 peace accords thus hammered out an impressive power-sharing arrangement that Burundi then slowly put in place between 2000 and 2005. Once the peace accords were signed in 2000, the donor community upheld their initial promise and came together in Paris and pledged more than $300 million to rebuilding Burundi.  

In the end, donors played an indirect role in the establishment of peace and the resulting power-sharing arrangement in Burundi from 2000 onward, but they did so without spending money specifically in Burundi on implementing aid projects for institutionalizing power sharing. The few projects that donors did dedicate to this purpose include a few small projects from the Netherlands and Belgium that supported the peace negotiations and establishing the local and national government structure according to the peace accords.

Outside the branches of government, donors were peripherally influential in establishing the power-sharing quotas in the military called for in the peace accords. Under the peace accords, the opposition forces needed to be integrated into the state military along with a massive reduction in overall forces. These measures would help institute proportional representation (with over-representation of Tutsi forces) within the military to help guarantee the military could not be used against one ethnic group in the future. While aid money was not used directly to integrate the divergent military forces, the World Bank did launch several large-scale demobilization projects to reduce the size of the military. The first program ran from 2004 to 2008, and the second project ran from 2009 to 2012. These projects successfully helped demobilize nearly 100% of those eligible and willing to participate in the program—allowing surplus military and combatant forces to reintegrate into society so that the proper proportions could be established in the military.

Decentralization

Compared to Rwanda, there was a significant lack of a focus on decentralization in Burundi. The funding that did come through for decentralization came much later—starting in 2004. The first decentralization aid activities were largely peripheral to the actual aid project. For example, the 2004 Community-based Reintegration program funded by USAID was largely focused on developing democratic norms in society, but one portion of the project trained local authorities on conflict mitigation techniques. The project design originally only called for training non-governmental leaders in the community, but the Burundian Government requested USAID extend the training to newly elected local officials and local party leaders, which it did. USAID sent trainers to 34 communes that were considered to be the most divisive during the elections to help increase the local leaders’ ability to manage and dampen conflict. Similarly, the 2005 Post-Conflict Transitional Assistance Program funded by USAID had a component that provided training for communal and hillside councils. The project ran through 2007, and according to project documents, it successfully trained over 5,000 local participants. These training sessions sought to empower local leaders and therefore devolve authority from the central government.
Beyond these smaller projects, several donors implemented projects focused on building capacity at the local level. In 2005, the United States funded a project for community-based reintegration of internally displaced peoples, ex-combatants, and returning members of the community. One component of this project was a community initiatives project that sought to build community structures and capacity for directing community development.\textsuperscript{312} This project was modeled after the community development committees implemented by donors in Rwanda. These community initiatives were effectively implemented and encouraged public participation, increased their ability to plan and execute community projects, and bolstered reconciliation by involving citizens from all ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{313} Also, in 2007 the World Bank implemented a similar, but more extensive, program focused on community involvement in development activities—dedicating over $40 million to the project through 2012.\textsuperscript{314} UNDP also funded two capacity-building projects at the local level—one is 2007 and one in 2009.\textsuperscript{315} The goal of these aid flows was to establish decentralized, participatory, and transparent local community institutions, and in the case of the World Bank project, donor documents indicate it was successfully implemented. The final evaluation indicated the World Bank project had effectively developed local capacity to facilitate local development as well as enabled and funded community-driven projects, but its support for the government’s decentralization strategy ended up being less effective.\textsuperscript{316}

The World Bank and United States were the largest funders of decentralization in Burundi, but significant flows also came from Germany who gave $8 million towards a project in 2010 to increase local service delivery through decentralization. Other decentralization aid flows came from Switzerland and Belgium between 2008 and 2009.\textsuperscript{317} These projects support the processes of decentralization, but not much more detail is known.

Looking at a specific sector, noteworthy donor flows also went towards decentralizing land management in Burundi. Specifically, the EC and Switzerland dedicated aid flows to funding pilot decentralization and land management operations in nine different provinces.\textsuperscript{318} Land management is an important—and potentially explosive—issue in Burundi given its high population density rates and low economic development. These decentralization projects came at the same time that Burundi introduced decentralized land reforms, though it is not clear whether these aid flows came before or after the government announced the new decentralization reforms.

### Elections

Elections are the most significant type of aid that donors gave in Burundi to increase the representativeness of formal institutions. The bulk of aid flows directed at elections in Burundi came in the last quarter of the research study though. In the first quarter, there were only a few projects recorded, including an EC project for $3 million along with smaller flows from the United States, Sweden, Canada, and Belgium between 1993 and 1994. Details on these flows are limited, but the project goals were to support the elections in Rwanda (most likely through institutional support).\textsuperscript{319}
Starting in 2004, elections became a significant focus for donor funds. Between 2004 and 2005, donors poured over $17 million into Burundi to support several scheduled elections, including the constitutional referendum, the communal elections, the legislative election, the senate election, and the presidential election. These elections were important steps forward for Burundian democracy, and donors were a large part of that. The largest donor for these years was Belgium with $4.5 million in electoral aid, but the Netherlands, the EC, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, the UK, and the U.S. were also significant donors. The vast majority of this aid went towards supporting and establishing the electoral system in general—including $15 million towards supporting electoral institutions and election processes. In addition, approximately $1 million from the UK was directed specifically at supporting the establishment of the constitution and its referendum. Also interesting to note, almost $6 million of the donor flows for these two years went to a basket fund managed by UNDP to support the elections. The largest donors that reported their aid flows to this basket fund included the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and Italy.

From donor project documents, it is also apparent that some donors supported the elections through civil society and the media rather than through supporting formal institutions. This is particularly true for the United States which before the election still was legally banned from giving aid flows directly to the government. Starting in 2004, the United States designed a component of its aid to target independent media outlets and journalists that helped perform monitoring functions during the elections. This activity was successfully implemented through 2006, with donor documents specifically noting that the intervention effectively suppressed rumors in rural populations and focused citizen’s attention on upcoming elections and referendums. Also, the UK implemented a project that sought to bridge the two approaches and simultaneously supported the state institution of the National Independent Electoral Commission in Burundi (CENI) as well as developing civil society to also support successful elections.

The run-up to the 2010 elections—including commune, local, parliamentary, and presidential elections—inspired the largest flow of aid money from donors for elections. In 2009 and 2010, donors dedicated over $21 million to supporting the elections. Again the vast majority of these flows went towards general election support, with very few details of the aid programs known. Also, another $6 million went towards the basket funding implemented through UNDP for election support in 2009. This time though, some of the project information provided by Norway shows that this basket funding was used for supporting formal and informal electoral institutions—including both the state institution CENI as well as supporting the development of media and civil society organizations. Similarly, election aid flows for these two years saw a greater diversity in how donors chose to support the elections with more flows going towards activities such as voters education, increasing civil society’s participation in the election process, and supporting media outlets.

In 2009, one part of the USAID Burundi Policy Reform Project sought to address some of the shortcomings of the 2005 elections by organizing a deep analysis of Burundi electoral code and a
widely-inclusive roundtable discussion in June involving representatives of political parties, civil society, government, media, and other groups to discuss ways the electoral code could be revised. The outcome of the roundtable was a proposal to revise the electoral code submitted to the government. Unfortunately the government did not adopt many of the revisions included in the proposal, but a few were—including the recommendation to use national identity cards for voters to present on election day.

In 2010, UNDP built upon its previous work in this area and started a four-year project in 2010 directed again at CENI, voters’ education, media, and civil society to bolster the electoral processes in Burundi for over $18 million. Project documents from UNDP show significant contributions from Norway, the EC, Belgium, and the Burundian Government itself to support this project. However, how much of those project flows were actually disbursed during our study period is unknown.

Public Participation Mechanisms

Some donor aid flows to Burundi focused on public participation methods, but compared to Rwanda this sector was much more under-developed. In general, the only flows that went towards public-participation methods were small portions of projects focused on completely different issues. All of these projects came from the United States. It is possible that other donors likewise designed portions of their projects to incorporate public participation methods in formal institutions, but the available information for most other donors makes it difficult to identify any such activities.

The first public participation mechanism supported by aid flows was from USAID’s 2002-2003 Burundi Initiative for Peace Project. This project sought to support the implementation of the Arusha Peace accords through three activities: the first two focused on fostering democratic norms, but the last one focused on strengthening the capacity of the government to respond to constituency needs. Specifically, this project included support to transitional institutions including the Parliament and local-level institutions. The aid money was used to organize a National Outreach Program that encouraged parliamentarians to visit their constituencies, hold a public open meeting, and get direct feedback from constituencies. The government leaders at all levels were also given training on how to include such feedback into their decisions and respond to the expressed needs from their constituencies. Furthermore, some project activities were targeted towards encouraging citizen participation in public affairs through creating Local Committees of Good Governance at varying levels—from the hill level to the province level—where citizens could come to discuss and debate relevant topics such as transparency and corruption. During the project, these committees in total engaged approximately 10,000 citizens.

From 2005 through 2007, USAID’s Post-Conflict Transitional Assistance Program also integrated a small aspect of public-participation mechanisms into the project. Under the project, local officials could submit development “micro-project” requests, but the program required
those local officials to hold public meetings to determine which micro-project ideas to submit. This practice forced local officials to incorporate public participation into their procedures as well as sought to teach a larger lesson, which was to train these leaders to incorporate public feedback into their decision making.

As part of the Burundi Policy Reform Project (BPRP) started in 2007 and ran through 2009, USAID also sought to promote a participatory policy process between representatives of the executive government—including ministers and ministerial officials—and public representative organizations such as the media and civil society organizations. A small portion of the project focused on organizing several roundtables among elected officials, the media, and civil society to foster policy dialogue. These roundtables culminated in a government retreat where executive government officials consulted together to evaluate their progress and set objectives going forward in relation to their responsibilities to the population. The retreat was the first time all of the ministers interacted together, established a consultative model, and set objectives going forward. Again the project activities as a whole were much larger than these roundtables, but this activity shows an effort from donors such as the US to foster more representative state institutions.

As part of a different activity under the BPRP, the project sought to reform some land policies to better handle land disputes within communities. In 2008, the Burundian Government announced it would create a land commission to explore the issue of land reform. The U.S. supported this initiative through playing a crucial role in the creation of the committee and its coordination with other actors. Specifically, it helped define the activities of the committee, it organized focus groups throughout the country, and it held public validation workshops on the land policy. One of the outcomes of the focus groups was the idea to decentralize land management. The focus groups also helped build consensus and support around this idea, and the reform became a policy of Burundi land management, as described previously in the decentralization section. This was the first aid program in Burundi that sought to involve citizens in the reform process through formal mechanisms.

Looking at the available project information from donors other than the U.S., it is clear that participative activities were not a high priority—only approximately $1.4 million worth of projects out of $414 million implemented by donors during the study period specifically mentioned participation as a goal. Of those flows, almost all of the projects specifically focused on increasing participation in civil society rather than zeroing in on increasing participation in formal institutions. In contrast, the US-reported flows totaled over $3 million and all focused on participation in institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taking Stock: Progress in Institutional Reforms Focused on Representation in Burundi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To the extent that aid flows were directed towards decentralization, elections, and public participation mechanisms in Burundi, donor documents indicate that those aid flows helped establish the institutional framework for citizen’s capacity to engage in government institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts
and decision-making. Among these categories, there were comparatively very few flows directed towards decentralization and public participation mechanisms. Aid towards supporting elections was the main standout, which was a fairly significant focus for many donors. Given the analysis detailed in this entire section, it is reasonable to conclude that these aid flows passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 1: 1) the decentralization, election support, and public participation mechanism projects were successfully implemented and the government of Burundi adopted the associated reforms, and 2) the project outcomes successfully increased the level of institutional representation in the country. Assessment of whether these aid programs passed the third criteria for Hypothesis 1 will be discussed at the end of this section.

ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS OF AID FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON REPRESENTATION

Throughout the study period, donors had divergent approaches to increasing democracy and good governance in Rwanda and Burundi. These differences extended to their attempts—or lack thereof—to increase the representativeness of formal government institutions. As the aid program overviews have detailed, donors in Rwanda spent a great deal of time, effort, and money on creating and reforming government institutions to broaden their processes for consulting citizens as well as increasing their responsiveness to citizens’ demands. In contrast, donors in Burundi dedicated relatively fewer aid flows to building and reforming formal government institutions to be more responsive to citizens. This next section analyzes the differences in aid programs between Rwanda and Burundi that focused on formal government institutional responsiveness and compares these differences to the final criterion outlined above, namely whether the new forms of formal institutional representation brought about by these aid programs increased overall democratic development in these countries. Hypothesis 1 posits that we would expect to see that the country with the most robust aid programs focused on increasing formal institutional representation would progress the most in its democratic development trajectory.

Institutionalized Pluralism: Comparison and Evaluation

In both Rwanda and Burundi, virtually no democracy and governance aid flows specifically targeted institutionalized pluralism. In Rwanda, the government chose to ban references to ethnicity, which is the most volatile identifier in the country. As such, no institutions have formal rules institutionalizing pluralism by, for example, requiring power sharing or representation of specific ethnic groups in government institutions. Rwanda’s laws banning references to ethnicity meant to foster the same goal often articulated by advocates of institutionalized pluralism—ensuring equal representation and equal access to government—by instead ending discrimination against any ethnicity—even to the point of attempting to erase ethnicity as a feature of citizen’s identity. The government even re-issued all identity cards without ethnic classifications, which the Rwandan Ministry of Interior distributed with the help of USAID and the Netherlands. Given the Rwandan government’s position on institutionalized pluralism with ethnicity, it is
clear that donors could not formally encourage this type of representation during the study period.

In contrast to its treatment of ethnicity, the Rwandan government energetically embraced institutionalized gender pluralism through gender quotas for elected positions at all levels, quotas for ministerial positions, and the creation of gender councils and a national ministry specifically focused on gender issues—the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion. While this sensitivity to women’s issues is certainly a step forward in good governance, there is no evidence that these improvements were initialized or affected by aid flows from donors. In fact, sources indicate these were initiated by RPF leadership quickly in the aftermath of the genocide and consistently reinforced both through institutional means as well as encouraging new norms for women’s empowerment. So while Rwanda’s efforts to increase gender equality have generally been deemed successful, this success is not directly or indirectly attributable to any democracy and governance aid programs.

On the other hand, Burundi’s reforms for institutional pluralism were far-reaching for both ethnicity and gender. These reforms, particularly the ethnic-related reforms, were indirectly influenced by donors—but again no actual democracy and governance aid flows directly implemented or initiated these institutional reforms. As such, this study cannot assess the effectiveness of aid flows in this particular category.

However, it is important to recognize that Burundi’s power-sharing structure was a significant contextual factor that affected Burundi’s democratic trajectory. Quantifiable measures for its impact are a bit murky, but reasonable evidence includes the following: First, since the full establishment of power-sharing institutions in 2005, Burundi has experienced far less violent conflict and increased stability. As discussed in the contextual literature review earlier in this chapter, stability is a prerequisite for democratic development; to quote one researcher, “No order, no democracy.” As such, the power sharing arrangement has ostensibly provided enough guarantees to each ethnic group and their factions to ensure they continue to work within the bounds of government instead of resorting to violence. Second, power-sharing requirements have helped political leaders move beyond ethnicity as a rallying call for society. For example, power-sharing requirements even extend to political parties, and this has helped create multi-ethnic parties that coalesce around substantive political platforms rather than ethnic identities. As such, the power-sharing structure of the Burundian government has proven to be a stabilizing force and fosters an environment where democracy can develop. How well citizens, leaders, and donor’s aid programs are able to take and run with that opportunity though is something that this study is meant to determine.

Decentralization: Comparison and Evaluation

Aid flows directed at devolving decision-making power to lower levels of government played significantly different roles in Rwanda and Burundi. Where decentralization was a huge focus for Rwanda and its donor partners, Burundi did not experience as much activity in the
Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts

decentralization sphere. Given available evidence from donor documentation, it is clear that the decentralization policies in Rwanda were adopted and well implemented by the Rwandan government and donors. Did these reforms become the driving force for democratic change in Rwanda?

This is where the great paradox of Rwanda first comes to light. Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 1, the increased institutional representation did not lead to real democratic progress in Rwanda. According to two widely used macro-level indicators of democratic development, Rwanda begins the study period in 1990 as “Not Free” and ends the study period in 2010 with the same value, according to Freedom House; similarly, Rwanda progresses on the Polity2 scale only from a score of -7 to -4 over these two decades, remaining squarely within the range of autocracies.\textsuperscript{343} Similarly, the level of political rights at the beginning of the study was rated at 6 then decreased to 7—which is the bottom of the scale indicating no political rights—and again settled at 6 by 2010.\textsuperscript{344} Other quantitative measures show some improvement, but they still classify Rwanda as an undemocratic government and society. On the other hand, Burundi successfully made progress on its democratic trajectory, moving from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” despite the relatively fewer aid flows going towards decentralization.\textsuperscript{345} Looking more closely at the way that Rwanda and Burundi implemented decentralization reform can give some insight into the true drivers of democratic reform as well as any mitigating factors in Rwanda’s case.

\textit{Linking Decentralization and Democracy: Rwanda’s Weak Link}

One of the tenets of Hypothesis 1 regarding institutional representativeness is that an increase in decentralization should increase democracy because it creates downward accountability and gives citizens a voice in local governance. While this may be the logic often behind decentralization, and may have worked in Burundi, this is unfortunately not the case in Rwanda. The government of Rwanda enthusiastically embraced the institution of decentralization with the release of the Rwanda Vision 2020 report, which focused on decentralization as a main goal for the country over the next 20 years. Rwanda also incorporated decentralization into its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

However, the way Rwanda structured its decentralization counter-acted the potential for democratic openings through this reform. From the beginning, decentralization was instituted as a top-down reform. With both donors and the government, the decentralization initiatives were initiated and enforced by the central government, rather than as a response to pressure from lower levels of government or the population as a whole. Some donor reports call these actions “deconcentration” rather than decentralization because the lower-levels of government were still highly dependent on the central government, making it difficult for these agencies to exercise any amount of autonomy or discretion.\textsuperscript{346}

The one area where it appears the government did effectively devolve decision-making power was in community development needs and service delivery. With the establishment of
community development committees and similar structures, the central government allowed communities to determine their local development needs and execute projects, though usually with donor funding, leaving a question as to how sustainable this local autonomy and locally led development approach is. Similarly, throughout the study period the government decentralized service delivery to empower local actors to make decisions they were in the best position to make.

However, the Rwandan government maintained tight control on wider government policy, government objectives, and reform agendas. One USAID assessment of the decentralization process in 2009 also noted that decentralization was implemented as a way that engaged citizens in “centrally-determined objectives”—meaning that citizens are not empowered to change or influence policy if it is not in line with the central government’s initiatives and that, even throughout the decentralization process, the source of political power in the country still remained the national executive office. This is further seen through other population survey results showing that, while there was an increase in citizen participation in community affairs and local government during the study period, the survey respondents indicated the quality of citizen participation and their trust in local elected officials actually decreased. Indeed, even though Switzerland had supported decentralization activities in Rwanda every year since 2002, Switzerland specifically decided to stop funding decentralization projects in Rwanda in 2010 due to the lack of democratic results seen from decentralization. The 2010 project description from Switzerland explicitly stated that the decentralization in Rwanda was “being used as a means for stronger control of central government over local powers” through the existence of parallel decision and accountability mechanisms that held the local authorities more accountable to the central government rather than their constituents. Switzerland, as many other donors have now concluded, states that Rwanda has been exploiting the institutions of decentralization to close political space and maintain social control. Looking at research outside of donor reports, one author even implicated the government in actively suppressing opposition—stating that anyone who puts forth policy that is not in line with the central government’s policies will often disappear without explanation.

These statements paint a picture very different from a country moving towards greater democratic development. While the government has increased its level of efficiency as well as decentralized decision authority, it has not increased the level of democracy in the country. This trend is also confirmed in quantitative measures provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. The WGI indicator for Government Effectiveness shows a steady and impressive upward trend—from -1.20 in 1996 to -0.05 by 2010—moving the country from the 12th percentile to the 53rd percentile. During the same time period, though, the WGI indicator for Voice and Accountability shows little improvement; it started at -1.56 in 1996 and ended at -1.31 in 2010, moving the country from the 7th percentile to the 12th percentile. During the study period, the highest increase came in 2005 with a score of -1.16 right after the national elections, but this progress quickly unraveled after the government tightened control over the years following the election. As a document from the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation
states, “decentralization programs succeed if partner country governments clearly prove that they intend to redistribute the political and administrative power,” but it is now clear that Rwanda did not allow such redistribution.

**Decentralization and Democratization: Burundi’s Experience**

As stated above, not much of Burundi’s democracy and governance aid was directed towards decentralization. If Hypothesis 1 is correct, we would expect to see little democratic development during the study period. Looking over Burundi’s democratic trajectory over the study period though, Burundi experienced positive growth towards establishing effective democracy. Burundi begins the study period in 1990 as “Not Free” and ends the study period in 2010 with a higher value of “Partly Free” according to Freedom House. Even more impressively, Burundi progresses on the Polity2 scale from a score of -7 to 6—moving from a strong autocracy to a relatively strong democracy during the study period. Given that Burundi received fairly little aid focused on formal decentralization, it must have been other factors driving Burundi’s progress in popular representation and democratic development overall.

This trend is also confirmed in assessing sector-level quantitative measures provided by the WGI dataset. The WGI indicator for *Voice and Accountability* shows significant improvement overall; it moved from -1.75 in 1996 to -0.94 by 2010, raising the country from the 4th percentile to the 22nd percentile. This indicator peaked in 2005 right after the national elections at -0.64 (29th percentile), but decreased slowly over the later years. This shows that, throughout the study period, and particularly between 2000 and 2010, citizens in Burundi had significantly more opportunities to influence the government. Burundi’s trajectory far outstrips Rwanda’s performance during the same time period: Burundi started out three percentile points below Rwanda and ended up over ten percentile points above Rwanda by 2010. In contrast, the WGI indicator for *Government Effectiveness* in Burundi shows a much less rosy story—Burundi made modest progress but stagnated far below Rwanda. In 1996, Burundi measured at -1.73 (3rd percentile) and by 2010 it had only increased to -1.10 (14th percentile).

---

**Elections: Comparison and Evaluation**

**Controlled Elections: Rwanda**

In terms of increasing democracy, donors support elections as a way to establish accountability between political leaders and their constituents, increase the responsiveness of government to its citizen’s needs and opinions, and create a forum for a competition of ideas that is enabled and decided by voters. In Rwanda, donors dedicated a great deal of resources towards supporting and bolstering the election process in Rwanda. In the end, though the elections have been well established as a public institution, the election process as a whole has failed to increase the overall level of democracy in Rwanda. One quantitative indicator of this lack of progress is Polity IV’s *Political Competitiveness* measure, which seeks to measure the extent to which citizens can pursue alternative preferences for policy and leadership in the political arena. During
the study period, in Rwanda this indicator started out at 1 in 1990, moved to 3 in 2000, and then moved back down to 2 in 2010.\(^{357}\) On a scale of 1-10, with 1 indicating the least amount of political competition, Rwanda has made minimal progress in building space for political competition despite donors’ efforts.

Surprisingly, most donor documents do not discuss this lack of political openness around elections. In general, the elections are praised for their efficiency and successful completion—in the sense that little or no violence broke out, the elections had very high turnouts, voter registration went smoothly, and the ballots were counted with little or no fraud. As such, donors declared the various elections from 2003-2010 as “free and fair.”\(^{358}\) While these statements are all true, they do not recognize that political leaders, parties, or ideas are not allowed to compete in those elections. In an assessment published in 2002 on Rwanda’s democratic position, one USAID document spoke frankly of the continued narrowing of the political space in Rwanda, stating that “the RPF maintains effective control over virtually all state institutions [and] exercises tight control over political debate.”\(^{359}\) In the same report, USAID states that the party forum “often operates as an institution of control rather than a forum for dialogue and competition of ideas.”\(^{360}\)

The sentiments outlined in these USAID statements correspond with reports from scholars. According to these reports, the government regularly denies political parties’ registration applications, accuses opposition candidates of divisionist ideology and imprisons them, and disqualifies candidates days before an election. For example, in 2001, former President Bizimungu announced he was forming a new political party, and immediately he was put under house arrest by the government and officially jailed a year later.\(^{361}\) Similarly, the main opposition party in the early 2000s (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain, or MDR) was eventually outlawed and disbanded in 2003, shortly before parliamentary elections.\(^{362}\) The 2008 and 2010 elections showed similar trends: Talking to a news reporter in 2010, the former speaker of the Rwandan Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi stated the following:

> In my view these are not elections. Elections suppose competition and in Rwanda today you don't have that competition because the leaders of political parties have been put in prison, other political parties were prevented from presenting their candidate because they were not registered. Those who are running are friends of Kagame.\(^{363}\)

Clearly, in Rwanda’s case the aid directed towards elections helped establish the institutions of elections, but those elections did not increase the democratic development of Rwanda.

**Burundi’s Elections:**

In Burundi, elections likewise garnered significant funding from the aid community, though this was split between supporting formal election institutions and fostering informal democratic norms around the elections. In contrast to Rwanda’s lack of progress in building political
competition, Burundi’s competitive election system blossomed very well over the study period. In Burundi, Polity IV’s Political Competitiveness measure started at 1 in 1990—as it had in Rwanda, but then moved to 6 in 1998, and settled at 8 in 2010. On a scale of 1-10, with 10 indicating the highest amount of political competition, Burundi voters clearly have a high amount of opportunities to support and elect competing platforms and candidates.

This progress does not mean, however, that Burundi elections were perfect. Some donor project documents highlight flaws of the 2005 elections, including accusations of cheating, intimidation, and manipulation in some polling stations. They also indicate that the CENI still lacked sufficient human, material, and financial resources and, as a result, was not adequately transparent or neutral. By the 2010 elections, there were hints at larger problems looming over Burundian democracy. Despite having 23 different parties participating, the commune elections showed a large win (64%) for the National Council for the Defence of Democracy / Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), which had been the majority party for the prior 5 years. Opposition parties refused to accept this result and accused the government of fraud and intimidation—despite the fact that national and international observer teams had declared the elections were free and fair. The 12 largest parties boycotted the presidential elections later that year, so the only candidate was the incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza, who won the election overwhelmingly. These situations indicate Burundi is still undergoing growing pains as it matures its democratic sector, but compared to Rwanda, the elections held during the study period presented voters with space to voice their opinions among multiple options.

---

Public Participation Mechanisms: Comparison and Evaluation

Participation without Voice: Rwanda

As with trends in other formal institutional sectors discussed here, the Rwandan government, with the help of aid dollars, managed to establish the institutions of public participation without increasing democracy inside the country. Over the study period, the government and donors instituted a broad range of public participation mechanisms, while at the same time effectively reducing opportunities for citizens to truly have a voice in their government. This “participation without voice” culture stemmed from two aspects of participation in Rwanda.

First, the public participation institutions were largely state-driven and state-determined. In Rwanda, the government determined when and where citizens could participate, and often this participation would then be undermined by the government’s decision power. The Vision 2020 participation process serves as an illustrative example. To formulate the Vision 2020 document, the government held widely inclusive dialogue sessions with citizens from all areas of the country and at all levels, yet it held the pen on what policies were actually included in the final document. Further along during the study period, the decentralization institutions were even co-opted to better control citizen participation, as one USAID document states:
Decentralized administrative structures of the government tend to manage the participation process, guided from the center. As a result, citizens are not so much initiating engagement with administrative structures to push for responsiveness; citizens are instead being mobilized to participate in state-set agendas.\textsuperscript{369}

The second aspect of Rwanda’s participation processes that reduced their effectiveness is a strong emphasis on conformity. The regime consistently exerts pressure on all levels of society to conform tightly to the bounds of discourse and ideas set by the state.\textsuperscript{370} The state expects consensus rather than a diversity of opinions, and, within this culture, participation could be easily viewed as more formulaic or perfunctory.\textsuperscript{371} Politicians, civil society, activists, and others were expected to bolster the ruling consensus rather than tear it down.

Thus while democracy and governance aid flows went toward establishing an impressive array of public participation mechanisms within Rwanda, the end result was far from an inclusive democracy. This harks back to the lack of progress Rwanda has seen on the WGI indicator for Voice and Accountability: Over the study period, Rwanda only moved from the 6\textsuperscript{th} percentile (with a score of -1.56) to the 12\textsuperscript{th} percentile (with a score of -1.31) compared to all other countries.\textsuperscript{372}

**Public Participation in Burundi:**

As detailed in a previous section, building public participation mechanisms with formal government institutions was not a focus for donors. Despite this, Burundi did experience a significant expansion of political space for citizens’ participation and influence on the government. For example, the WGI indicator for Voice and Accountability showed that from 1996 to 2010, Burundi moved from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} percentile (with a score of -1.75) to the 22\textsuperscript{nd} percentile (with a score of -0.94).\textsuperscript{373} This increase in citizens’ ability to voice their opinions, despite there being very few aid flows dedicated to increasing formal institutional mechanisms for public participation, suggest that there were likely other causes driving Burundi’s progress.

---

**Mitigating factors**

In all of the forms of representational institutions analyzed as part of this study, the government of Rwanda—and more specifically the executive—sought to maintain control over the process and the direction of reforms. It created an environment where consensus was expected and participation was inclusive but lacked power. Many supporters of the Rwandan government (including many donors) sanction these actions though, citing the extraordinary circumstances of a country recovering from violent conflict and genocide. These supporters state that in a country that was so violently ripped apart with neighbor killing neighbor, the development and democratization trajectory of the country must be carefully managed from the top to avoid any opportunities for radicalization of the population again (especially from the Hutu elite).\textsuperscript{374} Along with this, the government has adopted a low tolerance for internal or external criticism, and often its critics are accused of inciting or endorsing divisionism (which it outlawed in 2002), therefore
branding them as radicals that are unfit to participate in Rwandan political spheres.\textsuperscript{375} Furthermore, the government states that Rwanda is striving for a new kind of democracy—a “consensual democracy” rather than a competitive, western-styled democracy. It argues this type of democracy is in the best interest of Rwanda to make sure its society avoids outbreaks of violence that have historically risen due to competitive ideologies.\textsuperscript{376}

This culture of ‘genocide exceptionalism’ and the resulting strength of the executive is one of the largest mitigating factors of democracy development in Rwanda. Furthermore, whether this culture is appropriate or correct for Rwanda’s history is a subjective judgment. The regime would argue it’s efforts have helped Rwanda make immense improvements—especially in government efficiency and service delivery—that are priming the country for greater democracy in the future. On the other hand, the real lack of citizen empowerment in Rwanda’s system is a true failure for democracy so far. However, this study is comparing multiple case studies on their overall democratic trajectory and analyzing how democracy and governance aid has furthered that trajectory along. As such, this study can leave behind the argument of whether the current path was the best option for Rwanda or not and, rather, objectively assess how much progress has been made towards traditional democratic objectives. And objectively speaking, Rwanda has failed to make meaningful progress on standard benchmarks for democratic development over the 20 years of the study period—genocide or not.

CONCLUSION: HYPOTHESIS 1

\textit{Hypothesis 1} posits that aid directed toward increasing representation in formal institutions will increase the democratic development of a country as it provides the structure and opportunity for citizens to have a voice in government. According to this causal logic and assumptions, along with the case-pairing methodology this study uses, this study should have seen the country with the most aid flows targeting representation in formal institutions out-perform the country with the least aid flows targeting the same institutions. However, the analysis of Rwanda and Burundi has revealed the opposite: despite the high amount of aid flowing into Rwanda that focused on the institutions of decentralization, elections, and public participation mechanisms, Burundi ultimately far outstripped Rwanda in its democratic trajectory from 2000 to 2010. As a result, we reject \textit{Hypothesis 1} (see Figure 5). In these cases, there must have been additional aspects of aid that explained the differences seen in Rwanda and Burundi, which we will further explore in the coming sections.
Figure 5. Conclusion on Hypothesis 1 for Rwanda and Burundi

Hypothesis 1: Democracy aid programs that increase the representativeness of formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid Programs</th>
<th>Decentralization</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>National Participation Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented reform increased representativeness of institution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased representativeness of institution advanced democracy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented reform increased representativeness of institution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased representativeness of institution advanced democracy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: CHECKS AND BALANCES

In an effort to further democratic reform and increase democracy and good governance, aid programs may seek to create and increase checks and balances across formal government institutions to improve a country’s democratic functioning. These types of programs attempt to establish balanced democratic institutions. By seeking to balance the formal structures of government, these programs attempt to bolster all types of legitimate government power—including legislative, judicial, and executive—so no one institution dominates the other and each fulfills its duties. As such, the second hypothesis this study tests is stated thus:

Hypothesis 2: Democracy aid programs that increase checks and balances across formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

If this hypothesis is true, then aid programs targeting institutional changes that establish checks and balances such as programs creating horizontal and vertical separation of powers, establishing the rule of law in the country, or integrating institutions of former authoritarian strength into democratic order will lead to increased democratic performance in the country. In our analysis of aid programs in Rwanda and Burundi, we test this hypothesis by first outlining the aid programs from major donors focusing on creating checks and balances in formal institutions in Rwanda and Burundi, and then assessing whether these programs were successful in leading the way to
democratic change. We will conclude this hypothesis is correct if after the implementation of the democracy and governance aid program:

- The government adopted and/or allowed the program’s intended reform or innovation, e.g. legal or constitutional separation of powers were established (criterion 1).
- These reforms contributed to or increased the designated type of formal institutional balance, e.g. establishing more expansive oversight powers for the legislature reduced executive over-reach in the country (criterion 2).
- The designated type of formal institutional balance contributed to the democratization of the country—measured qualitatively and through quantitative measures of sectoral and overall democratic development (criterion 3). The study will also seek to analyze whether democracy and governance aid programs contributed to any of the key historical or contextual factors known to be influential in the country’s democratic development. Depending on the factor though, this influence could positively affect the country’s democratic trajectory or lead the country further away from democracy and good governance.

Since Rwanda and Burundi had different democratic trajectory outcomes, we expect to see a divergence in the type and effectiveness of institutional reforms promoted by aid programs in those countries if this hypothesis is true. Likewise, we will reject this hypothesis if:

- The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but they did not contribute to the democratic reform of the institution (criterion 2), or
- Democratic reform of the institution was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).

This study will look for evidence from the same sources mentioned in the analysis of Hypothesis 1, including donor reports, project documents, existing scholarly research, and published quantitative measures—namely Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* to assess overall democracy levels and World Governance Indicators’ *Rule of Law* and *Control of Corruption* to assess sectoral democracy levels related to balanced and accountable government institutions. It will also identify any mitigating factors that inhibited the aid program’s ability to increase democratic development in the country through formal checks and balances among institutions. To facilitate a more comprehensive analysis, the first and second criteria for effectiveness listed above—whether a democracy and governance aid program was successfully implemented and whether that type of reform increased the balance of formal institutions—have been incorporated in the following sections detailing the aid programs implemented during the study period. The final criterion for effectiveness—whether the designated type of institutional balance contributed to democratization in the country—will be analyzed in the last section.
Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts

A large portion of the aid programs in Rwanda during the study period focused on establishing proper checks and balances among formal institutions and building capacity within the weaker institutions. The following sections will detail the relevant aid programs from each major donor in Rwanda and their involvement in aid programs focused on increasing institutional accountability and establishing horizontal separation of powers.

In any analysis of aid to Rwanda, an important contextual factor to keep in mind is the strong ownership and control that the Rwandan government held over aid programs. Starting half way through the study period (2000) the Rwandan government (specifically the Executive) required all aid programs to first be approved by the government before the programs could be implemented in the country. Given the strong institutional cooperation aid in this sector requires, this is a natural limitation to the aid programs a donor could fund in the country. Each donor agency had to find the best programs for furthering its democracy building goals within the constraints of the existing Rwandan government’s compulsion for control. As such, the aid programs that were implemented could be more conservative in nature than the donor desired because the government would not approve programs outside its own interests.

Bureaucratic Transparency and Accountability

Public Financial Management

Building systems for better transparency and accountability across government institutions was a significant focus for donors between 1990-2010. This was particularly true for public financial management projects. At the beginning of the study period, corruption was rampant in Rwanda. By 1996, the first systematic measure of corruption was published through the World Governance Indicators with its Control of Corruption indicator—showing that Rwanda was only in the 20th percentile for countries best reducing corruption. As such, there was clearly little transparency or accountability in public finances. The donor to first move in this area was the United States through USAID. In 1994, USAID started the Budget Reform Assistance Project that was supposed to run through 1998 for $20 million. The project was focused on encouraging the government to adopt budget control systems to increase accountability. This project was likely canceled though once the genocide began, and project documents do not indicate it was re-started after the genocide.

During the years immediately after the genocide, public financial management did not receive much funding, even though corruption continued to be a major problem. Starting in 1998, donors started pouring significant financing and effort into making public finances more transparent and accountable, and they did so by supporting three key institutions involved with public financial management: the Rwandan Revenue Authority, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), and the Rwandan Ombudsman Office.
The first institution to receive aid flows was the Rwandan Revenue Authority, which received almost $24 million from the United Kingdom between 1998 and 2006. While this institution is not directly charged with reducing corruption, it is responsible for collecting all public funds. As such, it handles the public resources directly and is traditionally a major source for corruption in susceptible countries. The aid directed towards this agency focused on building the institution internally—to increase its efficiency and reduce opportunities for corruption. No implementation information (and its specific success or failure) is available for these flows however.

The second institution to receive aid flows was the OAG. In 2000, the Netherlands and Sweden both dedicated over $1 million to bolstering the institution and its auditing activities. The Netherlands continued its support to the OAG through 2007, totaling another $7 million. Sweden also continued its support to the OAG through 2004, totaling an additional $1 million. Since the OAG is directly charged with auditing the use of public resources, these project flows sought to bolster the institutional transparency of Rwanda’s public finances. Again, no implementation information is available for these project flows.

Lastly, the Rwandan Office of the Ombudsman received some funding during the study period. The institution is tasked with reducing corruption across all government institutions and ensuring the government’s accountability more generally. Between 2007 and 2010, the Netherlands (dedicating approximately $2 million) and UNDP (giving $500 thousand) dedicated projects to bolstering this office in its duties. The UNDP project specifically focused the Ombudsman’s office on anti-corruption activities. Annual Report documents for UNDP indicate the UNDP project was implemented successfully and helped inform an expanded anti-corruption policy.

Beyond these specific institutions, many donors also gave general aid towards public financial management and anti-corruption activities between 1999 and 2010. Specific project activity details and implementation reports are unavailable, but according to the project descriptions, the flows were directed towards enhancing public financial management through technical assistance, training, institutional support, or other means. The largest donors for these flows included Sweden ($3.6 million), the UK ($2.5 million), the U.S. Department of the Treasury ($200 thousand), and Switzerland ($150 thousand). France, Germany, and the Netherlands also gave negligible amounts during this time frame.

Similarly, the U.K. also dedicated annual flows between 2006 and 2010 totaling $14 million towards strengthening “key institutions in Rwanda which have a mandate to enhance responsiveness and accountability in Rwanda.” More specific details on the U.K.’s flows (and the success of their implementation) are not available. However, the size of the flows, and their consistency, show that increasing institutional transparency was a high priority for USAID and the U.K. and that there were likely no major problems with implementation.

The two projects where more details are known came from the World Bank: the Public Sector Capacity Building Project from 2004-2010 for $20 million and the Fifth Poverty Reduction Support Grant from 2009-2010 for $80 million. These projects had broad goals with many
activities, a portion of which sought to strengthen public institutions through bolstering public financial management and increasing accountability at all levels of government.\textsuperscript{386} Specifically, the 2004 project helped to make the public tendering more competitive and reduce opportunities for corruption.\textsuperscript{387} The 2009 project also targeted increasing the transparency of procurement methods, but it also included implementing fiscal decentralization and rolling out a software program to districts throughout Rwanda designed to better manage and monitor district budgets.\textsuperscript{388} By 2010, the projects were successfully implemented and met all of their outcome indicators. The completion reports also indicate that, perhaps more significantly, the Rwandan government was fully committed to—and adopted as their own—the public financial reforms the projects targeted and helped ensure their timely implementation.\textsuperscript{389} The 2004 project was even restructured in 2009 to give more responsibility to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning so that it was the direct implementing agency instead of going through a third party agency. USAID states that this restructuring occurred because the Ministry’s capacity had grown significantly over the previous five years of the project to the point that it could handle the increased responsibility.\textsuperscript{390} This development certainly shows successful implementation and adoption of the aid flow’s intended reforms by the Rwandan government institution.

\textit{Taking Stock: Progress in Bureaucratic Accountability and Transparency}

As noted above, most of the aid flows targeting bureaucratic transparency and public financial management generally lacked specific implementation reports, which makes assessing their individual success difficult. It is possible, however, to see the significant progress that Rwanda made throughout the study period in fully embracing and implementing fiscal accountability and transparency. Starting with the Rwanda Vision 2020 policy document released in 2000, the government made accountable public financing one of six pillars of development it committed to focusing on, stating: “The State will ensure good governance, which can be understood as accountability, transparency and efficiency in deploying scarce resources.”\textsuperscript{391} Donors began funding the sector this same year, showing that the donor had high ownership of this goal prior to the aid flows. But more significantly, Rwanda remained committed to implementing the needed reforms throughout the rest of the study period. So instead of initiating new reforms, in this case the donors mostly focused on helping implement the reforms needed to better the government’s fiscal accountability.

