Welcome to the July issue of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) Conflict Trends report. Each month, ACLED researchers gather, analyse and publish data on political violence in Africa in realtime. Weekly updates to realtime conflict event data are published on the ACLED website.

This month’s issue includes conflict summaries on Chad, Mali and Somalia and focuses on simmering tensions between the UPC and the FPRC-MPC and Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation militia violence in Central African Republic, the trajectory of a peaceful protest to armed rebellion in Ethiopia, and political and land-motivated unrest and insurgency in the lead up to the August elections in Kenya. A Special Report explores Witchcraft and Vigilante Justice in Africa.

Elsewhere on the continent, CNDD-FDD attacks against civilians decreased as unrest continues in Burundi, battles increased between Mayi Mayi militia and military forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, riots and protests continued in central and southern Tunisia and overall conflict decreased by 47% from May to June in South Sudan.

Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Country, February - June 2017.
Chad
With 170 fatalities, June 2017 saw Chad’s highest monthly total of reported fatalities in the past decade. The fatalities occurred during a three-day battle between June 23 - 25 that saw the Chadian army and Boko Haram militants clash around a series of islands near the Nigerian border in the Bol area of Lac region. This region has been regularly targeted by Boko Haram attacks in the past, including a raid in May 2015 on the Kaiga border post. During the battle in June 2017 at least 162 militants and 8 Chadian soldiers were reported killed. These clashes are reminiscent of a significant clash in July 2015 resulted in a high number of fatalities (173 dead), although those clashes spanned a two-week period compared to the shorter but much more intense fighting in terms of reported fatalities in June 2017. Viewed from the wider regional perspective, these events support the larger trend towards military defeats suffered by Boko Haram militants while fighting with state security forces, which includes similar incidents reported in Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria this year.

Mali
Mali saw a dramatic rise in reported fatalities in June 2017 to a total of 185 compared to an average of only 74 per month between January and May 2017. In terms of reported fatalities, June 2017 is the most violent month since the initial months of the French intervention in the country’s north in early 2013. This increase in reported fatalities is the result of at least two separate dynamics. The first is a trend of rising ethnic violence between various groups primarily situated in the Mopti area, which has motivated cycles of reprisals since February 2017. The second is the Group for Support of Islam and Muslim’s (JNIM) continued attacks on both hard and soft targets, including assaults on a resort frequented by foreigners in Bamako and a Malian army post in Bintagoungou. The simmering conflict between the government and rebel groups in the north also contributed to the significant rise in reported fatalities in June 2017, as the event with the highest reported fatalities (30) was a battle between the Coordination of Movements of the Azawad (CMA), the main rebel coalition, and Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA), a militia generally seen as aligned with the government.

Somalia
Insurgent activity continues to drive overall conflict levels in Somalia. Activity remains high in the first half of 2017, with over 2,500 fatalities since the beginning of the year. The risk to civilians in continues to be severe, and particularly so in Mogadishu. Throughout the month of June and first weeks of July al-Shabaab carried out assassination campaigns against government ministers in the capital. Al-Shabaab dispersed leaflets advising bystanders to avoid government buildings. While maintaining a heavy presence in southern regions, an increasing number of al-Shabaab’s efforts have begun to move north where fatalities peaked in June following an attack on Puntland forces at Af-Uurur. Al-Shabaab’s recent movements into the Puntland may be motivated by ideological competition with the Islamic State, whose influence around the town of Qandala grew in recent months. Throughout May and June, US drone strikes against al-Shabaab leadership personnel increased over the lull in the beginning of the year. Bolstered by AMISOM air forces, similar operations are focused in Lower Shabelle, and activity in Bari began in mid-June.

NB: Darker shading in the country maps indicates a higher number of relative conflict and protest events in the administrative region from 2014 - 2017.
Despite relatively low levels of reported violence in Central African Republic (CAR) between 2015/2016 (see Figure 2), there is a growing rift between the ex Seleka Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and the Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa (FPRC), which is allied with the Patriotic Movement for CAR (MPC). Starting in late 2016, this disjunction has caused the return of significant instability over the past few months. At the same time, another militia, the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (RRR) group, has become an important actor in the country’s west as a force opposed to the Anti-Balaka militias operating in the same areas. RRR was established in 2016 and is led by a Cameroonian known as Colonel Sidiki Abbas.

