Welcome to the November issue of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) Conflict Trends report. Each month, ACLED researchers gather, analyse and publish data on political violence in Africa in realtime. Weekly updates to realtime conflict event data are published on the ACLED website.

This month’s issue includes conflict summaries on Burundi, Tunisia, and Somalia. The report focuses on protests and low-level violence in Ethiopia’s border regions, violence in Kenya around the electoral re-run, Boko Haram’s weakened but ongoing campaign of violence and continued communal violence in Nigeria, a spike in violence in Mozambique’s northern region of Cabo Delgado and the resurgence of violence in South Sudan as the rainy season comes to an end.

A Special Report explores the relationship between gender, inclusion and conflict across Africa. Elsewhere on the continent, tensions increased in Cameroon between the government and Anglophone minority, violence escalates in the Central African Republic while in Libya, Egypt and Sudan conflict was ongoing.

Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Country, June 2017 - October 2017.
Burundi
This month saw Burundi fall to the lowest level of events and second lowest reported fatality count since before the presidential elections in 2015. October 2017 also represents the continuation of a shorter term downward trend in fatalities from a 2017 high of 34 in each of June and July to 13 this month. Violence involving members of the ruling CNDD’s youth wing, the Imbonerakure, continues to feature prominently, with their involvement noted in a significant number of events. Although most of the events involving the Imbonerakure are incidents of violence targeting civilians, the number of reported fatalities in these incidents per month has remained low, with only 5 civilians reported killed by Imbonerakure members since August 2017. Rather than the Imbonerakure, the majority of reported fatalities over the last few months have been attributed to unidentified assailants, often using machetes or grenades. Grenade attacks in particular on restaurants and bars continue to be relatively common in Burundi, with the most significant recent attack being reported in July 2017, causing 8 fatalities and wounding at least 40. The majority of these attacks appear to be politically motivated, with members of opposition parties often being targeted. In a number of these cases Imbonerakure involvement is also suggested by the reporting despite not being stated explicitly.

Tunisia
October 2017 saw a continuation of a significant downward trend in events in Tunisia going back to April 2017. That month saw a 2017 high of 124 events, with the majority of these being protests and riots. The only months that saw more events in Tunisia since the start of ACLED’s dataset were January 2016 (at 178) which saw large-scale protests over youth unemployment and January 2011 (at 230) when ongoing streets protests culminated in the ouster of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The fall in events in October 2017 to just under 50, the majority of which remain protests and riots, can be attributed mainly to a drop in the number of labour-related protests, although concerns over unemployment continue to be a focal point for unrest in Tunisia. Frustration over lack of jobs, especially among youth, has been an ongoing problem in the country for over a decade (as it has been across most of the North African region), and was a primary catalyst for the protests which ousted Ben Ali in 2011. Although labour concerns continued to motivate a plurality of the protests and riots tracked in October 2017, concerns over education, insecurity, and excessive use of force by police were also important catalysts.

Somalia
Conflict levels in Somalia remain extremely high. The al Shabaab insurgency continues to be the driving force of violence, accounting for 49% of October’s activity. Though this figure is down 4% from September, Mogadishu’s Hodan District saw the deadliest single attack of the country’s history on 14 October, accounting for approximately 400 fatalities. Additional high fatality attacks occurred in the following weeks, most notably in the Xamar Weyne District on 28 October. In both instances al Shabaab targeted hotels in high profile areas of the city. These attacks may be a tactical watershed for the group; both were likely seen as successful and each achieved heavy notice in western media. Military reaction to the attacks has been considerable. The Federal Government declared new offensives against al Shabaab and the Ethiopian contingent of AMISOM added 1,000 soldiers and 50 vehicles to the force on 1 November. In relatively late breaking development, United States forces carried out a pair of air strikes against Sheikh Abdulkadir Mumin and other Islamic State-linked fighters in the northern town of Buqa on 3 November. This action is notable as it is the first time the United States has targeted Islamic State assets within Somalia.