Furthermore, the Rwandan government launched a second major phase of reforms with the Public Financial Management Reform Strategy from 2008-2012. This action plan sought to better monitor government budgets and control expenditures.\textsuperscript{392} This ambitious plan again demonstrated Rwanda’s commitment to the ideals of bureaucratic transparency and accountability, and again the donors responded by helping implement it. Furthermore, the strong commitment of Rwanda to “prudent financial management” increased donor confidence in the Rwandan government to the point that most donors trusted them with large sums of general budget support by the end of the study period.\textsuperscript{393} With this information, it is reasonable to conclude that Criteria 1 (aid reforms were adopted/implemented by the government) and Criteria
Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts

2 (the reforms increased bureaucratic transparency/accountability) for testing *Hypothesis 2* have been generally met.

---

**Horizontal Checks and Balances**

The real heart of separation of powers in a democratic system are the horizontal checks and balances given to the different branches of government to carry out the law—and to stop other branches from ruling outside the law. The main starting point for this horizontal separation of powers in Rwanda was the 1991 constitution. This constitution from the outset established a strong executive, but also included some separation of powers between the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches. This structure was largely inherited from colonial times, and the legislative and judicial branches were far from independent powers from the executive. From historical precedent in 1978, the Supreme Court and all other lower courts had become subject to Executive supervision and had limited resources independent of the executive, so exercising any separation of powers was extremely difficult.

Between 1991 and 1994, Rwanda was facing a civil war led by RPF soldiers coming out of exile in Uganda, which led President Habiyarimana to sign the Arusha Peace Accords. The Accords called for a transitional government and a power sharing arrangement. During that time, USAID initiated the *Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project* in 1992 where one of the activities focused on educating officials on “the way existing institutions can be shaped to share more effectively in the emerging democratic polity.” One component of the project specifically targeted the National Assembly with the goal helping it to become a “co-equal branch of government in lawmaking, in the oversight of public agencies, and in the maintaining transparency and accountability in the government.” This project shows some early interest from USAID to create greater horizontal separation of powers. Unfortunately, the genocide erupted across the country before the transitional government could be established and the project could gain much traction.

When the RPF gained control of the government though, it implemented the government structure set out in the Arusha Accords. This transitional government also had the basic structure of a strong executive with some powers endowed in the legislative and judicial branches. However, the institutional separation of powers—and the capacity of the legislative and judicial branches to exercise their powers—was extremely weak. Once the dust had settled from the RPF’s victory, the international community engaged the Rwandan government and directed flows towards creating greater horizontal separation of powers as a first step toward achieving proper democratic checks and balances. These flows assisted the legislative and judicial branches through three conduits: 1) Providing general support to the relevant institutions, 2) Conducting capacity building activities within the institutions to get them to a position where they could exercise their powers independently, and 3) Helping shape the formal rules and laws defining the separation of powers to better ensure oversight powers of and independence from the executive. The following sections will detail these aid flows and their activities.
Judicial Sector Support

After the Genocide, one of the most immediate needs of the government was help in building the judicial sector and its institutions to deal with the aftermath. There was a general sense of impunity for many, while there were also now over 130,000 people detained in prisons and jails. During the genocide though, many of the country’s judges and judicial employees were killed or fled the country, leaving very few to carry out justice after the genocide and ensure the rule of law—including only five judges and fifty lawyers. These shortcomings of the judicial sector meant it could hardly carry out justice and facilitate reconciliation, as well as help protect citizens from another outbreak of violence. The first donor to move in this sector was the U.S. through USAID. In late 1994, after the genocide was stopped, the USAID Mission was reactivated and the pre-existing Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project (DIG) was restarted. This time though, it was amended to better respond to the emergency situation in the country and provided essential support to key ministries—including the justice sector. These aid flows went towards commodity support to the Ministry of Justice and rehabilitating physical infrastructure for the courts and totaled approximately $11 million. Soon after, other donors began to work on technical capacity building within the Ministry of Justice and police training. During this time, these donors included Canada ($5.2 million), Belgium ($1 million), the U.K. ($0.7 million), Switzerland ($0.5 million), and negligible amounts from the Netherlands and the European Union.

Toward the latter end of the 1990s, the Ministry of Justice was chronically underfunded, receiving less than 2% of the government’s expenditures, and donors sought to relieve some of the burden. Starting in 1997 and going through 2000, USAID shifted to a Transitional Phase of funding—where instead of funding distinct projects, USAID directed flows to three strategic objectives through an Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP), where one objective was Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance with over $24 million in aid flows. As part of this strategic objective, USAID prioritized activities targeting justice sector institutions. Annual reports and budget submission documents indicate the activities focused on supporting this strategic objective were successfully implemented and “meeting its expectations.” Beyond USAID, many other donors also poured significant resources and effort into supporting the justice sector. The largest donors between 1997 and 2000 were Belgium ($11.3 million), Canada (6.7 million), the Netherlands ($6.4 million), Denmark ($4.8 million), and Germany ($1.6 million). The smaller donors included Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., France, and UNDP—each contributing less than a million dollars during this time period. Details on these flows are limited, but the activities ranged from training judges, lawyers, prosecutors, staff, and police and general support for handling the backlog of cases for alleged genocide perpetrators. Implementation details are unavailable for these flows. Even though the UNDP’s flows were negligible ($65 thousand in 1999) they represented the first engagement of UNDP in the justice sector during the study period.

In 2001, USAID renewed its ISP approach through 2003 and continued to target Strategic Objective 1 (SO1) Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance. This time though,
activities directed at the justice sector focused on bolstering police training and general support to the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{406} In total, the funding towards SO1 between 2001 and 2003 totaled $16.6 million, which includes funding to activities in the legislative sector.\textsuperscript{407} The justice-related activities included capacity building for judges, prosecutors and judicial police, and administration training for staff. The project flows were successfully implemented, with all the project targets being met or exceeded. More importantly, the evaluations found the activities had positively strengthened the technical capacity of the Ministry of Justice, resulting in the highest number of Category 1 genocide cases being resolved during 2001.\textsuperscript{408}

During this period, Belgium and the Netherlands significantly increased their flows targeting the justice sector—each giving over $13 million. The smaller donors included Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the U.K.\textsuperscript{409} These flows largely focused on general support and capacity building within the Ministry of Justice and police training, but there was also an emergence of flows directed directly at the Supreme Court. This new focus on the Supreme Court shows that the donors were able to turn away from emergency capacity building and instead start to focus on more of the strategic position and independence of the Justice sector’s highest court. Still, the total flows directed towards the Supreme Court were small during this period, including only about $500 thousand. Implementation for these flows are unavailable, but a sector evaluation from USAID from 2002 indicated that the “massive efforts on the part of donors and GOR seem to have paid off in many regards” because the new police force was much more professionalized and trials were for the first time being run in a predictable manner with the rights of the accused being respected.\textsuperscript{410}

Towards the end of this phase, UNDP began its \textit{Good Governance for Poverty Reduction Project}, which ran from 2002-2007. As one component of this project, UNDP provided aid flows to the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court. The project activities specifically focused on capacity building within the the Ministry of Justice to review and draft laws and policies, and to oversee their implementation as well as strengthening the Supreme Court and its lower-level courts so they could adequately support the judicial system. These activities were successfully implemented—including helping the Supreme Court develop a Strategic plan—though the lack of sufficient physical and human resources was a consistent problem with the court system.\textsuperscript{411}

By 2004, Rwanda had finally undergone it’s first round of complete national elections, including parliamentary and presidential elections, and a referendum passing the new formal constitution for the Government of Rwanda. With these developments, donors were eager to push for increased horizontal checks and balances—especially to make sure that the formal powers enumerated in the new constitution could be fully exercised by the judicial and parliamentary branches. In this final phase of donor flows from 2004 to 2010, Belgium became the largest donor with over $30 million dedicated to the justice sector, including $21 million in general flows, $5.7 million towards police training, and $2.9 towards supporting the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{412} The next largest donor was the Netherlands at $9.4 million, with $9 million directed towards the Supreme Court and the rest mostly going to police training.\textsuperscript{413} The rest of the donors included UNDP,\textsuperscript{414} Portugal, Sweden, the U.K. UNICEF, Canada, France, and Germany, adding up to
another $17 million collectively.\textsuperscript{415} As these trends show, flows directed to the Supreme Court increased dramatically in this last phase. These flows likely helped foster and cement the powers of the judicial branch separate from the executive—including through fortifying judicial review. As such, these flows sought to better establish horizontal separation of powers.

After reducing its involvement for a few years in supporting the justice sector, the U.S. re-invested with a grant through a Threshold Program with the Millennium Challenge Cooperation. This project was implemented by USAID and was geared toward addressing critical gaps in the justice sector so that Rwanda could qualify for an MCC compact in later years. While the project as a whole totaled over $24 million, only $5.6 million went towards the justice sector. The main related components included 1) technical assistance to the judiciary, such as training judicial staff on judicial independence and impartiality, as well as 2) strengthening Rwanda’s Legislative Drafting Unit to build members’ capacity for continued legal reform and judicial independence.\textsuperscript{416} The first component included a specific focus on increasing the judicial branch’s independence, including “Strengthen judicial independence as a means to maintain separation of powers and check excessive power in any branch or level of government. This element helps to ensure that government is bound by law, and government decision-making is in accordance with law.”\textsuperscript{417} Though the executing agency implemented most of the component’s planned judiciary strengthening activities, some of the activities related to the second component encountered difficulties. Many of the targeted reforms depended on legislative authorization and dedicated funds for new staff. Despite the efforts to push these reforms, Parliament did not adopt the legislation required in the end.\textsuperscript{418} Taking a broader view, the threshold project was never followed up with a compact program because Rwanda did not make enough progress in its indicators for \textit{Ruling Justly}.

\textit{Legislative Sector Support}

In a well-functioning democracy, the legislative branch should function independently and hold significant powers to help check the power of the executive. Surprisingly, this sector did not get a great deal of consistent support from a broad range of donors. There were no flows directed at a legislative body before the genocide, and after the genocide institutional support for the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was “extremely limited”\textsuperscript{419}—perhaps because the executive’s voice was much louder in articulating areas of need and directing flows. The lack of aid flows in this sector did not indicate a lack of need, however. The TNA was appointed in the latter half of 1994 once the RPF decided to implement the Arusha Accords after stopping the genocide. Within this framework, the TNA had substantial formal powers to legislate and exercise executive oversight—at least on paper.\textsuperscript{420} Unfortunately its capacity to fulfill those functions was underdeveloped and unprecedented. Some positive initial steps the TNA took between 1994 and 1999 included engaging in a debate over the national budget as well as questioning some ministerial officials on the execution of their duties,\textsuperscript{421} hence exercising some element of executive oversight. Beyond these steps though, the TNA was completely untrained and under-resourced.
The first donor to dedicate a project to the legislative branch was the U.K. in 1998. The project sought to build capacity (both human and infrastructure) within the TNA. This project was relatively small at only $100,000. In 1999, the TNA petitioned donors for direct support since it was largely getting overlooked. In response to the petition, USAID launched a needs assessment for the TNA, which concluded that while it had substantial oversight and budgetary powers, the TNA would require important institutional capacity building for it to actually exercise those powers. In response to the needs assessment findings, USAID launched the National Assembly Support Project starting in 2000. This project was designed to provide long-term technical assistance for institutional capacity building to specifically check the executive branch, including training on drafting legislation and budget analysis. As the project was about to end after 13 months, the TNA requested continued assistance, and USAID extended the project through September 2003. In one sense, the multiple requests from TNA for donor support is an indication of the legislative branch’s eagerness to adopt reforms put forward from donors to help increase the independence of the legislative branch, even if its capacity was lacking.

During this time, UNDP was also actively supporting the TNA with training and capacity building activities, including some financial support from the Netherlands. In 2002, it launched a broad project, the Good Governance for Poverty Reduction Programme, that included strengthening the TNA’s ability to perform its oversight function through training on legislative drafting.

The results of USAID’s and UNDP’s efforts with the legislative branch projects by 2003 were generally encouraging. The Speaker for the TNA stated that the budget trainings provided by the donors advanced the budget skills of the members and increased the quality of budget deliberations. In fact, the length of the 2003 budget deliberations increased over 2002 by over 50%. The project also made internet and computers more accessible for assembly members and staff for better research capabilities, and 93% of the MPs attended the training on executive oversight. Soon after the training, the TNA held a highly publicized inquiry into education policies. Lastly, there was a 28% reduction in the number of bills passed that were found unconstitutional in 2003 compared to 2002. These results indicate the projects were successfully implemented and were critical in increasing the institutional capacity of legislative branch members to better exercise checks and balances across the branches of government.

Through these projects, donors also helped the TNA shape the constitution, which would have lasting effects on the horizontal separation of powers in Rwanda. Following the project implementers’ recommendations, the TNA became active in preparing and debating a new national constitution. Specifically, the TNA debated and eventually incorporated changes such as securing the power to hire its own staff, reduced executive power over Senator appointments, legislative autonomy, oversight of the Auditor General; improved equity for the budget process, and overlapping senatorial terms. According to assessments from USAID, these changes helped create a stronger legislative branch that could act more independently as well as create a more effective horizontal balance of power.
Not all of the reforms put forward through aid flows were as successfully adopted as these were though. The implementing partners for these TNA projects helped draft several bills that aimed to increase the legislative branch’s independence, but many of these were not officially passed. In addition, the TNA usually just rubber-stamped bills originating from the executive with little debate—and rarely ever rejected an executive bill.429

During 2003, the citizens of Rwanda passed a new constitution through referendum and soon after elected representatives for the first ever Rwandan Chamber of Deputies and Senate. The establishment of an officially elected legislative branch, with legislative autonomy, was a huge accomplishment, but it also presented new challenges. Once again, the legislature—with many new members and a new bicameral structure—needed additional training and capacity building. Among all the new duties for the legislature, it also faced an enormous task of executing its formal powers in the face of a strong and zealous executive. UNDP continued its support through the same project started in 2002, and USAID again provided capacity building to the legislature through a *Parliament Support Project* from 2003-2004. Similar to earlier projects, USAID’s and UNDP’s activities focused on training for legislative drafting, budget analysis, and research support.430 These projects were successfully implemented, according to project documents. Through these projects, the new Parliament asserted its independence to some degree through several developments before 2005, including 1) the Senate successfully pushed for a 50% increase in its budget over what the Minister of Finance had proposed, 2) Parliament members publicly expressed criticisms of executive leaders and effectively increased the number of plenary sessions dedicated to Executive Oversight, and 3) the Chamber of Deputies rejected an executive-proposed bill on land expropriations, which broke both its earlier record and the record of the TNA in deferring to the executive.431

Despite these indications of progress, USAID’s project evaluation indicated that some of the overall project outcomes were less than anticipated. For example, one target was to have at least four member-originated bills pass by September 2004. However, in reality only one ended up passing. Furthermore, other bills that USAID helped draft that increased legislative autonomy in internal rules and administrative duties were stalled and did not pass.432 Regardless of these setbacks, evaluation documents for USAID’s involvement with the legislative branch had made “important contributions” to the Rwanda legislature.433

In a final phase of projects during this time period, USAID, UNDP, and the European Communities (EC) initiated projects for the legislative branch between 2007 and 2010. In 2007, UNDP started its *Programme of Support for Good Governance*, which included one activity focused on strengthening parliament, among many other activities.434 Similarly, the EC dedicated $2 million to the parliament in 2007,435 and in 2008 USAID initiated its *Rwanda Legislative Process Strengthening Project*.436 These projects again focused on general capacity building and legislative training. The USAID project took a slightly different approach though, and was focused on policies related to vulnerable populations. However, one activity of the project included the “professionalization of the legislative drafting process in Rwanda.”437 By 2010,
Activities in post-conflict contexts indicate that these projects were implemented successfully and "well-received by the GOR participants." 438

**Taking Stock: Progress in Horizontal Separation of Powers**

As a complete set of interventions, the aid targeted towards bolstering the judicial and legislative branches of government successfully bolstered the horizontal separation of powers in Rwanda by the end of the study period. As described above, the aid that the donors extended focused mainly on institutionally strengthening these branches of the government, in hopes that their increased capacity and clearly defined institutional powers would allow them to assert greater institutional independence.

In terms of actual flows, the Justice sector received huge amounts of aid flows—including both direct financial support as well as capacity building and training support that dwarfed most other democracy and governance sectors. By the end of the study period, the judicial branch had achieved an autonomous administrative structure and budget (including in the Supreme Court), which reduced the courts’ dependence on the other branches of government significantly.439 Furthermore, aid flows were critical in this development. In one evaluation of the judicial sector, the report concluded that USAID had contributed significantly to the expansion of judicial independence. The report states: “For the first time, judges have been deeply involved in preparing the budget for the judiciary itself. While this progress has caused some tension, the [Strategic Objective] has helped to create an opportunity for Rwanda to move towards international standards of judicial independence.”440 Other areas of improvement included the judiciary’s ability to run trials in a predictable manner with respect for the rights of the accused, and the police force was successfully professionalized, which were all activities amply funded by donors.441

The legislature also received attention from a smaller group of donors, but the support those donors extended was still significant. With the legislature, much of the donors’ work was to convince the legislative branch members that institutional independence was desirable and possible. From Rwanda’s history of strong executives, most in the legislative branch saw power as “indivisible” in the first half of the study period.442 This is not surprising given Rwanda’s history of essentially autocratic executive leaders. Through the efforts of USAID and UNDP with the legislative branch though, by 2003 there was a “growing understanding among the legislators of the need for an independent and well-informed legislature as a critical component in democracy.”443 Furthermore, one key staffer wrote to USAID in 2005: “Thank you for the excellent collaboration you have made with us.... We have understood how you were so right when you defended the importance of the full autonomy for any Parliament.”444 Independent evaluations of USAID’s support also concluded that USAID’s efforts had made vital contributions to the Rwanda legislature and successfully encouraged separation of powers.445 These comments, as well as the detailed evidence from the previous section, show that the aid flows did make some progress in pushing for institutional independence in Rwanda—in both real terms as well as ideologically.
However, the progress was perhaps not as complete as donors would have preferred. Despite the donors’ advocacy and training efforts, the legislature relinquished some of its constitutional authority due to pressure from the executive branch. For example, donors helped some legislative members draft an autonomy bill that would ensure administrative autonomy for the legislative branch, but in the end the legislative leaders agreed with executive leaders to forego the bill because the executive objected to some of its provisions. Such actions compromise the legislature’s independence.

Overall, the success of the aid programs in Rwanda towards increasing horizontal separation of powers can be considered broadly successful. Given all the evidence detailed in this and previous sections, it is reasonable to conclude that the aid flows going toward increasing horizontal separation of powers institutionally passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 2: 1) projects focused on strengthening the judicial and legislative branches were successfully implemented and the government of Rwanda adopted the associated reforms, and 2) the project outcomes successfully increased the level of formal horizontal institutional independence and separation of powers in Rwanda. Assessment of whether these aid programs passed the third criteria for Hypothesis 2 will be discussed in a later section.

### Vertical Checks and Balances

During the study period, there were no aid flows in Rwanda that were clearly focused on establishing a vertical separation of powers, which this study defines as fostering decentralization meant to check the central government’s power. Rather, decentralization in Rwanda was used as a way to increase institutional representation (as discussed with Hypothesis 1). One explanation of this phenomenon goes back to the government’s strong ownership of the development process—since Rwanda’s central government tightly controlled the decentralization process, there was limited opportunity for donors to push for any such vertical checks and balances—even if the donors would have prioritized such reforms. It is also possible that the donors were hoping the decentralization process would empower the lower levels of government to become a check on the central government’s powers, but using such language in project documents would have been politically unwise, so the donors opted to highlight them as representation-focused projects. Either way, there were no projects in Rwanda that clearly identified a vertical separation of power as a driving force. As such, there are no project flows to analyze for this section pertaining to Hypothesis 2.
Aid Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts

AID PROGRAMS IN BURUNDI: FEEBLE BUT BALANCED

Compared to its northern neighbor, Burundi received relatively few aid flows that targeted institutional separation of powers. The following sections highlight these flows in Burundi, specifically ones that focused on increasing institutional transparency and accountability, horizontal separation of powers, and vertical separation of powers. Most of these aid flows occurred towards the end of the study period, likely because of the sporadic and sometimes heavy violence throughout the country before 2004. As noted in earlier sections, there are two additional factors that likely affected how much donors focused on institutional separation of powers in specific aid flows: 1) donors were often limited in the type of assistance they could provide directly to government institutions due to periodic aid suspensions, and 2) the peace negotiations essentially set up the structure of government including outlining power sharing arrangements, defining the powers of each branch in the transitional government, and so forth. While the donors provided support to the peace negotiations, they did not provide direct flows to influence the creation of these power arrangements. As such, donors’ influence vis-à-vis institutional separation of powers is difficult to measure in this study. This study will therefore seek to analyze the influence of the specific aid programs the donors put in place away from the negotiation table.

Public Financial Management

The proper use of all public resources is an important step towards democracy as it builds a foundation of transparency and accountability across government institutions and actors. In Burundi, public financial management is the sector that by far received the greatest amount of aid flows within the boundaries of Hypothesis 2 during the study period. By the middle of the study period—in the late 1990s—these aid flows were desperately needed as Burundi struggled with exceedingly high levels of corruption. Surprisingly though, before 1993 Burundi had very few corruption problems. According to USAID, Burundi’s public administration was known as one of the best in Africa: it provided disciplined service with high administrative accountability and low, predictable levels of corruption. However, as civil war broke out across the country, administrative accountability mechanisms broke down and a sense of impunity seeped into administrative and political circles. By 1996, Burundi had switched from being one of the best to one of the worst examples of controlling corruption—according to WGI data, Burundi ranked in the 5th percentile of countries with control over corruption in 1996—showing it was in the bottom 5% of all countries in terms of transparency and accountability.

The first donor to target public financial management to bring Burundi to its pre-civil war status was the World Bank. In 2004, it launched the Economic Management Support Project that ran through 2009. While this project had components focused more broadly on the macroeconomic management of the country and private sector development, there was also a component totaling
$12 million and targeting better financial and administrative management of the government to increase accountability. The activities under this component sought to improve the processes for budget execution, increase accountability for public resources, reform the procurement process, and bring transparency to administrative procedures. By the beginning of 2011, a donor evaluation indicated the project was successfully implemented and made satisfactory progress in these areas, including successfully reforming the procurement code and implementing a law on financial incentives.449

This project was later followed up by several larger projects focused on public financial management from the African Development Fund (AfDF) and the World Bank. In 2008, AfDF started the Second Economic Reform Support Program ($18 million) and followed it up with the Third Economic Reform Support Program in 2010 ($15 million). With these projects, AfDF sought to strengthen controls in public financial management and the budget process.450 These projects included a broad spectrum of activities, encompassing over 55 indicators for the 2008 project alone. The projects overall were successfully implemented, with favorable support from the government of Burundi, but the full scope of the projects overestimated the institutional capacity in Burundi and left some of the activities incomplete.451 The World Bank also initiated its Fourth Economic Reform Support Grant in 2010 for almost $25 million, with one component focused on continuing reforms in public financial management to improve budget credibility, planning, and controls. The program documents for this last project affirm that the government’s commitment to better financial management remain “unequivocally strong,” but ultimately the technical capacity and institutional strength of the government were obstacles in effecting change.452 Furthermore, a World Bank evaluation noted that the government had adopted several important changes throughout the life of these projects including 1) implementing a new Public Finance Framework Law, 2) closing several off-budget accounts, 3) defining a comprehensive public financial management strategy, and 4) implementing the new procurement code.453 These changes show willingness from Burundi to implement the reforms toward transparency and accountability that donors were advocating.

A few smaller donors in this sector included France with a project in 2005, the UK with two projects from 2008-2009 focused on general accountability in government and public financial management, and the Netherlands with a project from 2012-15.454 The US also implemented two projects through USAID and the State Department, which were focused on anti-corruption reforms and capacity building.455 In all, over $70 million flowed into Burundi from donors to boost the public financial management sector or accountability within only six years. Clearly this sector was a priority for donors towards the end of the study period, but the previous 14 years it had received no attention.

Taking Stock: Progress in Bureaucratic Accountability and Transparency

Despite the large amount of flows targeted towards increasing bureaucratic accountability and transparency, it is difficult to fully assess whether those aid flows actually led to an increase in accountability and transparency by the end of the study period. This is mostly due to a lack of
information, as well the donors’ late entry into this sector. One positive indicator of reform was the Government of Burundi’s commitment to reforms meant to increase transparency and accountability in governmental actions. As one donor assessment put it, there was in Burundi an “unusual degree of consensus between government and donors” regarding these reforms.\textsuperscript{456} Similarly, a USAID evaluation document towards the end of the study period asserts that donor flows had successfully “promoted transparency and accountability in governance institutions, processes, and policies.”\textsuperscript{457} However, the same evaluation cites a lack of transparency in executive actions as well as allegations of corruption. These concerns led the donor community to largely withhold budget support flows towards the end of the study period,\textsuperscript{458} which is in direct contrast to Rwanda’s position. In Rwanda, donors chose to increase budget support flows towards the end of the study period because the Rwandan government had shown a commitment to accountability and transparency. So while the aid flows directed towards institutional transparency may have made some progress in Burundi, the rate of progress seemed to be below donors’ expectations and did little to stem corruption in the long term. As such, these projects generally passed the first criterion of \textit{Hypothesis 2} in that they were successfully implemented, but they failed criterion 2 because the projects did not ultimately increase the degree of bureaucratic transparency and accountability in Burundi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizontal Checks and Balances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi received very little attention from donors in terms of bolstering horizontal separation of powers in the government. This is likely due to the length of the civil war and the power sharing arrangement instituted as a part of the peace process—after the war, donors may have assumed the power sharing arrangements provided enough separation of powers for the government to function democratically. However, the executive branch generally exercised more power with fewer limits to its reach, and the legislative and judicial branches of government were critically under-developed. In particular, parliament was a relatively recent innovation in Burundi—the legislative branch was largely absent in Burundi’s politics, and when it did exist, it exercised very little power.\textsuperscript{459} The justice sector also lacked critical skills and training to enable it to act independently. The next two sections will detail the projects dedicated to increasing the independence of these institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De-militarization Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An important characteristic of Burundi’s democratic trajectory is the role that the army played as a governmental institution. After the outbreak of violence in 1993 and again between 1996 and 2005, the Tutsi-dominated army was a powerful, and often persuasive, arm of governmental power. Many government actors, including legislative and judicial members of government, accused the army of using its power to coerce compliance from them and even to eliminate those who continued to oppose the Tutsi positions. As such, a critical aspect of restoring horizontal checks and balances in Burundi and enabling democracy was to integrate the military itself into its proper role within a democratic government—and especially to remove it as an institution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
used for securing the compliance of domestic political institutions. The World Bank was the most directly involved donor in this aspect of democratic development through several large-scale demobilization projects. These projects helped reduce the size of the military and make sure it was ethnically balanced. The first project ran from 2004 to 2008, and the second project ran from 2009 to 2012. These projects successfully helped demobilize nearly 100% of those eligible and willing to participate in the program—reducing the military’s active role as a government institution that could control the political sphere. As such, these aid flows helped integrate an institution of former authoritarian strength into Burundi’s new democratic order towards the end of the study period.

**Judicial Sector Support**

In contrast to the strong focus donors had on the judicial sector in Rwanda, Burundi received only a few flows specifically targeting judicial institutions. These projects mostly sought to strengthen the judicial sector. The most active donor in this capacity was Belgium, which dedicated over $15 million in flows to the justice sector in 1994, 1999-2001, and 2006-2010. These projects focused on supporting justice sector institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and police. Even though these projects do not represent huge sums of aid flows, the continued engagement of Belgium in this sector from 1994-2010 made it the most consistent donor to the justice sector in Burundi. There is, however, no implementation information available for these aid flows, making it difficult to assess their impact.

In addition to Belgium’s efforts, there were three specific projects that are of note. First is the Justice Integrated Unit project from UNDP. This project totaled approximately $2.8 million and ran from 2007-2010. It focused on building the capacity of the justice sector generally, but also specified judicial independence as a core goal of these reforms. Unfortunately, no further implementation information is available for this project.

The second major judicial sector initiative implemented by a donor other than Belgium is a component of the World Bank’s Economic Management Support Project implemented from 2004-2009. This component focused on capacity building within the justice sector to increase its strategic importance and its ability to provide external oversight of the other branches of government. As part of this component, the World Bank funded a diagnostic study on the judicial sector and provided recommendations for its reform. While the details on those recommended reforms and how well the government implemented them are not specified, the project completion report indicates the diagnostic study was successfully completed, and the project as a whole received a ‘satisfactory’ rating—indicating that, in the view of the donor, these reforms were relatively well-adopted by the government.

The third judicial sector initiative implemented by a donor other than Belgium was a more concerted effort by USAID, which launched its Post-Conflict Transitional Assistance Program from 2005-2007. As part of this project, USAID and the Minister of Justice designed a program to “rehabilitate and re-invigorate” the Ministry of Justice. The program provided commodity
support to the ministry, including key legal books for three law libraries and computers for judicial offices. USAID also provided training sessions for Ministry of Justice personnel. USAID project documents assert that these activities were successfully completed and received the full support of the Ministry of Justice. By the end of the project, the Minister of Justice specifically thanked USAID for this assistance, stating that the activities had been essential in strengthening judicial institutions.  

Legislative Sector Support

The legislative sector garnered much less attention than other institutions during the study period, with only three projects focusing in some way on strengthening the legislative branch. In the early 1990s, the Burundian Government had taken significant steps toward democracy, including creating a multi-party constitution with separation of powers across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The legislative branch, however, remained relatively weak and dependent on the executive to some degree. To take advantage of this window of opportunity for positive institutional development, USAID included parliamentary support as part of its Burundi Democracy and Governance Project starting in 1993. These activities included institutional reforms as well as direct training for members of parliament. By 1995 though, the creeping coup was full blown and the program was suspended and officially closed down in 1996. During this time period, some members of parliament, especially members of the Hutu Frodebu party elected in the 1993 elections, were routinely intimidated and manipulated by the Tutsi-dominated military and Uprona party leadership.

After Buyoya seized power officially in 1996, most donors suspended aid going directly to the Burundian government. By 2002, a transitional government was put in place and tasked with finalizing drafts for the constitution, and many donors resumed direct dealings with the Burundian government. Under this new transitional government, USAID provided institutional support to parliament through the Burundi Initiative for Peace project—especially in the form of commodity support to enable parliament to carry out its duties. By 2003, the project had made a tangible contribution: During the opening parliamentary session, the chairman of the National Assembly thanked USAID for the institutional support the project provided. The project was set to go through the end of 2003, but it was suspended four months early due to continued violence in the country.

Two years later, the government had implemented the peace agreement and held official elections. With a government now ruling that the international community saw as legitimate, USAID initiated its Post-Conflict Transitional Assistance Program project from 2005-2007. The project focused mostly on building civil society, but one component of the project was to increase the capacity of all newly elected officials and legislative institutions—specifically focusing on formalizing the process of passing laws and harmonizing existing laws. These trainings were successfully held, with USAID evaluations suggesting the participants had increased ability to fulfill their legislative duties.
The main task in Burundi to establish horizontal separation of powers involved simultaneously dampening the power of the military and increasing the capacity of the traditional branches of the government, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches while solidifying their boundaries. Throughout the study period, aid flows had some success in inspiring these reforms. While the military largely had free reign of the political scene in the early half of the study period, its role was successfully diminished through the peace agreements and the demobilization programs funded through donor aid flows. Without the coercive influence of the military in politics, the rest of the government branches were free to assert their power.

As the previous sections detail, donors also gave some flows towards capacity building in these branches of government, and these projects were successfully implemented for the most part, so it is reasonable to conclude the aid flows passed the first criteria for Hypothesis 2. However, these flows were relatively small, were erratic, and were for the most part only present in the last 6-8 years of the study period. There is a lack of evidence that these aid flows initiated significant institutional reform in the Burundian government. One assessment from the Netherlands in 2010 described the justice sector as still suffering from limited capacity, politicized oversight, and inadequate infrastructure. Similarly, it also stated that parliament was often unduly influenced by the executive power. USAID published an evaluation that was just as damning, stating that the judicial branch lacked both transparency and independence. As such, the aid flows directed toward horizontal separation of powers in Burundi would fail the second criteria for Hypothesis 2 – the aid flows directed toward this sector did not increase the execution of checks and balances among government branches. It is unlikely these aid flows reached a necessary threshold to support lasting institutional change. Any changes Burundi did experience in horizontal separation of powers are likely due to other influences—the aid flows were simply too little too late.

Much like in Rwanda, there were no aid flows in Burundi that targeted vertical checks and balances. There were some decentralization projects, but the descriptions named civic participation as a main goal, rather than decentralizing to check the central government’s power. This is likely due to the lack of a strong central government—in fact, more often the problem in Burundi was the central government could not retain control at lower levels during the civil war and subsequent episodes of violence.
Hypothesis 2 posits that aid flows for institutional reforms that seek to establish balance across government institutions will effectively increase the democratic development of a country. As the different branches of government successfully provide oversight and enforce boundaries to the other branches, the democratic institutions will be free to operate without undemocratic influences or obstacles. Most importantly, no specific agency or actor in the government system can block democratic development and policies. As the aid analysis sections above detail, donors sought to increase the institutional transparency and separation of powers to different degrees in Rwanda and Burundi. Rwanda received a great deal of attention and aid flows for both bureaucratic transparency as well as horizontal separation of powers. On the other hand, Burundi received much less in both categories. This next section analyzes the differences in aid programs between these countries and compares them to the final criterion, namely whether any increases in transparency and separation of powers brought about by these aid programs increased overall democratic development in these countries. If the current hypothesis were accurate, the country with the largest aid flows in this sector would have the most democratic development during the study period.

**Bureaucratic Transparency and Accountability: Comparison and Evaluation**

The aid flows directed towards bureaucratic transparency and accountability played different roles in Burundi and Rwanda. Rwanda received the most flows in this area, and likewise had the most success in reducing corruption and concurrently increasing financial accountability throughout the country. By 2010, the WGI’s Control of Corruption indicator showed that Rwanda had moved from the 20th percentile to the 72nd percentile of countries, signifying Rwanda was now better at controlling corruption than 71% of all other countries. This progress is impressive: it went from being one of the most corrupt countries in Africa to one of the least in only 14 years.

In contrast, Burundi continued to suffer from chronic corruption despite the aid flows. According to the same indicator for Control of Corruption, Burundi ranked in the bottom—in the 5th percentile in 1996—and by 2010 it had risen only to the 12th percentile. Between 2002 and 2005, there were some indications that corruption was declining, and Burundi even rose to the 19th percentile. This progress was short lived, though, as corruption surged soon after the 2005 national elections.

Indicators for the Rule of Law follow similar trends. Starting in 1996, Burundi and Rwanda start in roughly the same place in the 2nd percentile of countries who were perceived to have rule of law. During the study period through 2010, though, Rwanda’s performance picked up dramatically, and it moved to the 46th percentile by 2010, while Burundi only moved to the 11th percentile.
Corruption and the rule of law in these cases are used here as proxies for how transparent and accountable the government was in its dealings. Such institutional transparency and accountability is a vital prerequisite to democratic functioning. As governments become more accountable in their routine dealings, they are less likely to undermine accountability in other governmental spheres. In contrast to Rwanda’s positive trajectory and Burundi’s negative trajectory in corruption and rule of law, though, quantitative indicators show that Burundi made the most progress in democratic development more generally, moving from “not free” to “partly free” on the Freedom House scale between 1990 and 2010. During the same time period, Rwanda stayed stagnant at “not free.” While Rwanda succeeded in becoming highly efficient and transparent in its financial management and routine dealings, this transparency and accountability did not translate to progress in its political sphere. The third criterion for aid funding to the institutional transparency and accountability therefore fails: The higher amount of aid flows and attention donors dedicated to Rwanda for transparency and accountability did not increase its democratic development. Likewise, Burundi increased its democratic development despite very few aid flows being directed at building bureaucratic transparency and accountability.

**Horizontal Checks and Balances: Comparison and Evaluation**

The true crux of Burundi’s and Rwanda’s institutional democratic trajectories lies within creating proper checks and balances within the government. Without those institutional checks and balances, history proves that actors fearful of losing power will use government institutions to manipulate, intimidate, and overpower the other democratic institutions. In Rwanda, this controlling institution has been the executive branch, led mostly by President Kagame and a tight-knit group around him. In fact, Polity IV’s *Executive Constraints* indicator reflects that, in the 1990s in Rwanda, the executive had unlimited authority: There were no institutional limits regularly imposed on the executive. In Burundi, the Tutsi-dominated army became an unconventional institution in the government as Tutsi groups used their influence and intimidation to control the other branches of the government. As such, the challenge for aid flows intended to bolster horizontal checks and balances across government institutions in these countries was to integrate these sources of authoritarian power into the democratic order. Unfortunately, it is not clear that the aid flows were able to achieve this outcome. Rwanda received the most aid in this regard, so according to *Hypothesis 2* it should have had a stronger democratic awakening. However, events throughout the study period show that the other institutions were not able to establish effective checks against the ubiquitous power of the executive in Rwanda.

In Rwanda, the aid flows donors dedicated to this sphere largely sought to increase the institutional independence of the different branches of government—with the hope that each branch would then have more equal shares of power and be able to act as a check to the executive. However, there is little to no evidence that this institutional independence then allowed each branch to be a check on the executive when it acted beyond its institutional powers,
or that there was an *equitable* horizontal balance of power. This last point helps highlight something that is missing from donor documentation and independent evaluations: While the legislative and judicial branches in Rwanda became increasingly independent and had more defined powers, there is a lack of evidence that they were actually able to check the power of the executive when the executive went beyond its legal powers. Donors point to no specific examples where either branch was able to successfully stop the executive from its desired course of action—whether that action was within the limits of the law or not.

In fact, there are examples of just the opposite happening, where the competing branches chose to relinquish their own authority when the executive applied pressure: First, a survey analysis showed judges routinely used self-censorship when confronted with problematic issues relating to the executive.\(^476\) Second, legislative leaders abandoned an autonomy bill that would have solidified the legislative branch’s constitutionally sanctioned independence—specifically because of pressure from the executive.\(^477\) These are troubling indications that the increase in institutional capacity in the legislature and judiciary did not ultimately build sufficient institutional independence and therefore democracy in Rwanda. This lack of progress in Rwanda is again confirmed with quantitative measures as well. *Polity IV*’s measure on Executive Constraints shows very little progress: In 1990, Rwanda earned a score of 1 and only briefly moved to a score of 3 by 2003 through 2010. The slight improvement to 3 indicated a “slight to moderate” limitation on executive authority. However, at the same time Rwanda only progressed on the *Polity2* scale from a score of -7 to -4, remaining squarely within the range of autocracies by the end of the study period.\(^478\) The improvement in executive constraint scores may indicate the aid flows directed towards bolstering other branches were having a positive effect, but ultimately the effect was not large enough to push Rwanda towards increased democracy overall.

In Burundi, the arm of authoritarian power was successfully integrated into the democratic system, but the extent to which aid flows directed towards horizontal separation of powers actually contributed to this accomplishment is unclear. The army was the main institution that routinely extended past its democratically sanctioned role, but the peace agreement and power-sharing arrangements successfully got the main actors behind the military to accept more restraints. This mostly came in the form of restructuring the ethnic makeup and leadership of the military so that it could not be used as a tool for ethnic or political violence. Aid flows had very little to do with this process directly, though donors did generally support the peace process and provide funding for demobilization. Furthermore, the total amount of aid flows dedicated to bolstering the other branches of government was generally too low to make any real impact in Burundi. If *Hypothesis 2* were correct, we would expect to see less progress in Burundi given the low aid levels, but the opposite is true: Burundi progressed on the *Polity2* scale from a score of -7 to 6 during the study period, moving from a strong autocracy to a relatively strong democracy.\(^479\)
Mitigating factors

While Rwanda and Burundi both faced authoritarian institutions that needed to be integrated into the democratic order, there were several factors that heavily influenced Rwanda’s experience. First, the genocide created a unique culture of ‘exceptionalism’ where actors within the country were willing to cede power to the executive and central government—and donors were willing to turn a blind eye to such authoritarian actions—to stop the violence and avoid a future outbreak of violence. The executive touted that exceptional situations called for exceptional responses—which in this case consisted of tight executive control of all political operations. Second, the executive came to power through a military victory against those committing the genocide. Rather than having to come to a negotiated peace like in Burundi, the RPF was the outright military victor at the end of 1994. As such, there was no necessity for it to give up power or to set up a power-sharing arrangement. The effect of this second mitigating factor cannot be underestimated. However, the purpose of this study is to identify which aid programs were effective at increasing democratic development, even when presented with challenging circumstances such as these. Given Rwanda’s lack of progress in democratic development, it seems the institutional approaches that aid flows targeted did not substantively affect Rwanda’s democracy levels.