In terms of reported fatalities, May 2017 had levels of violence only surpassed during the heights of the conflict between the Seleka coalition and Anti-Balaka militias between December 2013 and February 2014 (see Figure 2). During that period, claims of ethnic cleansing by Anti-Balaka militias and clashes between them and the ex-Seleka factions (Reuters, 8 January 2015) were widespread. This instability prompted international interventions by France and several international organizations (Al Jazeera, 11 February 2014; The Guardian, 29 January 2014).

A major catalyst of the conflict between the UPC (plus their Anti-Balaka allies) and the FPRC-MPC was the declaration of an autonomous Republic of Logone by Nourredine Adam, the leader of the FPRC, in December 2015 (Reuters, 16 December 2015) with Bambari as its intended capital. However, this idea was condemned by the UPC’s leader Ali Darassa (Enough Project, 15 February 2017).

Following a period of growing animosity, a fight over a goldmine in November 2016 touched off significant fighting between the two groups (Human Rights Watch, 16 February 2017), often resulting in substantial numbers of reported fatalities. Although the fighting grew steadily following this incident, it came to a head in February 2017 with threats by the FPRC-MPC that they would march on Bambari (IBT, 6 March 2017), the nominal headquarters of the UPC and residence of Darassa. This outcome was only averted by MINUSCA airstrikes on FPRC-MPC columns heading to the city (Newsweek, 13 February 2017) followed by the negotiated withdrawal of Darassa and allied Anti-Balaka leaders from the city (IBT, 6 March 2017).

Following Darassa’s withdrawal from Bambari, the focus of the conflict has shifted as a result: the UPC moved into more rural areas, which led to a significant increase in reported fatalities in events attributed to the UPC and FPRC-MPC, from 48 in February 2017 to an average of over 150 between March and June 2017. Since February 2017, 16 out of the 27 high-fatality events (10 or more fatalities) in the country involved either the UPC or FPRC-MPC, while 5 out of 6 of events involving 50 or more reported fatalities involved these groups. A significant number of civilians have also been targeted by these groups. Out of the total 622 reported fatalities attributed to events involving the UPC and FPRC-MPC, over 230 of these were part of directed attacks on civilians specifically.

In the country’s western provinces, including Ouham, Ou-
Central African Republic

ham-Pendé and Nana-Mambéré, the RRR militia has become another notable source of violence in the country. This group was nominally formed as a counter-weight to the Anti-Balaka militias in these areas, with its leader Abass claiming that the RRR is the only group that stands in the way of continued attacks on Peuhl and Muslims in their areas of operation (Deutsche Welle, 30 April 2017). Although more active in reporting between September and November 2016, the group has continued to be involved in high fatality attacks in 2017. Their most recent attack in May 2017 involved an assault on the town of Niem (RJDH, 12 May 2017), situated near the Cameroonian border, causing 22 reported civilian fatalities. This type of event is indicative of the RRR’s overall activity, as 25 of the 33 events involving the group recorded since its creation in 2016 were events targeting civilians, while battles with Anti-Balaka groups accounted for the majority of the rest.

In terms of the geographic distribution of the violence carried out by these militias, Figure 3 shows the relatively clustered nature of the events. The conflict between the UPC and FPRC-MPC has largely taken place in the Ouaka region, and around Bambari specifically, with some spillover into neighbouring provinces. These battles fall along the rough line of territorial control between the two groups, with the provinces of Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran and Haute-Kotto representing the area controlled by the FPRC-MPC and the nominal territory of the Republic of Logone. The RRR meanwhile is engaged in battles and attacks across the western provinces of Ouham, Ouham-Pendé and Nana-Mambéré, although the majority of its activity is reported in and around towns and villages near the country’s porous border with Cameroon (see Figure 3).