NB: Darker shading in the country maps indicates a higher number of relative conflict and protest events in the administrative region from 2014 - 2017.
On Friday, 4 October, Ethiopian officials lifted the 10-month long State of Emergency that was declared last year during an unprecedented wave of popular mobilization and anti-government protests. Enhanced government powers during the State of Emergency brought mass detentions, politically motivated criminal charges, and numerous restrictions on people’s movement and communication (HRW, 7 August 2017). Approximately 29,000 people were arrested, 8,000 of whom are currently on trial (Reuters, 4 August 2017). While mass detainment did succeed in bringing perceived normalcy back to the country throughout the State of Emergency, renewed riots and protests reaching levels seen leading up to the declaration of the State of Emergency in October of 2016 illustrate the failure of the Ethiopian government to address protestor’s concerns and open up political space for opposing views. Opposition leaders remain in custody, and regime affiliated security forces continue to act with impunity; triggering renewed unrest in the country.

Government sanctioned violence against civilians has been a key factor driving sustained unrest in Ethiopia since the beginning of protests in 2015. While violence against protesters declined during the State of Emergency due to the strict enforcement of a protest ban, clashes along the remote eastern regions of Oromiya region have been increasing in both frequency and lethality. Beginning early this year, alleged members of a government affiliated paramilitary force known as the Liyu Police have conducted numerous cross border raids into the eastern edge of Oromiya region, sparking ethnic clashes that have killed hundreds.

Clashes between the Oromo and Somali pastoralist communities along the border of the two regions are not uncommon, however the participation of a state sponsored military force has taken the conflict to new levels and raised suspicions from opposition groups. The Oromo community identifies the increased activity by the Liyu police as a way for the government to usurp Oromo lands and further quash dissent (ACLED Conflict Trends Report 60, Ethiopia).

The Liyu police are the Ethiopian Somali Region’s special force created to conduct missions against armed anti-government groups in the restive Somali region. Activity is primarily concentrated within the Somali region, although they have also participated in AMNISOM peacekeeping missions in Somalia (Aiga Forum, 2017). However, Liyu police forces have recently become increasingly involved in a border dispute along the Eastern edge of Oromia region and are accused of perpetuating serious violence deep in the area. In late August, a group of elders from the relatively remote region travelled to the capital to
submit a letter to the government requesting assistance in defending their community against cross-border attacks (Addis Standard, 24 August 2017). Despite a peace deal resolving border issues that was signed in April, the Elders described repeated incidents of looting, rape and displacement of villagers by the Liyu police. Data collected from local and international media reported 64 clashes and an estimated 434 battle related fatalities during fighting between Liyu Police forces and Oromo Communal militias in Oromia region since 1 January 2017.

Anger at perceived government backing of the Liyu Police forces has erupted in protests and armed violence across the eastern parts of Oromia region, highlighting an increasing distrust of regime security forces and government intention. Recently, on September 1st, an Oromo communal militia clashed with Liyu police forces in Miesso resulting in 30 fatalities (Ethiopian Observatory, 13 September 2017). Violence continued to escalate, and on 12 September, two of three local Oromo officials detained by Liyu police were shot dead. Violent riots erupted in Awaday, leading to the death of at least 48 ethnic Somalis (Radio Shabelle, 15 September 2017).

Protests directly or indirectly linked to the violence in East Oromia spread across the rest of the region after the lifting of the State of Emergency. In October, ACLED recorded 60 Protest/Riot events in Oromia region, with demonstrators and rioters demanding the release of political prisoners and a cease of violence perpetrated by the Liyu Police. On 10 October, at least 4 were killed and 20 others injured when security forces used lethal force to disperse protesters in Shashemene (ESAT News, 11 October 2017). On the October 24, rioters in Illulabor burned down 50 houses and killed 12 civilians (Borkena, 22 October, 2017). At least 10 people were killed in Ambo on October 26 after regime forces opened fire on protesters who had blocked roads and torched government vehicles (Africa News, 26 October 2017).