CONCLUSION: HYPOTHESIS 2

Hypothesis 2 posits that aid directed toward increasing institutional checks and balances would increase the democratic development of a country as it ensures independence and equity among different political branches. According to this causal logic and assumptions, along with the case-pairing methodology this study uses, this study should have seen the country with the most aid flows targeting institutional balance out-perform the country with the least aid flows targeting the same institutions. However, the analysis of Rwanda and Burundi has showed the opposite: Despite the high amount of aid flowing into Rwanda that focused on bureaucratic transparency and horizontal separation of powers, Burundi fairs better in its democratic trajectory between 2000-2010. As a result, it is reasonable to reject Hypothesis 2 for this case pairing (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Conclusion on Hypothesis 2 for Rwanda and Burundi

Hypothesis 2: Democracy aid programs that increase checks and balances across formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aid Programs</th>
<th>Horizontal Checks &amp; Balances</th>
<th>Vertical Checks &amp; Balances</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Transparency &amp; Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No programs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implemented reform increased institutional checks &amp; balances</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No programs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased institutional checks &amp; balances advanced democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No programs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implemented reform increased institutional checks &amp; balances</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No programs</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased institutional checks &amp; balances advanced democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INFORMAL PROCESSES AND NORMS

The previous two hypotheses explored in this study sought to test a theory stating that formal institutions were the central mechanism through which democracy aid contributed to democratic development. Hypothesis 3 explored here turns to an opposing theory, which posits that developing informal processes and democratic norms in society is the critical step to drive democratic change. This theoretical perspective posits that without these norms, the formal institutions are unable to function democratically because people’s behavior will not change. In the context of aid programs, these types of aid flows focus on channeling funding outside the government and directly into society through supporting civil society organizations, encouraging citizen participation, and developing an independent media. If this perspective is correct, as these elements of society grow in strength and activity, they will become a collective power for change from the ground up and enact change in the sociopolitical sphere of the country—and eventually even change how the government functions at each level. If properly developed, then, such informal mechanisms would become a counter-weight to the government, fulfilling a watchdog role or communicating citizen interests to the government and ultimately contributing to democratic development. As such, the third hypothesis this study will test is stated thus:

Hypothesis 3: Democracy aid programs that build informal democratic processes and norms will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.
If this hypothesis is true, then aid programs targeting development of democratic norms through support for civil society, civic participation, or the media will lead to increased democratic performance in the country. In our analysis of aid programs in Rwanda and Burundi, we will test this hypothesis by first outlining the aid programs from major donors focusing on creating democratic norms through informal institutions and processes in Rwanda and Burundi, and then assessing whether these programs were successful in leading the way to democratic change. We will conclude that this hypothesis is correct if after the implementation of the democracy and governance aid program:

- The local partner adopted the program’s intended reforms, e.g. a media outlet implemented a training on independent media practices (criterion 1).
- These reforms contributed to or increased the designated type of informal democratic process or norm, e.g. media trainings developed the media sector as a voice for democratic reform (criterion 2).
- The designated type of informal democratic process or norm contributed to the democratization of the country—measured qualitatively or through quantitative measures (criterion 3). The study will also seek to analyze whether democracy and governance aid programs contributed to any of the key historical or contextual factors known to be influential in the country’s democratic development. Depending on the factor, though, this influence could positively affect the country’s democratic trajectory or lead the country further away from democracy and good governance.

Since Rwanda and Burundi had different democratic trajectory outcomes by this study’s end date of 2010, we expect to see a divergence in the type or quantity of informal democratic norms promoted by aid programs in those countries if this hypothesis is true. Likewise, then, we will reject this hypothesis if:

- The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but there was no increase in the targeted informal democratic processes or norm (criterion 2), or
- The targeted informal democratic process or norm was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).

This study will look for evidence from the same sources mentioned in the analysis of Hypotheses 1 and 2, which include donor reports, project documents, existing scholarly research, and published quantitative measures—namely Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* to assess overall democracy levels and World Governance Indicators’ *Voice and Accountability* to assess sectoral democracy levels related to informal democratic norms. It will also identify any mitigating factors that inhibited the aid program’s ability to increase democratic development in the country through informal processes. To facilitate a more comprehensive analysis, the first and second criteria for effectiveness listed above—whether an aid program was successfully implemented and whether that type of reform increased informal democratic norms—have been incorporated in the following sections detailing the aid programs implemented during the study period. The final criterion for effectiveness—whether the
designated type of informal norms contributed to democratization in the country—will be analyzed in the last section.

**AID IN RWANDA: DEMOCRATIC NORMS UNROOTED**

As the previous analysis of *Hypotheses 1* and 2 has shown, most of the aid flows dedicated to Rwanda during the study period focused on institutional capacity and reform. Conversely, there were relatively few aid flows focused on developing informal democratic norms. Donors’ willingness to channel aid flows directly through government institutions may stem from the Rwandan government’s high ownership of its development agenda, as it took an active role in planning for its own development and shaping development outcomes and processes. As part of Rwanda’s development process, the government required all aid or NGO programs be on-budget and on-program even if the projects were dedicated to institutions or activities outside the government. Regardless, this section will discuss aid flows directed at three approaches to developing democratic norms: fostering a robust, active civil society; encouraging civic participation and reconciliation; and creating an independent and energetic media presence in the country.

**Civil Society**

Throughout most of its history, Rwanda’s leaders and governments largely suppressed civil society. However, some forms of civil society organizations enjoyed a new degree of freedom under President Habyarimana after he took power in 1973. Under the new regime, Habyarimana specifically promoted the rapid organization and expansion of agricultural cooperatives and pre-cooperatives in Rwanda. Donors at the time took the opportunity to pour large amounts of resources into Rwandan civil society organizations, and by 1990, they hailed Rwanda’s civil society network as both dense and vibrant.\(^{480}\) Between 1990-1994, though, these aid flows to civil society had largely dried up as donors turned their focus to building formal institutions in response to Habyarimana’s efforts to open some democratic space. The only donor project showing a focus on civil society during this time was the Democracy Initiatives and Governance Project (DIG) in 1992, where one small component supported the establishment of a Center for Civil Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI). This new non-profit center was meant to bring together diverse groups to work toward common goals, provide capacity building to local NGOs, and provide civic education to the population.\(^{481}\) This project activity, though, was aborted in 1994 after the genocide.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of these early efforts by donors to support civil society did not seem to have a lasting effect, as Habyarimana ended up crafting a system that favored northern Hutus and restricted Tutsi and southern Hutu access to higher education, government positions, and even employment. Beyond these discriminatory institutional mechanisms that marginalized parts of civil society, Rwandan civil society could also be understood as being ineffective since these civil society organizations did not provide any significant resistance to the genocide.
Despite having a “dense” and “vibrant” civil society, the population was swiftly mobilized to exterminate neighbors and those they had previously worked alongside. In fact, some parts of civil society actually became mobilizing factions for the genocide—such as church leaders who helped plan and execute mass exterminations along with Hutu extremists.\textsuperscript{482}

In the aftermath of the genocide, donors realized the civil society organizations (CSOs) had functioned largely as an extension of the state, rather than a counterbalance to it. So as donors designed their aid programs after the genocide, they had to grapple with two questions: 1) how to cultivate a civil society that functioned independently of the state, and 2) how to repair the damage caused by the genocide to the social fabric of society. Instead of focusing on rebuilding civil society, however, most donors focused aid flows on emergency aid and formal institution development. The only donor to dedicate funds to building civil society right after the genocide was Belgium, which gave $350,000 between 1994-1995.\textsuperscript{483} Belgium continued this support every year from 1997-2010 with annual flow amounts ranging from $110,000 to $720,000—totaling $5 million over the whole study period. While there is little detail available on these aid flows or their implementation, some of the funds focused on supporting local NGOs, including those focused on women’s needs and increasing civil society’s ability to provide oversight to government actions.\textsuperscript{484}

Between 1998 and 2003, several other donors entered the scene and dedicated flows towards strengthening civil society, including the U.K., Netherlands, Canada, and the EU. Collectively, they committed $8 million to fostering civil society and supporting informal democratic norms during this time frame.\textsuperscript{485} Unfortunately no details are available on these aid flows or their implementation.

To this point, USAID had largely excluded aid flows focused directly on civil society from its portfolio. During 1997-2003, it did incorporate a component into its legislative development project that included encouraging the legislature to consult with NGOs as part of the legislative decision-making process.\textsuperscript{486} Similarly, many donors also included activities focused on creating or encouraging formal pathways for government institutions to interact or consult with civil society. Given that these types of flows are targeted towards formal institutions and do not go towards building or supporting civil society itself, these flows are included in our analysis of Hypothesis 1 as methods for encouraging formal representation and are thus excluded from Hypothesis 3. Interestingly though, USAID proposed a project to the Parliament between 2004-2005 that would involve educating CSOs on their rights and potential influence in the legislative process. The Parliament however rejected the proposal as a low priority.\textsuperscript{487} This indicated a general disinterest from government actors to actively encourage civil society’s involvement in policymaking.

By 2004, USAID changed its tactics to include a new focus on supporting civil society directly. Starting in its 2004 programming, USAID adopted a new Strategic Objective focused on increasing civic participation through civil society. This new objective represents an addition to USAID’s approach from only supporting top-down activities focused on formal institutions to
also including bottom-up projects concentrating on building a cohesive civil society. USAID enthusiastically threw its new-found support behind a local NGO named Seruka with its Civil Society, Governance and Reconciliation (CSGR) flagship project starting in 2005 with approximately $3 million. As part of this project, Seruka was tasked with awarding 417 grants to support activities that would develop civil society, local NGOs, and grassroots organizations throughout Rwanda. This project would therefore not only strengthen local NGOs, but also build a broad support network for those NGOs and build social cohesion. Similarly, Canada and Ireland both dedicated aid flows between $2 and $3 million to supporting local NGOs between 2004 and 2007. Smaller donor flows also came from Germany ($0.9 million), Luxemburg ($0.5 million), Sweden ($0.3 million), and UNICEF ($0.3 million) for the same purpose during this time period.

The USAID project was meant to go through 2010, but it encountered multiple problems during implementation. By 2007, USAID terminated the project for non-performance. The project documents do not specifically state the reason the project failed, but it seems likely that the project design over-estimated the strength of Rwanda’s civil society in the first place. In 2007 alone, Seruka was supposed to award 190 sub-grants to local organizations, but it was only able to complete 29 sub-awards. Given the low number of sub-awards, it seems likely that there was a lack of suitable organizations in Rwanda to accept the sub-awards. This is one major indication that the state of civil society was much more dire than USAID, or even other donors, assessed at the time.

In the last few years of the study period, there was an upswing in donor interest in civil society and, likewise, an increase in donor aid targeting it. In 2009, Sweden funded a $5 million project dedicated to encouraging local NGOs to influence public policies. Denmark, Germany, and Norway also targeted civil society with smaller projects of around $1 million each. Most significantly though, USAID chose to accept Rwanda into the MCC Threshold Program from 2008-2011 and made civil society a key part it. Other aspects of the program have been described in earlier sections, but one component of the threshold program focused on building the technical capacity of civil society actors so they could advocate on local issues, monitor government performance (including police actions), and establish their independence from the state. During implementation, two implementing partners were selected: The Urban Institute (UI) and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). As part of the portion implemented by UI, 43 CSOs were selected to receive direct training and grant money to build their capacity. However, these activities were only partially implemented: UI was only able to provide training and support to 13 CSOs for one year instead of providing 43 CSOs with three years’ worth of support. Similarly, IREX was only able to provide training and support to a fraction of the 40 CSOs identified for its activities. One of the main reasons that project documents cite for the poor implementation was low CSO capacity to absorb the training or even prepare proposal documents to receive the grant funding. Despite its stunted activities, though, the project did manage to make some progress—an independent evaluation of MCC’s actions concluded that the project helped encourage citizens to more freely voice criticisms of government policy.
However, the study also found that the aid program overall did not significantly increase citizens’ perception of their ability to influence government.\textsuperscript{494}

Beyond noting which donors dedicated what levels of funding to build civil society, it is also important to note the donors that are conspicuously missing from this list. Most notable is the World Bank, which usually plays a large part in all democracy and governance sectors. However, World Bank documents indicate that it specifically chose to exclude civil society programming from its portfolio in Rwanda during the study period, instead leaving capacity building of the civil society for “later interventions.”\textsuperscript{495} Similarly, UNDP has been a major donor in Rwanda, but its aid flows have been generally targeted towards formal institutions, so it too did not fund significant civil society activities in Rwanda during the study period.

Overall, the record of aid flows and implementation for civil society programming in Rwanda is erratic at best. There were several clear attempts by donors to build civil society, but two of the largest attempts were undercut by the sheer feebleness of Rwanda’s civil society and eventually failed part-way through their implementation. In these cases, the projects failed the first two basic criterion of Hypothesis 3: the project must be successfully implemented, and the local organization must adopt the intended reform/training.

\textbf{Civic Participation and Reconciliation}

An active citizenry that participates in civil society is a critical step in developing democratic norms. If government by the people can be established, the people must be actively involved and educated on their role. Participation can be developed through formal or informal institutions and channels, and aid flows that focused on increasing participation through formal institutions were studied under Hypothesis 1. These activities included those working with government institutions or government representatives to build patterns of consultation with citizens or civil society directly into governmental processes. Many aid flows in Rwanda focused on this type of civic participation as a part of decentralization initiatives. Similarly, many aid flows focused on building reconciliation through supporting official government institutions—such the Gacaca courts or government-sponsored education camps by the National Unity and Reconciliation Council. This section will not consider these top-down avenues for increasing formal representation and reconciliation within and by government institutions. Rather, this section will focus on ground-up aid flows directed outside government control to increase civic participation, conduct civic education, or support reconciliation activities with citizens.

Compared to the level of aid flows it received for formal participation and reconciliation activities, Rwanda received relatively few projects directed at informal avenues for citizen participation, education, and reconciliation. The first activity came from USAID as a small portion of the DIG project starting in 1992. One portion of the project involved civic education through local NGOs and the free press.\textsuperscript{496} Since democratic space was just opening up in the early 1990s, civic education would be a critical aspect to helping citizens know the new ways
they could influence and engage public policies. However, this project was cut short due to the outbreak of genocide in 1994.

After the genocide, there were no significant aid flows in this area until 2002. In preparation for the 2002 and 2003 elections, USAID funded a four-day workshop in Kigali for civic education involving national and international NGOs, students, political parties, and some government representatives. This conference provided some material and a framework for the participants to turn around and hold their own trainings at the local level. Project documents also show that some USAID funding was used to create two videos focused on voter education. Unfortunately, the government did not grant formal authorization to air the videos once they were completed, despite having given informal approval before the video production process was started. As such, USAID could not air the videos to the general public. These aid activities were relatively small, and unfortunately it seems they were not enough to make a difference for the 2002 elections, as a separate donor report concluded that civil society was ultimately ineffective at providing civic education to the population in the run up to the elections. Given the limited scope of aid in this area though, the inadequacy of the provided civic education is likely due to the limited flows rather than a failure of the specific USAID interventions.

The U.S. again focused on civic education in 2008 and incorporated a component into the MCC threshold program that focused on capacity building for civil society organizations to provide voter education. As with other components of the MCC threshold program noted previously, this component was terminated early after two years.

The last few years of the study period also saw a new focus on encouraging reconciliation through building informal democratic norms. In 2008, UNDP supported a local NGO in producing documentary films on the democratization process, Rwanda’s history, and the rule of law. Public discussions were also held as part of the viewing as a way to increase social cohesion and encourage reconciliation. Similarly, in 2009 USAID also supported a peace-building project to build trust among Rwandans by discussing and debating sensitive political topics respectfully. These projects were successfully implemented, each hosting multiple discussions at schools and dialogue clubs around the country. These programs for reconciliation, though few, represent a change in donors’ approaches to reconciliation in Rwanda. Prior to this period, donors had generally chosen to direct aid flows towards the justice sector and Gacaca courts as a way to facilitate reconciliation, while these new aid flows in the late 2000s focus instead on fostering informal routes of dialogue among citizens.

**Media**

A free and independent media is critical to informing the public, monitoring government action, and eventually influencing public policies. As with the other forms of democratic norms, though, media did not garner significant attention from international donors during the study period. At the beginning of the study period, donor documents indicate that Rwanda’s media was undertrained and under-resourced. The DIG project from USAID in 1992 included a
component to support a Rwandan Press Center, which was a non-profit organization that would provide all journalists with equal access to a shared pool of resources. As mentioned previously though, the DIG project and its components were canceled due to the genocide in 1994.

After the genocide, aid directly to the media is almost nonexistent until 1999, when Norway and Sweden dedicated some aid flows towards developing an independent media. Norway’s aid flows included $500 thousand towards the media sector, and Sweden included $200 thousand. These projects were soon followed up with projects from the U.K. and EU between 2002-2004 to support the media sector. No implementation information is available for these projects though.

In 2005, USAID funded a youth-oriented radio program called Generation Great Lakes that was designed to get youth involved in peace and reconciliation activities in their own communities. After the radio programs were aired, survey results found that youth who listened were more likely to believe that youth had a role in peace building and reported a preference for choosing dialogue as a way of resolving conflict.

Lastly, from 2008-2009, one component of the MCC threshold program established radio stations in rural areas as well as journalist training. These components were canceled early though after only two years. In terms of actual aid flows, this appears to be the largest project in Rwanda dedicated to the media—totaling approximately $2 million.

---

**Taking Stock: Progress in Democratic Norm Development in Rwanda**

Based on the analysis of Rwanda’s aid programs focused on civil society, civic participation, and the media, it is clear that while some project objectives were achieved, many were left incomplete. Unfortunately, many of the largest projects encountered significant implementation problems and were canceled before the planned end of the projects—or the government rejected the planned project before it even began. Similarly, the donor aid programs focused on building informal democratic norms were few and far between, indicating that this type of democracy aid was not a priority for donors, the Rwandan government, or both. Overall, the low level of funding that these type of aid programs did not garner a critical mass necessary to create any specific changes in the long run in Rwanda. As a group, these aid programs generally failed the first and second criteria for proving Hypothesis 3: many of the programs were not successfully implemented and therefore did not increase the effective functioning of the targeted sectors, in this case civil society, civic participation, or a free media.

---

**AID IN BURUNDI: DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE SPOTLIGHT**

In stark contrast to Rwanda, the majority of democracy and governance aid flows to Burundi during the study period focused on developing informal democratic norms in some capacity or another. Whether through targeting civil society, perpetuating civic education and reconciliation,
or supporting the free media, aid projects focused heavily on developing the informal institutions and norms required to make a democracy function. This may be a reaction to the prolonged insecurity in Burundi, where the civil war lasted from 1993 to 2005, with varying levels of intensity, while Rwanda’s conflict largely ended in 1994. Furthermore, the 1996 military coup in Burundi caused some donors like the United States to suspend aid that went directly to the government. These suspensions may have caused donors to send larger amounts of aid money through informal channels than they would have under different circumstances. Even so, the increased focus on informal institutions in Burundi highlights the results of this type of democracy aid to better test its effectiveness. The following sections will highlight the aid programs that included a focus on civil society, civic participation, or the media.

### Civil Society

At the beginning of the study period in 1990, civil society was under tight government control, and it had been for most of Burundi’s history as an independent state since 1962. Civil society organizations, churches, and charitable/development organizations were monitored and repressed by the state, or even banned outright. However, between 1990-1992, President Buyoya began to open some political space for civil society as part of his reforms to be more inclusive of Hutus and transition to a multi-party government. Donors and churches began providing funding for these civil society organizations, creating what one USAID report called a “visible new dynamism” of civil society engaging in social work or development-related activities by 1992. However, the same report recognized that the relative capacity and experience of these organizations was still very limited.

USAID was encouraged by this new dynamism though, and based on the recommendations of the report, recognized civil society as a key to developing democracy and good governance in Burundi. In 1993, USAID made popular participation a strategic goal, which included increasing public dialogue and consensus building as well as supporting civil society. Then in 1994, USAID doubled down on this strategic goal, saying that participation was USAID’s “most important development assistance activity” in the country. To put these words into action, USAID designed the Burundi Democracy and Governance Project with a component targeting civil society that ran from 1993-1996. The project was originally designed to target mainly government institutions. However, one activity was focused on strengthening civil society organizations’ political awareness and effectiveness in engaging in the political process. While this activity started out small, USAID soon found itself expanding its scope.

The political developments in the country throughout 1993 meant the project had a rough start though. In the previous few years, Burundi had experienced sustained political progress through June 1993, culminating in successful national elections where a Hutu, Mechior Ndadaye, was elected President. The Tutsi elite, especially in the army, were not ready for this reversal of power though, and by October Ndadaye had been assassinated and the country was plunged into severe ethnic conflict. USAID reported that this political crisis had destroyed all the
achievements of its programs to that point.\textsuperscript{512} By mid-1994, it was able to resume its projects for the most part, but it re-designed them to fit the new political reality in Burundi. As part of this re-design, USAID put a new emphasis on building consensus through non-violent dialogue with a total budget of $5 million. The program included a major focus on supporting civil society and NGOs – both local and international as a way to pave Burundi’s path towards democracy. As such, USAID became the first donor after the 1993 crisis to provide bottom-up programs and support to civil society.\textsuperscript{513} Specific civil society-focused activities funded by this project included civil society organization training, media programs, and “intensive” consultation to strengthen the role of civil society; working with women’s associations; training 100 leaders of civil society organizations every year; and creating a network of NGOs and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) to foster a greater role of civil society in governance in Burundi.\textsuperscript{514} Project assessments indicate USAID was “highly successful” in implementing this strategic objective and its associated activities.\textsuperscript{515}

During this time, the only other donor to fund a civil society specific project was Belgium, who committed $500,000 to a project in 1995. This project focused on supporting civil society in Burundi, but no more details on its activities or implementation is available.\textsuperscript{516} Just a year later though, political turmoil in the country once again hit a boiling point when Buyoya instigated a military coup and took over power in Burundi. As this was a coup displacing a democratically elected leader, the United States and other donors put sanctions on aid channeled directly to the government. USAID’s Democracy and Governance project was already winding down since it was in its last year, and it had already been channeling a good portion of its aid flows outside government control to civil society organizations and other implementing agencies.

The state of civil society in Burundi was rapidly evolving during this time period. After losing the 1993 elections, Tutsi-dominated political parties converted themselves into civil society organizations, especially after Buyoya seized power in 1996 and banned political parties. Civil society quickly became driven by extremists representing only their partisan interests. In this process, moderate civil society organizations were sidelined and civil society itself was highly divisive.\textsuperscript{517} With such a backdrop, USAID and other donor organizations chose to re-focus their civil society interventions to emphasize reconciliation, consensus building, and resolving conflict with non-violent approaches. According to Hypothesis 3 of this study, such building blocks of civil society would be essential to create the democratic norms that govern society’s behavior and the ultimate success of a country’s democratic development.

As the government aid sanctions came into effect, USAID moved its governance funding away from discrete projects towards a programmatic approach, which essentially gives more freedom to implementing agencies to design and execute their activities according to current conditions in the country as well as providing a more constant stream of funding for longer time periods than typical discrete projects. A main PVO whose funding continued after the Burundi Democracy and Governance project ended in 1996 was Search for Common Ground. Post 1996, USAID treated Search as a program, meaning its objectives were fairly flexible, and Search could adjust its activities to the needs it observed in the field. Plus, there was no specific end date for its
activities set out from the beginning. As an average, Search received $2 million from USAID every year to continue its program until 2003.\textsuperscript{518} Search’s program also received smaller amounts of funding from Sweden’s SIDA and the U.K.’s DFID, though amounts are unknown.\textsuperscript{519}

Search developed four broad programs as part of its intervention, including two programs focused on women and youth associations, one program targeting media (discussed more in the media section later in this analysis), and one concentrated on helping victims of torture. The activities most directly related to building civil society were the programs focused on women and youth associations. The women’s program targeted a subset of civil society to create a network of women to bolster women’s influence in the community. Specifically, the program trained them to be a pacifying influence in the community that worked toward reconciliation and dialogue rather than conflict. Similarly, the youth program sought to increase dialogue among youth groups that traditionally pose a high risk for instigating conflict (such as university students, young men from suburbs, and economically disadvantaged youth). Under the program, Search integrated youth into civil society organizations and events that promoted dialogue and reconciliation through open, non-violent means.\textsuperscript{520} These programs were implemented by Search in four specific provinces, but the networks (especially for the women’s program) spread up to seven provinces. The fact that the networks spread to provinces outside the four that Search worked in indicates the program was successfully adopted by not only the targeted population, but other populations as well. Additionally, one evaluation concluded that Search’s women and youth groups had “deep impact” in their communities—causing “deep seated” changes in the communities towards openness and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{521}

In 1997, the U.S. government began to expand its activities once again, and it began designing the Great Lakes Justice Initiative. This initiative expanded the same approach the United States took with Search and designed a programmatic approach to its Burundi objectives instead of a discrete project. It was approved by the U.S. government in 1997 for $10 million, but wasn’t moved to implementation until 1999. Search’s program was also put underneath the umbrella of the Great Lakes Justice Initiative. The initiative as a whole provided programmatic funding to 4 implementing agencies focused on public education, ethnic reconciliation, civil society organization capacity building, and justice system improvements. Search continued its activities as before, which were all focused on subsets of civil society and media. Unfortunately, the specific activities for two implementing agencies—International Foundation for Election Systems and Africare—are unknown, but the last implementing agency, Global Rights, included activities on civil society, civic reconciliation, and institution building.\textsuperscript{522}

Under the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, Global Rights immediately launched activities focused on building capacity of civil society organizations, assessing their needs, training on advocacy skills and methods, and providing technical assistance. These activities continued through 2004, eventually including sub-grants to local NGOs for high needs projects.\textsuperscript{523}

Starting in 2002, Global Rights added additional program areas, including a legal assistance program. In contrast to other donors’ approaches to legal aid in Rwanda that focused on building
government institutions for legal aid, the Global Rights program focused specifically on building the capacity of NGOs and civil society actors to provide legal advice and mediation through several legal clinics. Furthermore, the program focused on rural areas, targeting local associations instead of international NGOs working in the capital. The program brought together the disparate civil society actors that had been working to provide legal services in some way previously, and offered mediation opportunities to disenfranchised segments of society that didn’t trust the legal system or couldn’t afford the courts.\textsuperscript{524} The program was initially conceived as a country-wide intervention, but Great Lakes initially had difficulty finding rural civil society organizations that had enough capacity to partner. Great Lakes subsequently condensed its focus into three provinces, where it could focus its efforts more concertedly on finding and partnering with local civil society organizations. This strategy to focus more intensely on a few provinces allowed Great Lakes to overcome the initial problems it had encountered with identifying rural civil society organizations so that it was able to successfully partner with a wide variety of organizations within the target provinces.\textsuperscript{525}

While this activity was implemented in a limited number of areas, its impact was much greater. According to one program evaluation, the legal clinics program was “highly regarded” by the local population and by other donors.\textsuperscript{526} A critical key to the program’s success was that the clinics derived their power from the community and the civil society organizations involved, instead of citing official authority given from the government. As such, the clinics created an accountability structure that was based in the authority of the local community, rather than having to answer to any central government authority. In this way, the clinics were reminiscent of a traditional mediation institution from Burundi’s tribal history called Bashingantehe where arbitrators were picked from the community by the population to mediate conflicts.\textsuperscript{527} So not only were the clinics a good adaptation to the Burundian context, but they also ensured the local populations were empowered to address issues themselves—leading to one evaluation concluding that the population successfully invested their trust in the clinics.\textsuperscript{528} Furthermore, the legal clinics designed by Global Rights became a model for the clinics called for in the Arusha Accords to settle land disputes, with one program evaluator calling Global Right’s impact on the Arusha Accord clinics “concrete and unquestionable.”\textsuperscript{529} Such outcomes indicates that the activity was not only successfully implemented, but the reform was successfully adopted by civil society and the government.

A second new program that Global Rights introduced in 2002 was a legislative advocacy program. It focused on building the capacity of local NGOs to advocate before the parliament for legal reforms they desired. This program was an important step in the political development of the country—particularly from the perspective of democratic norm development. Historically NGOs in Burundi had little capacity, but moreover, influencing government was not an established purpose of the organizations. Furthermore, citizen participation in public debates was nonexistent.\textsuperscript{530} When the Global Rights program started, the trainings first had to establish why lobbying parliament and advocating for specific changes or outcomes was something the NGOs should want to do—a concept that one program evaluation called “revolutionary” for Burundian
Throughout the program, Global Rights established working groups of NGOs in three provinces who worked to lobby the parliament and advocate for specific changes. The groups successfully proposed amendments to draft laws and lobbied the parliament to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. By 2004, Global Rights and a separate evaluation report found that participants in the program had internalized the need for advocating for policies and lobbying parliament and understood some of the mechanisms for doing so.

Between 1997 and 2002, other donors reported allocating some aid flows to Burundian civil society. Specifically, Sweden started with a $500,000 project in 1997, and then followed it up with another $1.5 million in funding for civil society by 2001. Finland also became a notable donor, with commitments of $1.5 million for civil society between 2000 and 2001. These larger funds were likely awarded in response to the progress the peace talks made with the official institution of the Transitional Government in 2001. No details on these projects’ implementation is available, but these small projects show that some other donors were active in this sector. However, USAID was certainly the main donor in this sector in Burundi.

By 2002, USAID was ready to implement a new dedicated project in Burundi with the Burundi Initiative for Peace (BIP). This project continued many of the themes of the Great Lakes Justice Initiatives with three objectives, two of which focused on bottom-up norms development through supporting the media and civil society. The objective that targeted civil society focused particularly on building civil society’s capacity to engage government and policymakers in a way that policymakers would recognize and respond to their constituency’s needs. The BIP project was given a budget of $3 million dollars and was set to be implemented over two years. During the life of the project, USAID’s implementing partner awarded 80 sub-grants to local civil society organizations who each carried out activities focused on a variety of topics, including good governance, media, peace and reconciliation, and community development. As the project was on its last six months, the political situation in the country was improving, and Burundi was preparing for its first set of national elections the next year. As such, the U.S. government released a revised strategy for Burundi, and USAID decided to cut the BIP project short by four months with only $2.5 million disbursed. This unexpected change was not a rejection of the bottom-up approach USAID had taken in Burundi though, as USAID immediately designed two successor programs that still focused on norm development.

Despite being cut several months short, USAID evaluation documents hail the BIP civil society activities as highly effective. According to its Final Report, USAID notes that “the BIP project contributed substantially to the expansion and strengthening of the capacity of Burundian civil society organizations.” In a separate report, BIP was credited with creating a “new dynamic of dialogue and cooperation” between government officials and civil society. From this increased cross-cutting dialogue, there was also a marked improvement in the relationships between authorities and the population.

With the peace accords officially in effect and the Transitional Government established, a host of donors began to fund projects focusing on civil society between 2003 and 2004 to
complement USAID’s activities. The largest project came from the European Union, which funded a project to strengthen civil society groups focused on human rights with $1.5 million in 2003. Other donors with large projects included Germany ($843,000), the Netherlands ($608,000), and UNDP ($528,000). The Netherlands and Germany funded projects focusing on strengthening civil society in general, and UNDP focused specifically on women’s equality organizations. Smaller donors included Spain and the U.K., each giving about $170,000, and Belgium, Sweden, and Italy, giving approximately $100,000 collectively. Additionally, the U.S. Embassy Democracy and Human Rights Fund earmarked funding for local NGOs in Burundi, but the amount is not known. The details on these project objectives and their implementation is not available, but this aid shows a renewed interest by a range of donors in supporting civil society as the country was preparing for its upcoming national elections.

As the transitional government came to a close and the country prepared for local and national elections in the second half of 2005, USAID launched the Post-Conflict Transitional Assistance Program (PCTAP). Given the developments in the country, this project focused mostly on formal institution development, but a portion of the project was dedicated towards civil society development. Specifically, the project sought to build the capacity of civil society to implement good governance policies and to promote peace and reconciliation. By the end of the project in 2007, it had carried out trainings in 111 communes with broad audiences, including a total of 1,036 civil society members. It also built a network of 17 NGOs that met bimonthly to receive technical support and engage in issues related to transitional justice.

With the successful presidential election of Pierre Nkurunziza in August of 2005, the United States and other donors lifted any remaining sanctions on aid flows going directly to the government. However, even with the legal restrictions lifted, the United States stated that its strategy would not change dramatically, and that the majority of its aid would continue to go through NGOs. Similarly, many other donors increased their aid to civil society even after the elections. Belgium, which had given a large amount of aid in 1995 but afterwards had reduced its aid to less than $90,000 every two years, doubled its efforts starting in 2006. Between 2006 and 2007, Belgium dedicated over $160,000 each year to civil society, and then redoubled its flows to between $240,000 and $360,000 each year for 2008, 2009, and 2010. Ireland also entered the civil society arena, and went from dedicating just $36,000 in 2007 to $207,000 in 2009 and finally over $675,000 in 2010. These aid flows went towards building local NGOs within Burundi to bolster civil society. Other donors maintained their commitment levels, such as the United Nations, who funded a project for just under $1 million in 2006 and UNDP who gave nearly $350,000 total between 2005 and 2008 for women’s equality organizations again. Other donors included Sweden ($424,000), Denmark ($210,000), and Switzerland ($131,000), with Austria, Spain, Italy, and the U.K. giving minimal amounts between 2005 and 2010. No implementation details are available for these aid flows.

Before the Post-Conflict Transitional Assistance Program was finished at the end of 2007, USAID sought to capitalize on the recent improvements in governance and started a large, multifaceted project called the Burundi Policy Reform Project. This project ran from 2007 to 2009,
and focused on five thematic areas, three of which significantly featured democratic norm development through civil society capacity building. These three areas were anti-corruption reforms, civic participation, and media freedom. To show the scale at which bottom-up norm development featured in this project, seven of the eleven project performance indicators were based on civil society and media targets. The media-focused portion of these activities will be detailed in the media section later in this paper.

Under the anti-corruption reforms element, the project targeted both government agencies and civil society to bring together a unified front against corruption. The civil-society related activities included training sessions to build civil society’s ability and desire to serve as “vocal opponents of corruption” and become a source of external oversight to the government. This training included educating the attendees on the 2006 anti-corruption law and the role of transparency in resource management. Project documents indicate that these trainings successfully educated the attendees on the system of checks and balances that should pervade government and civil society relations. Two of the represented NGOs went on to expand their anti-corruption activities, showing the project objectives were adopted by some attendees.

The civic participation element of the Burundi Policy Reform Project focused exclusively on democratic norm development through civil society and media. Under the activities specific to civil society in general, the project focused on building up civil society organizations so they could act as independent “agents for reform” and influence democratic decision making through advocating for their members’ interests, including a focus on women’s participation in civil society and advocacy work. During implementation, the project successfully trained civil society members on advocacy techniques so they could launch their own campaigns and enter public dialogue on the issues they cared about. By the end of 2008, project documents indicated that participants acknowledged the importance of engaging government in constructive, positive policy dialogue and seeking to influence policymaking. Documents also note that the civil society training activities had created space for civil society to have positive policy influence and “promote new norms.” More broadly though, these activities had “reignited” civil society, sparked new public debates on issues important to the population, and even inspired two NGOs to launch local and national campaigns, partner with other local organizations, and actively advocate for specific reforms and greater awareness. These proactive actions show that the project was not only successfully implemented, but its objectives were well-received and adopted by civil society organizations.

Throughout the study period, civil society received significant and sustained attention, especially from USAID. Where implementation details are known, the projects were effectively implemented without major difficulties. Furthermore, the projects and programs showed concrete evidence that the objectives were adopted by participants, and in some cases even diffused beyond project participants. Taken as a whole the successful projects and their outcomes increased the vibrancy of Burundi’s civil society and strengthened their role in influencing public policy making. At the end of the study period in 2010, a performance evaluation for USAID’s interventions in Burundi concluded that USAID’s activities “enabled members of Burundian
civil society to advocate with government officials, serve as agents of policy reform, and participate in government decision-making processes. Evidence above also shows that because of the interventions, civil society organizations initiated advocacy campaigns and assumed watchdog roles, which are significant democratic norms to have in a society. Throughout the study period, civil society organizations supported through USAID activities became more organized in their advocacy efforts, played an increasingly important role in advocacy efforts, and used media more effectively—all prompted by USAID’s extensive capacity building activities. Additionally, because of USAID’s capacity building activities focused on civil society, civil society organizations (CSOs) were registered and recognized by the Burundian government as official partners in the transitional justice process. Given the evidence detailed above, the projects focusing on civil society met both criteria 1 and 2 for Hypothesis 3, meaning that 1) the projects were successfully implemented and the reforms were adopted by civil society, and 2) the project outcomes lead to an increase in civil society’s capacity to engage in political and social matters. Over the study period, Burundi’s civil society was “reignited” and underwent significant expansion in size, diversity, capacity, and influence—all of which are critical to developing informal democratic norms that will support democratic development in a country.

Civic Education and Reconciliation

Similar to Rwanda, Burundi’s history—both long-term and during the study period—was plagued by severe ethnic violence. In combination with its authoritarian political history, by the beginning of the study period there was no forum for public discussion of politics. With the groups largely isolated from any form of meaningful dialogue together, the population was vulnerable to elite manipulation, and fear of the “other” group was often rampant—and turned into increased violence. To move from such circumstances to resolving conflicts through democratic methods rather than violence, a citizenry must have internalized democratic norms in their society, understand their active role in influencing government, and embrace reconciliation as a step towards creating a peaceful, democratic society. As detailed under Hypothesis 1, some donor activities focused on reconciliation through formal government institutions, but throughout the study period Burundi received far more civic education and reconciliation funding through informal institutions. By funding and delivering aid through informal institutions such as local NGOs and other non-governmental channels, donors approached civic education with a bottom-up approach—believing that as they built up the capabilities of the population for peace and positive engagement with policymaking, the country as a whole would move closer to democracy.

A common theme for the first activities in this sector is emphasizing the importance of dialogue, peace, and reconciliation in citizens’ actions within society. The earliest project activity that specifically targeted this goal was USAID’s Burundi Democracy and Governance Project from 1993-1995 for a total of $5 million. USAID had made its first strategic goal in Burundi to “promote dialogue, reconciliation, and stability within a framework of democratic
The project had activities related to formal institutions (detailed in Hypothesis 1-2) and civil society (detailed above), but it also had a few activities that focused on creating a culture of dialogue and reconciliation among the citizenry through informal channels. For example, USAID partnered with UNICEF to train teachers to add curricula focusing on the concepts of peace, dialogue, and tolerance for diverse ethnic groups. The project sought to train 2,000 teachers with the hopes of reaching 100,000 students. Another activity implemented by Search for Common Ground was their women’s peace center project (as described under civil society), and one main component of those associations was providing mid-level dialogue and reconciliation opportunities to Burundian women from diverse backgrounds. Within the centers, women could meet diverse people, exchange views peacefully, and learn from one another. These women were also trained to become dialogue facilitators in their own community to help increase peace.

Lastly, in 1994 USAID funded a series of pilot activities to strengthen democratic norms in the population through promoting dialogue and furthering reconciliation. These activities were recognized as the earliest “on-the-ground” attempts to promoting mediation of the conflict from a community level. By 1995, these activities were successfully implemented, and USAID measured its success in achieving its first strategic objective as “highly successful.”

The potential impact of this early intervention, and particularly its emphasis on peace and reconciliation at the community level, is potentially astronomical. In 1994, when a plane crash killed both Rwanda’s and Burundi’s presidents, each country experienced ethnic violence, but the scale of violence diverged across the countries. Both countries had similar histories of ethnic repression and discrimination, and both sides had elites that were grasping for power. However, during the same time period, the violence in Rwanda was more extensive with a death toll of 800,000 people, while Burundi had a death toll of 300,000. Looking back, it is impossible to attribute such an outcome to any specific action, but one USAID evaluation includes a potentially revealing statement. Describing its activities between 1993 and 1995, the report states, “The fact that Burundi has survived this difficult 18 month period and not degenerated into a ‘Rwanda like’ situation has been credited by observers such as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (UNSRSG) to USAID's pivotal role in quickly putting in place mechanisms to promote dialogue and reconciliation.” According to this statement, the peace and reconciliation activities carried out by USAID—and specifically their focus on real dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation at the community level—had a significant impact on society, demonstrating not only that the community adopted the norms, but also illustrating the potential power of democratic norms.

In 1995, USAID reaffirmed its commitment to dialogue as a form of reconciliation through providing funding to International Alert, who implemented a project in Bujumbura called Apostles of Peace Project in Political Dialogue that ran through 2001. This project’s main objective was to bring together middle-level members of opposing ethnic or political groups—especially Hutus and Tutsis—to discuss and address questions of Burundi’s political development going forward. These groups offered a way to humanize the opposition and focus
on commonalities. The activities also developed participants’ skills in engaging in peaceful exchanges. Through the program, members of the group would meet together at social events, public forums, or media programs to discuss Burundi’s future. A particular innovation of this program was its emphasis on targeting what many called the “crucial middle.”\textsuperscript{563} The program exclusively targeted middle-class members of each ethnic group to bring them together. In Burundi the middle class was rather small, but they were distanced from the political elite that had often manipulated the broader public toward violence. By targeting this group, International Alert and USAID sought to urge the middle class to embrace the positive influence they could have in society and set the agenda towards peace. The project enjoyed much success in implementation and, by 2001, there were 55 active members. The project evaluation found that the Apostles of Peace programs helped others recognize that “the other camp are not monsters,” thus reducing fear and demonization of the other group.\textsuperscript{564} The programs also helped push the media and public outlets to similarly emphasize these themes more broadly in their own programming.\textsuperscript{565} Perhaps most encouraging, though, during the project several local NGOs independently formed to perpetuate International Alert’s approach to peace through dialogue because they saw the need for increased intervention.\textsuperscript{566} Many of these NGOs were subsequently supported by International Alert, and one specific NGO focused on engaging and educating women on the political process. Its activities were deemed successful in an evaluation report for USAID, and the increase of women delegates at the 2000 Arusha meeting was attributed directly to this NGO’s efforts by the same evaluation report.\textsuperscript{567} These outcomes demonstrate effective implementation and adoption of civic education and reconciliation democratic norms.