The activity of these groups over the past year, and the general rising trend in fatalities to extraordinary levels as compared to the dynamics witnessed in 2015/2016, suggests that the UPC/FPRC-MPC conflict remains the main cause of insecurity in CAR. At the same time, sporadic attacks by RRR forces on civilians and clashes with Anti-Balaka in the west are also playing a supporting role. Together these dynamics suggest that long-term stability will not be secured until the central government can impose a semblance of order outside Bangui.
From November 2015, Ethiopia has experienced an unprecedented wave of popular mobilisation. The protests took place mainly in the Oromia region, spanning nearly 300 locations. They are generally seen as part of a movement that began in April-May 2014, when students across several locations in the region protested a plan to expand the boundary of the capital, Addis Ababa (hereafter, the Addis Ababa Master Plan). The 2014 protests, led by university students, were comparatively small and situated in the Western part of Oromia (see Figure 4). From November 2015, the demonstrations quickly gained momentum, and farmers, workers and other citizens soon joined the students in collective marches, boycotts and strikes (see ACLED, June 2017 for a more detailed background on the roots and dynamics of the protests).

Despite the government’s suspension of the Addis Ababa Master Plan in January 2016, the protests continued and expanded to other regions, such as Amhara and the SNNPR. The Amhara community joined the Oromo protests in August 2016, after a fatal clash between security forces and Amhara residents over the Wolkayt district’s identity issue ignited regionalist grievances (African Arguments, 27 September 2016). The continuation of the protests revealed widespread suspicion of the Ethiopian regime and enduring grievances among different ethnic groups, particularly in the way federalism is implemented, and in the way power and resources are shared. The Ethiopian government’s unrelenting use of lethal force against largely peaceful protesters since November 2015 has played a major role in bolstering a shared sense of oppression among the Oromo and other ethnic groups. Available data collected from international and local media since November 2015 points to more than 1,200 people reported killed during the protests. Approximately 660 fatalities are due to state violence against peaceful protesters, 250 fatalities from state engagement against rioters, and more than 380 people killed by security forces following the declaration of the state of emergency on 8 October 2016.

The state of emergency was declared after government violence at the Irecha festival in Oromia led to a “week of rage” among the opposition. The move cemented the government’s commitment to repression rather than dialogue (The Guardian, 20 October 2016; Amnesty, 18 October 2016). The state of emergency imposed tight restrictions that have since successfully curbed the protests. However significant developments have occurred in parallel, pointing to persisting discontent in Ethiopia.

First, the significant reduction in riots and protests accompanied an increase in battles involving security forces and foreign-based rebel groups, and in political and ethnic militia activity. Though the link between the protesters and the various armed groups remains unclear, these trends point to an escalation from peaceful unrest to an armed struggle taken up by local armed militias and rebel movements united in their aim to remove the government.

The ACLED dataset shows that rebel activity in 2016 was at its third highest since 1997 (see Figure 5). Rebellion reached unprecedented levels in Oromia and Tigray, led by the OLF and the AGUDM forces respectively; and in Amhara, rebellion led by the AGUDM forces resurfaced after two years of inactivity. So far in 2017, AGUDM has represented the most active rebel front in the country. The group significantly stepped up its attacks in June 2017, confronting government forces on several fronts in...
the Amhara region’s Gonder zone, and claiming a rare attack in Addis Ababa on a government ammunition depot. The movement’s leader recently announced that AGUDM’s attacks would not subside. Other rebel fronts, however, have been relatively inactive in 2017. As of end June, no attack had been claimed yet in 2017 by the OLF for instance.

In parallel, militant activity has significantly increased in Oromia and Amhara in 2017 (see Figure 6). Since January 2017, large numbers of the Oromo community have risen up against a marked increase in attacks and human rights violations in Oromia by state and paramilitary forces, such as the Liyu police. Data collected shows nearly 40 clashes between the two parties along the border with the Somali and Afar regions between 1 January - 8 July 2017, resulting in around 170 fatalities. This compares to only six clashes between Oromo militias and state forces during the protest period. The Oromo community identifies the increased activity by the Liyu police as a way for the government to usurp Oromo lands and further squash dissent (Opride, 5 March 2017). The assignment of federal soldiers to all members of the Oromia regional police in May after suspecting some of them of supporting Oromo militias in the recent clashes, revealed the government’s continued control of the country’s security apparatus. In Amhara, unidentified armed groups also engaged in various clashes with state forces and executed no less than 14 bomb and grenade attacks, mainly targeting state officials, between 1 January - 8 July 2017.