As illustrated by the renewed protests and violence after the lifting of the State of Emergency, the Ethiopian government’s refusal to realistically address protest concerns and allow for political space continues to foster an environment of instability and discontent. Several high profile Oromo leaders remain in custody, and the government seems unwilling or unable to hold its security forces accountable for rights violations. Until it is able to meaningfully and fully address these concerns, violence throughout the country will likely continue to occur.
Despite the spectre of the 2007 post-election violence looming over Kenya’s elections this year, the level of events and fatalities have proven to be more comparable to the 2013 elections than those of 2007. Although election-related events in the months preceding the general election in August 2017 drove the numbers of both events and fatalities to highs not seen since 2015 (see Figure 4), it was only with the surprise invalidation of the results of the 2017 presidential election that a notable spike in events was produced, alongside a proportionally smaller one in fatalities.

With incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory in the first poll overturned by the Supreme Court due to procedural irregularities, the electoral re-run has not offered a more stable outcome. Despite Kenyatta winning with 98% of the vote, the election was marred by violence which prevented polls from being held in at least four constituencies seen as opposition strongholds. The election also suffered from a low turnout of between only 38-42% (Washington Post, 10 October 2017) which casts doubt on the legitimacy of the results, especially compared to the previous vote which recorded participation of almost 80%. This low turnout can be ascribed in large part to Kenyatta’s main opponent in the election and leader of the opposition coalition National Super Alliance (NASA), Raila Odinga, having pulled out the race in tandem with a call by the opposition to boycott the vote (Quartz Africa, 26 October 2017).

Despite the anger over the situation among the opposition and clashes between protesters and police before and during the election, reported fatalities associated with the elections remained relatively low in October (see Figure 4). But while fatalities may have been low, the electoral re-run was a significant contributor to October 2017 becoming the month with the third most events in Kenya in ACLED’s dataset going back to 1997. The only months which surpass it are December 2007 and January 2008 which saw the worst of 2007’s post-election violence, with more than 1,000 fatalities recorded.

With the 2017 elections complete, the question will now be what Kenyatta’s government will do to deal with the difficult situation facing the country. Odinga has said his coalition does not accept the results of the election (Al Jazeera, 31 October 2017) and that he wants a constitutional review to curb presidential powers. His NASA coalition has also called for a campaign of civil disobedience, dubbed a “national resistance movement”, including a boycott of products and services offered by firms seen as connected to Kenyatta (Reuters, 7 November 2017). The stated goal of the movement is to force new elections by January 2018 (Financial Times, 3 November 2017). Beyond the posturing of the opposition, it is clear the country remains deeply divided by the poll. Although the government and opposition have managed to steer clear of significant violence so far, tensions are likely to continue in the months ahead.

Figure 4: Number of Events by Type and Reported Fatalities, Kenya, November 2012 - October 2017.
Mozambique witnessed a dramatic increase in political violence in October 2017. The spike in violence stemmed from an apparent Islamist attack in the Cabo Delgado region, located in the far north of the country. An attack by a group calling itself ‘Al Shabaab’ attacked three police stations in the coastal village Mocimboa da Praia resulting in 16 fatalities. The attackers appear to have no connection to the Somalian rebel group but instead appear to be locally embedded in Mocimboa da Praia (Morier-Genoud, 18 October 2017). In a manner reminiscent of other Islamist groups on the continent, the attackers demanded the imposition of Sharia law in the area, the removal of children from secular education and refuse to pay state taxes (ibid.).

There are commonalities between this attack and other ongoing conflicts within Mozambique. The Cabo Delgado region is rich in natural resources and the government has made large investments in developing the capital Pemba to expand the exploitation of offshore gas (Reuters, 21 August 2017). In spite of this investment, the region remains poor and has not benefitted from the economic boom of the 2000s (Morier-Genoud, 18 October 2017).