Between 1990 and 2001, USAID was the only donor that had identifiable activities in the civic education and reconciliation sphere through informal institutions.\textsuperscript{568} However, the U.K. entered the space in 2001, once the Arusha Accords were officially signed, with a project for $380,000. This project sought to support community organizations in encouraging and educating citizens on participation in the development process. Implementation details are not available, and no other donors dedicated flows again to this area until 2005.\textsuperscript{569}

Despite a lack of flows from other donors, USAID remained active in promoting civic education and reconciliation. In 2002, it began its Burundi Initiative for Peace project. Most of this project’s activities have been described in other sections, but the last project activity involved giving 72 small grants to local organizations to encourage popular support for the Arusha peace and reconciliation process. Such an activity complements USAID’s other activities to foster community dialogue and support for peace. Additionally, the Burundi Initiative for Peace included a significant portion of funding for civil society, which was detailed in the previous section. Project documents indicate that the project was successfully implemented, though cut short by 4 months due to political instability. An evaluation found that the project increased popular support for the Arusha accords, and increased “active and informed” dialogue among diverse ethnic groups on public issues.\textsuperscript{570}

USAID followed up in 2004 with a project that was more specifically focused on democratic norm development through the Burundi Community-based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative. A
major focus of this project was a leadership training carried out at the community level called the Community-Based Leadership Program (CBLP). The program was adapted from a leadership project that had been deployed at the national level to train high-level government officials in collaborative decision making. With this program, USAID re-designed the model to focus on informal leaders at the community level. Specifically, CBLP sought traditional leaders and influencers in the community—who were not official government representatives—to provide them training in conflict mitigation, communication, and collaborative decision making. It was also originally designed to help re-integrate ex combatants, but participants ended up coming from diverse groups of people. By focusing on informal channels of community influence through local, respected, and influential leaders, USAID again was encouraging community-level dialogue and participation. The program was closed at the end of 2005 after training 6,200 community members in two provinces. Additionally, during implementation the Burundian government asked USAID to expand its activities to training government officials. This request implies that the project had enough positive outcomes to generate demand from the Burundian government. Furthermore, a project evaluation found that the leadership program provided a forum for dialogue and communication in the community, which lead to greater civic activism and positive community interactions.

As the Burundi Community-based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative was coming to a close in mid-2006, USAID implemented an innovative form of community engagement and reconciliation—it held a Sports Day in two provinces. Under this activity, each commune brought twelve male and female athletes to compete in a track and field competition. Over 1,000 people attended the event in one province, and equipment and uniforms were given as prizes to encourage ongoing community sports engagements. These sports days were the first community sports programs the provinces had in over 13 years, according to USAID documents. Furthermore, the governor of one province at the end of the event hailed sports as a “great way for people of diverse backgrounds to come together in an effort to reconcile their differences.” Interestingly, a year later Norway funded a project in Burundi to assess whether sports activities would be an effective tool for developing a stable democracy in Burundi. The results of the report are unavailable, but the turnout at USAID’s Sport Day indicates the usefulness of convening such community-based events. It is unclear whether these two provinces held follow-on sports days.

Towards the end of the study period, there was an increased interest from other donors in funding civic education and reconciliation activities in Burundi—particularly in response to the pending 2010 national elections. Between 2007 and 2010, Burundi received over $9.5 million dollars from seven additional donors beyond USAID. The largest contribution came from the European Union, which commuted nearly $1 million towards supporting non-state actors in the peace and reconciliation process. Other large donors included the United Kingdom—with contributions totaling $600,000 for rural community development—as well as the United Nations Democracy Fund and the U.S. State Department that each dedicated $300,000 to civic education in preparation for the democratic elections. Donors with smaller projects included
Germany, Norway, and Spain with each giving between $150,000 to $240,000.\textsuperscript{577}

The last democracy and government project in Burundi focused on civic education and reconciliation through informal institutions was funded by UNDP. Starting in 2008, UNDP launched the Support for National Consultations on the Establishment of Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Burundi Project. As the title indicates, this project focused on organizing public consultations around the country to gather information on what the population wanted to see in transitional institutions that were meant to foster reconciliation. This project was implemented in every province in Burundi and demonstrates a unique approach to civic participation by UNDP. Typical civic participation programs led by UNDP focus on fostering local economic development and contributing to the Millennium Development Goals with the theory that improved socio-economic conditions would pave the way for citizens to engage more fully in social and political activities. However, this project focused specifically on seeking citizen’s opinions and therefore directly engaging them in the political process. Furthermore, project documents indicate that UNDP designed this activity to build ownership of the transitional justice process in the country from the grassroots level. The project totaled $1 million and finished in 2009.\textsuperscript{578} Unfortunately, specific project results are not available.

As with Rwanda, it is interesting to note that the World Bank did not fund any projects in the democratic norm development sphere in Burundi. In one 2003 document, the World Bank directly states its own sequencing theory in Burundi, saying that ensuring sound public financial management, transparency, and accountability would be a prerequisite to any activity focusing on public participation.\textsuperscript{579} As such, the World Bank funded only projects that focused on economic reform, public financial management, and demobilization.

As this overview shows, donors—especially USAID—focused a great deal on peace and reconciliation in Burundi through dialogue, public consultations, and civic participation at the ground level. These projects broadly sought to build democratic norms in Burundi’s society by teaching and encouraging citizens to deal with disagreements through non-violent actions. Specifically, these projects sought to get citizens to channel their energy into engaging the political and social systems to make their voices heard. This type of engagement and norm development was particularly important in the conflict-ridden context of Burundi. While project implementation and outcomes are not readily available for many of the post-2007 projects in this sector, the earlier interventions showed strong patterns of successful implementation and participants’ adoption of the norms that the projects targeted. As a whole the projects contributed to transformations in Burundian attitudes—moving from a society that was deeply divided and driven by fear and hate between the ethnic groups in the country to a society that largely embraced dialogue as a way to achieve reconciliation. As such, the projects focusing on civic education and reconciliation in Burundi met both criteria 1 and 2 for Hypothesis 3.
Media

Developing a robust, free, and independent media is a particularly important informal democratic norm in post-conflict countries such as Burundi and Rwanda. As the population has access to a variety of news sources that are not controlled or manipulated by political forces, they will be more likely to develop balanced views of current events in the country. Subsequently, the population will be more likely to seek peaceful means of conflict resolution. Historically, Burundi had very limited media freedom. Since independence in 1962, most media outlets were either state controlled or subject to strict censorship. Along with the political opening in the early 1990s, the country adopted a new constitution in 1992 that guaranteed freedom of the press, but of course there were caveats. Any media organization had to get official certification from the government before being allowed to operate, and part of the qualifying criteria was that the media organization would not cover a set of issues deemed unfit for media, including anything that threatened national unity, attacked the president, or “undermined the reputation of the economy.” Regardless of these restrictions, though, print media began to slowly expand beyond the state-controlled outlets, and journalists began to have “increasing confidence in their personal security” as reports of direct harassment and detention lessened under the new constitution.

Given the slow progress in this area, donors were likely slow to target this area in the first few years of the study period. In 1993, USAID was the first donor to dedicate a portion of project funds to media activities with its Burundi Democracy and Governance Project. This project was set to run from 1993-1995, and amidst a few activities focused on formal institutions and civil society, two activities focused on supporting the media. In particular, the project envisioned a journalist training workshop and a learning study tour for Burundian journalists to go to the United States for six weeks. As described in previous sections, this project was cut short because of the increasing violence in the country, especially after the newly elected president died in a plane crash. However, when it was redesigned between 1994 and 1995, media became a much more prominent focus of the project. In particular, the revamped project included funding for Search for Common Ground to fund and carry independent media activities.

Search began operations in 1995 by launching the first independent radio focused on peace and reconciliation called Studio Ijambo. By 1995, the content of the existing media messages had become counter-productive to democratic development. The media mirrored the deep ethnic divisions in the country, and even actively promulgated them. Similar to the hate media in Rwanda, many press members issued “calls to kill” over the airwaves and broadcast programs designed to reinforce fear and distrust among ethnic groups. Furthermore, the concept of objectivity in journalism was seen as a betrayal of one’s ethnic ties or family loyalty. As such, Search had to grapple with these issues first to improve the quality and independence of Burundi’s media. Ultimately, it’s approach to combating these historical and current limitations proved quite innovative. It held specialized trainings to help its journalists understand the importance of objectivity, conflict mitigation, and independence, but most importantly it piloted
a new assignment strategy for all news coverage where all news events or programs were led by ethnically diverse teams. Under this assignment strategy, one Hutu and one Tutsi reporter would go together to cover news events. Doing so would allow the event to be interpreted through both sides’ perspectives on the same program. As the reporters got used to working together, they were able to overcome their own biases and mis-information about the other ethnic group, which then allowed for greater objectivity in their reporting.

A second type of innovation that Search initiated at Studio Ijambo was expanding the types of programing beyond just reporting on news. Specifically, it also designed and ran a series of unique drama media programs to help break ethnic barriers and overcome historical biases. In particular, Ijambo produced a soap opera radio program called “Our Neighbors, Our Selves.” The soap opera featured two neighboring families that were each from a different ethnic group—one Hutu and one Tutsi. The story centered around how the families found ways to coexist peacefully despite dramatic and violent events that were going on around them. Another popular innovative program was called “Heroes,” which featured stories of real people who hid members of the other ethnic group to save them during the height of conflict between 1993 and 1996. Such a program labeled such actions as not only desirable, but as the height of heroism—and promulgated those values into Burundian society. By 2000, Studio Ijambo featured 17 programs that included a mix of news coverage, dramatic productions, and radio magazines. In November 2002, Search also started supporting Radio Isanganiro with the same goals as Studio Ijambo. Radio Isanganiro soon became the most widely listened to radio in the country.

Search undertook its media activities with support from USAID starting under the Burundi Democracy and Governance Project, but as described in a previous section, USAID switched it to programmatic support in 1996, meaning that USAID provided consistent funding while allowing Search to have greater discretion over its activities. In 1997 it was folded into the Great Lakes Justice Initiative and still treated as a program rather than a project. Overall, Search received $2 million per year between 1995 and 2003, which included funding for its media programs as well as its other norms development activities described previously. During its implementation, the media landscape in Burundi had to overcome several challenges. After Buyoya took over power in 1996, he suspended freedom of the press. However, this did not stop Studio Ijambo in its designated activities. Rather, it appears the restrictions focused mostly on the press around the peace negotiations to effectively eliminate the opposition’s access to media, so only the perspective of the government party was broadcast. However, as Nelson Mandela stepped into the role of mediator, he insisted that freedom of the press be restored. Slowly all parties involved in the conflict were allowed to be interviewed in mid-2001.

Search’s impact on the media sector itself was immense. Studio Ijambo became recognized as a highly credible, neutral source of information in an environment that was exceedingly polarized. In fact, many subjects would refuse to interview with government-controlled media, and instead specifically sought out Studio Ijambo’s reporters. Its example also led to an “universally recognized” improvement in the quality of reporting in the country, including a positive change in Burundi’s media culture and practice. The reporting norms became more focused on providing
objective news coverage as well as professionalizing the trade more broadly. Its adoption of bi-ethnic team reporting showed systematic efforts to protect its programs from ethnic bias, which illustrated a greater level of professionalism for other news agencies to mimic. One study found that there was “no question” that this team reporting had “sensitized the rest of the media” and illustrated that balanced, objective news coverage was possible in Burundi. These results indicate that Search’s media activities were successfully implemented in Burundi, and its precepts were diffused even beyond the media programs it funded.

Beyond the effect of Search’s programs on the media industry itself, Search’s programs had a significant positive impact on Burundi’s population through bolstering public support for peace and reconciliation, as well as fostering greater understanding of the other ethnic group. In a 2001 evaluation, a stratified survey of 270 Burundians and in-depth interviews found that Studio Ijambo’s programs had helped reduce ethnic bias and increase the population’s focus on peace and reconciliation. Respondents were asked to name any media programs that helped them change their attitudes or behavior towards members of another ethnic group, and Ijambo’s soap opera and “Heroes” programs were consistently identified. Furthermore, in a 2004 evaluation, Ijambo’s productions were found to have led to “a new interaction between media and the political class over the period 2001-2004.” Its objectivity also helped reduce rumor-mongering, which was a consistent catalyst of violence and fear in Burundi’s history. Lastly, the media program strengthened the belief of people on both sides that dialogue was the only rational way to move forward. These changes in Burundi’s society and belief system indicate the democratic norms that USAID sought to propagate through Search’s funding were successfully adopted by some of the population.

In 2001, Austria also entered the media arena with a $250,000 project to support radio programs. Similarly, Norway dedicated $100,000 in 2003 to support educational radio programs about IDP rights. These projects represent the earliest known dedicated funds to media activities by donors outside the U.S., but implementation details are not available. Despite low activity from other donors, USAID continued a high level of dedication to the media sector. In 2002, it started its Burundi Initiative for Peace, which largely focused on democratic norm development. The project funded 80 sub-grants to local civil society organizations, some of which focused on media interventions. These media sub-grants focused on providing technical and logistical capacity building for existing radio stations, launching a national debate over radio on “hot topics” related to peace and democracy, and covering the progress on the peace negotiations in Arusha. The final report in 2003 found that—through a series of journalist trainings, coordinated media programs, and increased coverage of the peace negotiations—the interventions had successfully increased capacity of journalists, including through participants adopting a code of conduct for the first time ever. Additionally, the interventions were evaluated to have created a space for dialogue on traditionally contentious topics and to have encouraged a “move to the center” in public opinion.

USAID continued its support for media with the 2004-2006 Community Based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative, where one of three components focused on the media. As the country
began to prepare for national and local elections set for 2005, USAID designed the media activities in this project to bridge the communications gap between Burundi’s capital and the rest of the country and to dispel rumors. In total, the project dedicated over $800,000 to media interventions through 41 grants. These activities focused on assisting both state run and private radios to broadcast their news beyond the capital to the whole nation and ensuring the news coverage provided accurate, relevant information on the transition process and elections. It even provided logistical support for journalists to visit distant rural areas around the country to do public interests segments and share updated news. Journalists would then share the opinions and sentiments of these rural areas with the national stakeholders back in the capital. Another set of activities focused on election monitoring. A final evaluation found that the project had achieved its goals of reducing rumors and filling the information gap between the capital and rural areas on the election. Interestingly, though, the main radio stations the project supported claim that their interventions caused national authorities to listen to opinions expressed by the population through these journalist visits and even caused national decision makers to embark on their own rural visits. Furthermore, the main radio stations funded through this project joined together to create a “Media Synergy” where they coordinated media presence at election locations throughout the country. These journalists provided extensive monitoring of voting locations, reaching beyond what the formal Independent National Election Commission agency provided. Because of their presence, the journalists were able to expose numerous attempts at cheating and fraud on the ground. They also monitored the counting of ballots closely. Afterwards, the media affirmed that their presence helped eliminate fraud and led to successful, fair elections.

In the years following Burundi’s successful elections in 2005, USAID dedicated activities within an additional two projects to media interventions. Under the Burundi Post-Conflict Transition Assistance Program running from 2005-2007, USAID funded media freedom as a part of a wider project. Under the project, journalists were trained in journalism ethics and attended workshops on making media in Burundi self-sufficient. Under one training activity, 39 members of the media attended nine weeks of training on ethics and the media’s role in advocacy. One outcome of the trainings was that USAID created a coalition of public radio outlets that were committed to responsibly reporting on significant developments. Additionally, another outcome was that public radio outlets increased their advocacy around journalist arrests along with support from civil society organizations that had also been trained by USAID. This increased advocacy led to the release of arrested journalists, indicating that the project activities successfully increased the democratic role of media in Burundian society.

Similarly, under the Burundi Policy Reform Project from 2007-2009, USAID-funded activities focused on media freedom. The activities included providing equipment and financial support for media agencies, increasing the professional capacity of the media sector, enabling media organizations to engage in business development, and shaping the legal environment protecting freedom of the press. Project documents indicate the media activities were successfully carried out, with media members participating in trainings on models of international reform and the
media’s role in educating and sensitizing the population on reforms underway in Burundi. The project also successfully targeted and trained journalists at the provincial level outside the capital on professional reporting methods, constituting the first training that the majority of these provincial journalists had ever received. As an indicator of adoption of the project goals, many of the media outlets that engaged in training started to set up their own marketing departments as a step towards self-sufficiency.

Outside of USAID, other donors began to enter the media sector in earnest starting in 2005. That year, Belgium began funding media projects and, by 2009, its project funding totaled $2.3 million. These projects focused on supporting radio and other forms of media. In 2008, the next donor to enter was the United Kingdom, which between 2008 and 2010 gave $1 million to increase public accountability through the media, including a special focus on the 2010 elections. Additional donors began funding projects in 2009 and 2010, but these were small contributions (under $70,000 each) from Germany, UNICEF, and Finland. Finland is one of the few donors to focus on print media. Its project specifically targeted support for grassroots comics as a way to communicate with local communities. No implementation details are available for these projects.

Even though Burundi’s media sector did not have a large plurality of donors throughout the study period, Burundi’s overall democracy and governance aid flows in this sector are undeniably significant. While a large numbers of donors were not active in this area, Burundi enjoyed sustained and significant attention from one donor—USAID. Not only was USAID actively engaged in this sector throughout the entire study period, but the number of successfully implemented activities that bolstered Burundi’s media from any donor stand out in steep contrast to other recipients such as Rwanda. As this section has detailed, these projects were all successfully implemented, with many garnering significant positive outcomes that were further diffused into the media sector beyond project participants. By the end of the study period, the detailed media interventions had led to a more active, objective, and professionalized media sector in Burundi. In fact, after the media had played a significant role in preparing for and monitoring the 2005 elections, the directors of the two main radio stations that had received USAID’s support declared that “freedom of the press has now been confirmed as a power amongst others.” Such a statement indicates the media was successfully asserting its role in a democratic society and the democratic political system—a role that would not have been possible without the donor activities detailed above. As such, the projects focusing on media interventions in Burundi met both criteria 1 and 2 for Hypothesis 3.

### Assessing Effectiveness of Aid for Informal Democratic Processes and Norms

The aid flows into Burundi and Rwanda show considerably different approaches by donors towards fostering democratic development in the countries. Hypothesis 3 posits that developing informal democratic norms and processes in society is the driving factor of democratic change.
As these democratic norms become a part of people’s—and society’s—behavior, the people will become a mobilizing force in the country towards democracy.

Comparing the democracy and governance aid projects in Rwanda and Burundi reveals a stark contrast in how donors chose to foster democratic development. In Rwanda, relatively few projects targeted developing informal democratic norms through funding civil society, civic participation, and a free media. On the other hand, Burundi received sustained, significant support towards developing its democratic norms from the ground up. Based on this divergence in programming, Hypothesis 3 predicts Burundi’s democratic trajectory will increase more than Rwanda’s. This next section will compare each type of norms development in each country and analyze the programs against the third criterion, namely whether the increase in civil society, civic participation and reconciliation, and a free media brought about by these aid programs increased overall democratic development in these countries.

### Civil Society: Comparison and Evaluation

Rwanda and Burundi had very different experiences with funding for civil society during the study period. Compared to the activities dedicated to formal institutions, building informal democratic norms received little attention in Rwanda. As detailed in the analysis above, several donors were active at one point or another during the study period in this area in Rwanda, but the information available on project implementation and results show that the largest projects failed to be fully implemented or to make the impact the donor had targeted with the intervention. According to the current hypothesis, it is therefore not surprising that Rwanda does not see significant democratic development as measured through sectoral quantitative measures. For example, WGI’s *Voice and Accountability* indicator shows that during the study period, citizen’s involvement and influence in policymaking barely increased at all; this indicator only moved from a score of -1.56 in 1996 to a score of -1.31 by 2010, moving it from the 7th percentile to the 12th percentile. During the study period, the highest increase came in 2005 with a score of -1.16 right after the national elections, but this progress quickly collapsed after the government tightened control following the election and minimized the political space for civil society groups. Similarly, two macro-level indicators of democratic development show little progress in Rwanda. Rwanda begins the study period in 1990 as “Not Free” and ends the study period in 2010 with the same value, according to Freedom House; similarly, Rwanda progresses on the Polity2 scale only from a score of -7 to -4 over these two decades, showing it remained an autocracy even after all the democracy and governance flows during the study period. Since civil society activities failed both the first and second criteria, Rwanda’s civil society activities will necessarily fail the third criteria—these activities generally failed to be successfully implemented, were not adopted by civil society, and therefore did not increase Rwanda’s democratic development.

Donor evaluations in Rwanda provide some insight into these quantitative scores. They indicate that the civil society in Rwanda remained weak throughout the study period—both because of
the restrictions placed on it by the government and because of civil society groups’ “own fears” of reprisal from the government.\textsuperscript{612} Ultimately, this study shows that the aid flows supporting civil society in Rwanda did not reach the threshold necessary to overcome these challenges—both in terms of sustained commitment to this sector and in terms of the relative balance of aid targeting formal institutions versus informal democratic norm development. Instead, the Rwandan government increasingly viewed civil society as an implementation vehicle for its own policies instead of as external advocates for reform or a counterpoint to government power.\textsuperscript{613}

As the political space for civil society to meaningfully engage in democratic behavior diminished in Rwanda, citizens had less opportunities to influence and engage in policymaking, which makes a thriving democracy nearly impossible. Instead of focusing on informal norms development in the country, donors funded formal institutions of the government, which ultimately played into the hands of the increasingly centralized and autocratic-leaning government whereby the Rwandan government went through the motions of instituting democratic institutions, but ensured the people were not ever allowed to wield any real power.

In contrast, the democracy and governance aid programing in Burundi showed an extended and consistent focus on building informal democratic norms through bolstering its civil society. In this sector, USAID was the most active donor in Burundi. USAID’s choice to direct its main focus in democracy and governance programing in Burundi towards civil society and reconciliation after the 1993 political crisis stands in unique contrast to donors’ programming choices in Rwanda. In Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, USAID and other donors chose to focus their efforts largely on government institutions. However, after the 1993 crisis in Burundi where over 300,000 people were killed in a series of reprisals between Hutus and Tutsis, USAID chose to focus specifically on ground-up approaches to reconciliation and preparing the country for democracy. This is important for two reasons: 1) USAID chose this emphasis in 1993 and 1994, before the military coup in Burundi and therefore before it was required to target non-government sources for funding. It is impossible to determine whether USAID would have chosen to follow this course if Sanction 508 had not been imposed on it between 1996-2005, but the timeline shows USAID’s intention to focus on this sector before it became the only option.\textsuperscript{614} 2) This is the most important distinction between USAID’s programming in the two countries.

The results of USAID’s programming choices in Burundi had significant effects on both the vibrancy of the country’s civil society and its overall democratic development. As shown in the previous analysis, the democracy aid activities focused on civil society consistently expanded the capacity of civil society in Burundi to engage government institutions in policymaking, influence policy outcomes, and become agents for reform. The activities also successfully promoted new norms of how civil society organizations should be involved in society and policymaking by taking on new roles of advocating for change.

Sectoral and macro-level indicators of Burundi’s democratic trajectory capture the positive effect of these new norms, showing that Burundi was indeed moving towards greater democratic development. On WGI’s \textit{Voice and Accountability} indicator, Burundi showed significant
improvement over the course of the study period. It moved from a score of -1.75 in 1996 to a score of -0.94 by 2010, taking the country from the 3rd percentile to the 22nd percentile.\textsuperscript{615} This shows that throughout the study period, and particularly between 2000 and 2010, citizens in Burundi had significantly more opportunities to influence their government.

Burundi’s trajectory is particularly impressive when compared to Rwanda’s performance during the same time period. Burundi started out eight percentile points below Rwanda in 1996, but it ended up over ten percentile points above Rwanda by 2010. Similarly, according to Freedom House, Burundi started the study period in 1990 as “Not Free” and ended the study period in 2010 with a higher value of “Partly Free,” while Rwanda remained “Not Free” over the entire course of the twenty-year study period. Even more impressively, Burundi progresses on the \textit{Polity2} scale from a score of -7 to 6, moving from a strong autocracy to a relatively strong democracy during the study period.\textsuperscript{616} Given this evidence, the democracy and governance activities in Burundi successfully met criteria 3, meaning that the increase in civil society engagement led to an increase in democratic norms and ultimately to democratic development.

In addition to the increased sectoral focus that USAID had on civil society in Burundi, its aid activities were also structured differently in comparison to Rwanda. Between 1996 and 2004, USAID chose to switch the structure of its involvement from discrete aid projects to broader programmatic support of its implementing agencies. Switching to a programmatic approach meant that USAID provided its implementing agencies—such as Search for Common Ground—consistent, sustained funding for a longer period of time. It also meant that Search for Common Ground and the other implementers had greater flexibility in how they chose to design and implement their interventions, allowing for greater adaptability throughout the life of the program.\textsuperscript{617} Additionally, USAID’s programmatic-support approach meant there was a less specific focus on a pre-determined set of project indicators and outputs, which potentially allowed the implementing agencies to take a wider approach to effecting change in the realm of civil society and addressing gaps as they came across them. This structural difference in how the aid activities were designed, implemented, and sustained is potentially key to the success of USAID’s intervention in building informal democratic norms in Burundi.

In relation to civil society development, \textit{Hypothesis 3} predicts that the country with the most activities dedicated towards civil society will see a greater increase in democratic development. Comparing Rwanda’s and Burundi’s aid activities between 1990-2010 reveal that indeed the country with the most flows in this area had greater democratic development.

\section*{Civic Participation and Reconciliation: Comparison and Evaluation}

Democracy and governance activities focused on civic participation and reconciliation is another area where aid flows focusing on building democratic norms differed dramatically between Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, the activities that focused on informal routes of participation and reconciliation seemed to come in fits and spurts, with large gaps in funding of up to eight years. By the first election after the genocide in 2002, donor reports indicate that the informal
routes of civic participation, such as civil society and NGOs, had failed to provide adequate civic education in the run up to the election. Such results are not surprising given the extremely low attention donors gave to this area in Rwanda. Instead, donors relied on formal government institutions to develop civic participation. Given the autocratic nature of the government during this time period, though, this backfired on donors and resulted in participation being state-driven, meaning that the Rwandan government chose when, where, and how it allowed citizens to engage on a limited set of policies. As such, throughout the study period the space for citizens to engage government or policies on their own remained extremely restricted. The aid flows in Rwanda related to civic participation therefore failed criteria 3.

On the other hand, donors, and particularly USAID, focused on a bottom-up approach to civic participation and reconciliation early on in Burundi, and continued this focus throughout the study period. Project activities focused on creating informal forums for citizens to engage generally and also specifically with other ethnicities in constructive dialogue and positive interactions. Many aid activities focused on training community leaders, women, and youth on ways to participate in and influence policymaking and reconciliation in their own communities. As detailed previously, these activities had demonstrated positive effects—to such a degree that some observers attributed USAID’s early efforts with stopping Burundi from seeing the wider violence seen in Rwanda.

The effect these programs had on each country’s democratic trajectory can also be seen through the macro-level democracy indicators. Freedom House’s indicator of “Not Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Free” consists of two specific indicators measuring political rights and civil liberties in the country. The Political Rights indicator specifically measures how free citizens are to participate in the political process. Scores range from 1 to 7, with 7 being no political rights. During the study period, Burundi’s score for political rights moved from 7 to a 4, indicating a move from the least amount of political rights possible to partial political rights. It is this improvement in political rights that bumped Burundi from a country categorized as “Not Free” to “Partly Free,” as the score for civil liberties did not change markedly during the study period. At the same time, Rwanda failed to improve at all in its measure of political rights. It started out at 6 in 1990 and remained at a 6 in 2010.

As these indicators show, Burundi’s citizens enjoyed an expanding arena for participation in politics, but Rwanda’s government maintained tight control over participation despite the development of formal institutions. As such, the increase in civic participation and reconciliation can be understood to have successfully contributed to an increase in democratic development in Burundi. Thus, not only did Burundi’s aid flows meet criteria 3 for Hypothesis 3, but Hypothesis 3 correctly predicted which country would experience greater democratic development during the study period.
In line with the previous areas related to building informal democratic norms, Burundi received much more aid directed towards developing the media sector compared to Rwanda. Rwanda had very limited aid flows in this area—including nothing between 1994 and 1999, and only a few projects from USAID and other donors after that. These projects were not enough to increase the capacity of the media sector in Rwanda or to increase media freedom there. Burundi on the other hand had a great deal of attention poured into its media sector, especially through Search’s Studio Ijambo program. Ultimately these projects helped create independent, unbiased media options throughout Burundi; they also created a diffusion effect where the positive example of Burundi’s highly-acclaimed Studio Ijambo helped create a culture in the media that valued unbiased reporting that sought to increase understanding and dialogue across ethnic lines. Burundi media still operated under some level of repression from the government, but throughout the study period the repression decreased. The achievement of the aid activities in this sector was not specifically limited to just developing a free press. In many ways it was more focused on developing the press to become a force within the country for constructive reform. To do so, it first has to become a strong collective actor that can become a vehicle for citizen engagement. Aid project outcomes in Burundi indicate that aid activities successfully bolstered the media sector, but moreover, the media’s positive involvement in the 2005 elections indicate that the media had successfully become an agent of reform in the country. According to directors of various radio stations in Burundi, the monitoring initiative that the media independently launched and executed caught and prevented numerous incidences of attempted election fraud—showing that the media had finally developed into its own role in ensuring a democratic country. In the words of one radio station director, the media had become an actual political power in Burundi. The role of the media in ensuring the 2005 elections were free and fair is one qualitative indicator that the development of the media did in fact contribute to the democratic development of the country, showing that the aid flows in this sector met criteria 3 for Hypothesis 3.

**CONCLUSION: HYPOTHESIS 3**

Under Hypothesis 3, this study has sought to test an alternative theory of democratic development, namely whether focusing on developing informal democratic norms within a country will lead to greater democratic development compared to flows focused on formal institutions of democracy. This theory, and its resulting hypothesis, posit that the most important factor in a country’s democratic trajectory is how well democratic norms are established throughout society and through citizens’ behaviors. As donor flows focus on building civil society, increasing civic participation from the ground-up, and bolstering the role of a free media in the democratic process, then these democratic norms will become an enabling and mobilizing force for citizens to engage in policymaking and becoming effective democratic agents of reform. Since Burundi received the most aid activities focused on these categories of democratic norms, this hypothesis would predict that Burundi would experience greater democratic
development compared to Rwanda. As this analysis has shown, this prediction was correct. Burundi’s democracy and governance aid flows in this area met each of the three criteria, which traced the aid programs influence and causal mechanisms from the program design and implementation stage at the micro level, all the way to a national change in the country’s democratic development at the macro level. Given this evidence, we fail to reject Hypothesis 3, and conclude that aid flows directed towards developing informal democratic norms lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development (see Figure 7). By the end of the study paper, both countries looked like model democracies on paper, with constitutions passed by national referendums; guarantees for civil liberties, freedom of the press, and human rights; and consistent elections with high voter turnout levels. Yet in reality these institutions often ran differently than they appeared on paper, and it took more than just democratic institutions to drive democratic development.

*Figure 7. Conclusion on Hypothesis 3 for Rwanda and Burundi*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 3: Democracy aid programs that build informal democratic processes and norms will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aid Programs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This study period ran from 1990 to 2010. Over this time period, this case study delves into a detailed analysis of democracy aid outcomes and the democratic development of both Rwanda and Burundi. Fast forwarding to the present day in 2016, Rwanda and Burundi have continued to face challenging circumstances. Burundi in particular has experienced several problems with backsliding as its democratic norms and institutions are potentially eroding away. In 2013, the parliament and President Nkurunziza approved a media law that restricts press freedom by forbidding media coverage on topics that would undermine national security by publishing stories about national defense, public safety, state security, and the local currency.625 Journalists (through the Burundian Union of Journalists) countered by challenging the constitutionality of the law, and later in 2014 Burundi’s Constitutional Court struck down several parts of the law, but not all of it.626 The journalists’ challenge and the court’s ruling show that some aspects of democratic norms and institutions—such as civil society’s right to challenge the government and the exercise of horizontal checks and balances—were present during this struggle. However, the fact that parliament passed the law, the president signed the law, and the court did not strike down all of the law also signal a potential breakdown in key democratic norms and institutions.

Another warning sign came later in 2014 when the ruling party and the executive office tried to push through a constitutional change. The suggested change would have changed the power-sharing arrangement in Burundi and would have allowed President Nkurunziza to run for a third term, which the constitution at the time disallowed.627 However, parliament successfully blocked the change, which shows the strength of both the democratic values and horizontal checks established in the country. However, the suggested change itself reveals some un-democratic leanings of the executive office and ruling party.

In 2015, in the run-up to the presidential elections, the ruling party announced President Nkurunziza would again be its candidate for the executive office. The party argued that, since he had been elected to the presidency during his first term by a team of delegates instead of by a popular election, which were the terms of the Arusha Agreements, his first term did not count against the two term limit.628 However, many in Burundi believed this move was unconstitutional and was putting Burundi on a path towards dictatorship. After the announcement, widespread protests broke out and continued in the lead up to the election. The government responded with violence against the protesters. A month later, there was a failed coup attempt, and violence continued. When the elections happened in May, President Nkurunziza won 70% of the vote, with the vote being declared not free or credible by the United Nations. Many of the opposition candidates boycotted the elections, and Burundi’s largest donors condemned the election as not credible due to the persecution of the opposition, the press, and even voters. Donors and others have even threatened international sanctions—including cutting off aid flows to Burundi.629
An important milestone for any new democracy is the first successful hand-over of power from one executive or party to the newly-elected one. Unfortunately, Burundi has not yet passed this milestone, and the future of its democracy thus looks fragile. Due to the worsening situation, Burundi was rated once again “Not Free” by Freedom House in 2015, largely undoing the progress it made since 2004 when it was ranked “Partly Free” for the first time.630

During the same time period from 2010-2016, Rwanda failed to make any significant progress towards democracy and is still rated as “Not Free” by Freedom House.631

While the current case study cannot explain the determinants of these latest outcomes, or aid’s role in them, since they fall well beyond the study period, further research should explore what has contributed to Burundi’s backsliding. The example of Burundi demonstrates the ultimate frailty of new democracies, especially in post-conflict contexts, and the importance of continually building both formal democratic institutions and informal democratic norms.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

Based on the analysis of Rwanda and Burundi’s aid flows and democratic trajectory outcomes, the following lessons learned emerge as considerations for donors designing new democracy aid programs in post-conflict settings.

**Building informal democratic norms must be a focus for aid flows to successfully increase a country’s democratic trajectory.** The comparative experience between Rwanda and Burundi throughout the study period showed that aid flows focused on building informal democratic norms were more successful at changing people’s beliefs and behavior, and those changes lead to real increases in the democratic development of the country. In Burundi, donors’ concerted focus on building informal democratic norms resulted in people embracing democratic principles and putting them into action. As these informal democratic norms diffused into society and into government institutions, Burundi experienced greater levels of democratic development compared to Rwanda, where the focus was largely on building formal institutions of government. In Burundi, civil society and media organizations developed into strong checks on governmental power, elections offered real choices to the electorate and were largely executed without fraud or governmental abuse, and government institutions generally ran as independent institutions with a system of checks and balances. Focusing democracy aid activities on building informal democratic norms allowed the various actors in the country to grow into their respective roles in a functioning democracy.

**Aid focused on building formal institutions matters, but it is not enough to advance democratic development on its own.** Rwanda’s aid flows focused heavily on building formal institutions for representation and checks and balances. The theory behind these types of aid flows is that, if we build the formal rules and laws of interaction in government, then the relevant actors within those institutions will change their behavior to follow suit. Rwanda’s experience shows that such a focus on formal institutions was not enough on its
own to create real change. Even though the formal institutions became more developed along democratic lines, individuals in those institutions often continued to exhibit non-democratic behaviors—such as when the legislative and judicial branches chose to acquiesce to the executive branch even when it was against their interests. Rwanda therefore lacked a strong enough focus on building informal democratic norms to help actors and society change their behaviors, take on their respective new roles, and assert their authority in a functioning democratic system. In Burundi, the formal institutional changes were largely introduced through the peace accord process and resulted in a power-sharing arrangement. These changes were critical in building a balanced, democratic governmental structure. Before that, though, aid flows focused heavily on building informal democratic norms in the country so that when the institutions were in place, the relevant actors were ready to take on their democratic roles.

**Aid programs should focus on building informal democratic norms in a country early.** Donors in Burundi targeted their aid flows towards informal democratic norms and channels early in the study period, and they diversified their portfolios to include support for formal democratic institutions towards the end of the study period. This sequencing allowed the donor community to build the capacity of democratic actors to fulfill their roles as the formal institutions developed. In contrast, donors in Rwanda targeted their aid towards formal institutions first, and then later in the study sought to focus on building informal democratic norms. However, Rwanda’s experience showed this was too little, too late: By the time donors focused on informal democratic norms, the actors were either too weak relative to other institutions to change their behaviors and assert their rightful democratic roles, or they were already set in their un-democratic behaviors. As donors tried to bolster these actors, they found civil society was relatively nonexistent and most projects were cancelled or ended unsuccessfully for lack of viable partners. Focusing on building informal democratic norms from the beginning of aid interventions could have helped sustain and support these actors so that they were prepared to assert their roles once the formal democratic institutions were more established.

**Aid flows focused on fostering formal institutions of representation must incorporate a real de-concentration of power to successfully increase democratic development.** Even though creating and supporting formal institutions for representation was a dominant focus for democracy aid activities in Rwanda, there was no observed causal chain from these institutional reforms to an increase in democratic development. With these flows, the country increased its formal decentralization, but the Rwandan government retained centralized control over any meaningful decision-making power. The country held elections, but those elections did not offer citizens real choices, as opponents to the ruling regime were often disqualified, imprisoned, or not allowed to run. The government worked with aid agencies to establish public participation mechanisms, but the process was largely state-driven and the outcomes state-determined, so these public participation mechanisms did not lead to an increase in the citizens’ voice in policy decision making. Despite the large amount of aid...
targeting these activities, the Rwandan government ultimately retained and consolidated its top-down, centralized control of the policymaking process. This effectively undermined the democratic purposes of the institutional reforms made in the country. If they are to successfully increase democratic development in a country, future aid programs must ensure that de-concentration of power is a real outcome of aid focusing on increasing the representativeness of formal government institutions.

**Democracy aid should focus on incorporating the sources of authoritarian power into an equalized system of checks and balances.** Coming into the study period and particularly after the genocide, the main authoritarian institution in Rwanda was the executive, while in Burundi the authoritarian actor was the military. During the study period, both Rwanda and Burundi received aid focused on building checks and balances into the system of formal institutions—particularly Rwanda. Burundi’s aid successfully targeted the military and incorporated it into the new democratic order by implementing several large, coordinated demilitarization projects while simultaneously building up other government institutions to counter the military’s influence. In contrast, the aid projects in Rwanda were not able to successfully reign in the formal and informal sources of former authoritarian strength of the executive, which undermined the system of checks and balances in the government and inhibited Rwanda’s democratic trajectory. Donors should therefore consider what institutions need more focus from aid flows to bring the former sources of authoritarian strength in balance with the other government institutions.

**Consistency and sustainability in aid programming increases its impact.** In Burundi, donors moved much of their aid focused on informal democratic norms from project-specific aid flows to more flexible programmatic aid flows. This programmatic design allowed the implementing agencies to design and execute longer-term activities with the flexibility to adapt and change projects and activities to respond to the evolving situation on the ground. Building this flexibility and sustainability into the aid program design gave implementing agencies the runway and consistency in funding that they needed to focus on long-term outcomes that would contribute exponentially more to the democratic development in the country. In contrast, in Rwanda many of the aid flows for informal democratic norms came in fits and starts, which decreased the ability of implementing agencies to rely on consistent funding streams or make real progress. Donors might consider how such programmatic aid flows could be leveraged elsewhere—and particularly in post-conflict contexts—to increase the consistency and sustainability of aid flows to focus on longer-term objectives.
Chapter 3. Aid Effectiveness in Countries with Low Human Development: Benin and Guinea

By Daniel Robles-Olson

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the two West African countries of Benin and Guinea share important features. They have similar population sizes, population growth rates that exceed the global average, and high levels of ethnic fractionalization. Having both been French colonies, they also share similar legal systems and institutions based on the civil law tradition.

In 1990, Guinea and Benin were at similar points in their democratic trajectories. Both countries were in the process of shedding decades-long autocratic regimes. In Benin this took the form of a National Conference to draft a constitution, while in Guinea, the president introduced a new constitution meant to be more democratic. Both countries were beneficiaries of the global clientelism resulting from the Cold War but were also participating in the global movement towards democracy. Both countries had low levels of economic development and low human development. This point in history reflected for both countries a moment of great opportunity to consolidate democratic openings into lasting democracies.