Secondly, the ruling party’s continued domination since the declaration of the state of emergency and failure to engage in a dialogue with the protesters underlines its lack of interest in addressing the grievances that motivated the protests in the first place. This suggests that there is a strong possibility of demonstrations resuming once the state of emergency is lifted at the end of July 2017. Several developments since the declaration of the state of emergency have reinforced the perception of government oppression among the protesters. Chief among them is the implementation of the state of emergency’s tight restrictions, which has led to hundreds of new fatalities and arrests, as well as to a pervasive state control of internet access and use. Many people have been arrested on the basis of social media posts perceived as inciting violence for instance, while the government imposed prolonged periods of nationwide Internet blackouts to control students during national examinations (Tadias Magazine, 13 June 2017; Africa News, 11 June 2017). The ruling party’s refusal to allow an independent probe into the protests has also fuelled a loss of hope among the protesters for a better form of government, which respects peoples’ basic
Ethiopia

Politically, the several changes introduced to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet and to the leadership of the party representing the Oromos within the ruling coalition in the course of 2016 suggested only minimal ideological repositioning and thus did not convince the protesters. The government’s introduction in July 2017 of a draft bill to review the status of Addis Ababa represents the first attempt at credibly addressing the Oromo protesters’ grievances politically, by giving concrete meaning to Oromia’s constitutionally-enshrined “special interest” in the capital. However, there is still a possibility of future unrest if dissensions are not solved with its detractors, particularly among the Oromo nationalists (QZ, 6 July 2017; Global Voices, 7 July 2017). A recent plan to establish an oil venture in Oromia has also been seen by the ruling party as a way to address the protesters’ economic grievances (Bloomberg, 21 June 2017). Building on these overtures could lead to advancements in negotiations between the protesters and the government, and reduce the likelihood of future disruptions.

Other oppressive state practices in 2017 have also led to several punctual protests, most of which were severely repressed. In Oromia, people protested in March 2017 against violence by the Liyu police. Students also protested in Ambo in June 2017, after the Ethiopian education authority revealed a plan to re-arrange the Oromo alphabet. Police arrested 50 students, including two whom died from severe beatings received during their transfer to prison facilities. In Amhara, people protested in April 2017 against the planned demolition of thousands of houses by the government, and were fired on by federal military troops (ESAT, 23 March 2017). Finally, at various international sporting events in early 2017, several Ethiopian athletes have protested the ruling party’s inability to embrace ethnic and religious diversity, by refusing to wave the current starred Ethiopian flag to celebrate their victories (African Arguments, 6 March 2017).

This is despite the many international calls for the establishment of a fair accountability process, including by the UN and by members of the European Parliament (IPS, 17 April 2017; Africa News, 11 July 2017).

Figure 6: Political and Ethnic Militia Activity by Interaction and Reported Fatalities in Ethiopia, from 1 January 1997 - 8 July 2017.
Kenya

The parties, locations and intensity of political violence in Kenya has varied widely since the beginning of 2017 (see Figure 7). Increased political tension due to the upcoming August election has generated fear that Kenya’s multiple conflicts will intensify during the upcoming voting period. Political and land- motivated unrest dominates the western counties while al-Shabaab intensifies its campaign in the East. In certain towns and cities, the notion of ‘safety’ is becoming politicised.

Communal Contests

Violence in the eastern counties of Laikipia and Baringo increased due to a series of clashes between Pokot and Tugen-Illchamus militias. These battles caused a peak of fatalities in March 2017 (see Figure 7) (APA News, 15 March 2017). Overall, the south-east region suffered frequent episodes of violence, including in Narok County, where Maasai and Kipsigi militias continue their fight along the Trans Mara West-Trans Mara East border and near Bomet. This dispute devolved into a series of small revenge attacks along shared borders despite a two month amnesty provision given by the county commissioner in January (Daily Nation, 13 February 2017).