This is similar to the low-level conflict between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), the former rebel movement of the Mozambican Civil War and the current political opposition, and the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) partly stems from the government’s policy of resource extraction. RENAMO has demanded a more equitable sharing of the proceeds of natural resources, especially as many of the resources come from RENAMO’s political stronghold in the country’s central belt. As violence in Cabo Delgado has increased, the peace talks between RENAMO and FRELIMO have prevented large-scale clashes between the groups in the Sofala, Zambézia and Manica regions (see Figure 5). President Felipe Nyusi’s overwhelming re-election as FRELIMO president has allowed him to side-line hawkish factions in his party and pursue peace negotiations with RENAMO (News24, 2 October 2017).

Where the violence in Cabo Delgado differs from previous conflicts is in the region’s general support of the government. The province has consistently supported FRELIMO in elections and Nyusi hails from the region (Lodge et al., 2002; Africa Watch, 26 October 2017). While the province may be represented by the president, many Muslims in the region feel disenfranchised by the FRELIMO government. In the post-independence period, FRELIMO attacked Islam as regressive in accordance with the party’s Marxist doctrine and more recent attempts to court the Islamic vote have fractured the party (Morier-Genoud, 18 October 2017). The government has fostered close relationships with national Islamic organisations but they are informed by a hard-line Wahhabi doctrine and are prone to factionalism (ibid.). The Cabo Delgado violence may not be indicative of a long-term trend, but failure by FRELIMO to address economic resentment in the peripheries and to effectively represent the country’s Muslim population could result in future attacks.
Conflict activity in South Sudan reduced by half between May and October, confirming the trends outlined in ACLED’s last update on the conflict (ACLED, June 2017). Violence has resumed to affect all parts of the country and as we approach the end of the rainy season, conflict levels have started to rise again (see Figure 7). Not only is this a relatively common pattern in South Sudan, but that political violence drastically decreases during the rainy season should be a check on those who suggest that climate change affects the timing of conflict patterns more than strategy.

Despite declaring a unilateral ceasefire in May, the government launched key military operations throughout July to regain control of the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) headquarters in Pagak in Upper Nile. The SPLA ultimately recaptured Pagak on 6 August but SPLA-IO counter-offensives have continued since. The government also claimed to have regained all rebel areas in Jonglei after heavy offensives around Waat in October. The recent government operations came as a 30-day ultimatum expired on 30 September, after which the defence minister vowed to “crush” the remaining rebels (Radio Tamazuj, 29 August 2017). The SPLA-IO sustained its attacks on state forces in Greater Equatoria, making gains around Kaya in Morobo in August and at Ombasi in Yei early November. They also laid various ambushes on the roads around Maridi end October, leading to wider clashes in the area. The rebels also launched several offensives around oil fields in Unity, particularly in Rubkona and Koch, gaining control of Guit and Pakur in Rubkona in September and October respectively.

The visible divisions within pro-government and insurgent factions risk undermining the security situation further over the next months. First, discontent among the security forces over the government’s failure to pay their salaries amid economic hardship and food shortages has translated into rising levels of criminality. Fatal armed robberies have been regularly reported in Juba over the past few months, as well as looting and burning of civilian properties in agricultural areas. Second, there have been rising intra-Dinka tensions, dividing the government’s support base. Violence between Dinka communities has continued both in Aweil in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and in Warrap (President Kiir’s home state) since Kiir declared a state of emergency in these two states in July. Tensions are compounded by discontent over former army General Paul Malong’s house confinement by the government in Juba among his home community in Aweil and among the SPLA. This has led to defections. A new rebel front (SSPM/A: South Sudan Patriotic Movement/Army) also claimed several attacks and gains in the state between June and August, possibly in retaliation for Malong’s confinement. Thirdly, the SPLA-IO is constrained by increasing competition with new rebel fronts. The group clashed on several occasions with the National Salvation Front (NAS) in Central Equatoria after a number of defections, losing territory in Kajo-Keji mid-October. New fronts have also continued to form, underlining the lack of coherence within the insurgency movement.