Today, Benin has recently completed a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact that targeted key public sector reforms to consolidate this young democracy. Democracy in Benin has been punctuated by episodes of instability but the strength of the system is apparent in successfully completing its MCC compact, which requires and monitors for adherence to high governance accountability and transparency standards. Guinea, conversely, has suffered continuously from democratic instability. In recent years, periods of military violence—larger in scale than any previously experienced in the country—have hampered progress towards democratic consolidation. Thus while Guinea has maintained elections deemed fair by the international community and continued to work towards reducing poverty in the country, it has seen little progress in democratic development overall. What explains these divergent democratic outcomes among countries that share so many similarities? In particular, what role has international aid played in contributing to these outcomes? This case study explores the potential causal mechanisms through which democracy aid programs may have contributed to democratic development in Benin and Guinea.
In addition to the considerable challenges that democratizing states face generally, some face additional challenges due to high levels of poverty and low human development that can impede the development of effective governing institutions and the full participation of citizens in their democracy. Benin and Guinea are two such examples of countries facing high poverty and low levels of human development. This section surveys recent scholarship regarding democracy promotion in low-income countries.

Poverty in Africa is linked to a variety of factors. Landlocked countries are more prone to poverty than those with ports. Regional instability can cause or exacerbate economic decline for some countries. In other cases, cultural tensions and colonial heritage aggravate poverty in the region. However, the particular nature of the poverty that any country experiences—and its prospects for improvement—can be explained by the nature of that country’s institutions.

The political economy of post-independence West Africa was a combination of political institutions inherited from colonial rulers that relied on a powerful center and lacked constraints on the exercise of power. Power was maintained at the center by dispensing patronage for support, which reduced incentives for public goods because these cannot be targeted exclusively to political allies and supporters. Public sector employment and investment was thus transformed into a method for rewarding supporters and redistributing tax revenue to consolidate power. As a result, economic institutions meant to aid the private sector became tools to exercise power. In the case of most autocracies and partial democracies in Africa, markets remain inefficiently organized, property rights remain insecure, and states are often unable or unwilling to provide essential public goods that improve human development. Without meaningful institutional change, poverty and low human development would likely remain.

Sue Bowden, Blessing Chiripanhura, and Paul Mosly find that public investment is important; otherwise poverty levels are driven entirely by the ability of the dominant economic sectors to foster the livelihoods of the poor. In the latter scenario, the poor are dependent on accruing benefits from spillovers from the economic sectors. Bowden et al. attribute this dependence on the failure of government to fulfill its role in providing equitable distribution of public goods. The postcolonial urbanization of African countries meant that, as rural smallholder farmers migrated to the city, the poor became dispersed and their political strength became diluted. Poor rural immigrants to cities had varied interests and were of different identities. The lack of a strong voice left many poor in Africa with little representation on the national level. Pro-poor
policies in Africa are thus often a result of complex coalitions of support because political parties do not represent social classes but rather fall down ethnic or regional lines.633

---

**Measuring Poverty: The United Nations Development Program Human Development Indicators and its Drawbacks**

The first Human Development Report in 1990 laid out a vision “of economic and social progress that is fundamentally about people enlarging their choices and capabilities.”634 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) had, for the first time, established metrics to measure countries’ progress in creating economic opportunities and improving the livelihoods of their citizens. It called this the Human Development Index (HDI).

The index underwent a major change in 2010, but continues to be based on three main indicators: life expectancy at birth, level of schooling, and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.635

When the index was introduced in 1990, Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest average HDI value of 0.475, compared to a global average at the time of 0.694, but there have been improvements, particularly in the last 10 years. Life expectancy stagnated in the 1990s because of the AIDS epidemic, but has risen 5.5 years since 2000 to 55 years in 2013. Sub-Saharan Africa’s economy grew by 5% between 2003 and 2008 before the global financial crisis, reaching a level that was twice as much as its average in the 1990s. However, many of the Millennium Development Goals, including the target to halve extreme poverty by 2015, were largely unattained by Sub-Saharan Africa, despite a global reduction of poverty.

The Human Development Index, as stated in the 2013 Human Development Report, aims to assess poverty’s structural dimensions: unequal access to assets, unequal participation in the market, and unjust governance.

The UNDP index, however, is often critiqued as falling short and even misrepresenting progress. Martin Ravaillon expresses the perverse incentives the HDI may create in terms of countries skewing their priorities toward those expressed by donors. Countries with low HDI scores, for example, would not be incentivized by the HDI metrics to spend very much on extending longevity because the impact of increased life expectancy on a country’s index is less than that of an increase in raw GNI. As Ravaillon states: “It can be granted that a rich person will be able to afford to spend more to live longer than a poor person, and will typically do so, but that does not justify building such inequalities into our assessment of progress in ‘human development.’”636

This summary will debate new ideas raised for measuring poverty, including some from the UNDP.
GOVERNANCE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT LENS

For much of the 20th Century, Seymour M. Lipset was a leading authority on democratization and its requisites. Lipset produced early findings of a positive association between economic development and democratic stability—results later confirmed by a range of other scholars using varied methods. Lipset’s work asserts that, in order for low-income nations to grow, it is especially important to control the government through checks and balances. Yet he also notes the impediments to achieving this: Those in control of government in low-income countries do not always have the incentives to impose these checks on themselves, as the state is the economy’s engine and ceding control of any part of the state thus results in a loss of income for the ruling class. This creates a trap for low-income countries, where a ruling class determined to maintain its power hampers the reforms necessary to increase broader participation in the economy and in politics. Lipset’s conclusion was that a change of the norms and rules in impoverished countries was critical in both the political and economic spheres. Healthy economies depend on strong rule of law and norms that comply with the world order—as he notes, “a free market needs democracy and vice versa.”

More recent literature confirms a clear link between political and economic reforms, but the relationship is not deterministic, nor is there fixed sequencing. Some Cold War political thinkers, including Samuel Huntington, found that because autocrats do not need to worry about elections, they could afford to take a longer view, promote economic liberalization, and grow their countries’ economies—all while remaining autocratic. However, in a survey of post-Cold War countries, Eva Bellin finds that it is democratizing regimes—not the autocratic ones—that adopt economic liberalization policies. In fact, she finds that countries democratizing the fastest are those that implement the most comprehensive economic reforms. Bellin reaches the conclusion that strong economies provide better educational opportunities and improve human development, which may in turn create an environment conducive to democracy.

Responding to assertions that improved economic opportunities create better governance environments, Daniel Brumberg argues that improved economic opportunities in the way of job provision and widely distributed economic benefits creates political support for the government. Providing economic opportunity is thus an alternative tool—other than the use of force and intimidation—for maintaining control in autocratic societies. Because the slightest opening might deprive powerful members of the establishment of their payoffs, Brumberg argues that certain types of countries may not democratize—chief among these being countries with diverse populations and large economies.

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi set out to assess the statistical links between governance, regime types, economic development, and economic growth. Przeworski and colleagues find that the incidence of democracy is undoubtedly related to the level of economic development and that this relationship is “tight and strong.” They set out to determine the relative importance of economic development as compared with other factors such as political legacy, history, social structure, cultural traditions,
in institutional framework, and international political climate. They find that, while these other factors do a play a role, incidence of democratic regimes is most closely related to modernization and economic development.  

Their findings lead to follow-on questions about what types of economies or regimes are most likely to be democratic. Przeworski et al. confirm a positive relationship between economic development and democratic survival, but find no impact of economic development on democratic transition. The authors find that dictatorships are, on average, just as likely to breakdown regardless of the level of economic development, while democracies are more likely to breakdown only at lower levels of economic development and more likely to survive at higher levels of economic development. Transitions to democracy, however, occur at all levels of economic development, and thus the level of a country’s economic development is not related to its likelihood to experience a transition. This is a critical finding for countries and donors wishing to support democratic transitions in low-income countries.

Further, economic development has different impacts on autocratic and democratic regimes. While economic development can destabilize dictatorships—namely those with intermediate levels of income—economic development does not destabilize democracies. In fact, democracies respond positively to economic growth at all levels of economic development. This too is a key finding for democratic development efforts in low-income countries. Once countries transition to democracy, they are more likely to survive as economic development increases; the authors assert this is because democracies can better allocate available resources to productive uses because they are held accountable.

Responding to Lipset’s focus on the role of a free market economy in democratization, Stanley Samarasinghe finds that market-oriented reform is a generally efficient system to allocate resources for production but an independent civil society is required to strengthen the market economy. Independent civil societies provide the necessary checks to ensure an equitable distribution of resources and rebuff any negative effects caused by market forces. However, echoing other studies, Samarasinghe notes that liberal economies do not always lead to development.

This highlights the role of inequality in democratic development. Przeworski et al. recognize that, as average income declines and inequality increases, both autocratic and democratic regimes are much more vulnerable to being disrupted than when average income increases and inequality decreases.

Many of these studies on the links between economic and political development are based on a pre-Arab Spring paradigm that has since been challenged as failing to fully consider the role of civil societies and identity groups in democratization, leaving room for revision of these arguments. In a 2013 article, Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds argue that one of the reasons the Arab Spring produced so few true democratic yields is that the current regimes continue to benefit from the same rents and repression that authoritarian regimes
benefited from before the uprisings. They examine two key factors: the dynastic nature of autocracies in the Middle East and the rents extracted from oil revenues. Both factors work in complement, and so if a regime can retain either characteristic it will remain in power. Political scientists, they conclude, greatly exaggerated the fragility of personalistic dictatorships, and while they may one day fall, they will do so violently. Foreign intervention in the region also had a direct impact in helping topple or preserve regimes, as was the case of Libya and Bahrain respectively. Brownlee et al. reveal that inherited political structures remain very important even after popular uprisings.649

Bowden et al. also find that, in order to better understand both democratic growth patterns and responsive institutions, poverty measurements must consider equity of income distribution.650 Agustin Kwasi Fosu notes that, despite a global achievement of the first Millennium Development Goal to halve extreme poverty, it is not being achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa. Income distribution is becoming a large concern and although the African continent has seen high growth rates, income has not been distributed evenly. Countries with a higher level of inequality exhibit smaller reductions in poverty. Although Fosu avoids making generalizations, his findings convey that tracking inequality-generating characteristics of countries could help in designing poverty-reduction strategies. He also notes, however, that successfully implementing such strategies relies on states’ willingness to foster participative democracies. Fosu reaches the conclusion that, although having a keen understanding of inequality dynamics can improve the design of poverty-reduction programs, authoritarian countries will not participate.651 Democracy may therefore be an important component to reducing poverty because it may incorporate inequality reduction.

GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The more distant the Cold War becomes, the more global economic growth becomes an issue not of adopting a free market system, but of ensuring that the income generated in a free-market system is distributed equitably. Promoting this more holistic concept of human development relies on institutions that seek to reduce poverty, promote participation, and increase equity in terms of financial and social dividends. This has led to literature that questions the metrics as much as the methodology for measuring and improving governance in countries with low human development. Morten Jerven, for example, refutes the use of GDP alone as a metric for growth because it ignores aspects of inequality, but he qualifies this by noting that GDP is too important to be ignored. A chronic challenge in addressing the problems of post-colonial Africa, in Jerven’s view, is that often the failure of growth is accepted as fact, and models are used not to solve the problem but to explain it. He notes that, while research has confirmed that poor economic performance and poor governance are linked, there is no empirical evidence yet that one causes the other. He makes the case that the data thus do not justify ranking countries on HDI, as he sees such an index as a collection of perceptions and observations.652
The concern about available data has implications for the study of the relationship between human development and governance—and promoting good governance within contexts of low human development. It has led to revisions in many metrics used to measure this relationship and opened an ongoing discussion on improving these indicators. The Human Development Report has, since 2010, started to measure human development differently by adding an “inequality adjustment” that is weighed into the ranking to better reflect inequalities in income distribution.

Scholars like Leandro Prados de la Escosura, however, point to the need for additional changes to the HDI. de la Escosura asserts that the current Human Development Index neglects important issues of health and access to education because of the weight it gives to income. de la Escosura thus developed a new way of weighting the HDI to address these weaknesses in the data. Using his weighted index, he finds that regional variance emerges as an important feature of human development as the gap between rich and poor widen. His new metrics reveal that the perception that human development is improving stems largely from the unparalleled growth of income per capita in recent years and thus may not reflect advancement of a more holistic concept of human development. The UNDP recognizes these issues and attempts to address them, but is constrained by the availability of good data.

In this new context of information uncertainty, where the metrics tracked by the HDI may not provide a reliable assessment of a society’s development progress, Joseph Siegle sees the opportunity for countries with low human development to democratize in four steps, based on Robert Dahl’s description of a democracy as a system that includes popular participation, acceptance of equality among all citizens, respect for civil liberties, and meaningful checks and balances on executive power. In Siegle’s formulation linking political and economic progress, the first step is the democratic opening created by internal or external pressure that creates an opportunity for change and liberalization. The opening leads to the second step: a breakthrough where a new democracy replaces the autocracy and faces low economic growth rates. It is at this time of low growth rates that a country is most vulnerable to backsliding. In the third step, once the democracy has been created, it must build institutions that generate a democracy dividend so that citizens see the benefits of democratization. Investing in institutions to revise incentives, norms, and oversight in line with democratic principles is critical during this phase. Most importantly, political leaders must honor the process of succession. The final step, consolidation, occurs when democratic rules for gaining and holding power are the only alternative.

Democratization improves the economic standing of countries with large poor populations, and Siegle finds that growth under African democracies is five times more stable on average than growth in autocratic economies. Governments that depend on popular support and that are required to operate in a transparent environment must thus provide public goods and services responsibly. Siegle’s central conclusion is that it is important to continue exploring the link between human development and democratization to create aid strategies that are more effective at assisting with the transition and consolidation process.
Siegle argues that another promoter of growth is the increase of democratic accountability. Democratic accountability is defined by Siegle as the “mechanisms by which public authorities are obliged to be responsive to the preferences of the general public, maintain the transparency and fairness of public institutions, operate within established constraints and face sanctions for abuses of power.”

A lack of accountability over political leaders often undercuts the provision of needed goods and services, in turn contributing to chronic poverty and weak governing capacity. Growth rates, Siegle finds, are much higher in countries with high levels of government accountability, and even more so if these governments are entirely democratic.

Echoing the idea that equitable income distribution and poverty reduction cannot be attained without democratization, Bert Koenders stresses that democracy and development practitioners need to combine efforts. Democracy is making headway but it is still often illiberal democracy, not yet accompanied by the rule of law, separation of powers, or basic liberties. Substantive democratization is necessary to distribute or redistribute the benefits of growth and reduce poverty. Effective poverty reduction, for Koenders, is equivalent to changing the nature and quality of governance, but he concedes that most countries have yet to see large socioeconomic benefits from the wave of democratization in the 1990s. He asserts the international community thus needs a democracy test for development agendas to ensure that there is accountability by national governments not just to donors, but also to its citizens. Similarly, when donors are working in fragile states, he asserts that they should avoid creating parallel responsibilities and systems of accountability to the national governmental and thus prevent the state from losing legitimacy.

GOVERNANCE AID EFFECTIVENESS IN A LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Measuring the impact and the effectiveness of aid is by no means easy. The fluid and often non-linear paths of democratic transitions make it difficult to measure the real impact of aid in helping promote good governance. Siegle analyzes the impact aid has had in Africa in promoting democratic transitions. He finds that most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa suffered one episode of democratic backsliding, but continued to make incremental progress. Importantly, Siegle notes that poorer countries are at greater risk of democratic backsliding. Siegle finds that 90% of worldwide democratic backsliding occurs in countries with per capita incomes of $2,700 or less. The African country with the highest income to show this backsliding is the Republic of the Congo, which had a per capita income of $940 in 1997 before its civil war.

Siegle notes that steady economic growth in democracies translates into improved living conditions for citizens. Alternately, autocratic wealth accumulation does not improve human development. In autocratic societies, resources are centralized and not invested in improving the conditions of citizens.

Siegle thus finds that economic expansion and donor support of that expansion are important to sustaining democracy. He notes that development aid encourages democratic leaders during transition to maintain a democratic trajectory since it enhances the belief that democracy
increases personal and collective prosperity. Siegle discusses strategies to link economic and political development—through performance-based aid like the MCC compacts in democratizing countries—but highlights that donors must also respond to autocracies by curtailing aid if there is no progress in democratization and by providing timely and meaningful support during democratic openings. Aid can thus affect democratization directly by promoting democracy and indirectly through economic assistance and policy reforms that foster economic dynamism.

Carol Lancaster approaches aid effectiveness through an institutional lens, tackling the incentives that donors have to give aid. Specifically, she finds that in the 21st Century, development aid has domestic constituencies within the donor country. The donor’s domestic constituency is the broader public in a developed country that accepts the appropriateness of development aid—and its government’s role in providing it. This interest within the donor country in supporting and monitoring aid helps counter a large challenge that countries with low human development face in that they often lack the capacity to measure aid effectiveness, and thus there is often limited evidence of the short-term impacts of a donor’s aid. Even without this hard evidence, however, if aid appears to be well-spent and well-managed in the recipient country, the donor’s domestic constituency may be more likely to continue supporting provision of aid to that country. If, on the other hand, aid appears to be wasted or be fueling corruption in the recipient country, public support for aid in the donor country would erode. In Lancaster’s view then, good governance is thus both a driver and a result of increased aid.

Looking specifically at Africa, Lancaster focuses on the challenges of delivering aid in poor countries versus wealthier countries. She concludes that government policies in recipient countries can impede development by allocating resources wastefully, discouraging private investment, or using public institutions for patronage. Aid can thus be effective in easing the low-capacity constraints in such counties by building institutions and providing technical assistance. Lancaster likewise acknowledges the difficulty in measuring the qualitative nature of governance capacity.

Analyzing aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Steven Finkel and colleagues find that, on average, between 1990 and 2004, USAID’s investment in democracy promotion produced significant increases in national levels of democracy worldwide. They find that the marginal effect of one million dollars invested in democracy assistance is greater in countries that are in greater need of external assistance, particularly those with low levels of human development. They also found, however, that after a certain level of development, the effect of this assistance is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This has strong implications for countries with low levels of human development like Benin and Guinea, as democracy aid—dollar for dollar—could have a much larger impact in these countries during the time period when they are at low levels of human development.
Countries with low HDI provide both challenges and opportunities for effective governance aid to promote the democratization process. Foremost, in countries with low HDI there is lower capacity in the public sector to effectively implement aid programs. Urbanization and the internal migration of the poorest in countries with low HDI dilute the political strength of political constituencies since many of the poor migrate from homogenous rural strongholds to heterogeneous urban environments. The colonial heritage of countries with low HDI is particularly relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa. Colonial-era centralization created a tradition of patronage that reduced transparency and created a barrier to reforming the public sector.

Despite these challenges, as Finkel et al. note, money invested in democracy assistance in countries with low HDI can have a greater effect on democratic development in those countries than it does in countries with higher levels of human development. Investment in countries with low HDI should thus be more impactful both because aid can play a key role in improving the capacity gap and because democracy helps accelerate economic development when the poor expect more accountability from their leaders. Improving economic wellbeing in countries with low HDI also creates an opportunity to help new democracies survive. Once a country has had a democratic opening, economic development helps consolidate the democratic transition. Holistic aid programs that focus on democratic and economic development may thus have a greater impact on countries with low HDI because of the interplay between democratic survival and economic development that is particularly impactful in this setting.

BENIN’S DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORY

A CRISIS IN THE REGIME BRINGS CHANGE

In the twelve years after independence in 1960, Benin had eleven presidents, six constitutions, and five successful coups. Power was concentrated among three political leaders representing the three main political regions in the country. Shifting alliances between the political elite and the military marked the post-independence years. In 1972, with measured support from merchants and the political elite, Mathieu Kérékou took control of Benin and established a Marxist-Stalinist regime. Benin remained tightly under Kérékou’s control until 1988 when mass strikes and protests began a democratic opening that resulted in an exemplary National Conference and the beginning of multiparty democracy in Benin.671

This democratic opening in 1988 emerged after the private press stoked outrage and unrest in major cities across Benin about teacher and student demonstrations that were violently disbanded by the police. Later, civil servants demonstrated against a proposal to forgo three months’ pay to provide relief to public finances. In July of the following year, 13 of the 16 ministries were on strike and parliamentary elections resulted in the election of three reformist opposition members to the National Assembly. In August, Kérékou responded to increasing discontent by reforming
the government to include opposition member Robert Dosssou, and he signed an amnesty law releasing 100 communist party members from prison. In November, major demonstrations were held across the country, asserting that the president had failed to meet commitments to further democratize the country. The party politburo responded to the discontent on December 7, 1989 by abandoning the Marxist-Stalinist regime and the single-party system.

Starting in 1989, the new order was characterized by a clear separation of party and state, limits to presidential power, political decentralization, and modest political and civil rights guarantees like the right to protest and increased representation in governing bodies. The purpose of the decentralization was to devolve state bureaucracy to regional governments. In addition to strengthening regional governments, the reforms strengthened the national legislative body to serve as a check to presidential power and began liberalizing the country’s economy.

CIVIL SOCIETY STEPS UP TO THE PLATE AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE

The National Conference to draft a new constitution and set up the new democratic order, held in February of 1990, included 439 participants and resulted in a model for peaceful regime change and political pluralism that was later replicated in other African countries. The National Conference had broad participation from different stakeholders, thus alleviating the political crisis by allowing people to air grievances. The process was rife with disagreements and threats from the military, but in the end succeeded in the creation of a new democratic system, created checks to presidential power, and paved the way for a peaceful transition from autocracy to democracy.

The urban middle class, mostly civil servants, was of rural origin, which made the democratization movement a national movement that touched rural areas as well, rather than being a purely urban expression of discontent. The mobilization years from 1988 to 1990 thus represented a conflict within Benin’s political class. New power-seeking elites sustained the movement, while the old elites who were already integrated into the political clientelist networks protested against the effects of the economic crisis on their standard of living. The result was that the new elites’ demands were far reaching and broadly focused on social change, while the old elites had limited and largely self-serving goals that could be more easily co-opted by the broader population and serve as a rallying cry for greater representation.

A high level of existing capacity among Benin’s politicized groups allowed these groups to adequately prepare for the National Conference and ensure positive outcomes. Voluntary associations in Benin had for decades exerted political influence on the government, though under strict constraints from the government not to disrupt the political order. After 1989, however, these associations began adopting political agendas in advance of the National Conference. These associations, then—formed long before the National Conference—were a key aspect in the creation of political parties in Benin. The alliances made between civil service unions, students, and other organizations in these early days reflect the sophistication of Benin’s nascent political system at the time. The alliances were based on the shared experiences from the
early protests in 1988. The groups then sustained partnerships through their respective unions and evolved into distinct political parties with members from all groups. Further, the Beninese diaspora, familiar with bargaining in an organizational context because of their experience participating in political parties in Europe, were able to transfer expertise and experience to the national conference.

Initially in 1989, Kérékou expressed intent to stay in power. But as debates at the National Conference through 1990 gained momentum, it became clear that the opposition would not tolerate a continued Kérékou regime that it saw as undemocratic. Kérékou showed strong resistance to stepping down and threatened military action to regain control of power. However, the threat of a civil war like the one in neighboring Togo, and pressure from influential statesmen like Archbishop de Souza, moved Kérékou to relent. Kérékou stepped down, declared elections, and supported the National Conference, laying the foundation for a multi-party democracy to be born in Benin. The National Conference pardoned Kérékou in an effort to ensure stability and reconciliation.676 Today, its large number of parties, having a consistently high number of effective parties as well as a minority majority, where the largest party only has around a third of the seats in parliament, characterizes Benin’s political system.677

External factors also played a role in Benin’s democratic transition. While many observers saw the transition in Benin as an extension of the wave of democratization in Eastern Europe,678 this does not capture the whole picture. The criticism and nature of the debate in Benin did not focus only on broader claims for democracy as much as it did on internal grievances. Internally, at the time of democratic transition, Benin was suffering from a crisis stemming from the Marxist-Leninist economic model in place. The economic system was based on a policy of co-opting new elites and opposition groups into the state apparatus. For example, the public service sector expanded from 2,000 employees in 1960, to 12,000 by 1980, and then 49,000 by 1990.679 Benin’s export-oriented economy, geared toward Nigeria, enabled this kind of public spending on state-run enterprises that generated income for the national government. Benin also benefited from cheap oil from Nigeria in the 1970s and remittances from workers. The economy began its decline in 1984 when the Nigerian currency was devalued and guest workers were expelled from Nigeria due to worsening employment and protectionist policies in Nigeria, necessitating an increasing dependence on aid to support the state budget. By 1988, foreign aid represented 75% of the central government’s revenue and 90% of the revenue was spent on personnel expenses for the civil service. The growing crisis culminated in bankruptcy in 1989, and state officials were not paid.

In 1989, Benin thus agreed to a negotiated Structural Adjustment Program under pressure from international aid donors to liberalize its economy. The focus of the program was primarily on economic good governance to reduce inflation and the deficit by privatizing and shrinking the public sector. Democracy did not feature on the agenda of the multilateral donors in the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Program in 1989. These external pressures, then, were not expressly focused on democratic development. And yet, they did wield influence in the democratization process. This influence was felt in the role economic liberalization had on the economy and the
creation of a middle class that was engaged politically. The impetus for the 1989 reforms that eventually led to the democratization of Benin should be seen not as offshoots of international democratization movements elsewhere dismantling the Soviet Union, but as an attempt to address domestic economic and political legitimacy crises.

As the country moved toward the National Conference, the pre-existing structure of the military proved key to the path that the National Conference would eventually take. During his tenure, Kérékou did not favor any particular ethnic group within military ranks, and he embedded a professionalism and impartiality into the military bureaucracy. The unbiased nature of the military allowed for the National Conference to proceed without military intervention and then for the military to subsequently accept civilian rule since its fortunes were not tied to one particular regime or regime type.

The military’s separation from politics under Kérékou also led to the professionalization and growth of the civil service in Benin under Kérékou. The sheer number of people serving in the civil service at the time of democratic transition meant that the National Conference itself in 1990 included many members of the civil service who understood the pressures and requirements for public service and could account for this in planning for the new constitutional order. The strength of the civil service and their influence at the time of the National Conference greatly improved the chances for success in democratizing the country.

The Catholic Church and the Communist Party also played strong roles in the democratization process. The trust placed in the church by the majority of Beninese allowed the church to moderate debates that took place as part of the National Conference. The participation of the Communist Party, as the only opposition party at the time, also carried some weight and helped to legitimize the democratization process. The message of the Communist Party did not appeal to the people of Benin, however, and the party lost relevance soon after the National Conference. The Communist Party, then, was one actor that was key to democratic transition but not to eventual democratic consolidation in Benin.

As the country moved on after the National Conference, the importance of strong political leadership in solidifying the democratic transition cannot be understated. Kérékou—the president at the time of the transition—and Nicéphore Soglo—the prime minister at the time of transition and Kérékou’s main political rival—each showed leadership and deference to democratic institutions during this time of political fragility. Neither Soglo nor Kérékou controlled the process of democratization or the constitutional commission that drew up rules of the new regime. Upon winning the presidency in 1991, Soglo willingly accepted the Constitutional Court’s 1991 ruling allowing Kérékou to form an opposition party. Kérékou, despite having led an authoritarian regime and having strong connections to the military, never attempted to use military force to retain or return to the presidency. After losing to Soglo in 1991, Kérékou returned to a private life until coming back to win the presidency through democratic means in 1996. For his part, Soglo did not undermine the 1995 Assembly elections that reduced his majority, nor did he attempt to exclude Kérékou’s party from power during his tenure.
Similarly, the leadership of the Constitutional Court during various crises was critical.\textsuperscript{682} The Constitutional Court played a key role in providing objective rulings that strictly abided by the law and helped to maintain a degree of stability. Presidential respect for Constitutional Court decisions lent legitimacy to the body and bolstered the delicate democratization process. The President’s acceptance of the new democratic processes and the impartiality of the Constitutional Court prevented political crises that could have invited military intervention.\textsuperscript{683}

**ETHNIC AND SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION BRINGS STABILITY AND STALEMATE**

Benin has over 100 political parties but only a handful dominate close to 80 percent of the vote. The parties that are not heavily represented in parliament have not been successful in winning large numbers of seats in elections, but their leaders have garnered positions in government. The elections of 2006 and 2007 demonstrated this intense fractionalization. In both elections, the major political parties in Benin were forced to create coalitions with the smaller parties centered much more closely around regional and ethnic alliances. Benin is divided into four political regions and geographic differences are reinforced by the decentralization of the state. The micro-regionalism of Beninese politics prevents the creation of viable opposition outside of major parties and divides the country along regional and generational lines.\textsuperscript{684}

Presidential and legislative elections reveal that ethno-regional divisions heavily influence voting behavior. This phenomenon is made apparent by the ethno-regional fractionalization of the party system, with many parties representing specific ethnicities or regions. The expectation that parties should work to benefit their small constituencies and distribute public goods along these ethnic or regional lines forces representatives in national governing bodies to form complex coalitions to ensure this distribution of centralized public goods to their constituencies. The fractionalization of the political system in Benin prevents both strong autocratic rule and the formation of national governments by a single race or region.\textsuperscript{685}

Benin’s economy also indirectly strengthens the multi-party system through the decentralization process. Benin’s economy, based mostly on trade of commodities, and not smallholder agriculture, has driven the formalization of private land holdings in rural areas. The politicization of land registration influences national elections because the National Assembly determines the process and appoints officials. Thus, national-level politicians are incentivized to use their influence to advance the interests of their home region rather than work towards overarching national political goals.\textsuperscript{686}

Similarly, the ethnic divisions in Benin have forced national leaders to pay patronage to their home districts rather than working towards pushing a national agenda. Democratic consolidation in Benin is a result of blurring of the boundaries between institutional and ethnic fragmentation. Providing minorities and geographic regions representation increases the fractionalization of the system but increases stability through buy-in.\textsuperscript{687}
After its democratic transition, Benin received debt forgiveness from many donors and began receiving development assistance from USAID in 1991. A second installment of Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) funds was granted in 1998 even before the first phase was completed. The reliance on additional aid that flowed in as a result of the democratization process, coupled with the fractionalization of the political system, has resulted in some distortions to the political system in Benin because certain regions and parties have benefited more than others due to their role in government.

At many points, the price for democratic stability within Benin’s highly fractionalized political system has been political paralysis. The stalemate caused by the intense fractionalization has prevented any one group from getting too powerful—a trend that strengthens the president at the expense of parliament and builds a system where legitimacy in the eyes of citizens is based on patronage flows. The divisions in parliament have allowed it to be easily bypassed, and parliament has had relatively low technical capacity to challenge the administration given the shortage of professional staff and limited experience of most members of the legislature. The national political system thus still strongly favors the executive in a highly fractionalized political system that allows many parties to be represented but little opportunity for a single party to drive change.

Many reforms in the country since democratization began have thus occurred as a result of external influences that earmark release of funds for specific reforms. External demands have thus largely driven democratic consolidation, with reforms that are not contingent on aid funding being enacted more slowly. The civil society and media sectors likewise continue to rely heavily on donor and private funds to operate and thus have been criticized as focusing on priorities of funders over those of local stakeholders.

Today, though, there is a new political paradigm in Benin, and democratization in Benin represents a transformation underway for the country and its citizens. Despite the challenges to democracy in Benin, the people of Benin have internalized the democratic process by participating in elections, running for office, and making demands of their representatives. Most actors in the political system—including small party leaders, the executive, and local government officials—have expressed support for democracy despite tensions resulting from the state-building process.

Benin’s democratic trajectory is thus an incremental but consistent one towards democratic consolidation. In the twenty years examined in this study, Benin underwent a peaceful transition to democratic governance that has progressively consolidated. In doing so, Benin overcame many of the challenges of a low HDI context to become more democratic and to improve representation and economic opportunity for its citizens. Benin’s context thus provides this study with a case to explore how aid may have contributed to this steady progress.
GUINEA’S DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORY

ISOLATED AND ARMED, THE MILITARY STRENGTHENS

In 1958, the Guinean people firmly rejected participation in the French union of francophone countries. Guinea was the only former French colony to opt out of the French union and was consequently marginalized by the other francophone countries. The hasty departure of the French army and the lack of local capacity in state management left Guinea with a fairly weak state with only a few republican guards for a military. It was in this context that Ahmed Sékou Touré became President of Guinea in 1958 after declaring the Parti Democratique du Guinea (PDG) the only legal party. Touré, as president of a single-party system, maintained firm control over the military and the politics of Guinea. Kwame Nkrumah’s removal from power in neighboring Ghana in 1966 and the coup that overthrew Modibo Keita in Mali in 1968 provided powerful lessons for other West African leaders like Touré. Starting in 1968, Touré created a National Militia tasked with overseeing the armed forces, consolidating his control over the military, and maintaining his authority.

Guinea’s democratic trajectory has been affected by its colonial history and role in the Cold War. The effects of colonialism linger in the strong centralization of the Guinean state. The French legacy left a highly centralized state system in West Africa with little room for pluralism or local autonomy. The strong state tradition did maintain state integrity, which was not the case for many neighboring countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Guinea was thus able to maintain a degree of stability that was not common for other countries in the region. The particular trajectory Guinea took out of French colonialism also left a legacy in Guinea. Strong currents of anti-colonialism in the capital city of Conakry were responsible for the rejection of the French union in 1958. Guinea’s unique position on the unification proposition was the result of an intense internal political struggle, which was won by the left just before the unification decision. Guinea’s subsequent alienation from its West African neighbors led it to rely more on Soviet support than traditional West African alliances and trade routes.

In 1984, after years of speculation about his deteriorating health and age, Touré died and Lansana Conté seized power in a bloodless coup. Conté retained his military status and formed a government with both civilian and military members. Prefects and subprefects during the Conté period could be active or former military, building the reach and capacity of the military but weakening the capacity of civilian stakeholders. Also during the Conté period, the military was expanded and strengthened after an attempted coup in 1985 by Diarra Traore, Conté’s former prime minister. In 1990, Conté introduced a constitution that would allow for a civilian government, and in 1993 won the multiparty election and was reconfirmed as president. However, Conté retained the blended military-civilian government structure he had created even after the transition to a multiparty civilian system in 1993.
Throughout Conté’s time in power, the military leadership remained firmly behind him even in times of bloody mutiny and coup attempts conceived from lower ranks in the army. The army had a clear interest in protecting the regime because the military and the government became indistinguishable, and the status quo thus served the dual interests of the military and the government.

The military in Guinea grew from 9,700 in 1990 to 45,000 in 2010. Expansion of the military can be explained, in part, by the tenuous security situation and vulnerability of Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. The large unpatrolled forests and vast ungoverned regions of the country created public support for the presence of a strong military. The military presence in certain areas of Guinea was then and is still today viewed with a mix of support and suspicion because it effectively protects the country from incursions by rebels from neighboring countries, but also demands patronage and exerts largely unchecked force. Under Conté, the military became a business empire for government allies. The president’s inner circle was comprised by various political and economic interests that had a continued stake in the strength of the military. The military during the Conté period was well paid, supported, and respected by the regime.

The strength of the military produced relative stability and prevented civil wars. There was also no ‘domino effect’ of successive coups following Conté’s successful 1984 coup. Over the course of the Conté administration from 1993 to 2008, however, public support for the PDG declined significantly, and its political authority shrunk at regional and prefectural levels even though the president and the military remained powerful.

In December 2008, Conté died after years of illness. The military, led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, promptly seized power, deposing the civilian prime minister and disrupting the constitutional order of succession. Captain Camara, a junior officer, refused to accept the constitutional succession plan, and high-ranking military officials did not show any meaningful resistance. The lack of resistance from high-ranking military officials indicates that the corporate interests of the military trumped the effects of any possible fractures within the military such as ethnic rivalry, personality, and age.

The tendency to militarize public administration increased significantly after the 2008 coup. By 2010, the territorial administration outside Conakry was led entirely by the military or former military. Military and ex-military elements controlled transportation and extracted resources. Despite signs of ethnic fractures within the military, ethnic rivalry has not been the only reason for mutiny and attempted coups. Testimony to the cohesiveness of the military is that it has never taken power from itself. The 2008 military takeover can be interpreted not as a sign of instability but rather as an instrumental approach to succession. The lack of clear succession rules at that point allowed the military to see itself as being forced to maintain stability.

Initially, President Camara promised to organize elections without any members of the military, but it became evident that he would in fact be running. As a response to Camara’s announcement that he was running for president, the opposition held a large rally in Guinea’s largest football
stadium in Conakry in 2009 that was violently suppressed by the military and resulted in 157 deaths and 1,700 injuries. The army used automatic weapons—and knives when they ran out of bullets—and there was widespread sexual violence against women, making it one of the country’s most violent civilian-military clashes. After strong domestic and international pressure, Camara remained in Burkina Faso following treatment from an assassination attempt—a departure that paved the way for a democratic civilian election.

In 2010, Alpha Condé was elected President, ending military rule in Guinea. Instability and clashes, as well as assassination attempts, followed the announcement of election results. The opposition claimed that there was election rigging and widespread corruption. In September 2013, parliamentary elections gave Condé’s party, Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (RPG), a plurality of votes in the National Assembly despite multiple claims of election irregularities and fraud. Condé reacted by suppressing opposition.696

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOLATILITY AND LACK OF REGIONAL CAPACITY PREVENT DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The military’s strength is perhaps the most fundamental feature of Guinea’s history. The Touré regime from 1958 to 1984 limited governance institutions; Conté’s military-civilian regime in place through 2008 depended on a hierarchical prefectural administration to control the country; and Camara’s regime from 2008 to 2010 further militarized the public administration. For the five decades under these three governments, the political regime and military had deep but moderated ethnic divisions and extremely weak regional institutions and processes. Many of these legacies persist today.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The long history of brutality and impunity of the military in suppressing opposition and rebellions goes generally unchecked by the judiciary because it is overly politicized and loyal to the president. The judiciary was unable to remain independent even after a return to civilian control of the state in 2010, as can be seen in the lack of any official investigation into the violence that was inflicted by the military in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside of the capital, Guinea was controlled by territorial bureaucrats and traditional leaders. The prefects, leaders of administrative regions, have been partisan in Guinea because they have been appointed by the president and depend on presidential patronage. In many cases, they lack the professional capacity or experience to carry out their missions. This has led to a gap between the ideas and the reality of the decentralized system in Guinea. Leaders of administrative regions may claim to attempt rural development programs, but they often fall short or fail to implement coherent policy.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders and chiefs have long had indirect influence in both urban and rural areas, playing a major role in land allocation, conflict resolution, and community-level decision making due to a lack of state presence to uphold laws in these areas. Guinean people regularly defer to these traditional sources of power. Under colonialism, traditional leaders gained from the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
centralization of the regime because it ensured their continued control over local patronage—a role that continued even after decentralization since the national government retained tight control over the decentralized regional infrastructure.698

The reforming elite in Guinea has fostered a belief among the broader public that governance reforms and good governance more generally can succeed in Guinea. The reforming group was placed in government in the 2010 election and received support from the diaspora as well as international NGOs in the country. There has been a sense of national identity in Guinea since independence that is strengthened by the modest electoral and civil society reforms aimed at increasing representation through civil societies and more transparent elections. Opposition parties and reformers see decentralization as a way of increasing political participation and competition. Civil unrest has grown and increased in influence since the 2008 coup because strengthened civil societies are asserting themselves and expressing dissent after years of repression. The reforming elite continues to understand the benefit of aid and receives support from the donor community to implement reforms but wrestles with containing the military.699

The international donor community does intervene in a limited way in Guinea. Political instability was a challenge for effective donor intervention to support democratic, decentralized, and devolved institutions in Guinea. From 2005 until the coup in 2008, Conté attempted to reform the political system, but observers note this was inhibited by a lack of harmonization among development partner activities, with overlapping and sometimes contradictory actions among donors, NGOs, and the government. The 2008 coup made the role of international actors even more tenuous as the state became more unstable. With the 2010 election, however, there are inroads now with the civilian government to work to improve governance in Guinea.700

Guinea’s greatest challenge in democratization has been overcoming a capacity gap in its civil service. This capacity deficit has been reinforced by the consolidation of power in the military and the continued presence of autocratic leaders in Guinea throughout the study period. Guinea thus provides this study with a case to explore whether or not aid has been able to overcome the strong structural barriers to effectiveness in a context of low human development and low capacity.

DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORIES COMPARED

COMMON TRENDS

Strong and stable autocracies leading up to democratic transition. Both Guinea and Benin had strong autocracies with relatively low political violence and steady economic growth in the years preceding democratic transition. The democratic openings in both countries were primarily a result of internal pressures and opposition to their autocratic leaders.

Post-independence “rentier states.” The post-independence Cold War context of both countries resulted in authoritarian regimes with strong Marxist-Leninist tendencies that relied on the
creation of patronage lines to maintain power. In the case of Benin, this was the creation of a large civil service, and in Guinea, a large bureaucratic military.

*French colonial history of centralization followed by decentralization.* Guinea and Benin were colonies on the fringes of the French colonial system, as neither served as administrative centers for the colonial power, and the government systems in both countries were heavily centralized. Post-democratization, both countries confronted the centralized tradition through decentralization policies, which influenced the focus of democratization and the resulting political system.

*Professional and well-trained militaries.* Guinea invested heavily in the creation of a strong, centralized military capable of maintaining presidential power and regional control. Benin’s military was similarly professional and well trained, yet it was not involved in the political system and thus respected the democratic transition and democratic process.

