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CLIMATE CHANGE
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POLITICAL STABILITY



Shocks and Politics: The Political Economy of Natural Disasters in Africa

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
Background

- Third course-based research initiative in CCAPS program
- Goal: to evaluate the causes of variation in African governments' efforts to reduce the risk of, prepare for, and respond to natural shocks

Existing Research

- Rich literature on incentives to invest – in development generally and natural shocks in particular
 - Large number of potential explanations for variation
- Empirical testing re: hazards typically:
 - Relies on questionable quantitative data
 - Focuses on a single case study
 - Rarely considers interactive hypotheses
- Limited comprehensive evaluation of arguments

Research Scope



Medium-N Case Study Approach

- Five paired case studies of African countries
- Qualitative research, including fieldwork, conducted by graduate students at the LBJ School of Public Affairs
- Evaluation of a wide range of potential explanations for variation in national capacities to respond to natural hazards

Case Studies



Capacity Profiles

Country	Hyogo Priorities Capacity Scores				
	<i>H1: Political Priority</i>	<i>H2: Assessment/ Monitoring</i>	<i>H3: Culture of Safety</i>	<i>H4: Risk Reduction</i>	<i>H5: Response Preparedness</i>
<i>Ethiopia</i>	4.3	4.3	2.7	3.7	3.3
<i>Kenya</i>	3.0	4.0	3.4	2.6	2.3
<i>Gambia</i>	4.0	2.0	2.8	1.9	2.4
<i>Senegal</i>	3.5	2.8	3.2	2.0	3.1
<i>Ghana</i>	3.3	3.2	2.9	1.9	3.4
<i>Togo</i>	2.5	1.3	2.3	1.1	1.7
<i>Zambia</i>	4.3	3.3	2.8	2.1	3.3
<i>Zimbabwe</i>	2.1	3.0	4.1	1.8	3.0
<i>Malawi</i>	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.2

Hypothesis Categories

- Perceived risk
- Economic strength
- Electoral incentives
- Political development
- Moral hazard

Overall Findings

	Evidence to contradict mechanism										
	Evidence to support mechanism										
	Mixed evidence										
		Ethiopia	Kenya	Gambia	Senegal	Malawi	Mozambique	Ghana	Togo	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Perceived Risk	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Economic Strength	-	-	+	?	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Electoral Incentives	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Political Development	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Moral Hazard	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+

Perceived Risk & Economics

- Countries with high perceived risk are more likely to invest in DRM, even if poor
- But a lack of resources constrains most African states
- And some with economic resources have failed to invest

Democracy, Elections & Political Development

- Politics matters, but democracy often supports response over preparedness
- Political development matters regardless of democracy...
- ...and helps to explain otherwise puzzling cases

Moral Hazard

- This may be a risk in theory...
- ...but there is little evidence in practice
- Active focus on preparedness by international actors may explain why

Conclusions

- Comprehensive, qualitative assessment of African government capacities in DRM
- Evidence to support a number of dominant arguments...
- ...but more compelling is the interaction of multiple variables
- Moral hazard findings highlight importance of IOs and donors in ensuring DRR and preparedness

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