Figure 7: Political Violence by Event Type and Fatalities, South Sudan, January 2016 - October 2017.
Violent activity in Nigeria continues to be active on two major fronts. Military forces have opened a substantial air campaign against Boko Haram in the north-east and Fulani militia violence remains frequent in the country’s middle belt.

**Boko Haram**

Though Boko Haram was largely dislodged from their base of operations in Sambisa Forest in late 2016, the group continues to carry out small-scale suicide bombings against predominately civilian targets in rural villages and displacement camps of Borno State. Military offensives throughout September and October 2017 have been considerable. Relying heavily on newly leased attack helicopters (Defence Web, 12 January 2017) air forces have recently conducted a number of air strikes in the north-east, causing fatalities to reach a year high in October (see Figure 6). Pleased with early successes, the government recently purchased additional attack aircraft from a number of countries, among them the United States and the Russian Federation. (Sahara Reporters, 25 September 2017). Moreover, several high-profile targets have been killed or captured by security forces. The wife of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was targeted in an air strike on Konduga Local Government Area on 19 October (Sahara Reporters, 25 October 2017) and Idris Ibrahim Babawo, a top level Shekau lieutenant was arrested in Ondo State on 24 September (Sahara Reporters, 26 September 2017). The September-October offensives have yielded measureable effects on the already weakened Boko Haram apparatus. A number of intelligence reports have indicated a large number of Boko Haram fighters have fled to Adamawa State to avoid the Borno military saturation. The governor of Adamawa has deployed security forces into Maiduguri to limit possible attacks in the vicinity (This Day, 27 October 2017).

**Fulani Militia**

Events involving Fulani nomads continue to be the main cause of conflict in the country’s middle region. Hastened by the area’s agricultural developments, attacks in the later months of the year are largely attributed to dry-seasonal movements southward and competition for grasslands (Raddington Report, 10 October 2017). The Fulani have historically been at odds against the Tiv and Otukpa communities of Benue State. Notable violence in the recent period have occurred in a series of battles with Irigwe militia as well as a large multi-day attack on civilians in the Bassa area of Plateau State (Sahara Reporters, 27 October 2017). Local level governments have imposed a number of measures to curb violence, typically imposing extended curfews on heavily affected areas. More stringent methods have been attempted in the recent period. The Benue State government implemented an ‘anti-grazing’ law on 31 October to discourage further attacks (Vanguard, 3 November 2017). The law quickly caused Fulani exodus, leading the Taraba State government to consider similar legislation for 2018 (Daily Post, 2 November 2017).
A number of recent studies explore the relationship between gender inequality and conflict and generally find that higher gender inequality, or lower rates of inclusion, is associated with higher rates of conflict and violence. However, efforts to increase inclusion ought to be accompanied by institutional and normative changes too if negative violent consequences are to be curtailed.

Studies find a link between unbalanced sex ratios (Hudson and den Boer, 2002, 2004), a ‘surplus’ of young men (Hudson et al., 2009), or large youth populations (Urdal, 2008) and a higher likelihood or level of conflict. This vein of literature contends that gender inequality can impact conflict by increasing the capacity to mobilize for conflict, especially through the facilitation of the recruitment of young men (see GIWPS and PRIO, 2017; Forsberg and Olsson, 2016).

A more compelling argument, however, might be that gender inequality can impact conflict through unequal gender norms (see GIWPS and PRIO, 2017; Forsberg and Olsson, 2016) as such norms may legitimize the use of force (Caprioli, 2005; see also: Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). In this vein, Hudson et al. (2009) point to the role of “patriarchy and its attendant violence,” and reason that, evolutionarily, improved female status can in turn lead to societies where males are “less likely to submit and yield to male coercive violence” (Hudson et al., 2009).

Global indices can be a helpful tool as they distill complex information into a single number: a useful instrument in assessing and comparing multidimensional issues across countries. The new global Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Index—compiled by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS), in collaboration with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)—offers a way to assess gender inequality and development in addition to peace and security. “The index incorporates three basic dimensions of well-being—incorporation (economic, social, political); justice (formal laws and informal discrimination); and security (at the family, community, and societal levels)—and captures and quantifies them through 11 indicators. ... [And it finds that] countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity” (GIWPS and PRIO, 2017).