**MAJOR DIFFERENCES**

*Civil service.* Since independence, Benin has had a large and high-capacity civil service. In Guinea, however, the use of the military to administer the bureaucracy has built military strength at the expense of the civil service capacity, leaving the country with very low civilian capacity capable of governing. This is perhaps the most salient difference that has influenced the stability of both countries.

*Civil society.* Benin had a more advanced foundation for the development of strong political parties and civil society due to its experience with volunteer associations prior to its democratic opening.

*Independence trajectory.* Benin was part of the French post-colonial union that allowed it to integrate closely with its neighbors and engage in a regional context. Guinea’s rejection of French influence isolated the country and made it vulnerable to international aggression. This vulnerability led to further isolation and consolidation of military control as perceived threats increased.

*Economic pressures.* Benin’s strategic geographic placement strengthens its trade-based economy. Benin has enjoyed strong economic growth since democratic transition, which has helped consolidate progress after its democratic opening. Guinea’s precarious economy has weakened its democratic legitimacy by creating widespread dissatisfaction with government policies.

*Politicization of the military.* Guinea, unlike Benin, had an extremely politicized military with a strong role in politics. In Benin, the military played a more neutral role and did not intervene in politics after the beginning of the democratization process.
Fractionalization. The intense fractionalization of Benin’s political system is a feature of societal divisions in the country as well as a history of patronage to rural areas that created multiple constituencies and political parties based on ethnic differences. Guinea has a similar level of ethnic fractionalization, but this has not translated into ethnically based political divisions. Guinea has a much more unified national identity due to its proudful rejection of French influence post-independence.

ASSESSING AID INTERVENTIONS

This case comparison studies democracy aid programs implemented by the United States, African Development Bank, United Nations Development Program, World Bank, Denmark, France, and the European Union in Guinea and Benin from 1990 to 2010.

In this section, democracy aid programs are categorized into those focused on spurring democratic change through formal government institutions or through informal processes and norms. The programs reforming formal government institutions are further divided into two subcategories: (1) Formal institutional reforms focused on representation are those that create institutional mechanisms for public participation and representation in government, thus addressing institutional barriers to full participation. The goal of these aid programs is to address unequal or low levels of representation in national or subnational government structures. (2) Formal institutional reforms focused on checks and balances aim to rein in institutions that are too strong by bolstering other branches of government or transparency in governance.

The programs focused on informal processes seek to develop democratic norms within society and mobilize domestic pressures for democratic reform. They include measures working with civil society and grassroots mobilizers to promote democracy from the bottom up, seeking to increase pressure coming from citizens advocating democratic reform. These reforms focused on democratic norm development work towards creating strong grassroots democratic traditions and increasing public participation.

In this study, each democracy aid program conducted in Benin and Guinea between 1990 to 2010 is placed into one of these three categories: formal institutional reforms focused on representation, formal institutional reforms focused on checks and balances, or reforms to informal democratic processes and norms. It should be noted that decentralization is a process that can potentially fit in all three of these categories—as it may be used to increase the representativeness of formal institutions, build vertical checks and balances across formal institutions, and develop informal democratic norms of greater participation—so aid programs involving decentralization are categorized according to which of these three objectives is the stated motivating force behind the decentralization program.
Much governance aid focused on reforming government institutions in Guinea and Benin is broadly related to improving formal institutional mechanisms for public participation and representation in government. Such aid includes programs seeking to improve elections, create public participation mechanisms within government institutions, or decentralize decision-making as a means of increasing the representativeness and responsiveness of government (see Figure 8). The purpose of these programs is fundamentally to reform government institutions to make them more representative, but more importantly to make them the driving force of change within the democratic development process. As such, the first hypothesis this study tests is stated thus:

Hypothesis 1: Democracy aid programs that increase the representativeness of formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

If this hypothesis is true, then democracy aid programs targeting government institutional changes such as decentralization, democratic elections, and/or public participation mechanisms will lead to increased democratic development in the country. In our analysis of aid programs in Benin and Guinea, we test this hypothesis by first outlining the aid programs from major donors focused on increasing the representativeness of government institutions in Benin and Guinea, and then assessing whether these programs were successful in driving democratic change. We will conclude this hypothesis is correct if, after implementation of the democracy and governance aid program:

- The government adopted and/or allowed the program’s intended reforms, e.g. decentralized institutions were established (criterion 1).
- These reforms increased the designated type of formal representation, e.g. establishing community councils contributed to decentralized decision making in the country, adopting new election structures increased proportional representation in parliament, or holding constituent consultations increased public participation in the work of government institutions (criterion 2).
- The designated type of formal representation contributed to democratization in the country—measured by quantitative indicators of democratic development, as well as by qualitative assessments of whether these reforms contributed to key historical or contextual factors known to be influential in the country’s democratic development (criterion 3).

Furthermore, since Benin and Guinea had different democratic trajectories over the 20-year study period, we would expect to see a divergence in the type or effectiveness of institutional reforms promoted by aid programs in these countries if this hypothesis is true. Thus, we will reject this hypothesis if:

- After implementation of the democracy aid program:
The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but they did not contribute to the democratic reform of the institution (criterion 2), or Democratic reform of the institution was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).

- Little or no democracy aid focused on this type of institutional reform, and the country’s sectoral democracy score went up.
- Across the pair, similar countries adopted the same types of institutional reforms, and they had different democratic trajectories.

This study gathers evidence to assess these criteria from donor reports, project documents, existing scholarly research, and published quantitative measures—namely Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* to assess overall democracy levels and the World Governance Indicators’ *Voice and Accountability* and *Government Effectiveness* to assess sectoral democracy levels related to the representativeness and responsiveness of government institutions. This study also identifies any factors that inhibited the aid program’s ability to increase democratic development in the country through increasing the representativeness of formal government institutions.

To facilitate a more comprehensive analysis, the first and second criteria for effectiveness listed above—whether a democracy aid program was successfully implemented and whether those reforms increased the representativeness of formal institutions—are incorporated in the following sections detailing the aid programs implemented during the study period. The final criterion for effectiveness—whether the targeted type of institutional representation contributed to democratization in the country—is analyzed in the last part of this section.

*Figure 8. Democracy aid for institutional reforms focused on representation in Guinea and Benin, 1990-2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid Type</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Benin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public participation mechanisms</td>
<td>Creating National Public Participation Mechanisms:</td>
<td>Creating National Public Participation Mechanisms:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create a participatory election reform process</td>
<td>• Create a participatory legislative reform process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve participatory processes in national legislature</td>
<td>• Develop participatory processes in parliament to develop effective legislation and increase state capacity to deliver public services to reduce poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization as a means to increase representativeness</td>
<td>Developing Local Capacity:</td>
<td>Developing Local Capacity:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| & responsiveness of government institutions | • Build local government structures for participatory development planning  
1998-2006: USAID Rural and Urban Development Councils Program  
• Build local government capacity for development planning based on local needs  
• Improve community involvement in local councils  
• Improve responsiveness of national decision-making bodies to local interests  
2000-2007: UNDP Governmental Capacity Building Program  
• Build local government capacity to develop and implement regional strategic plans to meet public needs  
• Increase role of local officials in national policy planning and responsiveness of national executive  
• Improve public service delivery  
2009-2012: USAID Governing Justly and Democratically  
• Train local government officials, elected council members, and civil society on decentralization law, participatory budgeting, and anticorruption methods  
• Build local government capacity to develop budgets, raise revenue, and make national government aware of local needs  
• Build local governments’ capacity to develop and implement participatory local development plans  
• Fund and provide technical assistance for managing local micro-projects on citizen priorities  
• Involve NGOS in local development decision-making and implementation  
2004-2008: UNDP  
• Improve responsiveness of regional governments to regional issues  
• Improve transparency of regional governments  
• Strengthen cooperatives as conduits for dialogue between public and regional governments  
• Establish participatory development planning |
| --- | --- |
| Elections | **Stabilizing and Strengthening Election Institutions:**  
2005: UNDP  
• Coordinate preparations for 2005 local election  
2007: UNDP  
• Coordinate preparations for 2007 legislative election  
2009-2011: Department of State  
• Train electoral commission for complications expected in elections  
• Improve voter registration systems  
• Offer conferences for local reps and civil society leaders for dialogue on electoral issues  
2009-2012: USAID Governing Justly and Democratically  
• Unify political parties to lobby for repeal of the ban on political activity  
**Modernizing Election Institutions:**  
• Develop voter education and registration campaign [within broader NGO capacity-building program]  
2006: UNDP Improved Governance Program  
• Improve capacity of electoral commission  
• Create more transparent electoral process to encourage voter engagement and turnout  
• Reform election law to streamline processes  
2012: EU La Liste Electorale Permanente Informatisee  
• Implement electronic balloting system  
• Modernize electoral process |
Aid to Guinea focused on formal government institutions was closely tied to the political climate in the country—specifically the relative strength and stability of the executive leadership. Aid focused on increasing the representativeness of formal institutions during the study period is best framed by the tenures of Guinea’s two major leaders during this time period. The first period is defined as Conté’s presidency—who served from before the start of this study until his death and the ensuring coup in 2008—during which time aid focused primarily on decentralization as a means of increasing the representativeness and responsiveness of government. The second period is defined as the time after the 2008 coup, which brought Moussa Dadis Camara to power and saw aid focused on stabilizing and strengthening election systems and other processes for representing public views.

Decentralization: Developing Local Capacity

Conté’s early years focused on consolidating presidential power and strengthening the military as a way to guarantee stability for his regime at the expense of local civilian capacity, which was very low in Guinea at the beginning of the study period. Aid programs focused on increasing the representativeness of formal government institutions during these years thus aimed to strengthen institutions outside the centralized national executive. At the local level, from 1997 to 2001, UNDP implemented its Local Development Program in Central and Upper Guinea. The program promoted the development of sustainable and participatory local structures to enhance public participation in economic and social development. The program simultaneously helped local groups mobilize local resources, manage finances, and receive training in participatory planning so they could participate effectively in local development planning. UNDP found that the project led to an improvement in the delivery of services and infrastructure because civic groups became better advocates for their own needs.

From 2000 to 2007, the UNDP’s Governmental Capacity Building program worked directly with regional institutions to help promote the preparation of regional strategy documents tailored to meet the distinct needs of each region. These regional strategy documents were then shared at the national level with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization established in the 1990 constitution. The strategy documents aimed to consolidate the process of decentralization and increase local institutional capacity to implement the regional strategic plans. Overall, the stated goals of the decentralization portion of UNDP’s portfolio were to improve the management of local government, improve the public service delivery at a local level, strengthen the role of local officials in national policy planning, increase the participatory nature of the national legislature, and improve the electoral process. By these measures, the UNDP program was successful in achieving its stated program objectives, as it increased the capacity of government workers by thirty-five percent and increased the amount of trained judges in local governments by sixty percent.
USAID worked concurrently on the decentralization process under Conté’s rule. From 1998 to 2006, USAID focused on strengthening the Rural and Urban Development Councils to improve the operations of these local councils. The aid programs sought to improve the efficiency and transparency of council operations and improve community involvement in the councils. The overarching goal of all of USAID’s governance aid during this time was to increase the representation of, and influence of, local rural and urban interests in national decision-making bodies. Specifically, the objectives of the Rural and Urban Development Councils project were to increase the number of civil society organizations using acquired skills to advocate at the central government level, specifically through the National Assembly, to raise the profile of other interests. The project’s targeted results were: effective citizen participation in local governance, a more responsive political process, and increased articulation of citizen interests by target civil society organizations. Aid was given directly to the councils as a way of creating channels within government institutions to increase public participation in government.\(^707\) In this regard, the program was able to measure progress on a subnational level by measuring the number of concrete actions taken by community-based organizations as a result of the council decision-making process. Despite the challenging environment, USAID reported that ninety-two percent of the community based organizations in USAID’s target areas showed improved governance practices, which included regular meetings, bylaws, and mission statements. Local development councils were also reported to have been operating more efficiently due to USAID support.\(^708\)

The main axes of these programs continued under the new President Camara after 2008, though with a renewed focus on the electoral process, which was a primary concern for donors after the unlawful coup following Conté’s death.

---

**Decentralization, Representative Processes, and Elections: Stabilizing and Strengthening Nascent Democratic Institutions**

In this second phase of democracy aid in the years following the 2008 coup, there was substantial instability in democratic institutions, providing the backdrop for implementation of USAID’s program on Governing Justly and Democratically from 2009 to 2012. Camara’s coup resulted from a lack of institutions to manage the succession, forcing the army to take power.\(^709\) Emphasis by donors was thus placed on building formal institutional capacity. This program continued to train thousands of local government officials, elected council members, and members of civil society groups on decentralization law, participatory budgeting, and anticorruption methods. The project helped 83 local governments raise their own revenue and 55 local governments publish budgets and accounts in a concerted effort to become more transparent. The focus of USAID’s work during this timeframe was to continue increasing the capacity and transparency of local government offices and to ensure that the central government was aware of Guinea’s regional needs.\(^710\)
In addition, USAID also sought to unify political parties to lobby for the repeal of the ban on political activity put in place by President Camara after the coup 2008—a ban that had seriously hampered the engagement of citizens and political actors in the political process.711

Prior to the 2008 coup, election aid had been limited to the UNDP’s coordinating role in preparing for the 2005 local elections and 2007 legislative elections. UNDP did report success from these limited election programs, however, reporting that after the 2005 local election program fifty-five percent of the people in Guinea were aware of the democratic process and seventy-five percent of the population participated in local elections.712

UNDP’s portfolio from 1997 to 2001 in Guinea was primarily focused on corruption reduction, but also had a key goal of improving the coordination of civil society groups with each other and the government. Through broad donor coordination, UNDP promoted public participation in determining the agenda for election reforms during that time period. The project built the capacity of key actors to participate in the electoral reform process.

The growing instability in Guinea after the 2008 coup drew substantial election support from the Department of State (DoS). DoS aid from 2009 to 2011 supported preparations for free elections in 2009 and encouraged restoration of civilian rule. The focus was primarily on training and preparing the electoral commission for the complications expected to arise in the elections. Specifically, DoS trained electoral commission workers on properly preparing for national elections and improving voter registration systems. In an attempt to reduce the likelihood of instability, DoS facilitated conferences for locally elected government representatives and civil society leaders to provide a mechanism for constructive dialogue on key electoral issues. The U.S. government, in general, was a strong advocate for the creation of better public institutions to improve citizen services.713 The conferences and the electoral support led up to democratic elections in Guinea despite the political violence in 2009 that resulted in a violent suppression of civilians in Conakry.

For both the UNDP and U.S. agencies in Guinea, support for formal institutions to increase representation was spurred first by the authoritarianism of the Conté regime and then by the instability of the subsequent Camara regime.

Outside of the election process, there was little focus on developing public participation mechanisms at the national level in Guinea. As part of its programming from 1997 to 2001, the UNDP worked to create a participatory election reform process that engaged public stakeholders in planning for national election reforms.714 As part of its programming from 2000 to 2007, UNDP had a limited focus on improving the participatory processes in the national legislature. There is little evidence available, however, regarding whether the targeted outcomes of this program were achieved. Beyond this, donors’ efforts to engage the public in formal government operations remained at the local level through the decentralization processes described above.
As a complete set of interventions directed at increasing the representativeness of formal institutions in Guinea, donor documentation shows that aid flows directed towards decentralization, representative processes, and fair elections effectively helped establish the institutional framework needed for government engagement with and responsiveness to citizens.

Institutional reforms focused on representation, implemented from 1997 through the end of the study period, achieved their targeted program outputs. Donors began aid for decentralization relatively early in the country’s democratic trajectory and maintained a consistent focus on this type of programming, accomplishing the programs’ stated objectives of training local officials and elected council members on the decentralization law, participatory budgeting, and financial management. Further, these decentralization programs not only achieved their targeted outputs but also their targeted outcomes, building local participatory structures for development planning, strengthening the operational capacity of local Rural and Urban Development Councils, and developing regional strategy documents to articulate local needs at the national level.

Donors’ aid for election programming in Guinea, though limited, also achieved its targeted outputs and outcomes. The planned election assistance was implemented and accepted by the government, with donors providing election coordination, training election personnel, and supporting repeal of a ban on political activity that hampered citizen and political party involvement in the election process. Further, these results had their intended effect on the election system, improving public awareness of and participation in the elections.

Donor aid seeking to build national public participation mechanisms within government, though very limited, likewise achieved its targeted outputs. The programs to develop a participatory election reform process and participatory processes within the national legislature were implemented as planned. There is little evidence available, however, regarding whether or not the targeted outcomes of this program were achieved.

There is evidence that in many cases the program outcomes that were achieved helped maintain stability during circumstances that may have otherwise been more tumultuous. Under both the USAID program and the UNDP program, there is an indication that the projects were working under a stable atmosphere. Despite the authoritarian and centralized nature of the Conté regime, Guinea was in a primarily stable state during this regime, and thus aid programs were able to focus on strengthening representation within local governments throughout the country. Importantly, given these programs’ focus on local rather than national institutions in Guinea, the gains made by these regional strengthening programs were sustained even after the 2008 coup when the focus of aid turned toward ensuring clean and fair elections.

Further, even with the death of President Conté in 2008 and the bloodless coup that ensued, there was regional stability across Guinea. This perhaps demonstrates the success of efforts to
strengthen local and regional institutions in the time period before the coup, as these local governments continued to operate in a stable way despite national political instability during and following the 2008 coup.

Following President Conté’s death in 2008, USAID was able to capitalize on this democratic opening to support the legislature in repealing the ban on political activity. This is indicative of the second opening for democratic progress created after Conté’s death in Guinea and of donor responsiveness to this opening. Though direct attribution is always difficult, the success of USAID’s program in achieving new mechanisms for citizen engagement in local government structures and repealing the ban on political activity in elections shows at least modest impact and progress towards increasing the representativeness of these targeted institutions in Guinea. Aid programs in general actively supported the shift towards having government institutions be more representative after Conté’s death and leading up to the elections.

Taken together, it is thus reasonable to conclude that aid flows to Guinea seeking to advance democracy by increasing the representativeness of formal institutions passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 1: 1) these reforms focused on decentralization, representative processes, and election support were implemented according to their intended plans and the government of Guinea adopted associated reforms, and 2) these reforms increased the representativeness of the targeted local government institutions and election processes in the country. Assessment of whether these aid programs passed the third criterion for Hypothesis 1 will be discussed at the end of this section.

**AID IN BENIN: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON REPRESENTATION**

Given Benin’s relative stability and early gains in democratic performance, governance aid to Benin focused on consolidating more advanced democratic structures. Aid intended to increase the representativeness of formal institutions in Benin took on an added importance given the intense fractionalization of Benin’s society, which has high ethnic diversity and has seen over one hundred political parties during the study period. Aid in this category focused early and primarily on elections, followed by aid to increase public participation in government institutions at the local and national level. Election aid to Benin moved quickly from providing basic electoral support to the more advanced modernization of the electoral process, which is indicative of the progress made early in Benin’s transition towards democratic consolidation. The linear progression of aid to Benin is indicative of the linear nature of the democratization process in Benin with few backtracks in democratic progress.

**Elections: Modernizing Democratic Institutions**

Modernizing elections in Benin was a top concern for several donors to ensure successful progress in democratic consolidation, both before and particularly after the controversy of the 2001 election, in which Soglo failed to win the presidency and charged Kérékou with fraud. From 1998 to 2003, USAID’s Indigenous NGO Strengthening program supported the electoral
process by coordinating with the government and local NGOs to develop a voter education campaign that increased the number of people who were registered to vote and educated them about the national and regional elections. This was part of a larger program focused on building the capacity of NGOs in Benin.\textsuperscript{716}

In 2006, UNDP worked to improve the capacity of the electoral commission under its Improved Governance program. UNDP provided operational support to provide high-level training to officials within the commission. The goal of the project was to create a more transparent electoral process that encouraged voter engagement to increase participation in elections. UNDP reported some delays in implementation caused mostly by administrative delays and the complexity of the electoral law. UNDP recommended a comprehensive review of the electoral law to make the process more streamlined.\textsuperscript{717} The electoral reform emerging out of this review and later adopted in 2010 was widely considered inadequate at the time, but has been the focus of reform through subsequent aid activities discussed below. As a positive sign, however, the electoral commission during this time withstood pressure from the major political parties and reinforced the law at the time in ruling that Kérékou and Soglo were ineligible to run in 2006 due to term limits and age, respectively.\textsuperscript{718} This ruling may reflect one indication of a growing strength of the electoral commission.

Testament, perhaps, to the strength of Benin’s democracy is a 2012 European Union (EU) project La Liste Electorale Permanente Informatisée. The contested 2011 elections created a demand for better transparency and accountability in elections in Benin. As a result, the EU provided funds and training to implement an electronic balloting system and help with the modernization of the electoral process. Preliminary results in testing show that the electoral balloting system is poised to increase the transparency and oversight of elections, despite the logistical difficulties and inadequacy of the electoral reform law. The project, however, does include an emphasis on ensuring that the 2010 election law is reformed again to increase representation and incentivize transparency.\textsuperscript{719} While this project falls outside of the study period, it shows the degree of sophistication of the electoral process in Benin, the continued donor focus on improving participation through elections, and the successful implementation of key aspects of the 2010 election law.

---

**Decentralization: Developing Local Capacity**

Responding to the uncertainty and controversy surrounding Kérékou’s reelection in 1996, Denmark’s program on Decentralization and Local Governance from 2002 to 2007 focused on creating a degree of coherence between the development strategies coming from the diverse political parties and the ministries. The result was the creation of a legal and institutional framework for decentralization. The program’s support to national structures to engage regional representatives helped make the central government more responsive to regional concerns. The program’s support to regional governments included both conditional and unconditional budget support directly that supported a range of activities, including creation of local development
strategies through a participatory process. Unlike other donors, Denmark focused heavily on increasing the capacity of regional governments to manage resources. This support came in the form of human resources and financial management training to increase transparency and accountability of regional governments. Denmark reported that this resulted in both stronger and more representative regional governments.

From 2002 to 2007, USAID implemented its Decentralization and Anti-Corruption Support Program, which among other things sought to build local governments’ capacity to develop and implement participatory local development plans. The program also funded and provided technical assistance for managing local micro-projects on education, health, water, sanitation, and other citizen priorities. USAID reports that the program successfully increased the management capacities of local government officials and the participation of NGOs in local development decision-making. As evidence, USAID cites an increase in the number of government decisions influenced by NGOs and the number of local development plans adopted in USAID-targeted communities.

From 2004 to 2008, the UNDP likewise focused on increasing responsiveness to regional concerns, though this project sought to improve the management of these concerns by regional governments themselves. The project’s primary focus was on the development of transparent government institutions at a regional level but it also sought to strengthen local collectives and cooperatives to serve as conduits for dialogues between the public and regional government structures. The incorporation of these cooperatives into the regional decision-making process was formalized by making them representatives to discussions on participatory development plans.

As in Guinea, there was comparatively little focus on creating national public participation mechanisms in Benin. USAID’s Democracy and Governance Strengthening program was implemented from 1996 to 2005. It focused primarily on improving the independence and effectiveness of the National Assembly—activities that are thus discussed in the next aid section on checks and balances. However, the program also included a participatory reform process that engaged local stakeholders in the legislative reform process itself.

UNDP’s programs on Good Governance and Democratic Consolidation were implemented in Benin from 2004 to 2008. UNDP’s programs sought to develop participatory processes in the national government institutions as part of their efforts to build the capacity of parliament to develop effective legislation that met the needs of the public, increase state capacity to deliver services to reduce poverty in Benin, and increase resilience to natural resource stress—an identified priority of the government and population. The program aimed to create awareness and improve representation on issues of particular concern to the government and to the national population.
Democracy aid projects that focused on increasing the representativeness of formal government institutions in Benin reflect the country’s broader democratic trajectory: Benin has undergone a fairly steady democratic transition and consolidated its democracy over the last two decades or more. Given that Benin started the study period with relatively strong institutions, governance aid has thus been directed in large part at improving rather than creating new democratic institutions and processes, but it has not been without its hurdles.

Within this type of aid in Benin, donors began election-related reforms first. While some election programs reported implementation delays, these programs nonetheless accomplished their stated objectives, providing voter education, training election commission officials, and supporting review and adoption of a new election law. Further, these election programs not only achieved their targeted outputs but also their targeted outcomes, with donors reporting an increase in the number of registered voters and examples of election commission adherence to the law following their trainings.

Donors’ decentralization programming in Benin likewise achieved its targeted outputs and outcomes. The planned decentralization programs were implemented and accepted by the government, with donors supporting the government’s adoption of the legal and institutional framework for decentralization and providing training for local officials in participatory development planning and financial management. Further, these results had their intended effect on the targeted local government institutions, creating a participatory development planning process within local governments, formally incorporating civil society representatives into those structures, and developing local development strategies.

Donor aid seeking to build public participation mechanisms in the national government, though limited, likewise achieved its targeted outputs. The programs to develop a participatory legislative reform process and participatory processes within the national legislature were implemented as planned. There is little evidence available, however, regarding whether or not the targeted outcomes of this program were achieved.

As a complete set of interventions directed at increasing the representativeness of formal institutions in Benin, donor documentation shows that aid directed towards public participation mechanisms, decentralization, and elections effectively helped create frameworks for cooperation, decentralization to the regions, and modernization of the electoral process. In doing so, this aid contributed to the institutional framework needed for government engagement with and responsiveness to citizens.

Taken together, it is thus reasonable to conclude that the aid flows to Benin seeking to advance democracy by increasing the representativeness of formal institutions passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 1: 1) these reforms focused on election support, decentralization, and public participation mechanisms were successfully implemented and the government of Benin adopted
associated reforms, and 2) these reforms successfully increased the representativeness of the targeted local government institutions and electoral processes in the country.

ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS OF AID FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON REPRESENTATION

Over the study period, donors had divergent approaches to increasing the representativeness of government institutions in Benin and Guinea. In Benin, programs followed a linear progression as the democratic systems consolidated and modernized to become more sophisticated, while in Guinea programs focused on basic functioning of institutions and responsiveness to shocks. In both countries, though, democracy aid programs helped to improve the representativeness of the targeted government institutions. But was this enough to contribute to democratization in these countries more broadly?

This next section analyzes the differences across Benin and Guinea in this type of aid focused on increasing the representativeness of formal institutions, comparing these differences according to the final criterion outlined above, namely whether the new forms of formal institutional representation brought about by these aid programs increased overall democratic development in these countries. Hypothesis 1 posits that we would expect to see that the country with the most robust aid programs focused on increasing the representativeness of formal institutions would progress the most in its democratic development trajectory.

Decentralization: Comparison and Evaluation

In both Guinea and Benin, aid programs relating to decentralization took on a largely reactive approach, providing support to decentralization processes that were already underway prior to aid disbursements. In Guinea, the country returned to civilian rule in 1992, and from that point on the central government worked towards decentralization, supported by consistent aid from USAID and UNDP starting in 1997 through the end of the study period. Similarly, in Benin, after the democratic opening and election of Kérékou in 1991, the central government began a renewed attempt to decentralize, which was subsequently supported by donors, though to a lesser degree in Benin than in Guinea. Though each decentralization aid program had success in accomplishing its stated goals, the decentralization process was already occurring in these countries, and thus aid programs functioned more as complements to the process than agents of change.

Elections: Comparison and Evaluation

In Guinea, support for elections was a key part of aid programming in the country. It played an instrumental role in ensuring transparent and peaceful elections, yet it has not succeeded in creating free and fair elections overall. There have been few free elections in Guinea to date, but the results of the 2011 election are promising.
In Benin, support to elections focused on both increasing representation as well as modernizing the election process. Aid to Benin has been successful in promoting broader representation and public awareness of elections while also bringing new infrastructure to the electoral process. The level of sophistication of aid programs in Benin is indicative of the progress that the country has made towards democracy in comparison to Guinea where the focus has been primarily to simply have an election.

In both countries, aid programs had a direct impact in improving electoral processes and transparency to improve democratic representation. However, while the focus in Guinea was on standing up capacity for elections, in Benin the intent was to continue increasing participation to prevent backsliding in the democratization process.

### Public Participation Mechanisms: Comparison and Evaluation

In the case of public participation mechanisms, in both Guinea and Benin there was comparatively little focus on creating national public participation mechanisms. While this type of aid was among the earliest aid within this category of aid—starting in 1997 in Guinea and 1996 in Benin—it was also the most limited. Both countries started with a program to create participatory reform processes, followed by a program to entrench such participatory processes in the national legislature. While the programs to develop a participatory processes were implemented as planned, there is little evidence available regarding whether or not the targeted outcomes of this program were achieved.

### CONCLUSION: HYPOTHESIS 1

Attribution is often a challenge for aid programs because they operate in tandem with waves of democratic and political change. However, tangible outcomes of aid programs, such as increasing the representativeness of the legislature in Benin or creating public participation mechanisms in local institutions in Guinea, are testament to the ability of aid programs to positively impact key democratic institutions. But was this enough to contribute to democratization in these countries more broadly?

In looking at aid outcomes quantitatively, this study draws on three major sources for analyzing the potential impact of aid programs on democratic development: Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* indicators to assess change in overall democracy levels, and WGI’s *Voice and Accountability* and *Government Effectiveness* to assess change in sectoral democracy levels related to representativeness and responsiveness of government institutions.

In Guinea, the bulk of democracy aid during the study period fell under this first type of aid—formal institutional reforms promoting representation. This type of aid—focused primarily on decentralization in Guinea—began in 1997 and continued consistently through the end of the study period. However, the democracy indicators do not change as we would expect them to if this type of aid programming alone impacts democratic development. Over the study period,
Guinea is consistently rated “not free”; it is not until after the 2011 election that it becomes “partly free.” It is worth noting that 1992 is the only pre-2011 year in which Guinea was rated “partly free,” due to the fact that Conté resigned from the military at that time to become a civilian ruler and promised civilian rule. The return to “not free” status after 1992, however, reflects the backsliding after the Conté transition and, as noted, Guinea then maintained this “not free” status for the remainder of the study period. The Polity2 score likewise remains largely constant after the democratic transition in 1991, changing dramatically only in 2010. On a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic), Guinea moved from -5 to -1 in 1995—before the influx of this decentralization aid in 1997—and then from -1 to 5 in 2010, fully thirteen years after this decentralization aid started in Guinea.

Guinea even sees a decline in the WGI measure of Government Effectiveness—a sectoral democracy indicator we would expect to rise if decentralization increased the responsiveness and effectiveness of government. In Guinea, the WGI Government Effectiveness indicator declines from -0.8 in 1996 to -1.13 in 2010 (on a scale of -2.5 to +2.5 from least to most effective). Further, the WGI measure of Voice and Accountability does not show significant improvement until 2006—the year when direct civil society aid was introduced in Guinea. Over the course of the concerted decentralization aid focus in Guinea, then, the Voice and Accountability indicator moves only from -1.35 in 1996 (the 11th percentile of countries) to -1.24 in 2006 (the 12th percentile) while this type of formal institutional reforms alone were pursued, but then moves up to -0.95 in 2010 (the 22nd percentile of countries) only after direct civil society aid began in 2006.

The lack of substantial progress on the Voice and Accountability indicator in Guinea prior to the introduction of civil society aid (discussed under hypothesis 3), coupled with the decline in the other key indicator for measuring the impact of decentralization aid, Government Effectiveness, convey that this type of aid in Guinea did not pass the third criterion of this hypothesis.

Thus in Guinea, the country received substantial aid and saw impact in this area of institutional reform, but saw little change and even declines on democracy indicators that would move with the aid flows if Hypothesis 1 were true. We thus reject Hypothesis 1 in the case of Guinea because aid programs were successfully implemented in this area (criterion 1) and targeted formal representation was achieved (criterion 2), but the country’s overall and sectoral levels of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3), as shown in Figure 9.

For its part, Benin is “free” during the entire period of this study except for the first year in 1990 before its full transition to democracy. Benin also has high, stable scores on the Polity2 measure, with a score of 6 for most of the study period until in 2006 it moves to a score of 7 (on a range of -10 to 10, with 10 signaling a full democracy). Benin likewise sees positive movement on its Voice and Accountability score, moving from 0.12 in 1996 to 0.29 in 2010 (on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher scores signaling more public voice in the democracy).
Thus in Benin, the country received relatively little aid in this area compared to other areas, yet Benin’s overall democracy scores remained high throughout this time and its relevant sectoral democracy scores improved substantially. As shown in Figure 9, we thus reject Hypothesis 1 in the case of Benin because little democracy aid focused on this type of institutional reform, yet the country’s sectoral democracy score went up.

Figure 9. Conclusion on Hypothesis 1 for Guinea and Benin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1: Democracy aid programs that increase the representativeness of formal government institutions will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.</th>
<th>Aid Programs</th>
<th>Decentralization</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>National Participation Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implemented reform increased representativeness of institution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased representativeness of institution advanced democracy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implemented reform increased representativeness of institution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased representativeness of institution advanced democracy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: CHECKS AND BALANCES

Aid given to Guinea and Benin to promote checks and balances across formal government institutions is subtly different from the aid reforming government institutions to increase representation within these institutions. The distinction made in this study is that the aid intended for checks and balances seeks to build the capacity, accountability, transparency, and oversight of the country’s formal institutions. This type of aid thus includes programs seeking to improve horizontal checks and balances, vertical checks and balances, and bureaucratic accountability and transparency (see Figure 10). Programs focused on transparency in this section are related to transparency in financial administration, while those in the prior section are related to transparency to promote public participation. The purpose of the aid in this section is often to integrate institutions of former authoritarian strength in to the new democratic order and to create formal institutional, as opposed to informal civil society, checks on government power. As such, the second hypothesis this study tests is stated thus:
Hypothesis 2: Democracy aid programs that *increase checks and balances across formal government institutions* will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

If this hypothesis is true, then democracy aid programs targeting formal institutional changes that increase bureaucratic transparency and accountability, horizontal checks and balances, and vertical checks and balances will lead to increased democratic development in the country. We will conclude this hypothesis is correct if, after the implementation of the democracy and governance aid program:

- The government adopted and/or allowed the program’s intended reforms (criterion 1).
- These reforms increased the designated type of formal institutional balance (criterion 2).
- The designated type of formal institutional balance contributed to democratization in the country—measured qualitatively and through quantitative measures of sectoral and overall democratic development (criterion 3).

Likewise, we will reject this hypothesis if:

- After implementation of the aid program:
  - The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but they did not contribute to the democratic reform of the institution (criterion 2), or
  - Democratic reform of the institution was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).
- Little or no democracy aid focused on this type of institutional reform, and the country’s sectoral democracy score went up.
- Across the pair, similar countries adopted the same types of institutional reforms, and they had different democratic trajectories.

The first and second criteria for effectiveness listed above—whether a democracy aid program was successfully implemented and whether those reforms increased checks and balances between formal institutions—will be discussed in the following sections detailing the aid programs implemented during the study period. The final criterion for effectiveness—whether increased checks and balances contributed to democratization in the country—will be analyzed in the last section of this chapter.
Figure 10. Democracy aid for institutional reforms focused on checks and balances in Guinea and Benin, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid Type</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Benin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal checks and balances</td>
<td>Reinforcing the Legislature:</td>
<td>Reinforcing the Legislature:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratically</td>
<td>Strengthening Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create code of conduct for legislators</td>
<td>• Increase effectiveness and independence of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcing the Judiciary:</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009-2012: EU Institutional Governance</td>
<td>• Address debilitating fractionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Program</td>
<td>and increase cooperation within the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Review operating conditions of the courts</td>
<td>legislative branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Review the application of law and</td>
<td>• Increase legislature’s role as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>development of case law</td>
<td>counterweight to executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strengthen capacity of personnel within</td>
<td>• Provide legislative drafting training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>judiciary and Justice Ministry</td>
<td>• Bolster legislature by reforming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop judicial reform plan</td>
<td>electoral system, improving political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>party chapters, and increasing transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in campaign finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2004-2008: UNDP Good Governance and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Consolidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Build capacity of parliament to develop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>effective legislation, particularly to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reduce poverty and increase resilience to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>natural resource stress—two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>identified priorities of the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2005-2010: AfDB Control Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide training and technology to support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Assembly in providing external</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>controls over executive management of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>public funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009-2013: UNDP program on promoting good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase transparency, working conditions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and policymaking capacity of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduce political patronage and resulting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fractionalization in legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcing the Judiciary:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2002-2005: USAID Decentralization and Anti-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption Support Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase capacity of auditors in Supreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Court’s chamber of accounts to oversee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>executive management of public funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2005-2010: AfDB Control Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide training and technology to support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supreme Court’s audit bench in providing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>external controls over executive management of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>public funds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Bureaucratic transparency and accountability | **Building Local Capacity for Financial Management:**
| 1995-2005: World Bank Public Expenditure Management Adjustment Credit Program; Capacity Development for Service Delivery Program |
| 2002: EU Central Accounting Agency Support Project |
| 2002: EU project on institutional support |
| **Increasing Transparency in Financial Management:**
| 2008-2012: AfDB Economic and Financial Reform Support Program |
| **Building Local Capacity for Financial Management:**
| 2002-2007: EU project on institutional support |
| 2001-2004: World Bank Public Expenditure Reform Program |
| **Increasing Transparency in Financial Management:**
| 2001-2004: World Bank Public Expenditure Reform Program |
| **Building an Accountable Bureaucracy:**
| 2002-2005: Denmark |
| **Building an Accountable Bureaucracy:**
| 2002-2005: Denmark |
| **Building an Accountable Bureaucracy:**
| 2002-2005: Denmark |
| 2002-2005: USAID Decentralization and Anti-Corruption Support Program |
| **Increasing Transparency in Financial Management:**
| 2005-2010: AfDB Control Institutions Support Project |
| 2005-2010: AfDB Control Institutions Support Project |
| 2006-2011: USAID |

| Vertical checks and balances (decentralization as means to check centralized national power) | **MCC Compact component on “Access to Justice”** |
| 2006-2011: MCC Compact component on “Access to Justice” |
| • Improve quality of judicial personnel |
| • Draft and ratify new legal code to increase transparency and streamline legal process |
| • Reduce barriers to accessing the legal system |
| • Improve dispute resolution |
| • Reduce court-processing times |

**Building Local Capacity for Financial Management:**

2002-2007: EU project on institutional support
- Strengthen institutions and improve checks and balances in place at regional level
- Make decentralization process more transparent and equitable
- Support budgetary and judicial authorities at executive level to accomplish institutional goals

**Increasing Transparency in Financial Management:**

2001-2004: World Bank Public Expenditure Reform Program
- Monitor direct budgetary assistance
- Build ministries’ capacity to increase the transparency of how funds were spent
- Build national executive transparency

**Building an Accountable Bureaucracy:**

2002-2005: Denmark
- Improve government processes to reduce corruption
- Reduce administrative burdens and streamline operations to reduce opportunities for graft

2002-2005: USAID Decentralization and Anti-Corruption Support Program
- Reduce corruption within the national bureaucracy
- Increase investigative and verification capacity of auditors and other internal review services within Public Control Institutions

2005-2010: AfDB Control Institutions Support Project
- Provide training and technology to support ministries’ financial control and results-based management

2006-2011: USAID
- Increase management capacities of Ministry of Finance to promote transparency and accountability
AID IN GUINEA: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON CHECKS AND BALANCES

This type of aid took on added importance in Guinea, given the need to reform the former authoritarian regime, counterbalance the strong presidency, build the atrophied civil service bureaucracy, and generally stabilize the democratic system after the introduction of multi-party elections in 1993. Aid to Guinea in this area focused first and most extensively on creating *vertical* checks and balances to accomplish these goals, followed only secondarily and much later by aid focused on improving the accountability and transparency of the national bureaucracy and on creating *horizontal* checks on the executive.

**Vertical Checks and Balances: Building Local Capacity for Financial Management**

The World Bank (WB) was involved in Guinea from 1995-2005 under its Public Expenditure Management Adjustment Credit and Capacity Development for Service Delivery programs working with the Ministry of Finance and Planning to build government capacity to manage aid and deliver needed services. The original scope of the WB project was to increase the government’s capacity to manage credit and financing from international institutions, but it quickly transitioned into a project to improve the government’s overall public service delivery due to the large degree of corruption in the public sector that was hampering the use of aid funds.

The program goal was to decentralize public expenditure management and expand budgetary reform. In order to do this, the WB sought to improve the institutional capacity and accountability of local governments as a counterweight to the strong central government to ensure that they were able to hold the central government accountable for delivery of public expenditures. The creation of a transparent financial management system came with a strong incentive and communication component. The intent of the communications component was to create stronger public accountability for public expenditures.727

The WB reported challenges with corruption and mismanagement during the Capacity Development for Service Delivery project, and the project was deemed highly unsustainable. The World Bank also reported that after the program there were problems ensuring proper auditing was occurring. Primarily, the World Bank attributed the program’s deficits to a lack of sufficient focus on regional governments, noting that the design took very little consideration of the way local governments interacted with the central governments and made the assumption that improved capacity at a centralized level would trickle down; however, they found that this was not the case. The World Bank also recommended instituting end enforcing ethical standards from the outset.728 This demonstrates some of the systemic challenges to advancing institutional reforms under the Conté presidency through 2008.