Violence in these regions is often linked to competition over land, but the recent clashes could be related to political tensions stemming from the upcoming election. Devolution means that governors are now sources of significant wealth and political power, raising the chances of groups engaging in violence to secure control of the local government (Reliefweb, 27 April 2017). Memories of the 2007-2008 electoral crises that occurred through the Rift Valley and into the Western Region still concerns residents. In spite a relatively peaceful elections in 2013, allegations of widespread voter fraud and a difficult political climate persist. Most importantly, political polarization remains tied to geography and group rather than ideology (Daily Nation, 28 June 2017). Illustrating this unease, a May 2017 poll found that 70 percent of voters expect violence over the course of the upcoming campaign. Many politicians, including incumbent President Kenyatta, use ‘safety’ as a burgeoning political issue, stating opposition groups are “planning violent disruptions during the campaign” (Washington Times, 11 May 2017). Anticipating unrest, police in Nairobi are focussing their presence on potential political “hot spots” throughout the city, including informal settlements, and those containing dense populations of intermingling diverse groups holding varying political allegiances (Kenya Standard, 4 July 2017).

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab insurgents continue to be active in the eastern counties bordering Somalia. These attacks are generally close to the Somali border and are concentrated in Mandera County in the extreme north east (see Figure 8). The majority of recent attacks are IED or other explosions, typically targeting civilians or local police. When attacking the Mandera area, al-Shabaab typically launches raids from the adjacent Somali town of Bula Hawo, and often returns back to Somalia the same day. Over the past month, al-Shabaab’s focus has shifted to Lamu County in the south where a series of attacks caused nine civilian fatalities and a destroyed police post over the course of only a few days (The Independent, 8 July 2017). An emerging tactic of the group is the abduction of security personnel for ransom or to extract strategic information.

Figure 7: Communal and Insurgent Violence by Type in Kenya, from 1 January - 7 July 2017.
from the abductees (Somali Update, 16 May, 2017). Other al-Shabaab targets are telecommunication masts and other radio equipment, with the intention of cutting military communications between Mandera and the rest of the county. Attacks on communication infrastructure sometimes foreshadow an upcoming attack on soldiers or other government personnel, as victims are less able to call for reinforcements.

Observers are speculating that the sharp increase in al-Shabaab activity over the past months is related to the upcoming election (AllAfrica 24 May, 2017) (Kenya Standard, 24 June 2017). Along with displacing the Somali government, al-Shabaab is committed to removing Kenyan troops from Somalia. A propaganda video released on 18 May referenced the upcoming elections multiple times and demanded President Kenyatta withdraws Kenyan forces from Somalia (Daily Nation, 20 May 2017).

President Kenyatta remains committed to maintaining Kenyan troops in Somalia under the current anti-al-Shabaab AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia) mission (Daily Nation, 26 May 2017). In contrast, Raila Odinga, leader of the opposition National Super Alliance Party coalition, argues that the Kenya-backed Somali African Union mission against al-Shabaab secondary to local economic circumstances and has pledged to remove a number of Kenyan forces from Somalia operation if he gains office (Kenya Star, 27 June 2017). In response to the escalating violence the government plans to increase security measures in the east in the run up to the August election (All Africa, 29 May 2017).

Islamic State remains a presence in Kenya, albeit in more narrow capacity than al-Shabaab. This is perhaps due to limited personnel and resources. The group has thus far only focused on urban areas, attacking police personnel in Mombasa and Nairobi (Reuters, 29 October 2016) (see Figure 8). Following a pair of incidents in 2016, security forces made a handful of arrests, including two in Mombasa in early 2017 (The Star, 18 February 2017). It is thus far unclear if agents are being actively directed by the group’s leadership, or are simply inspired by their ideological goals.
Violence involving vigilante militias has been increasing across Africa since 2012 (see Figure 9). Vigilante militias refer to groups that believe their role to be the delivery of justice; they are not formally organized groups and are often association with a location or small group. ACLED codes violence involving vigilante militias as these groups often emerge to address internal security arrangements within a community, and take enforcement of what they believe to be the law into their own hands.

