The Robert S. Strauss Center welcomed Dr. Itty Abraham, Director of the South Asia Institute at The University of Texas at Austin, and Ms. Sharon Squassoni, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on November 20, 2009 to discuss the U.S.-India nuclear agreement.  Dr. Robert Hargrave, the Larry and Louann Temple Centennial Professor Emeritus in the Humanities at The University of Texas at Austin introduced the panelists.

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh forged the U.S.-India nuclear agreement on July 18, 2005. Under the terms of the deal, Washington will end its three-decade moratorium on nuclear trade with India. New Delhi in return will allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to have access to India’s civilian nuclear program. The U.S. Congress gave its final approval to the agreement on October 1, 2008. Supporters of the agreement argue that it marks a watershed in U.S.-India relations. Critics argue that the agreement undoes a half-century of U.S. nonproliferation efforts and increases the chances of a nuclear arms race in Asia.

Dr. Abraham began the discussion by noting that the U.S.-India nuclear agreement represents a better deal for India than for the U.S.  Furthermore, the agreement marks a setback for nuclear nonproliferation efforts.  However, the deal will also reveal substantial information about India’s internal energy policies.  Dr. Abraham discussed the possibility of the deal facilitating India’s nuclear arsenal expansion. 

Ms. Squassoni began her discussion of the U.S.-India deal by noting that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  She described the political evolutions in the U.S. that led to the agreement despite India’s refusal to sign the NPT.  Ms. Squassoni stressed the importance to the U.S. of not facilitating further development of India’s nuclear arsenal for both legal and political reasons. 

Dr. Hargrave asked the panelists to discuss the potential effects of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement on nonproliferation efforts more generally.  Dr. Abraham responded by acknowledging that U.S. nonproliferation policy has largely failed, although a larger, international nonproliferation regime has nonetheless emerged.  Dr. Abraham further noted that the massive American nuclear stockpile serves little strategic purpose given its relative size compared to other states.  In order to develop an effective U.S. policy and strengthen nonproliferation, the U.S. would first have to eliminate a large proportion of its nuclear stockpile.

Ms. Squassoni stated that, while the U.S-India agreement might have a marginal impact on other states’ approaches to nuclear development, the more troublesome element of the deal is its potential to aid India’s nuclear weapons development.  Ms. Squassoni asserted that removing the prestige typically associated with nuclear power in international relations is a requisite step to discourage nuclear weapons development. 

On the issue of domestic political factors in both India and the U.S. that brought about the nuclear agreement, Dr. Abraham noted that there were objections to the deal in New Delhi from both the left and the right, although he indicated that such objections might have stemmed in part from the inability of the Indian legislators to take credit for forging the deal.  Regarding the U.S. political processes that led to the agreement, Ms. Squassoni described how nonproliferation advocates were largely absent during the process and how the Indian-American Caucus was particularly active in promoting the agreement. 

The panelists then fielded questions from the audience. They addressed the probable views of Russia towards the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, the role of the U.S. in establishing the international nonproliferation regime, the current role of the U.S. in relation to the nonproliferation regime and the possibility that the U.S.-India agreement will encourage Pakistan and Israel to seek a similar deal.

Watch the panel below:

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