Similarly, in 2002, the European Union initiated its Central Accounting Agency Support project to improve the national government’s capacity to be more accountable and transparent and support decentralization in financial systems.729 The project was started as a response to the transition from authoritarian rule and growing stabilization seen in the government over the prior
decade after a return to civilian rule in 1993. Starting shortly after the shift from a very authoritarian to a less authoritarian regime type, the project’s focus on strengthening financial systems seemed intended to strengthen the democratic transition. However, the EU reported similar difficulties with implementation that arose from social instability resulting from Conté’s consolidation of power in the military. The program was unable to ensure sustainability without continuity in central planning, due largely to regular changes in the decentralization plan.\textsuperscript{730}

**Bureaucratic Transparency and Accountability: Increasing Transparency in Financial Management**

Following the 2008 coup, international donors sought to stabilize and bolster institutions weakened by the coup—and particularly those that were needed to provide adequate checks on the strong office of the president.\textsuperscript{731} During this time, the African Development Bank (AfDB) focused on increasing the transparency and accountability of financial management in Guinea. The AfDB’s Economic and Financial Reform Support Program had many variations but lasted from 2008-2012. The primary purpose of this project was to stabilize the government’s finances after the coup following President Conte’s death in 2008, but the project also improved the functioning of the country’s financial institutions more generally, which in turn made political patronage more difficult in Guinea. Previously under Conté, the government’s custom of using regional leadership and ministry appointments as sources of patronage had greatly reduced the capacity of the civil service as a whole. The AfDB’s project thus worked to restore fiscal discipline, strengthen the procurement system, and increase transparency in the critically important mining sector.\textsuperscript{732} AfDB was successful in training officials in their fiscal responsibilities and building the capacity of high- and mid-level government officials in the Ministry of Planning and Finance.\textsuperscript{733}

**Horizontal Checks and Balances: Reinforcing the Legislature and Judiciary**

Following the upheaval caused by the coup, USAID worked closely with legislators to create a code of conduct for legislators.\textsuperscript{734} In a similar effort to reinforce institutions after the coup, the European Union led a judiciary support project within its Institutional Governance Support program from 2009 to 2012. The project included a review of the operating conditions of the courts, a study of the application of the law and the development of case law, development of proposals to strengthen human capital within the judiciary, training of Justice Ministry personnel, and development of a reform plan for the judicial sector with short- and medium-term goals.\textsuperscript{735}

**Taking Stock: Progress in Building Checks and Balances across Government Institutions in Guinea**

As a complete set of interventions directed at increasing checks and balances across formal institutions in Guinea, donor documentation shows that aid flows directed towards bureaucratic transparency, vertical checks and balances, and horizontal checks and balances did not
effectively increase the checks and balances across formal institutions. This is evidenced by the thwarted implementation of aid programs focused on vertical checks, and the late and inconclusive implementation of aid program focused on horizontal checks and bureaucratic accountability. It is also seen in the institutional dynamics that remain in Guinea, with the uncontestable strength of the executive relative to the other branches of government.

The largest hurdles to increasing transparency in Guinea were ongoing corruption and the strength of the central government in managing finances—challenges that were not well addressed by aid programs. Only the WB focused explicitly on the need to improve public management of finances to improve governance as a lesson learned from the implementation of its own projects. Other donors did not focus on these much-needed transparency and corruption reduction programs to the same extent.

Taken together, it is thus reasonable to conclude that the aid flows to Guinea seeking to advance democracy by improving checks and balances across formal institutions did not pass the first two criteria for Hypothesis 2: 1) most reforms focused on institutional checks and balances were not successfully implemented, and those that were came very late in the study period, and 2) these reforms did not produce tangible results during the study period in terms of improved checks and balances across formal government institutions.

| AID IN BENIN: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON CHECKS AND BALANCES |

Benin had a comparatively stronger and more professional bureaucracy than many other West African countries at their times of democratic transition. Aid focused on building formal institutional checks and balances in Benin thus explicitly aimed to, first, shore up horizontal checks and balances and, second, promote greater bureaucratic transparency—steps perceived as critical in Benin to allow greater oversight of a strong executive and to allow greater checks on all governing institutions in a political system seen as fractionalized and heavily partisan. These programs to improve horizontal checks and bureaucratic transparency represent a sizable portion of aid to Benin over this time period. Benin also saw aid programs focused on improving vertical checks and balances, but to a much lesser extent than in the first two areas.

| Horizontal Checks and Balances |

*Reinforcing the Legislature as a Counterweight to the Strong Executive*

Building the effectiveness of the legislature was a primary concern for most donors in Benin during this time because of the pre-existing strength of the executive and the fractionalization within the legislature that had left it somewhat paralyzed. While representation of diverse groups in Benin’s parliament had achieved a representative legislature, the resulting political fractionalization within the legislative body had weakened that branch of government in relation to the constitutionally strong executive.
USAID’s Democracy and Governance Strengthening program implemented from 1996 to 2005 thus focused on bolstering the effectiveness of the National Assembly. As noted in the prior section, this program included a participatory reform process that sought to address fractionalization in Benin’s legislature by involving the multiple stakeholders in the legislative reform process itself. USAID’s reforms during this period thus aimed—both through the reform process and through specific institutional reforms—to address the debilitating fractionalization and to increase cooperation within the legislative branch to make it more effective at setting national policy. The political charter that resulted from this donor project set new standards for legislative work with the executive and established new processes for key elements required in an effective and independent legislature, such as the establishment new political parties.

USAID’s governance portfolio during this period also included the Benin National Assembly Strengthening project, implemented from 1998 to 2003 to increase the legislature’s role as a key counterweight to Benin’s strong executive. The project provided technical and administrative staff for trainings on legislative drafting, which led to greater awareness among legislators of the important role that professional staff play in the legislative drafting process. Institutional changes encouraged by the program aimed to bolster the legislature by reforming the electoral system, improving the functioning of political party chapters, and increasing transparency in campaign finance.

UNDP also focused on improving transparency as a strategy for increasing checks and balances, though it focused on legislative transparency. Specifically, UNDP’s program on promoting good governance and participatory development from 2009 to 2013 focused on building transparency in the legislative process at a national level. The goal of the project was to improve public policies and improve the working conditions of legislators. Focusing on transparency and strengthening the legislature’s accountability sought to increase public scrutiny of legislative work. The program sought to prevent legislators from using their political position to extend political patronage, which aggravates the fractionalization and paralysis in the legislature.

AfDB implemented its Control Institutions Support Project from 2005 to 2010 to strengthen the internal and external controls on executive management of public resources. Regarding the external controls, the project provided training and technology to support the National Assembly in providing external checks on executive financial management of public funds. AfDB reported that the project successfully completed the intended technology transfers, and provided some training to legislative staff but did not train any of the 83 Members of Parliament that the program intended to train.

Reinforcing the Judiciary

Both USAID and the AfDB sought to build the capacity of the judiciary to oversee the executive on financial matters. USAID’s Decentralization and Anti-Corruption Support Program, implemented from 2002 to 2005, trained auditors in the Supreme Court’s chamber of accounts to oversee executive management of public funds. USAID reported that the project successfully
trained the intended judicial personnel and resulted in improved investigative and verification capacity within the court. The AfDB’s Control Institutions Support Project, implemented from 2005 to 2010, also provided training to personnel in the Supreme Court to support the court in providing an external check on executive management of public funds. AfDB reported that the project successfully completed the intended technology transfers and the intended number of trainings of judicial personnel and magistrates. AfDB reports that this achieved better accounting skills within the court to provide oversight of executive management of public funds.

During this time, the United States and Benin signed an MCC compact in 2006. The compact was contingent on reaching and maintaining specific good governance standards, as well as other benchmarks. The reasoning behind the existence of MCC is to support and encourage good governance in democratic countries. Benin’s achievement of this milestone is noteworthy because it demonstrates the progress Benin had made in its democratic transition by 2006. It is important, then, to think of MCC as a national incentive towards good governance, despite the specific sectors receiving aid under a particular MCC compact. It is also relevant that the implementation of an MCC compact requires the host country to establish an office to manage the funds with little Washington programmatic oversight but tight fiscal regulations that are frequently audited. The purpose of this structure is to encourage transparent institutions. Benin recently ended its second compact, which ran from 2006 to 2011.

MCC in Benin had two components of particular interest to democratic reform—one related to institutional checks and balances and another related to informal democratic norms—the latter of which will be discussed in the next section. On the formal institutional side, MCC included a component focused on access to justice. The purpose of this component was to make the judiciary more accountable to citizens by reducing barriers to access to the legal system, improving dispute resolution, and reducing court-processing times for items such as business registration. The project sought to do so by reforming key parts of the judicial sector, improving the quality of magistrates and judicial staff, and helping to draft and ratify a new legal code to create more transparency and streamline legal processes.

MCC Benin reported that, by the end of its project in 2011, the new legal code it helped to draft had not yet been implemented, yet it also reported that some progress had been made in improving the responsiveness of the judicial sector, with the percent of businesses that trust the legal system to successfully and impartially arbitrate cases increasing from 35 percent when the project started to 76 percent at the project’s close in 2011. MCC notes that strengthening the judiciary increased the faith that citizens had in the state and strengthened this key arm of government.

---

**Bureaucratic Transparency and Accountability**

Several aid programs focused on building transparency and accountability in the national executive in Benin. In doing so, these programs attempted to harness the bureaucratic strength in Benin held over from the years of authoritarianism, while eliminating the accompanying legacies.
of corruption and political patronage. These programs thus sought to increase transparency and accountability as a way to increase the proper functioning and legitimacy of the democratic system.

**Strengthening Transparency in Financial Management**

The World Bank’s Public Expenditure Reform Program from 2001 to 2004 worked to improve the transparency of public finance through monitoring of direct budgetary assistance. In this case, the WB granted Benin’s ministries direct budgetary support and helped build the ministries’ capacity to increase the transparency of how these funds were spent. The project successfully trained individuals on budgeting processes and on bookkeeping. The Bank reported that the following “significant results” were achieved from the project: The Ministry of Finance recognized the benefits of programmatic approaches to budgeting and began preparing project-based budgets. Other ministries improved the preparation of unified budgets and implemented a new budget management system to improve accountability over public expenditures. External audits were strengthened, but the reform of internal audit systems was stalled and the monitoring and evaluation capacity of line ministries remained weak. Overall, the program was considered successful by the World Bank in increasing the transparency of the government to prevent fraud and graft, and the program was followed by a series of programs to address the remaining deficits in internal audit systems and financial management.

**Building an Accountable Bureaucracy**

Also in the second half of the study period, two donors conducted activities focused on increasing accountability within the national bureaucracy. Within its broader programming in Benin, Denmark conducted activities from 2002 to 2005 focused on improving government processes to reduce corruption. The project aimed to reduce administrative burdens and streamline operations to reduce opportunities for graft.

From 2002 to 2005, USAID’s Benin Decentralization and Anti-Corruption Support program also worked to improve accountability and reduce corruption within the national bureaucracy by increasing the capacity of auditors and other internal review services within the Chamber of Accounts. The program organized training workshops to build the capacity of Public Control Institutions (PCIs), such as the Supreme Audit Institution to develop and implement micro-grants and build transparency.

Along the same lines, the AfDB’s Control Institutions Support Project implemented from 2005 to 2010 sought to strengthen the internal and external controls on executive management of public resources. Regarding the internal controls, the project provided training and technology to support ministries’ financial control and results-based financial management. AfDB reported that the project successfully completed the intended technology transfer, exceeded its goals for the targeted number of personnel to be trained, and resulted in the production and effective use of technical audit guides by ministry personnel.
For its part, during its governance projects between 2006-2011, USAID continued its focus on improving accountability within the national bureaucracy, reflecting continued corruption at the national level and a need for donors to retain a focus on strengthening institutions to avoid backsliding. USAID’s program from 2006-2011 sought to increase the participation and management capacities of key stakeholders to promote transparency and accountability in the Ministry of Finance. USAID and other donors saw the continued impact of transparency projects in helping Benin achieve further consolidation and strengthening of governance systems. The achievement of the project may be measured in the continued trust in the system and the growing strength of audit systems, as reported by USAID.

Vertical Checks and Balances: Building Local Capacity for Financial Management

The EU focused on increasing transparency and accountability in regional government institutions. The EU implemented its project on institutional support from 2002 to 2007 with the broad goal of making the decentralization process in Benin more transparent and equitable by strengthening regional governance institutions and improving the checks and balances in place at the regional level. In particular, the program sought to increase these institutions’ financial management capacity and service delivery. The EU, in partnership with UNDP, also provided training for budgetary authorities at the executive level to improve mechanisms for transparency and oversight in the budgeting process between the national and local levels. The EU noted that increasing transparency at the regional level is difficult to measure but it remarked that progress was made by increasing citizen participation and sustaining faith in the democratic system by the people of Benin despite what many perceived increased corruption at the national level.

As noted in the prior section on aid for increasing the representativeness of formal institutions, Denmark and UNDP each advanced a decentralization program in Benin, though the donors described and targeted these programs as mechanisms for increasing the representativeness and responsiveness of local and national government institutions vis-à-vis the public, rather than as checks on the national government. Donors’ overall limited focus on increasing vertical checks and balances in Benin may be the result of the higher initial capacity of the national civil service to maintain accountability over public funds and services.

Taking Stock: Progress in Building Checks and Balances across Government Institutions in Benin

As a complete set of interventions, aid directed at increasing checks and balances across formal institutions in Benin did help increase transparency and balance across several of the targeted institutions.

Within this type of aid in Benin, donors focused first and more strongly on reforms to build horizontal checks and balances, focusing in particular on reducing fractionalization in the legislature to improve its capacity as a policymaking institution and a counterweight to the
executive, and also focusing on reinforcing the judiciary. These programs were successfully implemented, providing the intended technology transfers, technical assistance, and trainings on legislative drafting, policymaking, transparency, and legislative and judicial oversight of the executive. The programs also achieved some of their intended impacts on the targeted institutions, for example by improving the accounting and investigative capacity of court auditors, oversight capacity of legislators generally, and external oversight of public expenditures specifically. However, the programs also failed to achieve some of their core objectives—most notably by failing to reduce fractionalization within the legislature enough to ensure it could be an effective policymaking body and check on the executive.

Donors’ bureaucratic accountability programming in Benin fared better, achieving both its targeted outputs and outcomes. The planned programs were implemented and accepted by the government, with donors providing intended technology transfers and exceeding the planned trainings for ministry personnel and auditors on topics such as financial management and transparency. These programs also achieved their targeted outcomes, with donors noting that ministries began creating project-based budgets and using the audit guides developed by programs, the government implemented a new budget management system, and ministries improved their internal audit systems.

Donors’ aid for vertical checks and balances, though limited, also achieved its intended outputs and outcomes, providing training for local government officials in financial management, public service delivery, and oversight of national public expenditures. Aid programs in Benin targeted different levels of government from the local level up to the main branches of the national government. This focus allowed it to address transparency and accountability issues at all levels with differing degrees of impact but in all cases increasing the accountability of these institutions.

Taken together, it is thus reasonable to conclude that, overall, the aid flows to Benin seeking to advance democracy by improving checks and balances across formal institutions passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 2: 1) the reforms focused on institutional checks and balances were successfully implemented and the government of Benin adopted associated reforms, and 2) these reforms successfully increased most of the checks and balances they sought across formal government institutions in the country.

**ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS OF AID FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON CHECKS AND BALANCES**

Throughout the study period, donors had divergent approaches to increasing the checks and balances across government institutions in Benin and Guinea. This next section analyzes the differences in aid programs in Benin and Guinea that focused on increasing checks and balances across formal institutions and compares these differences according to the final criterion outlined above: Do the new institutional checks and balances brought about by these aid programs increase overall democratic development in these countries? Hypothesis 2 posits that we would
expect to see that the country with the most robust aid programs focused on increasing institutional checks and balances would progress the most in its democratic development trajectory.

**Bureaucratic Transparency and Accountability: Comparison and Evaluation**

The bureaucratic transparency programs implemented in Guinea and Benin had largely similar goals and approaches. The focus in both countries was on reducing the opaqueness of the budgetary process as well as increasing the accountability of government institutions in the sphere of public expenditures. Yet the timing and constraints related to these programs was very different across the two countries. In Guinea, these programs were implemented very late in the study period and reveal the challenge of attempting to implement such projects in a post-coup environment. In Benin, these transparency programs were implemented much earlier and played a key role in encouraging more accountable executive and bureaucratic institutions. The same cannot be said for Guinea, where transparency programs failed to have identifiable impacts.

**Vertical Checks and Balances: Comparison and Evaluation**

Here donors had the largest challenges with implementation in Guinea, as widespread corruption in Guinea largely derailed these projects. Program documents cite that many of the trainings did not lead to the implementation of the intended vertical controls on the executive and that corruption remained widespread in the regions. The major issue reported was that these programs did not sufficiently account for the extensive oversight that the central government held over the programs, which made them much more prone to corruption. On a national level, the WB and EU reported similar challenges with implementing their programs focused on vertical checks and balances. Donors were unable to overcome barriers in Guinea to have a measurable impact on corruption, revealing a major challenge to implementation of these aid programs in Guinea.

In Benin, donors’ aid for vertical checks and balances, though limited, achieved its intended objectives. This allowed aid programs in this area to address transparency and corruption issues at several levels with differing degrees of impact but in all cases increasing the accountability of the targeted institutions.

**Horizontal Checks and Balances: Comparison and Evaluation**

In Guinea, programs to reinforce the legislature and judiciary were limited and implemented very late in the study period, resulting in limited evidence as to the impact of these programs. In Benin, aid programs likewise addressed both the judiciary and the legislature, but did so in a much more concerted way. The legislative aid programs in Benin were instrumental in encouraging legislators to cooperate within the legislature as well as with a very powerful executive. This brought about some change, as reported by the programs, in cooperation among legislators. For its part, the MCC program in Benin was instrumental in creating incentives for
judicial reform, but also in incentivizing transparency nationwide. Overall in Benin, aid programs were able to overcome some of the transparency issues to create stronger checks and balances across democratic institutions, though the substantial fractionalization that remained in the legislature undermined its ability to serve with maximal effectiveness as a policymaking institution and check on the executive.

**CONCLUSION: HYPOTHESIS 2**

Benin had a comparatively stronger and more professional bureaucracy than many other West African countries at its time of democratic transition. Most aid programs have thus seen the bureaucracy as an opportunity to improve the transparency and accountability of the country’s existing strong civil service institutions. The results of this have been the modernization of the bureaucracy and strengthening of institutions’ roles as a check on the power of the central executive. Aid programs in Benin have thus successfully achieved greater transparency and stronger checks and balances.

In Guinea, projects implemented with the goal of increasing financial stability and oversight in Guinea were implemented in moments at which the political system had been upset. In particular, these aid projects focused on institutional stabilization and bolstering general institutional capacity peak when Guinea was recovering from its coup. The projects operating during this time suffered from a great deal of instability and ongoing lack of political freedoms and thus failed to impact transparency or strengthen checks and balances overall.

In looking at aid outcomes quantitatively, this paper focuses on three major sources for analyzing the potential impact of aid programs on democratic development: Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* indicators to assess change in overall democracy levels, and WGI’s *Rule of Law* and *Control of Corruption* indicators to assess change in sectoral democracy levels related to institutional checks and balances. As noted, both Guinea and Benin show a relative stability in their overall democracy levels measured by *Freedom Status* and *Polity2* prior to 2010, making the sectoral democracy scores a potentially more useful way to gauge democratic change in the country during the study period.

Over the course of the study, Guinea shows no improvement in the *Rule of Law*, which starts and ends the study period with a score of -1.5 (on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, with lower scores signaling less rule of law), with little fluctuation in between.\(^{751}\) *Control of Corruption* in Guinea got worse over the study period, dropping from -0.46 in 1996 to -1.19 in 2010.\(^{752}\) Democratic institutions take a particular decline after the 2008 coup. This is signaled by a decrease in Polity IV’s *Executive Recruitment* indicator, which measures constraints on the executive from opposition and which declined for two years after the coup, revealing the closed nature of the political system between Conté’s death in 2008 and the 2010 election.\(^{753}\)

Though progress on these dimensions was not made during the study period in Guinea, there are indications that Guinea is making important progress since the study end date of 2010. Since the
election in 2011, Guinea has shown modest improvement in the Rule of Law—moving from a score of -1.5 in 2010 to -1.38 in 2014—and in Control of Corruption, which improved slightly from -1.19 in 2010 to -1.07 in 2014.\textsuperscript{754}

We thus find that Hypothesis 2 is inconclusive in the case of Guinea, as shown in Figure 11. Prior to 2008, few aid programs were successfully implemented in this area, and the country failed to see progress on the relevant democratic indicators during that time. After the 2008 coup, however, several programs were implemented successfully in this area (criterion 1) but the results of these programs were inconclusive during the study period (criterion 2). Further, while the relevant sectoral democracy scores saw modest improvements within several years of the start of those programs (criterion 3), these gains did not occur within the study period.

Over the course of this study, Benin improves political constraints on the executive, moving from a score of 7 (which denotes restricted elections) to a score of 8 (which denotes competitive elections) on the Executive Recruitment measure. Benin also shows modest progress in improving Control of Corruption, moving from -0.93 in 1996 to -0.74 in 2010. One major factor may be the MCC compact, which began mandating transparency and corruption reduction. While aid programs in this area seem to have helped improve this aspect of democracy, these improvements in transparency and corruption have, in turn, positively impacted the effectiveness of aid programs.

In Benin, however, the Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness—both of which are key aims and aspects of institutional checks and balances—do not change as we would expect them to if this type of aid alone impacts democratic development. The Rule of Law declines substantially in Benin from -0.19 in 1996 to -0.7 in 2010. Government Effectiveness declines from -0.8 in 1996 to -1.13 in 2010. The latter could indicate the continued stalemate in parliament stemming from fractionalization that has improved but remains a defining feature of parliament and impacts its ability to effectively lead policymaking or check the executive.

With both progress and regression on the relevant sectoral democracy indicators in Benin, we find that Hypothesis 2 overall is inconclusive in the case of Benin, as shown in Figure 11. Donors successfully implemented substantial aid in this area (criterion 1), and the targeted institutional checks were achieved in some key areas but not others (criterion 2). Further, the country’s level of democracy went up slightly overall and up in two key areas related to these institutions, but not in other key areas related to these institutions (criterion 3).
**Figure 11. Conclusion on Hypothesis 2 for Guinea and Benin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid Programs</th>
<th>Horizontal Checks &amp; Balances</th>
<th>Vertical Checks &amp; Balances</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Transparency &amp; Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented reform increased institutional checks &amp; balances</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased institutional checks &amp; balances advanced democracy</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented reform increased institutional checks &amp; balances</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased institutional checks &amp; balances advanced democracy</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INFORMAL PROCESSES AND NORMS**

Democracy and governance aid also uses grassroots programs and bottom-up approaches to democratic reform, such as building the capacity of civil society organizations, increasing civic participation, and bolstering an independent media (see Figure 12). Such programs can help engender domestic pressure for democratic reform, foster buy-in from citizens, and accelerate the country’s democratic progress.

As such, the third hypothesis this study tests is stated thus:

**Hypothesis 3:** Democracy aid programs that build informal democratic processes and norms will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

If this hypothesis is true, then democracy aid programs focused on ground-up reforms that build or strengthen civic participation, civil society, and nongovernmental channels for sociopolitical impact will lead to increased democratic development in the country. We will conclude this hypothesis is correct if, after the implementation of the democracy and governance aid program:

- The local partner adopted the program’s intended reforms, e.g. a media outlet implemented a training on independent media practices (criterion 1).
• These reforms increased the designated type of informal democratic process or norm, e.g. media trainings developed the media sector as a voice for democratic reform (criterion 2).
• The designated type of informal democratic process or norm contributed to democratization in the country (criterion 3).

Likewise, we will reject this hypothesis if:

• After implementation of the aid program:
  o The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but there was no increase in the designated informal democratic process or norm (criterion 2), or
  o The targeted informal democratic process or norm was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).
• Little or no democracy aid focused on this type of reform, and the country’s sectoral democracy score went up.
• Across the pair, similar countries achieved the same types of reforms, and they had different democratic trajectories.

The first and second criteria for effectiveness listed above—whether a democracy aid program was successfully implemented and whether those reforms increased informal democratic norms and democratic mobilization—will be discussed in the following sections on aid programs implemented during the study period. The final criterion for effectiveness—whether an increase informal democratic norms and mobilization contributed to democratization in the country—will be discussed in the final section.

Figure 12. Democracy aid for informal democratic processes in Guinea and Benin, 1990-2010

| Democracy aid programs in this category support ground-up strategies that strengthen civic participation, civil society, and independent media |
|---|---|---|
| **Aid Type** | **Guinea** | **Benin** |
| Civic participation | **Building Civic Participation at the Local Level:** 2006: World Bank Village Community Support Program  • Improve local civic capacity to manage funds and implement development projects  • Increase participation of community organizations in decision making process | **Building Civic Participation at the National Level:** 2006-2011: AfDB  • Improve financial management and transparency of NGOs receiving government and AfDB funds  • Increase NGO awareness and oversight of the processes of government funds management | 1991-2000: USAID Benin Indigenous NGO project  • Bring local stakeholders into discussion with local government  • Emphasize role of public in keeping government accountable |
| | **Building Civic Participation at the Local Level:** 2008-2010: USAID Just Governance Program  • Support press and civil society organizations  • Train journalists to investigate corruption | **Building Civic Participation:** 2002: Denmark Gender Equality in Good Governance project  • Promote inclusion of women in municipal elections  • Train women in public speaking and running campaigns | 2002-2007: USAID Decentralization and Anti-Corruption Support Program  • Train NGOs to participate in local development decision-making  • Provide grants to NGOS to monitor and combat |
In Guinea, aid focused on building informal democratic norms so that increased the capacity and coordination of civil society groups at the local level, train press and civil society groups at the national level, and engage civil society groups in the oversight of public funds.

### Building Civic Participation at the Local Level

The World Bank’s Village Community Support Program in 2006 took a similar approach to encouraging the participation of civil society in the democratic process. The project established an effective and efficient mechanism for transferring public funds to local community.
organizations and improved local organizations’ capacity to manage funds and implement local development programs. The project increased the participation of village-based organizations in the development decision-making process and resulted in communities demanding services and infrastructure.755

---

**Building Civic Participation at the National Level**

After the 2008 coup in Guinea, USAID explicitly supported the press and civil society organizations through its Program on Just Governance implemented from 2008 to 2010. The members of the targeted civil society organizations became loud advocates for change in their communities. In addition, USAID trained journalists how to investigate corruption to increase the extra-governmental checks on the government’s transparency and accountability. USAID provided training, technical assistance, and equipment to private media outlets to reduce the dominance of the state-run media. USAID reported that the growth of the private radio industry was vital to the public being able to receive uncensored, independent information, especially after the 2008 coup and military takeover.756

From 2006 to 2011, the AfDB implemented a project that introduced financial management techniques to civil societies beneficiaries of the government’s and the AfDB’s funds in order to build transparent financial practices. The goal of the project was to increase the transparency of both civil society and government management of funds. AfDB reported that, as a result of the project, civil society organizations had increased awareness of the sources and management of public funds, which encouraged them to request information on the finances of local governments.757

French aid from 2008 to 2010 was primarily designed to improve the living conditions of the poor in Guinea through health and agriculture interventions. However, after the 2008 coup, a component of France’s aid portfolio included a program to create a sense of ownership by the population over their country, which was not completed successfully. The program’s goals were to create a sense of citizenship among the people of Guinea and ownership of their government institutions. The inability to complete the program is a result of the perceived instability in Guinea after the coup and the ongoing security concerns in West Africa.758

---

**Taking Stock: Progress in Building Informal Democratic Processes and Norms in Guinea**

As a complete set of interventions, aid directed at increasing informal democratic norms and democratic mobilization in Guinea did help increase citizen engagement in the democratic process, though robust aid in this area came quite late in the study period. While one program was not completed due to instability after the coup, donor documentation shows that on the whole these programs achieved their targeted outputs, training local civic groups to manage public funds and implement development programs, training national civic groups in advocacy, and training journalists to investigate corruption.
Donors also report that these programs achieved their targeted outcome of increasing citizen engagement in the democratic process. Evidence of this can be seen in the increased participation of local civic groups in development decision making, increased public demands for government action on key issues, and the growth of private radio stations late in the study period. The true test of the strength of civil society and the media came after the instability caused by the 2008 coups. Many of these organizations weathered the instability and were key voices calling for accountability by the post-2008 military government.

It is thus reasonable to conclude that—though they were implemented late in the study period—the aid flows to Guinea seeking to advance democracy by increasing informal democratic norms and mobilization passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 3: 1) the reforms focused on informal democratic norms were successfully implemented, and 2) these reforms successfully increased citizen engagement in the democratic process. Assessment of whether these aid programs passed the third criteria for Hypothesis 3 will be discussed at the end of this section.

### AID IN BENIN: BUILDING INFORMAL DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND NORMS

In Benin, aid focused on building informal democratic norms began in 1991 immediately after the country’s democratic opening and continued in a concerted and consistent way through the end of the study period in 2010.

#### Building Civic Participation

During the early years of Benin’s democracy from 1991 to 2000, USAID implemented projects to incorporate civil society and NGOs into the reform process. USAID’s Benin Indigenous NGO (BINGO) project brought local stakeholders into discussions with the local government on key decisions being made in the region. The project also emphasized the role of the public in keeping government accountable to maintain ethical standards. From 2003 to 2006, USAID implemented projects to improve the governance environments outside of the formal governing institutions. USAID’s project on improving the environment for decentralized, local, and private initiatives aimed to increase participation of regional organizations in the policy-making process. The project worked to develop the management skills of these regional stakeholders in order to make their administration more straightforward. The result was that these organizations worked to improve the governance environment and their own operating environment by demanding policies that were equitable and transparent. The project focused on antipoverty initiatives. USAID reported the project strengthened regional organizations and increased transparency.759

A priority for democracy aid from Denmark was incorporating regional and community leaders into the democratic process, specifically women. Denmark’s Gender Equality in Good Governance project worked in 2002 to promote the inclusion of women in municipal elections. Female leaders in community organizations were trained in public speaking and the practicalities of running a campaign. Although the project was not very successful in getting women elected, the project did create a stronger culture for women-led civil society.760
The results of USAID programming were mixed in this area over these fifteen years. From 1991 to 2000, there was increased participation in local development strategies and a channel for dialogue between the public and the regional administration, but no real growth in civil societies.\textsuperscript{761} The USAID projects from 2003 to 2006, however, strengthened regional administrations and civil society organizations, increasing the accountability on the executive and building informal checks and balances on the government.

Another U.S. strategy toward building informal democratic norms was seen in a component focused on access to land in Benin’s second MCC compact from 2006 to 2011. The access to land program created legal and policy reforms that emerged from a participatory process to formalize property rights and land registration. The project had a specific focus on using citizen input in the reform process and encouraging participation of community agriculture groups. The program had large education components and coordinated heavily with other government programs to harmonize the law.\textsuperscript{762} However, the law was never enacted. MCC did report an improvement in land registration processes. MCC Benin noted that the compact was successful in accomplishing many of its stated goals related to infrastructure and training but that the impact on governance and rule of law was much harder to quantify.\textsuperscript{763}

\textbf{Increasing Economic Opportunity and Advocacy}

AfDB, maintaining its economic focus, worked to strengthen small and medium enterprises and the private sector in the 1990s through its Institutional Support Project for the Ministries of Finance, Planning, and Economic Restructuring. This encouraged economic reforms on a national level by bringing key private sector stakeholders into the decision-making process by providing aid to civil society organizations. The resulting impacts on governance were an increased demand by the private sector through lobbying for infrastructure and construction as well as broader macroeconomic reforms to improve the business-enabling environment.\textsuperscript{764} In later years (2002-2004), AfDB’s Support to Poverty Reduction II program worked with community groups to develop a poverty reduction strategy, which informed the national poverty reduction strategy in Benin.\textsuperscript{765} AfDB reported some success in impacting poverty indicators in Benin, but it did not report any impact on regulation or governance in Benin as a result of the programs.

French aid programs from 2001-2010 likewise focused primarily on poverty alleviation and building rural and urban civil society. The programs saw a need to develop the regional and urban organizations in order to further impact governance in Benin. The broad focus of France’s aid programs in this area is to create empowered citizens in Benin that feel like a part of the democratic process and demand changes from leaders.\textsuperscript{766} These projects did empower local leaders to be engaged in the democratic process.

A 2009 UNDP project worked to engage youth in the democratic and economic development process in Benin. This Youth Employment project focused on working with young leaders to build their capacity to promote economic growth. The project provided job skills training and
coordinated across multiple structures in Benin to place trained youth in paid employment positions. Although employment numbers did not show an improvement, the project did result in a more established set of young leaders in the community that were engaged with the governance structures in their areas.\textsuperscript{767} UNDP’s attempts at inclusion were successful in that they created a more transparent process and trained a generation of young leaders to participate in the democratic process. Literature shows that improving economic opportunity can help consolidate democratic gains in countries with low HDI, and this program shows the link between economic development aid and democratization.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Taking Stock: Progress in Building Informal Democratic Processes and Norms in Benin}
\end{quote}

As a complete set of interventions, aid directed at building informal democratic norms and democratic mobilization in Benin did increase citizen engagement in the democratic process. Although both MCC and UNDP reported a difficulty in measuring the direct impact of their programs on broad governance indicators, they were able to implement the programs successfully and they reported progress in building the capacity and transparency of civil society in Benin.

Donors report that aid programs that focused on strengthening NGOs and civic participation were broadly successful in achieving their targeted outputs and outcomes, despite some setbacks in particular programs. Following civil society trainings and technical assistance on a range of skills and topics, Benin saw increased advocacy by NGOs on key issues like poverty reduction and land reform, increased civic participation in local development strategies, and an increase in the number of civil society groups, particularly in the second half of the study period.

Donors likewise report that aid programs focused on increasing economic opportunity and advocacy achieved their targeted goals, for example training private sector stakeholders in advocacy skills and providing job and leadership skills training for unemployed youth. Donors assert that these programs brought tangible results for development of informal norms and democratic mobilization, engaging the private sector in domestic economic reform, engaging community groups in developing poverty reduction strategy papers, and increasing advocacy by civil society groups more generally.

It is thus reasonable to conclude that aid flows seeking to advance democracy in Benin by increasing informal democratic norms and mobilization passed the first two criteria for Hypothesis 3: 1) reforms focused on informal democratic norms were implemented, and 2) these reforms successfully increased citizen engagement in the democratic process.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS OF AID FOR INFORMAL DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND NORMS}
\end{quote}

Throughout the study period, donors had divergent approaches to building informal democratic norms and mobilization in Benin and Guinea. In the case of Guinea, aid focused largely on
increasing the security and participation of the poor, while in Benin aid focused more explicitly on building civil society as advocates separate from the political system. This section analyzes the differences in aid programs in Benin and Guinea that focused on building informal democratic norms and compares these differences according to the final criterion outlined above, namely whether any new informal democratic norms and mobilization brought about by these aid programs increased overall democratic development in these countries. Hypothesis 3 posits that we would expect to see that the country with the most robust aid programs focused on increasing informal democratic norms and mobilization would progress the most in its democratic development trajectory.

---

**Civil Society Development: Comparison and Evaluation**

The role of civil society cannot be understated in the later years in Guinea. After the 2008 coup, the presence of a civil society growing in strength was key to maintaining accountability over the military and was integral to calls for accountability following the 2009 stadium massacre. During these later years of the study period, when Guinea experienced substantial national instability, donors focused intently on ground-up approaches to build civic participation at both the local and national levels. USAID and AfDB reported successes in strengthening civil society in Guinea during this time, and these donors also reported that the media played a key role in getting independent information to the people of the country in times of distress. Although all programs reported setbacks caused by corruption and instability, donors succeeded in implementing these programs and overall aid focused on civil society development was reported to be successful. In Benin, donors started civil society programs much earlier than they did in Guinea, and there was considerably more stability in Benin throughout the study period. The focus of this type of aid in Benin was to increase participation at a local level through strengthened and transparent NGOs, and donors report that they were able to achieve these goals.

---

**Economic Opportunity and Advocacy: Comparison and Evaluation**

Unlike in Guinea, donors in Benin focused on building civil society capacity to engage not only in general development efforts and policymaking, but also specifically in economic opportunities and advocacy. In doing so, aid to Benin more directly combined aid for democratic and economic development—at least for a few key constituencies like youth and the private sector. In the UNDP youth development project, for example, the donor reported an increase in the number of youth leaders as a result of the project. This kind of impact is indicative of the positive impact poverty reduction efforts can simultaneously have on informal democratic mobilization in low human development contexts.
CONCLUSION: HYPOTHESIS 3

As noted under Hypothesis 1, measures of Guinea’s overall level of democracy remain unchanged from 1995 until 2010, and sectoral measures of democracy change only slightly before the last few years of the study period. Guinea’s Voice and Accountability indicator shows only modest improvement over the decade from 1996 to 2006, but then shows a steady increase after 2006 when donors introduced more direct civil society aid in Guinea. From 1996 to 2006, Guinea’s Voice and Accountability rises only from -1.35 to -1.24. After donors introduce civil society aid in 2006, however, Voice and Accountability rises steadily at a much faster rate, from -1.24 in 2006 to -0.95 in 2010. Guinea’s overall democracy indicators likewise see a shift at the end of the study period. Guinea improves its Polity2 score from -1 to 5 in 2010, placing Guinea clearly on the side of democratization on the Polity2 scale that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). In 2011, Freedom House changes its designation for Guinea from “not free” to “partly free.”

The lack of substantial progress on the Voice and Accountability indicator in Guinea prior to the introduction of civil society aid, coupled with the noticeable gains on democracy indicators after its introduction, convey that this type of aid in Guinea passed the third criterion of this hypothesis. While this determination is based on a truncated portion of the study period—namely the last few years—the shift in both civil society aid and democracy scores during this time period is a compelling basis for this decision. As shown in Figure 13, we thus fail to reject Hypothesis 3 in the case of Guinea because the targeted civil society impacts were achieved (criterion 2) and the country’s level of democracy increased in concert with these reforms (criterion 3).

For its part, Benin is “free” during the entire study period except for the first year in 1990 before the full transition to democracy. Benin also has high, stable scores on the Polity2 measure, with a score of 6 for most of the study period until 2006 when it moves to a score of 7 (on a range of -10 to 10, with 10 signaling a full democracy). The country sees substantial improvements on its Voice and Accountability score, moving from 0.12 in 1996 0.29 in 2010 (on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher scores signaling more public voice in the democracy). We thus fail to reject Hypothesis 3 in the case of Benin because the country received and successfully implemented a substantial amount of aid for informal democratic processes (criterion 1), the targeted impacts on civil society were achieved (criterion 2), and the country’s level of democracy increased during this time (criterion 3), as shown in Figure 13.
**Hypothesis 3: Democracy aid programs that build informal democratic processes and norms will lead to improvements in a country's democratic development.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aid Programs</th>
<th>Civic Participation</th>
<th>Economic Opportunity &amp; Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guinea</strong></td>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implemented reform increased citizen engagement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased citizen engagement advanced democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benin</strong></td>
<td>Aid program reform was implemented</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implemented reform increased citizen engagement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased citizen engagement advanced democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LESSONS LEARNED**

The Benin-Guinea case study highlights several central findings about democracy aid generally and aid specifically in a low human development context.

*Both Benin and Guinea provide evidence that democracy aid programs that build informal democratic processes and norms lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.* Benin received civil society aid consistently throughout the study period, starting in 1991 through the end of the study period in 2010 and beyond. During this time, indicators of democratic development reflect increasing democratic progress in Benin both in the civil society sector and overall. This progress in civil society development and overall democratic development in Benin was seen even while the country experienced mixed results in building governance capacity, making progress on control of corruption and fairness in executive recruitment but declining in the rule of law and government effectiveness due to continued fractionalization and stalemate in parliament.

Guinea did not receive sustained civil society aid prior to 2006, and during this time the country made little progress on democracy indicators. Yet when Guinea received an infusion of civil society aid starting in 2006 through the end of the study period, this coincided with notable increases in democratic development both in the civil society sector and overall. Again, these gains in Guinea’s overall democratic development were seen even while
indicators of government capacity were stagnant or declining, with Guinea seeing no progress in the rule of law during the study period, and declines in government effectiveness, control of corruption, and fairness in executive recruitment.

Taken together, the experiences of Benin and Guinea underscore that it was progress in civil society development—even in the face of declining government effectiveness—that drove progress in democratic development overall, and that this progress in civil society development corresponded with donors’ aid to this sector.

**Civil society may be a particularly effective means through which donors can link democratic and economic development objectives in countries with low human development.** In both Benin and Guinea, donors took deliberate steps to link democracy aid to economic development objectives in the country. For example, in both Benin and Guinea donors focused decentralization aid on developing participatory, responsive development plans and improved service delivery (under Hypothesis 1), focused bureaucratic transparency and accountability aid on improving the management of public expenditures (under Hypothesis 2), and focused civil society efforts on engaging citizens in implementing development projects (under Hypothesis 3). Yet in Benin, donors focused civil society aid not only on engaging citizens in general development initiatives but also on creating economic and leadership opportunities for groups that faced barriers to economic and political participation. Notably, these programs successfully trained and engaged the private sector in the economic reform process and combined leadership and job skills training for youth to build both their advocacy skills and economic opportunities. Such democracy aid programs may be particularly important in countries with low human development, where poverty often fuels rural-to-urban migration, indirectly diluting the strength of poor constituencies once concentrated in rural areas but now diffused across urban areas. Democracy aid programs like those seen in Benin, which not only link democratic and economic objectives, but also build the advocacy skills and mobilization power of politically and economically marginalized groups, are well designed for countries with low human development and should be expanded in the future.