Since 2012, approximately 10% of events involving vigilante militias are associated with witchcraft. Belief in witchcraft is widespread across Africa, where it is “a means of explaining the unequal distribution of good and bad fortune, and the occurrence of otherwise inexplicable misfortune” (The Guardian, 1 March 2012). Vigilante groups often carry out ‘justice’ against alleged witches, even in cases where ‘witchcraft’ is illegal and ‘justice’ can be enforced by state agents, such as in South Africa where witchcraft has long carried a fine and/or ten years imprisonment. Researchers “have estimated the murders of supposed witches [worldwide] as numbering in the thousands each year, while beatings and banishments could run into the millions” (NY Times, 4 July 2014; UN OHCHR, 2009), and these trends have been on the rise in Africa (UN OHCHR, 2009; UNICEF, 2010).

Vigilante violence against ‘witchcraft’ is a widespread phenomenon across Africa (see Figure 10). For example, in Tanzania, albino persecution is common. Individuals with albinism are often targeted for their body parts, which are used in the practice of witchcraft as they are thought to have powers. As a result, there are many gruesome accounts of individuals with albinism being killed and dismembered for their body parts or having limbs chopped off (Newsweek, 13 June 2017; Associated Press, 27 June 2017). Babies, children, men, women, and the elderly are all targeted. In Kenya, “increased child trafficking ... has been linked to politicians using witchcraft to win [elections]” (Otieno, 2017). Children with albinism are often targeted as their organs are harvested for “rituals to cleanse politicians so they can defeat their rivals” (Otieno, 2017). These trends are not unique to Tanzania and Kenya.

Vigilante militias may also strive to seek ‘justice’ for those persecuted. A number of events are reported in which mobs attack an individual suspected of hurting another as related to witchcraft. For example, last year in Malawi there were reports of vigilante militias lynching or burning to death a number of individuals who were found in possession of bones belonging to people with albinism.

More organized political and conflict actors can use violence surrounding witchcraft to their advantage, such as blaming repression on witchcraft or manipulating populations based on their beliefs. This may contribute to the prevalence of witchcraft-related violence seen in recent
years. For example, violence has increased across Burundi since 2015 (see ACLED, 2016). President Nkurunziza’s announcement that he sought a third term despite constitutional limits was met with a renewed opposition and a failed coup attempt. In the lead up to his re-election and in its aftermath, state forces and the militant youth wing of the current regime in power (the Imbonerakure) have violently repressed opposition. Supporters have been abducted, and reports note that the bodies of many of these individuals are later discovered, with many exhibiting signs of torture. However, despite these reports, the Burundian police force contends there is no increase in violence, and that the bodies being found are not a result of political motives, but rather are occurrences of “common criminality”, such as witchcraft (IWACU Burundi, 27 March 2017).

Another example is the Central African Republic (CAR), where conflict continues since the national instability in late 2012. The predominantly Muslim Séléka Rebel Coalition is countered by the predominantly Christian Anti-Balaka (ACLED, 2015). Civilians have been the victims of atrocities by both sides (see Human Rights Watch, 2017) in what has been dubbed a largely ‘forgotten crisis’ on the international stage. Trends suggest that things may get worse, with Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reporting that “civilians are being attacked at levels not seen in years, especially in the east-central area of the country ... Thousands are being forced to flee for their lives and are receiving little to no humanitarian assistance. [MSF teams] have witnessed summary executions and have found mutilated bodies left exposed to terrorize populations” (Doctors Without Borders, 12 April 2017).

Violence involving ‘witchcraft’ has also increased in CAR during this time. The victims of this violence in CAR tend to be women who are persecuted for being ‘witches’. Vigilante groups carry out much of this violence, which may be linked to efforts to combat the rise in hardships people have faced during the context of the conflict. However, organized groups have carried out violence linked to witchcraft as well. The UN reports that “[armed groups] in Central African Republic have kidnapped, burned and buried alive ‘witches’ in public ceremonies, exploiting widely held superstitions to control areas in the war-torn country” (Reuters, 25 November 2015).

Certain conflict contexts can hence give rise to violence involving vigilante militias seeking to carry out ‘justice’ against witchcraft. This may be a result of trying to explain “the occurrence of otherwise inexplicable misfortune” (The Guardian, 1 March 2012), which may stem from large-scale conflict. Conflict actors can use this vigilante violence as a cover for their own repression, or may draw on beliefs surrounding witchcraft to manipulate populations within the conflict setting.

Figure 10: Violence against Civilians related to Witchcraft in Africa, from 1 January 1997 - 2 July 2017.