Figure 8 maps the 2017/2018 WPS Index score for African states, overlaid with ACLED political violence data recorded thus far in 2017; Figure 9 depicts the relationship between the WPS Index score and the number of political violence events by country.1 Indeed, states with a higher WPS Index value, on average, seem to see fewer political violence events than those with a lower WPS Index value.2 However, ‘inclusion’ alone is not enough. While gains are being made in women’s inclusion where it has long been lacking, this has often been met with a backlash. Berry (2015) notes that as the status of women in many societies grows, they may experience increased violence from men as men attempt to reassert their control through violence (see also: Vyas and Watts, 2008; Ahmed, 2008). A study by the ICRC found that “literate, educated and employed women experienced the highest rates of community violence, suggesting that men use violence as a way of repressing women’s increased status” (Rombouts, [1] Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, and South Sudan are not included in the WPS Index (due to data limitations) and are hence not included in figures here.

[2] Some degree of correlation is to be expected between the WPS Index and ACLED data, since ‘societal security’ is included in calculation of the index score. However, the WPS Index relies on a measure of conflict-related fatalities from the UCDP dataset, weighted by population, for its ‘societal security’ measure. Hence, looking at specific atomic events here—which include battles, remote violence, and violence against civilians—should be sufficiently different so as to avoid complete correlation here.

Figure 8: Political Violence (1 Jan - 4 Nov 2017) and WPS Index (2017/18), Africa
These trends can in turn point to the rise in political violence women face as opponents seek to discourage their greater participation in the political arena (Kishi, 2017) or their defying of the agendas of powerful male political elites (Berry, Bouka, and Kamuru, 2017). “Women around the world are attacked for being female and involved in politics ... by men who wanted to punish or coerce their political choices or prevent them from participating in a political activity like voting or running for office” (Bardall, 2017).

In the recent Kenyan election, for example, more women ran for office than ever before—and they were, in turn, met with targeted and gendered violence (Berry et al., 2017). During the political primaries for the general election, Ann Kanyi, vying for her party’s nomination was dragged from her car and brutally beaten; during the assault, she was asked to quit politics (Wangui, 2017). “Other female candidates were robbed by men armed with machetes and batons (Muhindi, 2017), had their torchades attacked and supporters killed (Nation, 2017), and were beaten and threatened with public stripping (Kerongo, 2017). ... The goal: to turn back progress ushered in by a new gender quota, implemented as part of a 2010 constitutional overhaul, that has vaulted more women into positions of power in Kenya than ever before” (Berry et al., 2017).

In Burundi, during the 2015 political crisis, women were often targeted with sexual and gender-based violence due to their real or suspected party affiliation (or that of family members), lack of support for the president’s third mandate, or suspected participation in the protests against it (Human Rights Watch, 2016). (For more on the Burundi Crisis, see Raleigh, Kishi, and McKnight, 2016). Similar to the Kenyan case, soon before the 2015 political crisis began, Burundi was “one of few countries in the world to have adopted a gender quota for its legislature in an effort to promote the inclusion and participation of women in the political process” (IFES, 2014).

Similar spikes in gendered political violence were seen in Zimbabwe during election periods, where both women running for office as well as those participating in politics at the local-level were targets of violence (Kishi, 2017). Again, similarly, Zimbabwe too included a “special electoral quota system to increase women’s representation in Parliament” in its new constitution, approved in 2013 (UN Women, 2013). All three of these countries are among the ‘more inclusive’ of African states as they fall within the top half of African states in terms of ranking by the WPS Index.

The establishment of gender quotas aiming to normalize the inclusion of women in politics is necessary. However, it is important that such steps are coupled with efforts to combat gender-based violence and the institutional and normative structures that allow for them. This means both strengthening the rule of law to protect women, while also dismantling the patriarchal structures in place that allow for such behavior as gendered violence (see also: Berry et al., 2017).