Strauss Center Distinguished Scholar Scott Wolford recently published an article in the January 2014 issue of the American Journal of Political Science. Titled “Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis,” this article challenges the conventional wisdom on the effects of coalition partners in the face of a common enemy, and studies how partners affect the dynamics of crisis bargaining. According to Wolford, it is widely accepted that when powerful states (like the United States) build coalitions, allies “water down” threats by demanding limits to the scale of military operations in return for their cooperation. However, Wolford argues that these “weak” signals sent by the coalition to their enemies are not always conducive to conflict. In fact, the presence of coalitions can either raise or lower the chances of war, depending on the strength of the target.

For Wolford, war is more likely when the coalition is facing a weaker opponent. Because powerful states have to secure allies, they will show more restraint (e.g. choosing a bombing campaign over an invasion). These watered down threats are therefore not credible in their opponents’ eyes, potentially leading to war. On the contrary, when the enemy is strong, allies can aid in discouraging leaders from bluffing about their resolve, reducing the possibility of confrontation. In sum, Wolford states that “coalitions may face higher probabilities of war against weaker targets than stronger ones, coalitions are more likely against weak than strong targets, and partners can increase or decrease the probability of war.”