**Aid dependence and political fractionalization—while detrimental to economic and political progress generally—created opportunities for donors to play a role in agenda-setting and to influence the democratization process.** Guinea’s capacity and funding deficits, and Benin’s dependence on aid prior to its democratic transition, created the initial windows for aid interventions to influence the early transition process. In Benin in the 1990s and 2000s, the highly fractionalized political system led to paralysis within the policymaking apparatus, weakened the parliament relative to the executive, and created an opportunity for donors to have a much greater influence in guiding policy and institutional development. Benin’s institutional development and democratic progress was thus by no means set at the beginning of the study period, despite the country having a stronger civil service bureaucracy and stronger foundations for civil society at the start of the study. Instead, many key reforms during democratization—such as building the accountability and transparency of the public
bureaucracy and reducing corruption—occurred as a result of donor interventions that earmarked release of funds for specific reforms.

The Benin-Guinea case study highlights several findings regarding aid focused on decentralization.

**Progress in decentralization did not impact democratic development overall when civil society did not have the capacity to use these newly decentralized, participatory mechanisms of government.** In Guinea, the bulk of democracy aid fell under the first hypothesis—focused on increasing the representativeness of government institutions—and, within that, under decentralization focused on increasing the representativeness and responsiveness of local government. This strong focus on decentralization alone, however, was not enough to impact sectoral or overall democracy levels in Guinea. The country thus achieved decentralization, but this did not lead to democratization. Without simultaneously building civil society capacity, civil society remained weak and unable to fully engage with or leverage these decentralized government institutions. The decentralization achieved through formal institutional reforms thus did not have the desired impact on engaging civil society, making government more responsive to public needs, and increasing democratic development overall.

**Progress in decentralization did not impact government effectiveness or overall democratic development when the central government continued to constrain the financial and policymaking capacity of local governments.** In Guinea, most of the implemented decentralization aid fell under Hypothesis 1, intending to increase the representativeness and effectiveness of government, and little was effectively implemented under Hypothesis 2, which captured aid pursuing decentralization as a check on the national government. This led to a gap between the ideas and the reality of the decentralized system in Guinea. Despite decentralization being successful on a technical level, the national government retained financial and policymaking power over local governments. Decentralization was thus a tool of the national government more than a vertical check on the power of that national government and, hence, did not contribute to democratic development.

**Even though decentralization did not contribute directly to democratization in Guinea, it did play an important, positive role in serving as a bulwark during a national crisis.** Even with the death of President Conté in 2008, and the bloodless coup and national instability that ensued, there was on the whole stability at the local level across Guinea during this politically tumultuous time. This perhaps demonstrates the success of efforts to strengthen local institutions in the time period before the coup, as these local government institutions continued to operate in a stable way despite national political instability during and following the 2008 coup.
The Benin-Guinea case study highlights several findings regarding aid programs focused on building bureaucratic accountability and horizontal checks across the national government.

**A lack of progress in bureaucratic accountability and checks on the executive can undermine progress in other institutional reforms.** In Guinea, most of the country’s aid for formal institutional reforms fell under the first hypothesis—focused specifically on decentralization. The limited and late focus on building bureaucratic accountability and horizontal checks across the national government left the strong executive largely unchecked for most of the study period. Thus, despite the strengthening of local government capacity in Guinea, the national executive and other national governance institutions still had limited capacity for democratic governance and limited incentive to democratize.

On the other hand, in Benin, much of the country’s aid fell under the second hypothesis—focused on institutional checks and balances—and, within that, under aid to build horizontal checks on the executive and aid to build bureaucratic accountability. Though Benin had a comparatively stronger and more professional bureaucracy at its time of democratic transition, democracy aid nonetheless focused early on shoring up the accountability, transparency, and checks related to the national bureaucracy and executive. This allowed greater oversight of a strong executive and ensured greater checks on all governing institutions in a political system seen as fractionalized and heavily partisan.

**Corruption undermined not only democratic progress in Guinea but also implementation of democracy aid programs targeting formal institutional reforms.** Corruption reflected the central barrier to advancing institutional reforms in Guinea. Yet aid interventions focused primarily on other aspects of government reform—namely creating vertical checks and balances—and turned in earnest to anti-corruption programs and bureaucratic accountability only very late in the study period after the 2008 coup. The negative impact that corruption had on Guinea’s democratic progress generally and on aid program success in particular highlights that starting aid programs earlier in the area of bureaucratic accountability and transparency could have paid dividends in advancing other aid programs and democratization more broadly. When facing corruption, aid programs should address bureaucratic and executive deficiencies alongside or before seeking to create other checks on that executive.

In contrast, in Benin, aid programs focused early on building transparency and accountability in the national executive as a way to increase the proper functioning and legitimacy of the democratic system. In doing so, these programs attempted to harness the bureaucratic strength in Benin held over from the years of authoritarianism, while eliminating the accompanying legacies of corruption and political patronage.
The Benin-Guinea case study highlights prospects for aid interventions to develop integrated programming across all of these areas.

**Integrated democracy programming may be a strategy for ensuring that capacity deficits in one part of the democratic system do not undermine progress made by aid in another part of the democratic system.** In Benin, more aid programs pursued activities that advanced more than one goal simultaneously. USAID and UNDP had programs that sought to create public participation mechanisms in national government institutions (under Hypothesis 1) and horizontal checks across national institutions (under Hypothesis 2). Denmark implemented programs focused on decentralization both as a means of building the responsiveness and representativeness of government (under Hypothesis 1) and as a means of creating vertical checks on the national government (under Hypothesis 2). USAID had a long-standing successful program that focused on all three areas, supporting decentralization (under Hypothesis 1), horizontal checks and bureaucratic checks within the national government (under Hypothesis 2), and civil society checks on government (under Hypothesis 3).

In Benin, more aid programs pursued activities that advanced more than one goal simultaneously. USAID and UNDP had programs that sought to create public participation mechanisms in national government institutions (under Hypothesis 1) and horizontal checks across national institutions (under Hypothesis 2). Denmark implemented programs focused on decentralization both as a means of building the responsiveness and representativeness of government (under Hypothesis 1) and as a means of creating vertical checks on the national government (under Hypothesis 2). USAID had a long-standing successful program that focused on all three areas, supporting decentralization (under Hypothesis 1), horizontal checks and bureaucratic checks within the national government (under Hypothesis 2), and civil society checks on government (under Hypothesis 3).

In Guinea, on the other hand, aid programs were focused predominantly on decentralization for most years of the study, with only one program that integrated activities across democratization goals spanning more than one hypothesis in this study. Particularly given the findings noted earlier—that substantial progress in one area of institutional reform in Guinea did not lead to democratic development without commensurate progress in civil society—the integrated program designs seen in Benin may be an important way for donors to ensure that progress made by aid in one part of the democratic system is not undermined by deficits in another part of the democratic system.

Looking at both Guinea and Benin in the aggregate, it is hard to separate their divergent political histories from the effectiveness of aid programs. Benin was the first country on the continent in which an incumbent president willfully stepped down after losing a fair election. The precedent for stability created a political system that was almost stable to a fault where multi-party pluralism was more important than government effectiveness. This feature of Beninese democracy has led to immobility in Benin’s democratic institutions at times, challenging both domestic policymaking and donor aid programs. However, donor aid has played an important role in consolidating democracy in Benin by modernizing its public service and promoting civil society reforms that address some of the fractionalization and effectiveness challenges in Benin.

Guinea, comparatively, has suffered from an intransigent military that focused on consolidating its own power rather than promoting democratic reforms. Even when promoting democratization, the military backslid and subverted its own reforms. This has meant that Guinea’s limited civil service does not have the capacity to govern or the ability to effectively use governance aid to consolidate democracy. Donors are frequently frustrated by setbacks and crises that disrupt projects. The result is thus mixed in Guinea, with tangible results coming from
some aid projects in Guinea but still not translating to an impact on broader democratic development in Guinea.

What donors can glean from the comparative experiences of Benin and Guinea is that building the accountability of the public bureaucracy, creating strong horizontal checks on the executive, and, above all, promoting civic participation have been key factors to Benin’s success. This study does not wish to discourage or downplay efforts for democratization in Guinea but rather highlight which factors may be more likely to play a role in successful democratic consolidation. As such, there are still many unanswered questions. Further studies could include a deeper look into success indicators and attribution of impact to specific aid programs to pinpoint which governance aid programs are more effective. This study may not provide all the answers but hopes to provide a backdrop from which to study these important questions.
Appendix A. Decision Rules and Evidence Used to Assess Hypotheses

This study tested each of its three hypotheses by examining the implementation and impact of democracy aid programs falling under that hypothesis. We used the following decision rules and evidence to determine if we would reject or fail to reject each hypothesis for each case pairing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory 1</th>
<th>Formal government institutions are the central mechanism by which democratic change takes root.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>Democracy aid programs that <em>increase the representativeness of formal government institutions</em> will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical test</td>
<td>Evidence that would cause us to fail to reject this hypothesis:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• After implementation of the democracy aid program:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | • **Criterion 1**: The government adopted and/or allowed the program’s intended reforms.  
  Evidence: Program activities and outputs were achieved (assessed based on donor program documents). |
| | • **Criterion 2**: These reforms contributed to the targeted type of formal representation.  
  Evidence: Program outputs impacted the targeted institution as intended (assessed based on donor program documents and this study’s qualitative research). |
| | • **Criterion 3**: The targeted type of formal representation contributed to democratization in the country. Evidence: On the quantitative side, the country’s sectoral and overall democracy scores went up (measured by Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2*) to assess overall democracy levels and by the World Governance Indicators’ *Voice and Accountability* and *Government Effectiveness* to assess sectoral democracy levels related to the representativeness and responsiveness of government institutions. On the qualitative side, these reforms contributed to key historical or contextual factors known to be influential in the country’s democratic development (assessed based on this study’s qualitative research). |
| | Evidence that would cause us to reject this hypothesis: |
| | • After implementation of the democracy aid program: |
| | • The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but they did not contribute to the democratic reform of the institution (criterion 2), or  
  Democratic reform of the institution was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3). |
| | • Little or no democracy aid focused on this type of institutional reform, and the country’s sectoral democracy score went up. |
| | • Across the pair, similar countries adopted the same types of institutional reforms, and they experienced different democratic trajectories. |

| Hypothesis 2 | Democracy aid programs that *increase checks and balances across formal government institutions* will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development. |
| Empirical test | Evidence that would cause us to fail to reject this hypothesis: |
| | • After implementation of the democracy aid program: |
| | • **Criterion 1**: The government adopted and/or allowed the program’s intended reforms.  
  Evidence: Program activities and outputs were achieved (assessed based on donor program documents). |
| | • **Criterion 2**: These reforms contributed to the targeted type of formal institutional balance. Evidence: Program outputs impacted the targeted institution as intended (assessed based on donor program documents and this study’s qualitative research). |
| | • **Criterion 3**: The targeted type of formal institutional balance contributed to |
democratization in the country. **Evidence:** On the quantitative side, the country’s sectoral and overall democracy scores went up (measured by Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* to assess overall democracy levels and by the World Governance Indicators’ *Rule of Law* and *Control of Corruption* to assess sectoral democracy levels related to balanced and accountable government institutions). On the qualitative side, these reforms contributed to key historical or contextual factors known to be influential in the country’s democratic development (assessed based on this study’s qualitative research).

Evidence that would cause us to reject this hypothesis:

- After implementation of the democracy aid program:
  - The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but they did not contribute to the democratic reform of the institution (criterion 2), or
  - Democratic reform of the institution was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).
- Little or no democracy aid focused on this type of institutional reform, and the country’s sectoral democracy score went up.
- Across the pair, similar countries adopted the same types of institutional reforms, and they experienced different democratic trajectories.

### Theory 2

**Political change is driven by informal processes and norms.**

#### Hypothesis 3

Democracy aid programs that *build informal democratic processes and norms* will lead to improvements in a country’s democratic development.

#### Empirical test

Evidence that would cause us to fail to reject this hypothesis:

- After implementation of the democracy aid program:
  - Criterion 1: The local partner adopted the program’s intended reforms. **Evidence:** Program activities and outputs were achieved (assessed based on donor program documents).
  - Criterion 2: These reforms contributed to the targeted type of informal democratic process or norm. **Evidence:** Program outputs impacted the targeted process or norm (assessed based on donor program documents and this study’s qualitative research).
  - Criterion 3: The targeted type of informal democratic process or norm contributed to democratization in the country. **Evidence:** On the quantitative side, the country’s sectoral and overall democracy scores went up (measured by Freedom House’s *Freedom Status* and Polity IV’s *Polity2* to assess overall democracy levels and by the World Governance Indicators’ *Voice and Accountability* to assess sectoral democracy levels related to informal democratic norms). On the qualitative side, these reforms contributed to key historical or contextual factors known to be influential in the country’s democratic development (assessed based on this study’s qualitative research).

Evidence that would cause us to reject this hypothesis:

- After implementation of the democracy aid program:
  - The aid program’s reforms were adopted (criterion 1) but there was no increase in the targeted informal democratic process or norm (criterion 2), or
  - The targeted informal democratic process or norm was achieved (criterion 2) but the country’s level of democracy stayed the same or went down (criterion 3).
  - Little or no democracy aid focused on this type of reform, and the country’s sectoral democracy score went up.
  - Across the pair, similar countries achieved the same types of reforms, and they experience different democratic trajectories.
Appendix B. Indicators Used in Case Matching

This study’s case matching process aimed to account for factors outside democracy and governance assistance that could impact variations in countries’ democratic development. Below is a summary of the indicators and sources used in each stage of the matching process—described in more detail in Chapter 1.

Stage 1: All countries were matched first on the similarity of their democratic trends prior to the start of the study in 1990. This included measures of short- and long-term democratic trends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short-term democratic trends</strong></td>
<td>Difference between Polity2 in 1985, 1989</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average of Polity2 from 1985-1989</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term democratic trends</strong></td>
<td>Difference between Polity2 in 1972, 1989</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average of Polity2 from 1972-1989</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stage 2: Countries with the most similar democratic starting points in 1990 were then paired based on six, equally weighted indicators. These sought to control for alternative explanations for democratic development and key predictors of democracy aid allocation and effectiveness. Data were used for the most complete range of years available for each indicator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional democratic diffusion</strong></td>
<td>Average polity score of the country's neighbors, where &quot;neighbor&quot; is defined as sharing a land border or being within 200 miles by sea (avg. from 1990-2008)</td>
<td>Polity IV, COW Direct Contiguity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stage 3: The computer-assisted matching done in Stages 1 and 2 produced a list of prospective case study pairs. Final pairs were then selected that have similar levels of total democratic assistance and similar conditions on a broader range of pertinent socioeconomic and political factors but dissimilar democratic outcomes (see below).

| Economic growth | Annual growth in real GDP (avg. from 1990-2008) | World Bank | Prior studies indicate that democracy aid is more effective in countries with low GDP (Finkel et al.) and that low GDP is a predictor of aid allocation (Nielsen and Nielson, Findley et al.) Numerous studies assert links between economic growth and democratic development (Przeworski and Limongi, Przeworski et al., Gleditsch and Ward) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | Probability that two randomly paired citizens will be of the same ethnicity (2003) | Fearon and Laitin | Prior study found that democracy aid is more effective in countries with high ethnic fractionalization (Finkel et al.) |
| Conflict | Conflict events (battles and violence against civilians, avg. from 1997-2010) | Armed Conflict Location and Event Data | Prior study found that democracy aid is less effective in conditions of political conflict (Finkel et al.) |
| Trade with donors | Natural log of combined exports and imports between the country and all DAC donor countries (avg. from 1990-2008) | OECD | Prior studies found trade is a predictor of democracy aid allocation (Nielsen and Nielson) across many types of democracy aid (Findley et al.), with trade partners receiving more democracy aid |
| Military alliances with donors | Indicator variable with 1 indicating the country has one or more military alliances with a DAC donor country, 0 if not (avg. from 1990-2003) | ATOP | Prior studies found trade is a predictor of democracy aid allocation (Nielsen and Nielson) across many types of democracy aid (Findley et al.), with alliance partners receiving less DG aid |

| Indicators (in order of importance in case matching) | Total democracy aid received 1990-2010 (USAID, USG, All donors) | Total democracy aid received 1980-89 (USAID, USG, All donors) |
| Colonial history |
| Cold War alliance |
| Natural resources |
| Population size |
| Land size |

Prior studies using a variety of methods and datasets have provided consistent findings that democratic diffusion from neighboring countries has a positive impact on a country’s democratic development. For example, Gleditsch and Ward, 917-921, 924-925; and Daniel Brinks and Michael Copadge, “Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy,” *Comparative Political Studies* 39, 4 (2006): 463-489.

Gleditsch and Ward find that democracies are more likely to survive in contexts with lower conflict, 924, 926.


Ibid., 518.


Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” *Political Studies* 44, 4 (1996), 937. Hall and Taylor describe the institutional organization of a state as the “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity” that structure “relations among legislators, organized interests, the electorate and the judiciary,” 938.


18 Finkel, Liñan, and Seligson; and Finkel et al.

19 These hypotheses were developed by the full research team comprised of Ashley Moran, Brooke Russell, Daniel Robles-Olson, Matt Deal, and Rob Wieczorek.

20 For aid programs that include activities spanning more than one of these categories, we assign each distinct component the aid program to its appropriate category.

21 Case matching was implemented in collaboration with Rich Nielsen, based on a computer-assisted case matching methodology he developed to leverage large amounts of data in identifying the best statistical matches for paired comparisons. For the methodology underlying his computer-assisted matching, see Rich Nielsen, “Case Selection via Matching,” Sociological Methods & Research, online release (October 27, 2014): 1-29. For the present study, the author selected indicators for use in case matching based on a review of relevant literature, then Nielsen applied his model in the first two stages of case matching described in this chapter.

22 For the methodology underlying his computer-assisted matching, see Nielsen 2014.

23 Prior studies have shown that democratic diffusion is associated with democratic development. See Gleditsch and Ward; and Brinks and Coppedge.

24 Prior studies have found consistent links between economic growth and democratic development; see Przeworski and Limongi, Przeworski at al., and Gleditsch and Ward. Further, studies have found that democracy aid is more effective in countries with low GDP (see Finkel et al.) and that low GDP is a predictor of democracy aid allocation; for the latter, see Richard Nielsen and Daniel Nielson, “Triage for Democracy: Selection Effects in Governance Aid,” unpublished manuscript, August 2010; and Mike Findley et al., “Preliminary Results: Finding the Bright Spots in USAID Democracy and Governance Assistance to Africa,” unpublished manuscript developed for the Robert Strauss Center, April 2011.

25 A prior study found that democracy aid is more effective in countries with high ethnic fractionalization; see Finkel et al.

26 A prior study found that democracy aid is less effective in conditions of political conflict; see Finkel et al.

27 Prior studies found that trade and military alliances are predictors of democracy aid allocation (Nielsen and Nielson) across many types of democracy aid (Findley et al.), with trade partners receiving more democracy aid and military alliance partners receiving less democracy aid.

28 “Total democracy aid” was based on the amount of democracy and good governance aid committed from 1990 to 2010, as reported by AidData, AidData 2.2 Provisional Dataset, accessed September 12, 2013. The “level of democratic development” was assessed using Polity IV and Freedom House scores.

29 See Chapter 2 for the full set of findings from Brooke Escobar’s study of Burundi and Rwanda, and see Chapter 3 for the full set of findings from Daniel Robles-Olson’s study of Benin and Guinea.


40 Freedom House, *Rwanda*.


43 Lemarchand, “Consciociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa.”


47 Nancy Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About Postwar Democratization.”


53 Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create Institutions”; and Ojendal and Lilja, *Beyond Democracy in Cambodia*.

54 Englebert and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa.”


57 Engleburg and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa.”

58 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States.”


62 Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create Institutions”; Ojendal and Lilja, Beyond Democracy in Cambodia; and Paris, At Wars End.


64 See the section of this chapter on institutional reforms for more details.

65 Kurtenbach and Seifert, Development Cooperation after War and Violent Conflict.


67 Ottaway, “Promoting Democracy After Conflict.”

68 Kühne, “The Role of Elections in Emerging Democracies and Post-Conflict Countries.”

69 Flores and Nooruddin, “The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction.”

70 Kühne, “The Role of Elections in Emerging Democracies and Post-Conflict Countries.”

71 Flores and Nooruddin, “The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction.”

72 Kühne, “The Role of Elections in Emerging Democracies and Post-Conflict Countries.”


74 Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About Postwar Democratization”; and Flores and Nooruddin, “The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction.”


78 Engleburt and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa”; and Ojendal and Lilja, Beyond Democracy in Cambodia.

79 Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create Institutions”; and Engleburt and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa.”

80 Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About Postwar Democratization.”

81 Flores and Nooruddin, “The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction.”


83 Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create Institutions.”

84 Ibid.

85 Kurtenbach and Seifert, Development Cooperation after War and Violent Conflict.

86 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States”; and Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About Postwar Democratization.”


89 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States”; Rondinelli and Montgomery, “Regime Change and Nation Building”; and Brinkerhoff, “Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies.”

90 Rondinelli and Montgomery, “Regime Change and Nation Building.”


95 Ibid.

96 Rafti, A Perilous Path to Democracy.


98 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

99 Musoni, “Innovations in Governance and Public Administration.”

Appendices and Endnotes


102 Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship”; and Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

103 Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda.”


105 Ibid.

106 Musoni, “Innovations in Governance and Public Administration.”

107 Ibid.

108 Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

109 Ibid.


111 Burnet, “Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda.”


116 Frére, “After the Hate Media.”

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.


120 Frére, “After the Hate Media.”

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid., 342.

123 Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

124 Musoni, “Innovations in Governance and Public Administration.”

125 Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

126 Musoni, “Innovations in Governance and Public Administration”; and Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

127 Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes.”


130 Rafti, *A Perilous Path to Democracy*; and Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

131 Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda.”


137 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

138 Rafti, *A Perilous Path to Democracy*.

139 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

140 Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*.

141 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

142 Rafti, *A Perilous Path to Democracy*.

143 Ibid.

144 Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

145 Ibid.

146 Rafti, *A Perilous Path to Democracy*; and Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

147 Burnet, “Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda”; and Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”


149 Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship.”


152 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

153 Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”


157 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”


159 Burnet, “Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda.”

160 Ibid.

161 Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On”; and Rafti, *A Perilous Path to Democracy*

162 Pottier, *Re-Imagining Rwanda*.

163 Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On”; and Pottier, *Re-Imagining Rwanda*. 

Sarken, “The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda”; and Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

Sarken, “The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda.”


As quoted in Sarken, “The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda.”


Rafti, A Perilous Path to Democracy; and Burnet, “Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda.”


Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda.

Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Rafti, A Perilous Path to Democracy; and Silva-Leander, “On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation.”

Rafti, “A Perilous Path to Democracy.”


Ibid.

Uvin, Aiding Violence; and Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda.”


Sarken, “The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda.”


Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On.”

Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”

Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes”; and Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda.”

Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda.”


Daley, “Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa.”


As quoted in Daley, “Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa.”

Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi.”

Ibid.

Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa”; and Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi.”


Ashild Falch, Power-Sharing to Build Peace?: The Burundi Experience with Power-Sharing Agreements (Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2008); and Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi.”


Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi.”

Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa.”


Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa.”


Reyntjens, “Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War?”; and Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa.”

Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi.”

Daley, “Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa.”


Ngeruko and Nkurunziza, “An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi.”

Daley, “Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa.”

CIA, “Burundi.”


Frère, “After the Hate Media.”

Ibid.

International Center for Transitional Justice, Burundi; and Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa.”

As quoted in Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa.”


225 See Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the three causal mechanisms and hypotheses explored in this case study.


227 See methodology section in Chapter 1.


229 Until 2001, Rwanda was divided into prefectures, which were in turn divided into subprefectures, communes, sectors, and, lastly, cells. In 2001, Rwanda’s subnational units were reorganized into provinces and districts, with provinces serving as the equivalent of the prior ‘prefectures’ and districts serving as the equivalent of the prior ‘communes.’


246 World Bank, Decentralization and Community Development Program for the Republic of Rwanda, Project Appraisal Document, 94. Netherlands 2002-2005 project titled Decentralization and Economic Development Support through Participatory Approach (PADDEP) in Ruhengeri Province; the project directed at MINALOC ran from 2003-2004 and is titled National Program of Support to Decentralization; evaluation project titled Evaluation of the 1st Phase of the National Decentralization Program and ran for only one year in 2003.

247 World Bank, Decentralization and Community Development Program for the Republic of Rwanda, Project Appraisal Document, 96. Project title: Management and Decentralization Unit (DMU) at MINALOC.


255 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning decentralization in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional), downloaded March 14, 2013.


257 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning Gacaca in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional), downloaded March 14, 2013.

258 AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional), downloaded March 14, 2013; and UNDP Rwanda, 2007 Annual Report.

260 USAID, Assessment of the Judicial Sector in Rwanda, report prepared by CAGEP-Consult for USAID (Kigali: USAID, 2002), 69.


262 See Belgium projects specifically mentioning Gacaca in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional), downloaded March 14, 2013.


273 ARD, Land Dispute Management in Rwanda: Final Report, 17.


276 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


278 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data that focused on elections in Rwanda, AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


281 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description) between 2002 and 2003. All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).

282 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description) between 2007 and 2008. All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


Ibid.


Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Millennium Challenge Account Threshold: Strengthen Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Voice and Accountability: Threshold Agreement (Washington: MCC, 2008), 11. This MCC agreement ran from 2008-2011, though the component discussed here that focused on citizen participation ran only through 2010.


Ibid.

UNDP Rwanda, Delivering as One 2011 Annual Report.

This land bill was amended and passed as the Organic Land Law in mid-2005 (Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005).


USAID Rwanda, Rwanda Decentralization Assessment.

USAID documents differentiate between ministries that deliver services to the public (line ministries) and those that do not deal with the public (technical ministries).

USAID Rwanda, Rwanda Decentralization Assessment, 31-41.


Ibid.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


Ibid., 34.


World Bank, Community and Social Development Project: Implementation Completion and Results Report, 10-12.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects to Burundi specifically mentioning decentralization in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects between 1993-1994 to Burundi specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects between 2004-2005 to Burundi specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects between 2004-2005 to Burundi specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects between 2004-2005 to Burundi specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


Ibid., 34.


Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects between 2009-2010 to Burundi specifically mentioning elections in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


Ibid., 6.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects to Burundi specifically mentioning participation in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description) excluding the U.S. All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, *Research Release 2.1 (Provisional)*.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data, including projects to Burundi specifically mentioning participation in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description) excluding the U.S. projects. AidData, *Research Release 2.1 (Provisional)*.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data from the U.S. to Burundi, AidData, *Research Release 2.1 (Provisional)*.


Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa.”


Friedman, “Kagame’s Rwanda”, 267.


Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Nordic Consulting Group, *Decentralisation in SDC’s Bilateral Cooperation: Relevance, Effectiveness, Sustainability and Comparative Advantage (English translation)*, 127.

Freedom House, *Freedom in the World – Country Ratings and Status*; and Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, *Polity IV Project*. The *Polity2* indicator scores countries on a scale ranging from -10 (signifying that it is strongly autocratic) to +10 (signifying that it is strongly democratic).

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability
indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  

356 Ibid. The Government Effectiveness indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.  

357 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, Polity IV Project. The Political Competitiveness variable scores countries on a scale ranging from 1 (signifying no political competition) to 10 (signifying strong political competition).  


359 Smith et al., Rwanda Democracy and Governance Assessment, 20.  

360 Ibid., 8.  

361 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.”  

362 Rafti, A Perilous Path to Democracy.  


364 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, Polity IV Project. The Political Competitiveness variable scores countries on a scale ranging from 1 (signifying no political competition) to 10 (signifying strong political competition).  


367 Palmans, Burundi’s 2010 Elections, 13.  

368 Brinkerhoff, Fort, and Stratton, Good Governance and Health: Assessing Progress in Rwanda, 6.  

369 Ibid., 33.  

370 Smith et al., Rwanda Democracy and Governance Assessment, 7-8.  

371 Ibid., 8.  

372 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.”  

373 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  

374 Smith et al., Rwanda Democracy and Governance Assessment, 7.  

375 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda; and Smith et al., Rwanda Democracy and Governance Assessment, 7.  


377 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Control of Corruption indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.  


380 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically focused on OAG from the Netherlands to Rwanda. All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).
Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically focused on OAG from Sweden to Rwanda. All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). AidData projects focused on public financial management, constant prices.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically focused on the Ombudsman Office from Netherlands (Nationale Ombudsman Rwanda) or UNDP (Support to Ombudsman Office). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically focused on ‘public financial management’ or ‘anti-corruption’ based on descriptive information. All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report: Poverty Reduction Series Four to Seven, 13.


Ibid.


Ibid., 6.


USAID, Rwanda Integrated Strategic Plan through FY 2004 (Revised), 9.


USAID, Rwanda Integrated Strategic Plan through FY 2004 (Revised), 9.

Based on analysis of projects focused on the Justice sector (1995-1996), Project IDs - Belgium (9809260, 9808218, 13535946, 13534258), Canada (10204160, 1305281), EC (0560111), Netherlands (13712765), Switzerland (10149134, 10153154), AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.

USAID, Rwanda Integrated Strategic Plan through FY 2004 (Revised); and USAID, “Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance” (1997-2000), Project IDs 11196370, 12105341, 13223344, 13223310, 13223276, 13223242, 15053911, 1505944, 1505978, 15036012, 1505877, AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.


Based on analysis of projects focused on the Justice sector (1997-2000), Project IDs – Belgium (10611586, 10618386, 10623633, 11325413, 11326479, 11330756, 11330790, 12313166, 14010617, 14021605, 14021644, 14022396, 14034981, 14059727, 10622392, 11329347, 12313490, 14037217), Canada (12045048, 12045575, 226
13124847), Denmark (10657608), France (12377126), Germany (14264492, 14194940), Netherlands (11618348, 12610714, 14366251, 9992395), Sweden (12803001), Switzerland (10973626), UK (14668683, 11857208), UNDP (13411860), AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.


USAID, Rwanda Integrated Strategic Plan through FY 2004 (Revised); and USAID, Results Review and Resource Request (R4): FY 2002.

Based on analysis of projects focused on the Justice sector (1997-2000), Project IDs – Belgium (15355258, 15355302, 15364325, 15364369, 17062061, 17062100, 17062139, 17065571, 18947625, 18947663, 18947739, 18946915), Netherlands (15798093, 15798130, 15798204, 17497462, 17497698, 19360351, 19361456), Austria (18886297), Ireland (16269169), Portugal, (19579182), Sweden (19608887), UK (19749082), AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.

Based on analysis of projects focused on the Justice sector (2004-2010), Project IDs – Belgium 21219595, 23689537, 23689846, 27603904, 27606551, 27607213, 31147571, 31147614, 31148499, 35260340, 35264707, 50007285, 50007320, 50118986, 94677939, AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.

Based on analysis of projects focused on the Justice sector (2004-2010), Project IDs – Netherlands 21770193, 21770580, 21770624, 21771086, 24340111, 24340327, 28204019, 50026617, 96751537, AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.

Programme of Support for Good Governance running from 2007-2010. This project included support for the Supreme Court, the police, and the Ministry of Justice. UNDP Rwanda, 2007 Annual Report.

Based on analysis of projects focused on the Justice sector excluding Belgium and Netherlands (2004-2010), Project IDs - 21770193, 21770580, 21770624, 21771086, 24340111, 24340327, 28204019, 50026617, 96751537, AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.

MCC, Strengthen Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Voice and Accountability, 23.


MCC, Strengthen Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Voice and Accountability, 23.

Smith et al., Rwanda Democracy and Governance Assessment, 7.


Based on analysis of projects focused on the Justice sector (2004-2010), Project IDs – Belgium 21219595, 23689846, 27603904, 27606551, 27607213, 31147571, 31147614, 31148499, 35260340, 35264707, 50007285, 50007320, 50118986, 94677939, AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional). 2009 constant USD prices.


Not many details are known about UNDP’s activities or their implementation before 2002. According to data available from AidData, the Netherlands contributed approximately $500 thousand to a basket fund project implemented by UNDP to support the legislature in 2000 (Project ID 14366891); USAID, ARD/SUNY Rwanda National Assembly Support Project: Final Report, 1-3.


Appendices and Endnotes

428 USAID, Rwanda National Assembly Support Project: Final Report, 5-10; and USAID, Rwanda Integrated Strategic Plan through FY 2004 (Revised).
433 Ibid.
437 Ibid.
439 USAID, Assessment of the Judicial Sector in Rwanda, 9.
441 Smith et al., Rwanda Democracy and Governance Assessment.
442 USAID, Results Review and Resource Request (R4): FY 2003; and USAID, Rwanda Integrated Strategic Plan through FY 2004 (Revised), 3.
445 Ibid., 4.
446 Ibid.
448 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Control of Corruption indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Burundi’s score in 1996 was -1.39.


Ibid., 8.


Based on analysis of projects focused on judicial sector support from Belgium, Project IDs 9236757, 12310837, 14016949, 14052878, 14048551, 15354997, 15364281, 35217479, 94752190. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional); Other small donors to this sector include Austria, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, and France.


Ibid., 13.


USAID, Burundi Initiative for Peace: Final Report, 6.


Netherlands, Netherlands Embassy Office Bujumbura-Burundi: Multi Annual Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 8.


Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Control of Corruption indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

Ibid.

Ibid. The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Rule of Law indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, Polity IV Project. The Executive Constraint variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives.

USAID, Assessment of the Judicial Sector in Rwanda, 100.


Freedom House, Freedom in the World – Country Ratings and Status; and Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, Polity IV Project. The Polity2 indicator scores countries on a scale ranging from -10 (signifying that it is strongly autocratic) to +10 (signifying that it is strongly democratic).
Appendices and Endnotes

479 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World – Country Ratings and Status*; and Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, *Polity IV Project*. The Polity2 indicator scores countries on a scale ranging from -10 (signifying that it is strongly autocratic) to +10 (signifying that it is strongly democratic).


484 Based on analysis of Belgium’s aid flows to civil society in Rwanda. Belgium AidData flows from Belgium focusing on civil society. All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, *Research Release 2.1 (Provisional)*.


487 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 2008-2010. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning civil society in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, *Research Release 2.1 (Provisional)*. Implementation details are not available for these projects.


Ibid.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 1999-2004. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning media in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. *AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional)*.


Nichols-Barrer et al., *Rwanda Threshold Program Evaluation*.


Ibid.

Ibid., 9


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 28


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 20.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 23.

Ibid., 23.

Ibid., 16.

Ibid., 24.

Ibid., 24.

Ibid., 12.

Ibid., 19.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 1990-2001. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning civil society in their descriptive fields (title, short...
description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).

535 The third one, which focused on increasing government’s capacity to respond to civil society, was discussed under hypothesis 1.


537 USAID, Burundi Initiative for Peace: Final Report.

538 Ibid.


540 Ibid.

541 Unfortunately, the fighting was still not completely halted with the 2000 peace accords since two major Hutu groups refused to sign. As such, violence actually increased across the country as the transitional government began its tenure.

542 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 2003-2004. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning civil society in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


547 Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 2005-2010. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning civil society in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).


552 Ibid.

553 Ibid., 12.


556 USAID, Fiscal Year 2008 Operational Plan for Burundi – Phase 1.


561 Ibid., 9; and USAID, Women’s Peace Center Activities in Burundi: Final Report, 4.


Many of these local NGOs were subsequently supported by International Alert. USAID, *The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace*, 23. The NGO mentioned working with women in Burundi was named Collective Women’s Organizations (CAFOB).

Unfortunately, the lack of comprehensive project documents from many donors likely means some activities are missing from this analysis.

United Kingdom, “Support to Community Based Participatory Development” (2001), Project ID 16152365, *AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).*


USAID, *Community-Focused Integration,* (Washington: USAID, 2006), 12


USAID, *Community-Focused Reintegration,* 20.


Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 2007-2010. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning civil society in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. *AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).*


USAID, *Case Study Six: Media Intervention in Peace Building in Burundi.*


Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 2001-2003. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning media in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).

USAID, Burundi Initiative for Peace: Final Report, 21.

Ibid., 19-20.

The media component constitutes roughly 18% of the total funding for the CIPRI project. USAID, USAID/OTI Community-Focused Reintegration Programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi: Final Evaluation, Report prepared by Social Impact, Inc. for USAID (Washington: USAID, 2006).

Ibid.

Ibid.

USAID, USAID/OTI Community-Focused Reintegration Programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi: Final Evaluation.

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Freedom House, Freedom in the World – Country Ratings and Status; and Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, Polity IV Project. The Polity2 indicator scores countries on a scale ranging from -10 (signifying that it is strongly autocratic) to +10 (signifying that it is strongly democratic).


Ibid., 14.

Ibid., 14.

Based on analysis of AidData Democracy and Governance data between 2005-2010. Figures represent total commitment amount from projects specifically mentioning media in their descriptive fields (title, short description, or long description). All financial figures given in 2009 constant USD prices. AidData, Research Release 2.1 (Provisional).

USAID, USAID/OTI Community-Focused Reintegration Programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi: Final Evaluation.

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Freedom House, Freedom in the World – Country Ratings and Status; and Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, Polity IV Project. The Polity2 indicator scores countries on a scale ranging from -10 (signifying that it is strongly autocratic) to +10 (signifying that it is strongly democratic).


Sanction 508 is a US law that prohibits aid flows going to a government that has unseated a democratically elected government. This sanction was applied to Burundi after Buyoya’s coup in 1996.

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The WGI indicators assess governance performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Freedom House, Freedom in the World – Country Ratings and Status; and Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, Polity IV Project. The Polity2 indicator scores countries on a scale ranging from -10 (signifying that it is strongly autocratic) to +10 (signifying that it is strongly democratic).


USAID Rwanda, Rwanda Decentralization Assessment, 23.


Ibid.

Ibid.

USAID, USAID/OTI Community-Focused Reintegration Programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi: Final Evaluation.


Ibid.


According to the Human Development Report from 2013, the education component is measured by the mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. Expected years of schooling estimates are based on enrollment by age at all levels of education and population of official school age for each level of education. Expected years of schooling are capped at 18 years. Life expectancy at birth is calculated using a minimum value of 20 years and an observed maximum of 83.57 years. For the wealth component, the goal post for minimum income is $100 U.S. Dollars Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the observed maximum is $87,478.


Bellin 2005, 131-150.

Przeworski et al. 2000, 78.

Ibid.

Ibid. The authors also recognize that income could be a proxy for education, but refute it showing that, across their sample, wealth makes democracies more stable independent of education level.

Ibid.

Stanley W. Samarasinghe, Series on Democracy and Health: Democracy and Democratization in Developing Countries (Boston: Data for Decision Making Project, Harvard School of Public Health, 1994).


Bowden et al. 2008.


Siegle 2006.

Ibid.


Siegle 2012.


Siegle 2012; and Siegle 2006.

Ibid.

Siegle 2012.

Siegle 2006.

Ibid.


Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

Communist party members were imprisoned for opposing the government and for protesting on behalf of students and public servants. Bierschenk 2009.

“Politicized groups” refers here to the groups that, although not formally opposition groups, formed coalitions within the new government.

Effective parties are defined here as parties that are representational and have bargaining power at a national level through coalitions. See Matthijs Bogaards, “Crafting Competitive Party Systems: Electoral Laws and the Opposition in Africa,” *Democratization* 7, 4 (2000): 163-190.

Crises included political unrest caused by opposition parties, close elections, and fluctuating majorities in the National Assembly.


Bah 2013.

Mann 2013.

Goerg 1980.

Ibid.

Picard 2010.
See Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the three causal mechanisms and hypotheses explored in this case study.

Bah 2013.


Ibid., 16-18.

Ibid., 16.


Ibid.

Ibid.; and Bah 2005.


Ibid., 2.

UNDP 2006, 16.


Ibid.; and USAID 2010, 2.


Bierschenk 2009.

Clotaire Olihide and Orden Alladatin, Etat des Lieux et Modalités de Correction de la LEPI (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), 2-5.


DANIDA, Alignment Strategies in the Field of Decentralisation and Local Governance: DANIDA (Copenhagen, DANIDA, 2009), 19-22.


Ibid. The WGI indicators assess government performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Appendices and Endnotes


734 Ibid.; and USAID 2010, 2.


738 UNDP 2008, 6-8.


741 AfDB 2010, 1, 5, 7-8.

742 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Benin, *Table of Key Indicators* (Cotonou: MCC Benin, 2011), 1.


748 AfDB 2010, 1, 3-9.

749 USAID 2006, 9.


751 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi. The WGI indicators measure government performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The *Rule of Law* indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

752 Ibid. The WGI indicators measure government performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The *Control of Corruption* indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.


754 Ibid.


USAID 2010.
MCC 2012, 1.
MCC Benin 2011, 1.
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi. The WGI indicators assess government performance on a range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The Voice and Accountability indicator seeks to measure perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.